1 


REESE   LIBRARY 


UNIVERSITY  .OF  CALIFORNIA. 
I  %eceived       MARIS  1893  ,g^ 

.j    ^Accessions  No.  5*0  i4-l4~Kt  .      Class  No. 


TM— iJ! 


THE 


CIYIL  SERYICE  LAW: 


A  DEFENSE  OF  ITS  PRINCIPLES,  WITH  CORROBORATIVE 
EVIDENCE  FROM  THE  WORKS  OF  MANY  EM- 
INENT AMERICAN  STATESMEN; 


BY 


WILLIAM  HARRISON  CLARKE. 

4^^  OP  THP.    ^^ 

Uiri7BIlSIT7] 


Offices  are  public  trusts,  not  private  spoila.— Z)ant«Z  WebtUr. 

No  people  have  a  higher  public  iutorest,  except  the  preservation  of  their 
liberties,  than  integrity  in  Iho  administration  of  their  government  in  all  its 
branches.— CT.  S.  Supreme  Court. 


NEW    YORK: 

CHARLES  T.   DILLINGHAM, 
718  i^-  720   Broadway, 


Copyright,  1887,  by  William  H.  Clarke. 


6~oi4Lj.6 


LoTEJOY,  Son  &  Co.,  Elkctrotypers, 
45  to  51  Rose  St.,  New  York. 


PREFACE. 


The  chief  object  of  this  work  is  to  defend  the  prin- 
ciples of  the  Civil  Service  Law.  It  is  not  a  criticism 
of  the  law,  nor  does  it  treat  to  any  great  extent  of 
civil  service  economy  as  such,  except  in  so  far  as  the 
subject  is  expounded  incidentally,  but  with  ability  and 
in  the  aggregate  with  great  success,  by  many  Ameri- 
can statesmen,  extracts  from  whose  works  embellish 
and  enrich  its  pages.  These  extracts  in  fact  constitute 
a  great  part  of  the  civil  service  history  and  literature 
of  the  country,  particularly  its  early  history  and  liter- 
ature, and  therefore  constitute  much  of  the  value  of 
this  volume.  This  is  well,  and  is  besides  opportune, 
for  the  subject  of  civil  service  reform  is  one  of  the 
greatest  issues  of  the  day,  and  too  much  light  cannot 
be  shed  upon  it.  A  work  that  even  aids  in  elucida- 
ting such  an  important  subject  ought  to  be  accepta- 
ble ;  indeed  it  appears  to  be  one  of  the  needs  of  the 
times.  The  fact  that  one  chapter  of  the  work  is  mostly 
devoted  to  corruption  at  elections  and  remedial  election 
laws,  only  adds  to  its  value,  for  the  subject  is  not  only 
collateral  but  of  great  importance,  of  as  great  impor- 
tance perhaps  as  civil  service  reform  itself.    Whatever 


IV  PBEE'AC:^. 

may  be  said  of  the  original  parts  of  the  volume,  the 
compiled  parts  are  certainly  both  useful  and  instructive 
reading,  and  ought  to  aid  in  elevating  and  purifying 
American  politics. 

The  importance  of  a  sound  civil  service  policy  was 
never  better  illustrated  perhaps  than  by  the  New  York 
Times,  when  criticising  in  1864  Senator  Sumner's  civil 
service  bill.  It  said  the  subject  was  second  in  impor- 
tance only  to  the  crushing  of  the  then  rebellion.  The 
Times  was  then  under  the  editorial  direction  of  Mr. 
Henry  J.  Raymond,  a  statesman  and  one  of  the  best 
known  editors  of  his  day. 

I  am  indebted  to  Mr.  George  William  Curtis,  the 
President  of  the  National  Civil  Service  Reform  League, 
for  valuable  suggestions  and  encouragement  to  perse- 
vere in  my  researches,  and  also  to  the  Astor  Library 
for  the  use  of  many  books.  Other  obligations  are  ac- 
knowledged here  and  there  throughout  the  volume. 

This  work,  it  should  be  understood,  refers  to  the 
natio9ial  civil  service  law.  The  civil  service  laws  of 
New  York  and  Massachusetts  are  patterned  after  the 
national  law,  but  of  course  contain  provisions  peculiar 
to  themselves. 

W.  H.  C. 

New  York,  July,  1888. 


CONTENTS. 


PAGE 

INTRODUCTIOJi;' — History  of  Civil  Service  Legislation,  Summary 
of  the  salient  points  of  the  Civil  Service  Law,  &c 7 

CHAPTER    I. 

FRUITS       AND      FACTS. 
Tlie  liiw  promotes  Education,  Efficiency,  and  Economy. — Its  chief 
Object. — Its  Constitutionality. — In  harmony  with  the  Teachings 
of  Madison,  Hamilton,  and  Jay. — Aids  instead  of  Hampers  the 
President,  wlio  makes  his  own  Rules  for  its  Execution 17 

CHAPTER    II. 

COMPETITIVE     EXAMINATIONS. 
Trial  by  Probation. — Appointees  independent  of  Politicians. — Com- 
petitive Examinations  superior  to  non-Competitive. — The  Edu- 
cation required. — Competitive  Exaitfinations  in  large  firms. ...     26 

CHAPTER    III. 

SOME     OP    THE     LAW'S    PROMISES. 
Reforms  of  priceless  value  Probable. — The  danger  of  Bribery  at 
Elections. — Opinions  thereon  of  Messrs.  Buchanan,  Harrison, 
Benton,  Jefferson,  Barton,  Bell,  and  Graves. — The  chief  Eng- 
lish Election  Laws  from  1276  to  1883 38 

CHAPTER    IV. 

THE  PATRONAGE  AND  MERIT  SYSTEMS  COMPARED. 
The  Merit  System  more  favorable  to  ex-Soldiers  and  Sailors. — 
Other  points  of  difference  between  the  two  Systems. — How  the 
President  and  Congressmen  were  harassed  under  tlie  Patron- 
age System. — Congressman  Kleiner  of  Indiana  declines  a  re- 
nomination  on  account  of  the  annoyance  of  Officeseeking ,     63 


VI  CONTENTS. 

CHAPTER    V. 

DANGER   OF   AN   OFFICEHOLDERS'   ARISTOCRACY.      PAGE 
The  importance  of  the  Subject. — The  Cause  of  and  Remedy  for 
Aristocracies. — No  danger  in  Life  Tenures  when  based  on 
Merit. — George  William  Curtis's  opinion  of  them. — Insolence 
of  Office. — Great  depravity  of  the  Roman  Aristocracy  (note). .     61 

CHAPTER    VI. 

THE      PATRONAGE      SYSTEM. 

The  practicability  of  the  System  only  Apparent. — General  Jackson 
versus  President  Jackson. — Probable  causes  of  his  Radical 
Change. — Probable  cause  of  Senator  Marcy's  use  of  the  word 
"  Spoils." — The  spoils  doctrine  Undemocratic  and  Ruinous. — 
Appalling  Corruption  at  Washington  after  the  Civil  War. — 
The  Civil  Service  Law  a  Rock  to  build  upon 71 

CHAPTER    VII. 

LEADING    STATESMEN'S    PRINCIPLES. 

The  Merit  System  both  Preached  and  Practiced  by  the  six  first 
Presidents  (forty  years). — Powerful  blows  at  the  Patronage 
System. — A  profound  disquisition  on  its  Evils  by  William 
Paley,  D.D.,  of  England  (1785). — Justice  James  Wilson  on 
Patronage  and  Official  Appointments 91 

CHAPTER    VHI. 

THE  POWER  OF  REMOVAL. 
A  remedy  for  its  Mistakes  or  Abuse. — The  salient  points  of  the 
great  debate  in  the  first  Congress  (1789)  on  the  Power  of 
Removal. — The  congressional  decision  then  made  criticised  by 
Benton,  Webster,  and  others. — The  Four-years'  Term  Law  and 
some  opinions  of  it  (note) 113 

CHAPTER    IX. 

COMPARATIVE     POLITICAL    ECONOMY. 
Its  Utility.— The  Civil  Service  Systems  of  England,  Canada,  British 

India,  Germany,  France,  Sweden,  Norway,  and  China 177 

LXDEX 195 


;nirivERsiT7] 

INTRODUCTION. 


The  Civil  Service  Law  was  passed  January  16, 
1883.  The  bill,  which  was  introduced  in  the  Senate  by- 
Senator  George  H.  Pendleton  of  Ohio,  and  is  commonly 
known  as  "  the  Pendleton  bill,"  was  drawn  originally 
by  Mr.  Dorman  B.  Eaton  of  New  York,  as  Chairman 
of  the  Committee  on  Legislation  of  the  New  York  Civil 
Service  Reform  Association.  The  law  was  preceded  by 
two  other  laws,  namely.  Sections  164  and  1753  of  the 
United  States  Revised  Statutes  (printed  on  page  23). 
Sec.  164  was  passed  March  3,  1853  ;  Sec.  1753  March 
3,  1871.  The  latter  was  originated  by  Senator  Lyman 
Trumbull  of  Illinois. 

The  civil  service  law  bill  was  preceded  by  three  other 
bills,  all  of  which  failed  to  pass  Congress.  The  first 
was  introduced,  in  1864,  by  Senator  Charles  Sumner  of 
Massachusetts,  whose  only  recorded  words  are  (Cong. 
Globe,  1864,  p.  1985):  **  The  object  of  the  bill  is  to 
provide  a  competitive  system  of  examination  in  the  civilt 
Bej;vice  of  the  United  States."  The  bill,  which  is  only 
a  good  foundation  on  which  to  build,  may  be  found  in 
('harles  Sumner's  Works  (Boston,  1874),  vol.  viii,  p.  452. 
The  billy  owing  perhaps  to  the  pressure  of  other  busi- 


Till  VABIOUS  CITIL  SERVICE  BILLS. 

ness,  never  came  up  for  discussion  by  the  Senate.  The 
second  bill,  which  was  wider  in  its  scope  than  Senator 
Sumner's,  was  introduced,  in  1865,  by  Representative 
Thomas  Allen  Jenckes  of  Rhode  Island,  and  again,  with 
improvements,  in  1866.  Mr.  Jenckes  advocated  his  bill 
ably,  argumentatively,  and  earnestly  during  several  ses- 
sions of  Congress.  The  third  bill  was  introduced,  in 
1869,  by  Senator  Carl  Schurz  of  Missouri.  It  gave  the 
President  the  option  of  selecting  from  among  the  men 
who  passed  the  Board,  or  of  ordering  men  of  his  own 
selection  before  it,  and  required  five  and  eight  year 
terms  of  office.  The  object  of  the  five-year  term  was 
to  prevent  such  appointments  from  being  made  on  the 
year  of  the  inauguration  of  the  President.  The  idea 
was,  as  explained  by  Mr.  Schurz,  that  appointments,  as 
a  rule,  should  not  be  made  until  the  administration  was 
well  settled  down  to  business.  Senator  Schurz's  bill 
required  a  year  of  probationary  service,  Representative 
Jenckes's  six  months.  Both  required  competitive  ex- 
aminations. Congress  did  not  distinguish  itself  by  sub- 
stituting Section  1753  for  these  bills,  and  that  is  saying 
a  great  deal.  Other  civil  service  bills  have  been  intro- 
duced at  different  times  by  Senators  Henry  L.  Dawes 
of  Massachusetts  and  George  F.  Edmunds  of  Vermont, 
and  Representatives  John  A.  Kasson  of  Iowa,  Albert 
S.  Willis  of  Kentucky,  and  Thomas  M.  Bayne  of  Penn- 
sylvania. 

It  is  noteworthy  in  this  connection  that  Represen- 
tative Samuel  Brenton  of  Indiana,  on  August  11,  1852, 
offered  an  amendment  to  a  resolution  proposing  to  in- 


THE   LAW'S   CHIEF  PROVISIONS.  IX 

crease  the  pay  of  civil  service  clerks  in  Washington, 
the  concluding  part  of  which  is  as  follows  (Congres- 
sional Globe,  vol.  xxiv,  pt.  iii,  p.  2189)  :  "  No  removals 
shall  be  made  except  for  incompetency,  or  cause  shown 
to  the  satisfaction  of  the  President  of  the  United  States. 
And  in  the  selection  of  said  clerks,  they  shall,  as  far 
as  practicable,  be  taken  from  the  several  States  and 
Territories  in  proportion  to  the  number  of  Senators, 
Representatives,  and  Delegates  from  each  in  the  Thirty- 
third  Congress." 

This  is  practically  the  same,  so  far  as  it  goes,  as 
the  civil  service  law.  Mr.  Brenton  said  his  object  was 
to  secure  permanency,  to  prevent  sectionalism  in  the 
selection  of  clerks,  and  to  "  break  down  party  spirit  as 
much  as  possible." 

The  provisions  of  the  civil  service  law  'concerning 
examinations  are  :  It  provides  that  in  any  State  or 
Territory  "  where  there  are  persons  to  be  examined," 
at  least  two  examinations  shall  be  held  each  year,  and 
in  such  places  "as  to  make  it  reasonably  convenient 
and  inexpensive  for  applicants  to  attend  before  them." 
It  provides  that  the  examiners,  "not  less  than  three," 
shall  be  chosen  from  among  United  States  officials* 
"  residing  in  said  State  or  Territory."  It  requires  the 
Commissioners  to  make  regulations  for  examinations 
and  annual  reports  of  their  proceedings,  with  such  sug- 

*  Tliis  is  required  not  only  in  the  interest  of  economy  but  to  secure 
examiners  who  are  familiar  with  the  real  needs  of  the  offices  for  which 
applicants  arc  examined.  The  examiners  receive  no  extra  compensa- 
tion.   (Third  Annual  Report,  p.  43.) 


X  -THE  EPFICIACI?  OB'  THE  NEW  EULESr 

gestions  as  in  their  judgment  will  result  in  improving 
the  service ;  and  it  authorizes  them  to  make  investi- 
gations concerning  all  matters  "  in  respect  to  the  ex- 
ecution of  this  act."  It  requires  that  selections  for 
office  shall  be  from  among  the  three  competitors  graded 
highest  in  the  examinations.  It  forbids  favoritism  in 
examinations,  and  exempts  officeholders  from  either 
political  assessments  or  services,  and  makes  a  violation 
of  either  provision  a  misdemeanor,  punishable  by  fine 
or  imprisonment  or  both,  and  the  new  rules  (adopted 
February  2,  1888)  require  that  a  violation  of  the  latter 
provision  shall  be  followed  by  dismission  from  the  ser- 
vice. It  exempts  from  examination — "  (a)  One  private 
secretary,  or  one  confidential  clerk,  of  the  head  of  each 
classified  department,  and  of  each  assistant  secretary 
thereof  ;  and  also  of  each  head  of  bureau  appointed 
by  the  President  by  and  with  the  advice  and  consent 
of  the  Senate,  (b)  Direct  custodians  of  money,  for 
whose  fidelity  another  officer  is  under  official  bond  ; 
but  this  exception  shall  not  include  any  officer  below 
the  grade  of  assistant  cashier  or  assistant  teller,  (c) 
Disbursing  officers  who  give  bonds,  (d)  Persons  em- 
ployed exclusively  in  the  secret  service  of  the  govern- 
ment, (e)  Chief  clerks.  (/)  Chiefs  of  divisions." 
Other  exemptions  are  :  Deputy  collectors  who  do  not 
also  act  as  inspectors,  examiners,  or  clerks ;  otherwise 
not ;  cashier,  assistant  cashier,  and  auditor  of  the  col- 
lector ;  deputy  naval  officers  ;  deputy  surveyors  ;  as- 
sistant postmasters,  and  superintendents,  custodians  of 
money,  stamps,  stamped  envelopes,  or  postal-cards,  who 


PROMOTION,   EDlTCATlON^,   AGE  LIMITS,   ETC.  Xi 

are  designated  as  such  by  the  Postoffice  Department. 
It  provides  for  non-competitive  examinations  when  com-  \ 
petent  persons  do  not  compete,  and  for  several  other  jl 
cogent  and  justifiable  reasons.  As  said  on  page  27, 
competitors  must  answer  10  per  cent,  of  the  questions 
asked,  except  ex-soldiers  and  sailors,  who  are  requirec 
to  answer  but  65,  the  old  standard.  Competitive  ex- 
aminations for  promotion  are  compulsory,  except  for 
ex-soldiers  and  sailors,  and  the  widows  and  orphans 
of  deceased  soldiers  and  sailors.  These  also  receive 
preference  in  case  of  a  reduction  of  force  in  any  branch 
of  the  classified  service.  All  who  attain  an  average  of 
75  per  cent,  are  eligible  to  promotion.  The  education 
required  in  examinations  for  ordinary  offices  embraces 
common- school  studies  only,  and  in  many  cases  only  a 
few  of  these.  As  to  the  age  at  which  a  person  may 
be  examined,  in  the  Customs  Department  clerks  and 
messengers  must  be  20  years  old;  all  others  21.  In 
the  Postal  Department  clerks  must  be  18  years  old  ; 
messengers,  stampers,  and  junior  clerks  must  not  be 
under  16  or  over  45  ;  carriers  not  under  21  or  over 
40  ;  all  others  not  under  18  or  over  45.  Enlisted  men 
may  be  examined  on  the  written  consent  of  the  Sec- 
retary of  War  or  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy.* 

Other  important  provisions  of  the  law  are  :  It  de- 
clares that  its  officials  shall  not  "  coerce  the  political 
action   of  any  person  or  body,  or   interfere  with  any 

*  For  further  information  about  competitive  examinations,  and  also 
some  facts  about  trial  by  probation,  as  well  as  a  few  other  facts 
pertinent  to  the  above  summary,  see  Chapter  11  (page  26). 


Xll        PENALTY  I^OR  iNfERi'ESlIira  WlTti   ELECTIONS. 

election,"  and  dismission  is  the  penalty  of  a  violation 
of  the  provision.  It  forbids  any  questions  as  to  an 
applicant's  political  or  religious  opinions,  and  when 
such  opinions  are  known,  any  discrimination  on  account 
of  them.  Further,  it  requires  its  officials  to  discoun- 
tenance the  disclosure  of  such  opinions.  And  again 
dismission  is  the  penalty.  It  forbids  the  appointment 
to  office  of  persons  who  habitually  use  intoxicating 
liquors  to  excess.  It  limits  the  number  of  members  of 
the  same  family  who  shall  hold  office  in  the  grades 
covered  by  it.  It  forbids  its  three  Commissioners, 
"  not  more  than  two  of  whom  shall  be  adherents  of 
the  same  party,"  from  holding  any  other  office  under 
the  United  States.  It  authorizes  the  President  to  "  re- 
move any  Commissioner."  An  appointing  officer  may, 
if  he  deems  it  for  the  good  of  the  service,  object  in 
writing  to  making  an  appointment,  and  refer  the  mat- 
ter to  the  Commission  for  investigation.  No  eligible 
person  can  be  certified  for  appointment  more  than  three 
times.  When  necessary,  transfers  may  be  made  from 
one  department  to  another.  There  are  three  branches 
of  the  classified  civil  service,  namely,  the  departmen- 
tal, the  customs,  and  the  postal. 

Such  is  a  summary  of  the  chief  features  of  the  law 
and  its  rules  and  regulations.  The  whole  is  certainly 
a  good  foundation  on  which  to  build  a  sound  civil  ser- 
vice system.  But  the  law,  even  in  its  present  stage  of 
perfection,  should  be  increased  in  scope.  There  is  prob- 
ably no  valid  reason  why  all  postmasters  and  employes 
of  the  railway  mail   service,  internal  revenue   service, 


REASOlsrS  ^0&  mCKEASlNO  THE  LAW'S  SCOPE.        Xlli 

mints,  &c.,  should  not  be  included  within  its  provisions. 
Postmasters  should  be  removed  only  for  good  cause 
known  to  the  Postmaster-General  or  President  and  at 
the  request  of  a  majority  of  the  business  men  of  their 
place  of  office.  Farther,  where  it  is  practicable  to  hold 
promotion  examinations,  vacant  postmasterships  as  well 
as  subordinate  positions  should  be  filled  by  the  person 
standing  the  best  test.  There  are  now  about  2,500 
postmasters  drawing  $1,000  or  over  a  year,  who  have 
for  this  reason  to  be  confirmed  by  the  Senate.  In  from 
twenty  to  twenty  five  years  more  the  number  will  prob- 
ably be  5,000.  It  is  impossible  for  the  Senate  to  con- 
firm this  great  number  properly  and  attend  to  oflier 
business  at  the  same  time.  Hence  the  necessity  of 
bringing  postmasterships  under  civil  service  law  rules. 

The  increase  in  the  number  of  examinations  held 
year  after  year,  State  as  well  as  national,  is  the  best 
illustration  of  the  progress  of  civil  service  reform. 

In  Massachusetts,  in  1887,  there  were  145  examina- 
tions. Number  examined,  1,433  ;  qualified,  938  ;  aj^- 
pointmenta,  403,  2 1  of  whom  were  women ;  average 
age,  36  years;  education — common-school,  919;  colle- 
giate, 19.     In  *tho  labor  service  of  Boston'*  the  num- 

*  Mayor  Hugh  O'Brien  of  Boston,  in  a  speech  in  1885,  said:  "  I  can 
certainly  testify  that  it  has  been  a  great  relief  to  the  city  of  Boston  that 
the  Civil  Service  Commission  has  taken  care  of  the  laboring  population. 
No  men  have  been  more  abused  than  the  laborers.  They  have  been 
made  the  tools  of  political  tricksters;  and  with  civil  service  reform  en- 
forced they  are  no  longer  in  the  hands  of  political  tricksters." 

One  of  the  best  features  of  this  '  labor  service '  is  that  the  men,  when 


XIV  HOW  TO  PRfiVi!i?T  I*ERS0NAT101^S. 

ber  registered  was  2,235  ;  certified  for  employment, 
1,998;  employed,  1,615.  Including  the  Boston  labor- 
ers, the  classified  service  of  the  State  numbers  6,000, 
the  aggregate  expense  being  about  14,400,000.  The 
total  number  of  persons  who  have  passed  examinations 
during  the  past  three  years,  says  Secretary  Warren  P. 
Dudley,  is  :  1885,  1,292,  of  whom  958  passed  with  a 
percentage  of  65  or  over  ;  1886,  1,035,  of  whom  791 
passed  ;    1887,  1,433,  of  whom  938  passed. 

Mr.  William  Potts,  who  was  Chief  Examiner  of  the 
New  York  State  Civil  Service  Commission  during  most 
of  the  year  1887,  in  his  report  to  the  Commission,  says 
that  384  applicants  were  examined  during  that  year, 
148  more  than  for  any  previous  year.  He  suggests 
that  a  roster  of  the  employes  be  kept,  stating  by  whom 
they  are  appointed,  together  with  their  functions  and 
pay.  Also  that  additional  means  be  provided  for  the 
correction  of  irregularities  in  the  service.  To  prevent 
personations  at  examinations  he  proposes  that  each  ap- 
plicant shall  certify  to  the  examiners  in  writing  as  to 
his  identity,  and  afterward  to  the  Commission  that  he 
passed  the  examination.  The  handwriting  of  the  two 
certificates  and  the  signature  on  the  application  paper, 
he  thinks,  will  prevent  fraud.  He  gives  an  instance 
of  an  applicant  who,  on  account  of  false  reports  con- 
cerning the  nature  of  the  examinations,  spent  so  much 
time  in  studying  about  mountains,  the  distance  to  tlie 
planet  Venus,  <fec.,  that  he  failed  in  ten  out  of  twelve 

wanted,  are  notified  by  mail.  They  thus  lose  no  time  in  calling  or  wait- 
ing around  for  city  work. 


COMPETITION  AND   A   RAILROAD   COMPANY.  XV 

questions  in  arithmetic.  He  says  the  Commission  re- 
ceived a  letter  from  the  civil  engineer  of  a  leading 
railroad  company  requesting  a  copy  of  a  list  of  sixteen 
civil  engineers  who  had  passed  an  examination,  with 
a  view  to  filling  a  position  on  the  staff  of  that  road.* 

In  the  State  of  New  York,  in  1886,  the  classified 
oflices  numbered  15,895  ;  number  of  persons  examined 
4,007  ;   appointments,  2,035. 

In  the  City  of  New  York  the  number  examined  was 
1,927  ;  qualified,  1,479  ;  appointments,  1,216.  Average 
age,  30  years.  Education  :  common-school,  517  ;  aca- 
demic, 54;  private,  68;  collegiate,  171.  In  addition 
to  the  classified  offices  (7,271),  there  were  3,635  laborers. 

In  Brooklyn  the  number  examined  was  1,241  ;  qual- 
ified, 681  ;  appointments,  258.  Average  age,  40  years. 
Education:  common-school,  937;  academic,  122;  pri- 
vate, 39  ;  collegiate,  143.  There  were  2,447  laborers 
employed  at  different  times  during  the  year. 

In  the  smaller  cities  the  education  was  nearly  all 
common-school. 

In  the  national  service  the  number  examined  in  1883 
was  3,542  ;  in  1884,  6,347  ;  in  1885,  7,602  ;  from  Jan- 
uary  16,  1886,  to  July  1,   1887,   15,842;   total,  33,333. 


The  American  people  had  reason  to  complain  of  the 
evils  of  the  patronage  system  many  years  before  the 

*  Mr.  Potts,  to  whom  I  am  indebted  for  the  above  information  in 
advance  of  its  publication,  was  removed  from  office  without  fault  of 
his,  and  in  violation  of  the  spirit  if  not  the  letter  of  the  civil  service 
law.    (See  note,  page  67.) 


i:vl  EARNlNa   SALARIES   BY   DEPUTV. 

Declaration  of  Independence.  Sir  Tliomas  Erskine 
May,  in  his  "  Constitutional  History  of  England  since 
the  Accession  of  George  III,"  says  that  many  of  the 
colonial  officeholders  sent  from  England  were  of  little 
account — were  thought  to  be  good  enough  for  the  col- 
onies, but  not  for  England.*  The  most  lucrative  colo- 
nial salary,  he  says,  would  often  be  earned  by  deputy. 
He  quotes  a  letter  of  Lieutenant  General  John  Huske, 
as  follows  (ii,  529)  :  "As  to  civil  officers  appointed  for 
America,  most  of  the  places  in  the  gift  of  the  Crown 
have  been  filled  with  broken .  members  of  Parliament, 
of  bad,  if  any,  principles — valets  de-chambre,  election- 
eering scoundrels,  and  even  livery  servants.  In  one 
word,  America  has  been  for  many  years  made  the  hos- 
pital of  England."     The  letter  was  written  in  1758. 

*  Such  men  were  more  mischievous  in  a  colony  than  at  home.  *  *  * 
To  allay  discontent,  the  government  finally  surrendered  to  the  local  Gov- 
ernors all  appointments  under  £200  a  year,  to  be  filled  from  among  the 
citizens  of  the  several  colonies. — E.  F.  Waters. 


UFIVBRSITT] 

THE  CIVIL  SERVICE  LAW. 


CHAPTER    I. 

FRUITS     AND     FACTS. 

The  law  promotes  Education,  Efficiency,  and  Economy. — Its  chief  Ob- 
ject.— Its  Constitutionality. — In  harmony  with  the  Teachings  of 
Madison,  Hamilton,  and  Jay. — It  Aids  instead  of  Hampers  the 
President,  who  makes  his  own  Rules  for  its  Execution. 

The  civil  service  law,  judged  by  its  fruits,  is  a  useful 
and  successful  reformatory  measure.  Its  fruits  or  re- 
forms are  necessarily  limited  in  number,  for  it  applies 
to  only  about  a  seventh  of  the  more  than  one  hundred 
thousand  public  offices.  But  notwithstanding  this  fact, 
it  has  made  a  good  beginning  in  reforming  the  patron- 
age system  of  distributing  offices,  and  it  promises  well 
for  the  future.  One  of  its  best  reforms  is  the  relief 
of  officeholders  from  compulsory  political  assessments. 
Another  is  the  making  of  subordinate  official  tenures 
coequal  with  efficiency  and  fidelity,  instead  of  their 
depending  on  the  politics  of  chief  officials.  It  has  also 
greatly  relieved  the  President,  the  Cabinet,  Congress- 
men, and  customs,  postoffice,  and  other  officials  of  the 
annoying  and  sometimes  embarrassing  burdens  of  office- 
seeking.  The  National  Civil  Service  Commission,  and 
also  the  State  Commissions  of  New  York  and  Massa- 
chusetts, have  received  encouraging  reports  of  the  util- 
ity of  the  system  from  nearly  every  city  wherein  it  is 
applicable.     The  New  York  State  Commissioners  say 


18  IXSPIRBD   BY   GENIUS   OF   OUR   INSTITUTIONS. 

(Second  Report,  p.  34)  ;  "  Higher  grade  employes, 
better  service,  reduction  in  the  number  employed,  and 
large  economy  in  expenditure  are  among  the  prominent 
results  already  partially  realized." 

The  law  is  certainly  in  harmony  with  the  spirit  of 
the  times^  for  it  both  promotes  and  encourages  educa- 
tion.*  Mr.  Everett  P.  Wheeler  truly  says :  "  So  far 
from  its  being  opposed  to  the  genius  of  our  institutions, 
it  is  inspired  by  that  genius."  Another  good  feature 
of  the  law  is  that  it  is,  like  all  laws  should  be,  non- 
partisan in  its  character,  having  been  originated  by  the 
best  known  men  of  both  the  Democratic  and  Republi- 
can parties.  It  makes  no  distinction  on  account  of  sex. 
The  provision  which  requires  that  examinations  for  and 
appointments  to  office  shall  be  controlled  by  separate 
sets  of  officials,  these  by  a  third  set  (the  Civil  Service 
Commissioners),  and  the  Commissioners  by  the  Presi- 
dent, is  certainly  a  wise  one,  for,  like  the  government's 
legislative,  executive,  and  judicial  officials,  one  set 
checks  as  well  as  aids  the  other.  For  examj)le,  appoint- 
ing officers  are  required  to  keep  records  of  removals, 

*  Mr.  Henry  Sherwin,  chief  examiner  of  the  Massachusetts  Civil  Ser- 
vice Commission,  s-iys  (Third  Annual  Report,  p.  11) :  *'  It  may  be  said 
truthfully  that,  in  their  way,  civil  service  examinations  form  a  part  of  a 
general  educational  system.  The  demands  made  upon  applicants  vary 
in  accordance  with  the  positions  for  which  they  are  examined.  A  first 
examination  has  shown  many  of  them  their  various  deficiencies,  and 
they  have  been  stimulated  to  bring  their  education  up  to  the  required 
standard.  In  many  cases  this  has  been  done  with  the  help  of  friends, 
but  more  frequently  by  attendance  at  the  evening  schools  which  are 
maintained  in  many  of  the  cities  of  the  Commonwealth." 

Many  other  Americans  have  made  similar  testimonials  to  the  above, 
and  Sir  Charles  Trevelyan  and  many  other  Englishmen  have  testified 
that  the  English  civil  service  law  has  the  same  effect  in  England,  Can- 
ada, Australia,  British  India,  &c.  To  print  even  a  synopsis  of  so  many 
gimilar  tcstiinonials  is.  certainly  superfluous. 


PUBLIC   BUSINESS   THE   SAME   AS    PRIVATE.  19 

rejections,  resignations,  transfers,  and  the  name  and 
residence  of  persons  selected  for  trial  by  probation. 
This  enables  the  Commissioners  to  check  either  unjust 
removals  or  rejections  after  trial  by  probation. 

The  chief  object  of  the  law  is  the  application  of  the 
common  sense  principles  of  private  business  to  public 
business.  Public  and  private  business  may  differ  more 
or  less  in  detail,  and  even  in  mode  of  performance,  yet 
their  fundamental  principles  are  the  same.*  For  exam- 
ple, the  violation  of  certain  rules  will  be  followed  by 
more  or  less  injury,  while  the  violation  of  certain  others 
will  be  followed  sooner  or  later  by  insolvency.  One  of 
these  principles  or  rules  is  the  retention  in  employment 
of  efficient  and  honest  men.  Another  is  the  removal  of 
either  inefficient  or  dishonest  men.  The  foregoing  being 
universally  admitted  facts,  it  is  therefore  self-evident 
that,  the  services  rendered  being  satisfactory,  and  the 
exigencies  of  business  permitting,  the  tenure  of  service 
of  subordinate  public  employes,  like  that  of  private  em- 
ployes, should  be  during  efficient  and  faithful  service, 
which  service  should  be  rewarded,  Avhen  practicable,  by 
promotion  and  a  reasonable  increase  of  pay.  In  private 
business  the  removal  of  efficient  and  faithful  employes 
to  make  room  for  untried  men,  who  might  prove  to  be 

*  The  oft-repeated  maxim  that  the  public  service  should  be  conducted 
on  business  principles,  means  thfit  accuracy,  promptitude,  honesty,  econ- 
omy, and  edicieney  are  as  essential  in  public  as  in  private  affairs ;  but 
the  methods  of  securing  these  qualities  cannot  be  exactly  the  same. 
The  merchant  has  a  direct  personal  and  pecuniary  interest  in  his  private 
affairs  which  leads  him  to  make  a  careful  selection  of  his  employes  ; 
but  in  the  public  service  there  must  be  substituted  some  more  compli- 
cated agency  in  the  form  of  laws,  regulations,  reports,  and  inspections. 
— Col.  Silas  W,  Bcut. 

The  very  men  who  advocate  the  spoils  system  for  public  business, 
would  call  a  man  a  fool  if  he  proposed  the  same  system  for  private 
business. — Thomas  H.  Benton. 

.      f/  V       OP  THE  ^'. 


20  BEASOKABLB   WAGES   PROMOTE   HONESTY. 

both  ineiScient  and  unfaithful,  is  deemed  the  hight  of 
folly.  Is  it  any  less  so  in  public  business  ?  Do  railroad 
or  telegraph  companies  injure  tbeir  business  by  chang- 
ing their  employes  every  time  they  change  their  presi- 
dents? Further,  reasonable  wages  and  employment 
during  satisfactory  service  tend  to  promote  honesty. 
Will  not  an  accountant  or  weigher,  public  or  private, 
who  learns  that  he  is  to  be  superseded,  be  tempted  to 
do  wrong  ? 

The  law  itself  is  new,  but  its  principles  are  as  old  as 
the  government,  if  not  in  fact  as  old  as  civilization. 
The  fact  that  its  principles  are  in  exact  conformity  with 
both  the  principles  and  practices  of  the  founders  of  the 
government,  is  a  good  if  not  perhaps  the  best  argument 
that  can  be  made  in  favor  of  its  constitutionality,  for  it 
is  not  reasonable  that  the  founders  of  the  government 
would  both  preach  and  practice  doctrine  that  is  in  vio- 
lation of  the  Constitution.*  The  law  is  certainly  not 
unconstitutional.  It  in  effect  simply  authorizes  the 
President  to  appoint  commissioners  to  aid  him  in  dis- 
charging his  constitutional  functions.  The  President's 
powers  are  therefore  really  increased,  not,  as  charged 
by  the  opponents  of  the  law,  diminished.  Thus,  instead 
of  hampering  the  President,  the  law  materially  increases 
his  facilities  for  transacting  business ;  and  the  increase 
of  facilities  is  not  greater  than  the  increase  of  business. 

♦Daniel  Webster  says  (iv,  196,  198):  "I  think  the  legislature  pos- 
sesses the  power  of  regulating  the  condition,  duration,  qualification, 
and  tenure  of  office  in  all  cases  where  the  Constitution  has  made  no 
express  provision  on  the  subject,  *  *  *  If  Congress  were  to  declare 
by  law  that  the  Attorney-General  or  the  Secretary  of  State  should  hold 
his  office  during  good  behavior,  I  am  not  aware  of  any  ground  on 
which  such  a  law  could  be  held  unconstitutional.  A  provision  of  that 
kind  might  be  unwise,  but  I  do  not  perceive  that  it  would  traijscend 
the  power  of  Congress," 


PSESlt)ENT   MADISON'S   VIEWS.  2l 

Further,  so  far  as  the  President  is  concerned,  the  en- 
forcement of  the  law  is  optional  instead  of  compulsory. 
In  fact  he  can  nullify  it  by  merely  refusing  to  enforce 
it.  Thus  everything  is  practically  left  to  the  President. 
This  is  precisely  what  the  Constitution  says  Congress 
may  do.  Art.  II.,  Sec.  4,  says  "  the  Congress  may  by 
law  vest  the  appointment  of  such  inferior  officers  as 
they  think  proper  in  the  President  alonCy  in  the  courts 
of  law,  or  in  the  heads  of  departments." 

This  is  the  modest,  not  to  say  timid,  way  in  which  the 
Congress  of  1883  sought  "to  regulate  and  improve"  a 
small  part  of  the  national  civil  service.  But  here  is  the 
way  in  which  President  Madison,  one  of  the  framers* 
of  the  Constitution  itself,  says  he  would  proceed  (iv, 
385)  :  "  The  right  of  suffrage,  the  rule  of  apportioning 
representation,  and  the  mode  of  appointing  to  and  re- 
moving from  office,  are  fundamentals  in  a  free  govern- 
ment, and  ought  to  be  fixed  by  the  Constitution.  An 
unforeseen  multiplication  of  offices  may  add  a  weight 
to  the  executive  scale,  disturbing  the  equilibrium  of  the 
government.  I  should  therefore  see  with  pleasure  a 
guard  against  the  evil,  *  *  *  even  by  an  amendment 
of  the  Constitution^ 

Alexander  Hamilton,  another  framer  of  the  Constitu- 
tion, not  only  advocated  principles  but  even  proposed  a 

*  The  opinions  of  the  framers  of  the  Constitution  ought  to  have  great 
weight.  William  E.  Gladstone  says  :  "  As  the  British  Constitution  is 
the  most  subtile  organism  which  has  proceeded  from  progressive  his- 
tory, so  tlie  American  Constitution  is  the  most  wonderful  work  ever 
struck  off  at  a  given  time  by  the  brain  and  purpose  of  man."  If  this 
does  not  increase  the  weight  of  the  framers'  opinions,  what  can  ?  But 
the  Constitution  needs  revising.  Jefferson  says  (iii,  106) :  "  Every  con- 
stitution and  every  law  naturally  expires  at  the  end  of  every  34  years." 
Spealting  of  other  omissions,  he  said  he  thought  the  Constitution  ought 
to  contain  a  provision  for  "  the  restriction  of  monopolies."    (ii,  229.) 


2f^  Hamilton's  plan  and  jay's  practice. 

plan  very  similar  to  both  the  plan  and  fundamental  prin- 
ciples of  the  civil  service  law.  Indeed  it  may  be  said 
tliat  the  law  is  only  an  enlargement  and  improvement 
of  his  plan.  His  "  select  assembly  "  would  have  been, 
Av^hat  the  Civil  Service  Commissioners  are  to-day,  a 
material  aid  to  the  President,  if  not  in  fact  a  sort  of 
second  Cabinet.  He  says  ("  The  Federalist,"  p.  355)  : 
"It  Avill  be  agreed  on  all  hands  that  the  power  of  ap- 
pointment, in  ordinary  cases,  can  be  properly  modified 
only  in  one  of  three  ways.  It  ought  to  be  vested  in  a 
single  man  ;  or  in  a  select  assembly  of  moderate  num- 
ber ;  or  in  a  single  man,  with  the  concurrence  of  such 
an  assembly."  He  deprecated  "  party  bargains "  (p. 
356)  as  a  mode  of  distributing  offices,  because  "  party 
victories  "  would  "  be  more  considered  than  the  intrinsic 
merit  of  the  candidate"  or  "the  advancement  of  the 
service." 

The  Federalist  papers  were  intended  by  their  authors 
— Hamilton,  Madison,  and  Jay — to  be  explanations  of 
the  Constitution.  So  it  is  hardly  necessary  to  say  that 
Hamilton's  plan  is  what  he  believed  to  be  the  Constitu- 
tion's plan. 

John  Jay,  the  first  Chief  Justice  of  the  United  States 
Supreme  Court,  did  not,  so  far  as  I  know,  formulate 
any  plan  for  or  expatiate  at  length  concerning  the  dis- 
tribution of  offices.  But  his  actions,  when  Governor  of 
New  York,  in  1795,  spoke  louder  than  plans,  or  even 
the  emphatic  words  he  then  used,  for  he  refused  to 
make  removals  on  account  of  politics,  notwithstanding 
Gov.  Clinton's  officeholders  had  bitterly  opposed  him, 
and  his  (Jay's)  political  friends  "anticipated  the  spoils 
of  victory."*     (Life  of  Jay,  i,  392.)     When  one  of  the 

*  These  words  were  written  by  William  Jay,  John  Jay's  son  and  biog- 
rapher, before  the  delivery  of  Senator  Marcy's  spoils  doctrine  speech. 


TWO   OTflEft   CIVIL   SERVICE   LAWS.  23 

council  of  four  men  that  then  confirmed  nominations, 
advised  the  Governor  to  appoint  a  Federalist  to  office, 
on  account  of  "  his  zeal  and  usefulness,"  he  replied  : 
"  That,  sir,  is  not  the  question.  Is  he  fit  for  the  office  ?" 
In  his  inaugural  address  he  said  (i,  389)  :  "  To  regard 
my  fellow-citizens  with  an  equal  eye,  to  cherish  and 
advance  merit  wherever  found,  *  *  *  are  obligations 
of  which  I  perceive  and  acknowledge  the  full  force." 

The  civil  service  law,  so  far  as  non-competitive  ex- 
aminations are  concerned,  is  not  without  precedent. 
Two  other  acts,  namely,  sections  164  and  1753  of  the 
United  States  Revised  Statutes,  provide  as  follows  : 

§  164.  No  clerk  shall  be  appointed  in  any  department, 
in  [any]  of  the  four  classes  above  designated,  until  he 
has  been  examined  and  found  qualified  by  a  board  of 
three  examiners. 

§  1753.  The  President  is  authorized  to  prescribe  such 
regulations  for  the  admission  of  persons  into  the  civil 
service  of  the  United  States  as  may  best  promote  the 
efficiency  thereof,  and  ascertain  the  fitness  of  each  can- 
didate in  respect  to  age,  health,  character,  knowledge, 
and  ability  for  the  branch  of  service  into  which  he 
seeks  to  enter ;  and  for  this  purpose  he  may  employ 
suitable  persons  to  conduct  such  inquiries,  and  may 
prescribe  their  duties  and  establish  regulations  for  the 
conduct  of  persons  who  may  receive  appointments  in 
the  civil  service. 

The  civil  service  law  is  a  careful  elaboration  and  im- 
provement of  sections  164  and  1753.  Therefore  one  is 
about  as  unconstitutional  as  the  other.  But  even  if  all 
were  unconstitutional,  the  evils  they  are  designed  to 
correct  would  have  to  be  dealt  with  by  some  other  law. 
The  law  not  only  appears  to  be  constitutional,  but  it  or 
f^  law  eimilar  to  it  appears  to  bo  expressly  authorized  by 


S4  tiOW  TO   ADAPT?   LAWS   TO   THE   PEOPLlfi. 

the  Constitution  itself.  It  causes,  it  must  be  admitted, 
a  radical  change.  Therefore  it  is  not  strange  that  it 
should  meet  with  opposition,  for  doubt  and  distrust  are 
the  natural  consequences  of  all  radical  governmental 
changes.  The  Constitution  itself  was  not  an  exception 
to  this  rule,  for  it  was  voted  down  by  two  of  the  States 
(Rhode  Island  and  North  Carolina),*  and  even  some  of 
its  f ramers  doubted  its  permanent  utility.  Is  it  strange 
then  that  some  men  doubt  the  utility  of  the  civil  service 
law? 

The  Constitution  requires  that  the  President  *'  shall 
take  care  that  the  laws  be  faithfully  executed."  In  har- 
mony with  and  apparently  in  view  of  this  fact,  the  civil 
service  law  authorizes  the  President  to  make  his  own 
rules  for  its  execution,  and  requires  the  Commissioners 
to  aid  him,  "  as  he  may  request,"  in  preparing  them. 
As  the  rules  are  subject  to  such  modifications  as  the 
President  and  his  aids  may  find  necessary,  they  ought 
in  the  course  of  time  to  become  not  only  satisfactory  as 
rules,  but  also  important  adjuncts  to  the  law  itself. 
This  is  well,  for  the  law,  which  has  not  yet,  except  in 
certain  places,  had  a  fair  trial,  may  have  faults  of  both 
omission  and  commission,!  the  exact  nature  of  and  rem- 

*  George  Bancroft  says  (*'  History  of  the  Constitution,"  ii,  850) : 
"  Neither  of  the  two  States  which  lingered  behind  remonstrated  against 
the  establishment  of  a  new  government  before  their  consent ;  nor  did 
they  ask  the  United  States  to  wait  for  them.  The  worst  that  can  be 
said  of  them  is  that  they  were  late  in  arriving." 

t  Sir  George  Cornwall  Lewis  says  ("  Methods  of  Observation  and 
Reasoning  in  Politics,"  i,  173):  "  A  government  is,  by  the  nature  of  its 
action,  constantly  trying  experiments  upon  the  community.  All  new 
measures,  all  laws  enacted  for  the  first  time,  are  in  the  nature  of  ex- 
periments. They  are  not  indeed  scientific  experiments ;  but  they  are 
experiments  made  for  a  practical  purpose,  and  they  are  regarded  merely 
as  provisional  and  tentative  until  experience  has  proved  their  fitness 
Rud  they  are  confirmed  by  the  proof  of  practical  success,     Being  tried. 


fedy  for  which  time  only  will  determine.  Therefore,  in 
the  meantime,  good  rules  will  give  it  strength  as  well 
as  facilitate  its  execution.  The  execution  of  the  law 
like  the  law  itself,  is  simple,  but  it  is  laborious.  For 
example,  in  1885  examinations  were  held  in  all  the 
States  and  every  Territory  except  Utah.  The  number 
of  examinations  held  was  150,  and  the  number  of  appli- 
cants examined  was  7,602,  of  whom  730  were  women. 
Total  in  three  years,  17,491.* 

not  '  in  corpore  vili,'  but  upon  the  lives  and  fortunes  of  the  people,  the 
conduct  of  the  experiment  must  be  regulated  by  the  nature  of  the  sub- 
ject upon  which  it  is  made.  Hence  the  progress  of  such  experiments  is 
carefully  watched  by  the  legislature,  while  the  executive  authorities 
proceed  cautiously  and  gently  with  a  new  law,  feeling  their  way  as  they 
advance,  and  exercising  their  discretion  as  to  its  more  rapid  or  tardy' 
advancement,  either  generally  or  in  particular  districts.  It  is  by  trying 
a  new  law  on  a  people,  as  the  maker  of  new  apparel  fits  it  on  the  body, 
and  by  enlarging  here  and  diminishing  there,  where  it  docs  not  suit  the 
shape,  that  the  legislature  gradually  adapts  its  work  to  the  wants  and 
feelings  of  the  community.  This  is  an  experimental  process,  for  the 
purpose,  not  of  ascertaining  a  general  truth,  but  of  improving  the  insti- 
tution, and  of  giving  it  the  form  best  suited  to  the  circumstances  of  the 
nation." 

*  For  further  and  later  details  on  this  subject,  and  also  for  further 
"  Fruits  and  Facts,"  see  Introduction, 


CHAPTER    II. 

COMPETITIVE     EXAMINATIONS. 

Trial  bj  Probation. — Appointees  independent  of  Politicians. — Competi- 
tive Examinations  superior  to  non-Competitive. — The  Education 
required,  Etc.,  Etc. 

The  competitive  examinations,  which  may  be  called 
the  backbone  of  the  civil  service  law  system,  about 
which  there  is  more  or  less  complaint,  are  a  simple 
mode  of  ascertaining  the  relative  theoretical  qualifica- 
tions of  applicants  for  office,  and  of  naming  those  who 
are  entitled  to  trial  by  probation  as  to  their  practical 
qualifications  before  final  appointment.  The  proceed- 
ings of  the  examiners  are  as  impartial  as  are  those  of  a 
court  of  justice,  and  "  are  open  to  such  spectators  as 
can  be  accommodated  without  interfering  with  the 
quiet  due  to  those  being  examined."  The  examiners 
know  the  applicants  and  their  respective  papers  by 
numbers,  not  by  names.*  There  is  therefore  practically 
no  reason  for  favoritism  f  on  the  part  of  the  examiners, 

*  Regulation  21.  The  examination  papers  of  each  applicant  shall  be 
marked  only  with  a  number,  and  his  name  with  his  number  shall  be 
placed  in  a  sealed  envelope,  which  shall  not  be  opened  until  after  his 
papers  are  marked. 

Regulation  35.  Complaints  which  show  injustice  or  unfairness  on  the 
part  of  any  Examining  Board,  or  any  one  acting  under  the  Commission, 
or  any  error  in  marking,  will  be  considered  by  the  Commission,  and  if 
necessary  it  will  revise  the  marking  and  grading  on  the  papers,  or  onJer 
a  new  examination,  or  otherwise  do  justice  in  the  premises. 

I  It  (the  Commission)  does  not  regard  itself  or  the  examinera  as  hav- 


iloW  TO  WEED  OUT  IMPR ACTIO AELfi  TaKORlSTS.       §7 

and  consequently  no  reason  for  complaint  on  the  part 
of  the  applicants.  Applicants  who  answer  seventy  per 
cent,  of  the  questions  asked,  except  veteran  soldiers  and 
sailors,  who  are  required  to  answer  but  sixty -five,  are 
eligible,  when  wanted,  to  trial  by  probation,  without 
further  examination.  Those  who  do  not,  are  eligible  to 
try  again  in  some  future  examination. 

The  utility  of  competitive  examinations  is  proved  in 
many  ways,  but  best  perhaps  by  trial  by  probation. 
Trial  by  probation  is  for  six  months.  It  is  the  gover- 
nor, as  it  were,  of  the  civil  service  law  system.  Its 
province  is  to  correct  an  inherent  fault  of  all  theoretical 
examinations,  namely,  the  indorsement  now  and  then 
by  the  examiners  of  impracticable  theorists.  Experi- 
ence shows  that,  when  tried  by  probation,  less  than  two 
per  cent,  of  the  applicants  who  have  passed  competitive 
examinations  fail  of  final  appointment.  What  system 
could  do  better?  The  utility  of  the  system  is  also 
proved   by  examinations  for  promotion  among  office- 

ing  any  more  right  to  take  into  account  requests,  recommendations,  or 
the  wishes  or  sympathies  of  persons,  however  high  in  official  and  social 
standing,  than  a  judge  or  jury  has  to  depart  from  the  law  or  the  evi- 
dence by  reason  of  such  interposition.    (Com'rs'  Third  An.  Rept.,  p.  73.) 

The  Postmaster-General  has  found  the  recommendations  of  persons 
for  inspectors  in  the  Postal  service,  who  are  not  yet  within  the  civil  ser- 
vice examinations,  to  be  so  unreliable  that  he  has  been  compelled  to 
resort  to  examinations  to  protect  himself  against  fraud  and  incompe- 
tency. For  the  same  reasons  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy  has  enforced 
examinations  for  securing  skilled  workmen  at  the  navy-yards.  (Ibid., 
p.  60.) 

Applicants  arc  required  to  file  formal  application  papers.  These  arc 
of  themselves  "  a  sort  of  preliminary  examination,"  for  they  contain  a 
record  of  the  birth,  age,  education,  physical  condition,  capacity  for 
business,  residence,  &c.,  of  each  applicant.  Besides  this  three  reputable 
persons  must  vouch  for  the  applicant's  character.  In  New  York  and 
Massachusetts  the  sponsors  miist  certify  their  willingness  that  their  cer- 
tificates may  be  published.     This  makes  them  careful. 


Sd  CIVIL  Ann)  MILITARY  SERVICE^  COMPAttEt^. 

holders  themselves.  The  records  in  such  cases  are  de- 
cidedly in  favor  of  those  who  have  passed  competitive 
examinations  as  against  those  who  have  not.  Examina- 
tions for  promotion  should  receive  careful  attention,  for 
sooner  or  later  many  chief  officials  may  be  chosen  from 
among  the  subordinates  who  pass  best  in  them.  * 

The  best  feature  perhaps  of  the  competitive  system  is 
the  entire  independence  of  its  appointees  of  politicians. 
How  can  public  business  be  efficiently  conducted  if 
politicians  practically  appoint,  control,  and  tax  the  men 
who  conduct  it  ?  Under  the  competitive  system  ap- 
pointees win  their  positions  by  merit,  and  by  merit  only 
can  they  retain  them  or  be  promoted. 

The  civil  service  law  system  of  competitive  examina- 
tions is  similar  to  the  system  of  choosing  cadets  to  the 
military  school  at  West  Point,!  that  is  when  the  latter 
is  not  made  a  matter  of  patronage,  and  it  compares 
favorably  with  it  in  its  results.  The  failures,  in  after 
life,  among  the  cadets  who  graduate,  like  those  who  are 
tried  by  probation  in  the  civil  service,  are  less  than  two 
per  cent.     The  cases   are  not  strictly  analogous,  but 


*In  I860  a  Parliamentary  Committee  of  Investigation  said  that 
among  the  ends  to  be  accomplished  was  the  following  :  "  To  encourage 
industry  and  foster  merit,  by  teaching  all  public  servants  to  look  for- 
ward to  promotion  according  to  their  deserts,  and  to  expect  the  highest 
prizes  in  the  service  if  they  can  qualify  themselves  for  them."  (Eaton's 
"  Civil  Service  in  Great  Britain,"  p.  220.) 

\  The  respective  civil  departments  of  the  government  being  in  eflFect 
schools  of  practical  instruction,  as  in  fact  are  all  offices,  vocations,  and 
avocations,  would  it  not  be  policy,  when  practicable,  to  make  them,  like 
West  Point  and  Annapolis,  schools  of  special  theoretical  instruction 
also?  In  practical  instruction,  under  the  civil  service  law  system,  they 
are  equal  if  not  superior  to  either  West  Point  or  Annapolis.  Such 
schools  would  produce  diplomatists,  financiers,  soldiers,  &c.  All  able- 
bodied  public  employes  should  be  soldiers,  for  they  not  only  belong  to 
but  are  a  part  of  the  government  itself, 


POLITICALLY  AMBITIOUS   OFFICIALS   CHECKED.         29 

educational  tests  are  required  in  both,  and  trial  by  pro- 
bation also,  it  may  be  said,  for  the  cadets  are  practically 
on  trial  for  four  years,  during  which  time  incompetent 
persons  are  weeded  out  by  numerous  examinations. 

Again,  the  examinations  are  a  check  on  politically 
ambitious  officehblders.  For  example,  under  the  pat- 
ronage system  the  Collector  of  the  Port  of  New  York, 
wishing  to  be  Governor  of  the  State  of  New  York,  can 
remove  subordinate  officials,  with  or  without  cause,  to 
make  room  for  his  personal  political  supporters.  Under 
the  competitive  or  merit  system  he  is  checked  in  two 
ways..  1.  While  he  has  an  unrestricted  power  of  re- 
moval, it  is  dangerous  to  abuse  it,  for,  as  before  said, 
he  has  to  furnish  the  Civil  Service  Commissioners  with 
records  of  removals,  rejections,  &c.  2.  He  cannot  make 
appointments  to  office,  except  in  conjunction  with  other 
officials,  with  whom  he  has  no  connection,  and  then  only 
such  as  have  passed  an  examination. 

The  examinations  relieve  the  President  of  burdens  of 
which  Washington  complained,  even  before  his  inau- 
guration as  President.  (''  Writings,"  ix,  479.)  As  the 
public  offices  have  increased  about  a  hundredfold  since 
Washington's  day,  it  is  self  evident  that  a  proper  exam- 
ination into  the  qualifications  of  all  subordinate  office- 
holJei-s  would  occupy  the  time  of  at  least  fifty  men, 
that  is  if  the  office ^lolders  were  changed  every  four 
years.  Hence  the  enactment  of  sections  164  and  1753 
of  the  United  States  Revised  Statutes,  and  finally  of 
the  civil  service  law.  The  President  and  Cabinet  now* 
adays  are  sometimes  overworked  in  the  performance  of 
regular  official  duties.  Those  of  the  Secretary  of  the 
Treasury  are  sufficient  for  two  men. 

The  failure  now  and  then  of  worthy  and  practical 
men  to  get  appointments  is  no  valid  argument  against 
the  competitive  system,  for  where  there  arc  so  many 


30        COMPETITIVE   EXAMINATIONS   IN   LARGE   FIRMS. 

applicants,  the  same  thing  will  occur  sometimes  under 
any  S3^stem.  No  system  of  course  is  perfect.  But  can 
any  system  do  more  than  require  applicants  to  prove 
both  theoretical  and  practical  ability  before  appoint- 
ment ?  The  question  of  satisfactory  future  service  is 
always  a  problem,  let  the  business  be  public  or  private, 
and  must  be  taken  for  granted.  Further,  the  failure  of 
worthy  and  practical  men  to  get  public  employment 
is  the  means  sometimes  of  securing  them  private  em- 
ployment. The  Civil  Service  Commissioners  say  that 
the  examinations  are  "  the  means  of  the  most  worthy 
securing  private  employment."  Besides  this,  examina- 
tions to  determine  merit  are  being  used  by  large  private 
business  firms  and  corporations  in  both  this  country  and 
Europe. 

Competitive  examinations  are  superior  to  the  non- 
competitive or  "  pass "  examinations  in  perhaps  every 
respect ;  besides  it  is  far  more  creditable  to  an  applicant 
to  pass  the  former  than  the  latter.  Some  of  the  non- 
competitive examinations  held  under  section  164  were  a 
mockery,  a  burlesque  on  business,  and  a  fraud  on  the 
government,  the  questions  asked,  according  to  J.  D.* 
Cox  (Secretary  of  the  Interior  under  President  Grant), 
consisting  of  such  as  "  How  far  is  it  to  your  boarding- 
house  ?"  and  "  Where  do  you  go  to  get  your  pay  at  the 
end  of  the  month?"  President  Grant,  in  1870,  said: 
"  The  present  system  does  not  secure  the  best  men,  and 
often  not  even  fit  men  for  public  place."  John  Stuart 
Mill  says :  "A  mere  pass  examination  never,  in  the  long 
run,  does  more  than  exclude  absolute  dunces.  *  *  * 
The  examinations  should  be  competitive,  and  the  ap- 
pointments given  to  those  who  are  the  most  successful." 

The  competitive  examinationr,  while  not  a  guarantee 
of  good  character,  are  sometimes,  but  very  rarely,  the 
means  of  exposing  bad  character,     Dorman  B,  Eaton, 

\ 


THE   ADVANTAGE   OF   BUSINESS   EXPERIENCE.  31 

who  speaks  from  experience,  having  been  a  Civil  Ser- 
vice Commissioner,  and  having  also  studied  the  subject 
(civil  service)  in  Europe,  says  ("  The  Spoils  System  and 
Civil  Service  Reform,"  p.  60)  :  "  Every  competitor  has 
his  chance  of  an  appointment  increased  by  every  one  he 
can  strike  from  the  list  above  him.  If  he  can  expose 
bad  character  in  any  person  graded  higher,  that  person 
will  be  no  longer  in  his  way.  This  interest  leads  to 
inquiry  and  exposure."  But,  Mr.  Eaton  might  have 
added,  this  privilege  is  liable  to  abuse.  * 

The  claim  that  a  collegiate  education  is  necessary  to 
pass  a  competitive  examination  is  not  sustained  by  the 
facts.  As  a  rule  about  85  per  cent,  of  the  appointees, 
as  is  shown  in  the  Introduction,  are  from  common 
schools  and  15  from  colleges.  But  it  is  true  that  some 
offices  require  proficiency  in  a  greater  number  of  studies 
than  others,  and  that  others  again  require  special  educa- 
tion. The  fact  that  more  or  less  knowledge  of  mathe- 
matics, grammar,  geography,  and  a  few  other  elemen- 
tary studies,  is  necessary  to  the  proper  discharge  of 
general  commercial  and  financial  business  is  certainly 
indisputable,  and  it  is  no  hardship  for  young  men  fresh 
from  school  to  be  examined  in  them.  But  with  elderly 
men  the  case  is  different.  It  is  not  reasonable  to  expect 
them  to  describe  the  minute  details  of  these  studies 
after  fifteen,  twenty,  or  twenty-five  years  of  more  or 
less  disuse.f     There  is  need  of  intelligent  and  practical 

*The  Commissioners  say  (Third  Annual  Report)  that  out  of  more 
than  17,000  individual  examinations,  not  more  than  six  or  seven  un- 
worthy persons  have  been  discovered  on  the  records.  "  The  '  Records ' 
are  the  books  in  which  the  names  of  applicants  for  examination  are 
entered.  The  '  Registers'  are  the  books  in  which  the  names  of  those 
found  eligible  for  appointment  after  examination  are  entered. 

f  The  Commissioners'  Report  for  1885  says  business  experience  is 
almost  the  exact  equivalent  of  a  fresh  recollection  of  studies, 


32       WASHINGTON",  GALLATIN,  JEFFERSON,  EVERETT. 

discrimination  here.  In  private  business  uneducated 
men  do  not  apply  for  work  which  requires  educated 
men.  It  would  be  useless.  But  in  public  business  the 
case  is  different.  This  fact  alone  justifies  competitive 
examinations. 

The  requirement  of  educational  qualifications  on  the 
part  of  officeholders  is  not  new  in  this  government,  nor 
perhaps  in  any  other.  Washington  says  ("  Writings," 
ix,  461)  :  "  The  nominator  ought  to  be  governed  pri- 
marily by  the  abilities  which  are  the  most  peculiarly 
adapted  to  the  nature  and  duties  of  the  office  which  is 
to  be  filled."  In  his  last  message  to  Congress  Washing- 
ton recommended  the  establishment  of  both  a  Military 
School  and  a  National  University,  the  specific  object  of 
the  latter  to  be,  he  said,  "  the  education  of  our  youth  in 
the  science  of  government.  In  a  republic,"  he  con- 
tinues, "  what  species  of  knowledge  can  be  equally  im- 
portant?" (Benton's  Abridged  Debates,  ii,  16.)  His 
admonition,  in  his  Farewell  Address,  to  promote  "  the 
general  diffusion  of  knowledge"  is  familiar  to  every 
school-boy. 

Albert  Gallatin,  writing  to  Jefferson,  in  1801,  said  : 
"  So  far  as  respects  subordinate  offices,  talent  and  integ- 
rity are  to  be  the  only  qualifications."  Jefferson,  in  re- 
ply, said  :  "  Talent  and  worth  alone  are  to  be  inquired 
into."     (Adams's  Gallatin,  p.  279.) 

Edward  Everett,  in  an  address  on  "  The  importance 
of  Education  in  a  Republic,"  says  ("  Orations,"  &c.,  ii, 
319,  320):  "But  I  have  not  yet  named  all  the  civil 
duties  for  which  education  is  needed  as  the  preparatory 
discipline.  The  various  official  trusts  in  society  are  to 
be  filled,  from  a  Commission  of  the  Peace  to  the  place 
of  Chief  Justice  ;  from  a  Constable  up  to  the  President 
of  the  United  States.  The  sphere  of  duty  of  some  of 
these  functionaries  is  narrow  j  of  others,  large  and  in- 


EDirCATION   CONGENIAL   WITH    REPUBLICANISM.        33 

expressibly  responsible  ;  of  none,  insignificant.  Taken 
together,  they  make  up  the  administration  of  free  gov- 
ernment— the  greatest  merely  temporal  interest  of  civil- 
ized man.  There  are  three  courses,  between  which  we 
must  choose.  We  must  have  officers  unqualified  for 
their  duties  ;  or  we  must  educate  a  privileged  class  to 
monopolize  the  honors  and  emoluments  of  place  ;  or  we 
must  establish  such  a  system  of  general  education  as 
will  furnish  a  supply  of  well-informed,  intelligent,  and 
respectable  citizens,  in  every  part  of  the  country  and  in 
every  walk  of  life,  capable  of  discharging  the  trusts 
which  the  people  may  devolve  upon  them.  The  topic 
is  of  great  compass,  but  I  cannot  dwell  upon  it.  It  is 
superfluous  to  say  which  of  the  three  courses  is  most 
congenial  with  the  spirit  of  republicanism." 

Similar  citations  might  be  made  from  many  other 
statesmen,  but  they  arc  certainly  superfluous.  Some 
statesmen's  deeds  speak  louder  than  words  ;  as,  for  ex- 
ample. Governor  Samuel  J.  Tilden's  late  posthumous 
gift  for  educational  purposes. 

The  New  York  Civil  Service  Commission  says  (Second 
Report,  1885,  p.  20)  :  "  The  competitive  method  is  sup- 
ported by  reasons  so  obvious  and  cogent  that  argument 
in  its  favor  seems  almost  superfluous.  Competition  is 
the  law  of  nature,  and  is  universal  in  its  application.  It 
prevails  in  every  department  of  human  activity,  and  is 
the  test  by  which  men  are  measured  in  every  profession, 
calling,  and  sphere.  It  is  the  only  absolutely  democratic 
rule,  and  therefore  consonant  with  the  spirit  of  our  in- 
stitutions, founded  on  the  political  equality  of  men.  By 
eliminating  the  elements  of  favoritism,  nepotism,  and 
partisan  recompense,  it  stimulates  manly  aspirations, 
develops  independence  in  thought  and  character,  pro- 
tects the  equal  rights  of  every  citizen,  and  secures  fair 
play  against  selfishness  and  presumptuous  mediocrity." 


34  COMPETITIVE   EXAMINATIONS   IN   IRELAND. 

Again  the  Commission  says  (Same  Report,  p.  24)  i 
"  It  is  rapidly  becoming  clear  that  the  system  of  com- 
petitive examinations  is  easily  applicable  to  almost  every 
subordinate  post,  however  high,  in  every  branch  of  the 
public  service,  State  or  municipal.  In  Ireland  the  four 
national  examiners  of  the  public  schools  are  selected  by 
competitive  examination,  and  a  note  of  the  subjects  for 
examination  gives  an  idea  of  the  varied  scientific  and 
scholarly  attainments  in  v^^hich  the  applicants  must  be 
versed." 

And  again  the  Commission  says  (Fourth  Report,  1887, 
p.  26)  :  "  One  advantage  of  the  competitive  system,  on 
which  stress  has  been  laid  by  a  Professor  of  Trinity 
College,  Dublin,  is  in  its  avoidance  of  animosities  aris- 
ing from  religious  differences,  which,  he  remarked  some 
thirty  years  ago,  *  are  greatly  embittered  by  the  patron- 
age system.' " 

Mayor  Seth  Low  of  Brooklyn,  New  York,  in  1885,  said 
of  the  competitive  system  :  "  There  is  a  fairness  and 
openness  about  it  peculiarly  American,  and  smacking  of 
all  that  is  best  in  the  American  love  of  fair  play  and  the 
American  demand  for  equal  treatment  of  all  citizens." 

Governor  David  B.  Hill  says  (An.  Message,  1886)  : 
"  Open  competition  rests  on  the  solid  basis  of  equal 
rights  and  fair  play,  and  is  a  principle  so  thoroughly 
democratic  in  its  character,  so  completely  in  harmony 
with  the  theory  of  our  institutions  and  the  spirit  of  our 
people,  that  the  method  would  seem  to  commend  itself 
to  universal  approval.  When  merit  alone,  ascertained 
by  fair  competition,  is  recognized  as  the  ground  of  ap- 
pointment and  promotion,  the  equity  and  propriety  of 
the  mode  are  self-evident  and  require  no  defense.  *  *  * 
It  is  besides  a  constant  stimulus  to  the  better  education 
and  training  of  the  people,  and  a  recognition  of  the 
utility  of  our  common  schools,  sustained  at  the  public 


GOOD  EFFECT  OF  THE  PROBATIONABY  TERM.    35 

exj^ense,  and  an  incentive  for  the  best  men  to  seek  the 
public  service." 

Collector  William  H.  Robertson,  writing  Dec.  8,  1883, 
says  (First  Rept.  New  York  C.  S.  Com.,  p.  266)  :  "  For 
several  years  the  civil  service  system  has  been  in  force 
in  the  Custom  House  at  this  Port,  and  the  results  are 
higlily  gratifying  to  its  friends.  The  appointments  are 
made  upon  competitive  examination  wherever  it  is  prac- 
ticable to  do  so.  No  wiser  or  safer  rule  could  be  de- 
vised for  filling  these  offices." 

Postmaster  Henry  G.  Pearson  of  New  York,  who 
also  believes  in  the  wisdom  of  competitive  tests,  says 
(Same  Report,  p.  271)  :"  I  do  not  desire,  however,  to 
be  understood  as  maintaining  that  the  system  of  ap- 
pointment through  competitive  examination  is  a  never- 
failinff  means  of  securincj  the  services  of  none  but  the 
most  efficient  and  deserving  for  the  performance  of  the 
public  business.  In  spite  of  all  precautions,  it  is  and 
has  been  possible  for  idle,  intemperate,  dishonest,  and 
careless  persons  to  obtain  employment  under  that  sys- 
tem. But  the  cases  have  been  rare  in  which  those 
defects  have  not  been  discovered  before  the  expiration 
of  the  six  months'  term  of  probation,  and  the  unfaithful 
or  incompetent  servant  dismissed." 

Silas  W.  Burt,  who  speaks  from  experience  as  Naval 
Officer  of  the  Port  of  New  York  and  also  Chief  Exam- 
iner of  the  New  York  Civil  Service  Commission,  says 
(Second  Rept.  N.  Y.  C.  S.  Com.,  p.  47)  :  "  Open  compe- 
tition gives  the  broadest  scope  of  choice,  determines 
with  substantial  accuracy  the  relative  fitness  of  all  who 
apply,  and  puts  on  record  all  the  transactions,  with  their 
details." 

As  early  as  1881,  two  years  before  the  passage  of  the 
civil  service  law,  the  New  York  Chamber  of  Commerce, 
whose  members'  business  connection  with  Custom  House 


S6        N.  Y.   CHAMBER  COMMEliCE,  WEBSTEtt,   GODKIN. 

officials  makes  them  eminently  qualified  to  judge  of  their 
merits,  passed  the  following  among  other  resolutions : 

Resolved,  That  in  the  judgment  of  this  Chamber  the 
system  of  examinations  for  appointment  to  place  in  the 
Custom  House,  which  has  ruled  during  the  last  few 
years,  has  been  of  substantial  value  to  the  mercantile 
community,  and  is,  in  their  eyes,  of  great  importance. 

Resolved,  That  this  Chamber  hereby  instructs  its 
Committee  on  Foreign  Commerce  and  the  Revenue 
Laws  to  wait  upon  the  new  Collector,  when  he  shall  be 
installed,  with  a  copy  of  these  resolutions,  and  to  press 
upon  his  attention  the  importance  of  their  subject- 
matter. 

The  following  maxim  of  Webster  is  similar  in  princi- 
ple to  competitive  examinations  (iii,  4)  :  "  Nothing  is 
more  unfounded  than  the  notion  that  any  man  has  a 
right  to  an  office.  This  must  depend  on  the  choice  of 
others,  and  consequently  on  the  opinions  of  others,  in 
relation  to  his  fitness  and  qualification  for  office." 

Edwin  L.  Godkin  says  ("  Danger  of  an  Officeholding 
Aristocracy,"  p.  14)  :  "  It  may  be  laid  down  as  one  of 
the  maxims  of  the  administrative  art,  that  no  public 
officer  can  ever  take  the  right  view  of  his  office,  or  of 
liis  relation  to  the  people  whom  he  serves,  who  feels 
that  he  has  owed  his  appointment  to  any  qualification 
but  his  fitness,  or  holds  it  by  any  tenure  but  that  of 
faithful  performance.  No  code  of  rules  can  take  the 
place  of  this  feeling.  No  shortening  of  the  term  can 
take  its  place." 

So  far  as  my  researches  go,  Commissioner  of  Patents 
S.  S.  Fisher  has  the  honor  of  being  the  first  person  to 
practice  the  system  of  competitive  examinations  in  this 
country.  He  began  them  in  1869,  and  his  example  was 
followed  by  most  if  not  all  of  his  successors  in  the 


MSHEli   AND    THOltAS    AS    PIONEERS.  37 

Patent  Office.  Colonel  Fisher,  who  was  a  well-known 
patent  lawyer,  accepted  office  more  to  accommodate 
President  Grant  than  anything  else.  But  as  his  profes- 
sion was  more  remunerative  than  his  office,  he  resigned 
at  the  end  of  eighteen  months. 

John  L.  Thomas,  Collector  of  the  Port  of  Baltimore, 
instituted,  in  1809,  strict  non-competitive  examinations 
in  the  Baltimore  Custom  House.  The  system  was  so 
satisfactory  that  his  two  successors  in  office  continued 
it.  When  Mr.  Thomas  was  again  appointed  Collector, 
in  1877,  he  found  that  all  the  clerks,  with  three  or  four 
exceptions,  whom  he  had  appointed  between  1869  and 
1873  had  been  retained  ;  and  when  he  left  the  office,  in 
1882,  they  were  still  there.  (Senate  Report  No.  576, 
for  18S2,  pp.  179,  182.) 

Silas  W.  Burt  instituted  competitive  examinations 
for  promotion  among  the  employes  in  the  New  York 
Naval  Office  in  1871.  This  was  on  his  own  responsibil- 
ity. In  1872  he  began  competitive  examinations  under 
the  Grant  rules  for  general  admission  to  the  service. 
In  the  same  year  Postmaster  Patrick  H.  Jones  began 
competitive  examinations  in  the  New  York  Postoffice. 
These  were  continued  by  his  successor  in  office,  Thomas 
L.  James,  in  1873.  In  1879  Mr.  James  improved  the 
system,  and  issued  "  Rules  governing  appointment  and 
promotion  in  the  New  York  Postoffice." 

Collector  Chester  A.  Arthur,  who  was  appointed  in 
1871,  introduced  radical  changes  in  the  New  York  Cus- 
tom House.  Mr.  Eaton  says  ("  Term  and  Tenure  of 
Office,"  p.  82)  that  in  five  years  Mr.  Arthur  made  only 
144  removals  as  against  1,678  during  the  preceding  five 
years.  Mr.  Arthur  advocated  as  well  as  practiced  re- 
form in  the  civil  service,  as  is  shown  in  Chapter  VII  of 
this  work. 


CHAPTER    III. 

SOME   OF   THE   LAW'S   PROMISES. 

Reforms  of  priceless  value  Probable. — The  danger  of  Bribery  at  Elec- 
tions.— Opinions  thereon  of  Messrs.  Buchanan,  Harrison,  Benton, 
Jefferson,  Barton,  Bell,  and  Graves. — The  chief  English  Election 
Laws  from  1275  to  1888. 

An  honest  and  intelligent  enforcement  of  the  civil 
service  law  promises  to  have  numerous  beneficial  effects, 
some  of  which  are  more  or  less  indirect.  This  is  nat- 
ural. A  good  law  not  only  aids  in  and  leads  to  other 
reforms,  but  is  sometimes  the  parent  of  other  good  laws. 
Further,  it  creates  a  general  spirit  of  reform. 

It  promises,  by  securing  the  services  of  men  of  busi- 
ness as  well  as  intellectual  ability,  to  materially  in- 
crease, if  not  double,  the  efficiency  of  the  civil  service. 
In  fact  this  has  been  partly  accomplished  already.  In- 
crease of  efficiency  will  naturally  lead  to  perfection  of 
system,  and  perfection  of  system  will  naturally  lead  to 
economy.  Are  efficiency  and  system  probable,  or,  in  a 
great  degree,  even  possible,  when  officeholders  are  ap- 
pointed chiefly  on  account  of  their  politics,  and  without 
much  if  any  regard  to  their  ability  to  discharge  the 
peculiar  duties  of  their  offices,  and  who,  for  obvious  rea- 
sons, take  more  interest  in  politics  than  in  their  official 
business  ?  * 

It  promises  to  aid  in  purifying  and  elevating  politics, 
and  to  thereby  induce  and  encourage  men  of  character 
and  ability  to  take  part  in  the  affairs  of  state.  It  was 
by  such  men  that  the  government  was  founded,  and  it 


HOW  TO  STRENGTHEN  BEPUBLICAN  INSTITUTIONS.       39 

is  only  by  such  that  it  can  be  preserved.  Hence  the 
necessity  of  using  any  and  every  means  to  thwart  the 
bold  and  violent  men  whom  Franklin  warned  us  would 
thrust  themselves  into  our  government  and  be  our 
rulers. 

It  has  materially  interfered  with  and  promises  to  ruin 
what,  for  lack  of  a  better  name,  may  be  called  the  office 
brokerage  business,  the  stock  in  trade  of  which  has 
heretofore  consisted  rather  in  the  promise  than  the  be- 
stowal of  office.  When  there  are  fewer  offices  to  either 
promise  or  bestow,  the  evil  will  be  abated  ;  and  when 
there  are  none  at  all,  it  will  cease  altogether. 

It  promises  to  stimulate  and  lead  men  to  vote  for  ' 
principle  —  principle,  the  pedestal  on  which  the  nionu-, 
ment  of  republican  institutions  rests!  —  principle,  the' 
life-blood  of  the  body-politic !  When  men  vote  for 
principle,  they  vote  to  refresh,  preserve,  strengthen, 
deepen,  broaden,  and  spread  republican  institutions. 
This  is  as  unquestionable  as  is  the  opposite  proposition 
that  when  they  vote  from  purely  selfish  motives,  they 
vote  to  undermine  and  weaken  republican  institutions, 
and  to  sooner  or  later  put  pirates  in  command  of  the 
ship  of  state.  From  Alderman  to  President  men  should 
vote  for  principle.  And  voting  for  a  man  of  principle 
is  voting  for  principle.  Officeholders  themselves  can 
now  so  vote,  for,  as  before  said,  they  are  independent  of 
politicians.  Tliis  is  well,  because  it  is  not  only  proper 
to  so  vote,  but  a  respectful  independence,  even  of  office- 
holding  itself,  is  both  desirable  and  commendable. 

It  promises  to  at  least  ameliorate  an  evil  that  threat- 
ens the  most  direful  ultimate  results,  namely,  bribery  at 
elections.  Even  the  amelioration  of  this  body-politic 
cancer  is  a  matter  of  importance,  for  in  the  course  of 
time,  with  the  aid  of  and  in  conjunction  with  other  re- 
forms, it  may  be  practically  eradicated.    The  nation  can 


40        tii:fi  LAW  aids  another  needed  reform. 

stand  the  sporadic  and  local  corruptions  that  are  the 
bane  of  private  as  well  as  public  business,  but  it  cannot 
stand,  as  a  repuhlic,  the  general,  far-reaching,  and  mul- 
tiform evils  that  continual  bribery  at  elections  will 
cause.  * 

If  the  cause  of  corruption  at  elections  be  removed, 
there  will  be  no  corruption.  As  official  patronage,  either 
direct  or  indirect,  is  a  great  if  not  perhaps  the  chief 
cause  of  corrupt  elections,  it  logically  follows  that  the 
less  patronage  there  is,  the  less  corruption  there  will  be. 
Therefore  if  all,  or  nearly  all,  of  the  non-elective  public 
offices  were  distributed  strictly  as  rewards  of  merit,  and 
without  regard  to  politics,  there  would  be  far  less  cor- 
ruption at  elections.  This  plan  ought  besides  to  mate- 
rially increase  public  interest  in  elections,  in  which  of 
course  too  much  care  and  interest  cannot  be  taken. 
The  civil  service  law  will  aid  in  accomplishing  this 
reform  ;  and  in  this  way  it  will  tend  to  renew  and 
strengthen  public  confidence  not  only  in  the  fidelity  and 
sacredness  of  the  ballot,  but  in  the  stability  of  the  gov- 
ernment itself. 

President  Buchanan,  writing  to  the  Pittsburg  Cen- 
tenary Celebration,  in  1858,  said  (Reports  Coms.  H.  of 
Rep.,  36th  Cong.,  1st  Sess.,  1859-60,  v,  25)  :  "  We  have 

*  Webster  says  (iv,  179,  180):  "The  principle  of  republican  govern- 
ments, we  are  taught,  is  public  virtue ;  and  whatever  tends  either  to 
corrupt  this  principle,  to  debase  it,  or  to  weaken  its  force,  tends,  in  the 
same  degree,  to  the  final  overthrow  of  such  governments.  *  *  * 
Whenever  personal,  individual,  or  selfish  motives  influence  the  conduct 
of  individuals  on  public  questions,  they  affect  the  safety  of  the  whole 
system.  When  these  motives  run  deep  and  wide,  and  come  in  serious 
conflict  with  higher,  purer,  and  more  patriotic  purposes,  they  greatly 
endanger  that  system ;  and  all  will  admit  that,  if  they  become  general 
and  overwhelming,  so  that  all  public  principle  is  lost  sight  of,  and  every 
election  becomes  a  mere  scramble  for  office,  the  system  inevitably  must 
full." 


VENALITY  VEESU8  LIBERTY.  41 

never  heard  until  within  a  recent  period  of  the  employ- 
ment of  money  to  carry  elections.  Should  this  practice 
increase  until  the  voters  and  their  representatives  in  the 
State  and  National  legislatures  shall  become  infected, 
the  fountain  of  the  government  will  be  poisoned  at  its 
source,  and  we  must  end,  as  history  proves,  in  a  military 
despotism.  *  *  *  When  the  people  become  venal, 
there  is  a  canker  at  the  root  of  tlie  tree  of  liberty  which 
must  cause  it  to  wither  and  die." 

President  Harrison,  in  1841,  in  a  circular  prepared  by 
his  Secretary  of  State,  Daniel  Webster,  said  (Civil  Ser- 
vice Reform  League  Proceedings,  1885,  p.  15)  :  "  I  will 
remove  no  incumbent  *  *  *  who  has  faithfully  and 
honestly  acquitted  himself  of  the  duties  of  his  office, 
except  where  such  officer  has  been  guilty  of  an  active 
partisanship,  *  *  *  thereby  bringing  the  patronage  o"f 
the  government  in  conflict  with  the  freedom  of  elec- 
tions." 

Senator  Thomas  H.  Benton,  in  reporting,  in  1826,  on 
the  "  expediency  of  reducing  the  patronage  of  the  Exec- 
utive," said  (Appendix  to  Gales  &  SeAton's  Debates  in 
Congress,  1820,  p.  137):  "The  power  of  patronage, 
unless  checked,  must  go  on  increasing  until  Federal  in- 
fluence will  predominate  in  elections  as  completely  as 
British  influence  predominates  in  the  elections  of  Scot- 
laud  and  Ireland.  *  *  *  <  Xhe  President  wants  my 
vote,  and  I  want  his  patronage.  I  will  vote  as  he  wishes, 
and  he  will  give  me  the  office  I  wish  for.'  What  will 
this  be  but  the  government  of  one  man  ?  and  what  is 
the  government  of  one  man  but  a  monarchy  ?" 

Thomas  Jefferson,  in  a  letter  to  Governor  Thomas 
McKean  of  Pennsylvania,  in  1801,  says  ("  Writings," 
iv,  350)  :  "  The  event  of  the  election  is  still  i9i  dubio. 
A  strong  portion  in  the  House  of  Representatives  will 
prevent  an  election  if  they  can.     I  rather  believe  they 


42  PURE   ELECTIONS   THE   PILLLAES   OF   LIBERTY. 

will  not  be  able  to  do  it,  as  there  are  six  individuals  of 
moderate  character,  any  one  of  whom,  coming  over  to 
the  Republican  vote,  will  make  a  ninth  State.  Till  this 
is  known,  it  is  too  soon  for  me  to  say  what  should  be 
done  in  such  atrocious  cases  as  those  you  mention,  of 
Federal  officers  obstructing  the  operation  of  the  State 
governments.  One  thing  I  will  say,  that,  as  to  the 
future,  interference  with  elections,  whether  of  the  State 
or  general  government,  by  officers  of  the  latter,  should 
be  deemed  cause  of  removal,  because  the  constitutional 
remedy  by  the  elective  principle  becomes  nothing,  if  it 
may  be  smothered  by  the  enormous  patronage  of  the 
general  government.  How  far  it  may  be  ^practicable, 
prudent,  or  proper  to  look  back,  is  too  great  a  question 
to  be  decided  but  by  the  united  wisdom  of  the  whole 
administration  when  formed." 

Mr.  Jefferson  issued  a  circular  to  the  officers  of  the 
government  after  his  election,  wherein  he  said  he  had 
"seen  with  dissatisfaction  officers  of  the  general  gov- 
ernment taking,  on  various  occasions,  active  parts  in  the 
election  of  public  functionaries,  whether  of  the  general 
or  State  governments."  He  furtlier  said  that  an  officer 
should  "  not  attemj^t  to  influence  the  votes  of  others, 
nor  to  take  any  part  in  the  business  of  electioneering, 
that  being  deemed  inconsistent  with  the  Constitution 
and  his  duties  to  it." 

Senator  David  Barton  of  Missouri  says  (Gales  &  Sea- 
ton's  Debates,  1830,  vol.  vi,  pt.  i,  p.  462)  :  "The  free- 
dom and  purity  of  elections  are  as  essential  to  our  liber- 
ties as  the  pillars  to  the  dome  they  support." 

Representative  John  Bell  of  Tennessee  (afterward 
United  States  Senator,  and,  in  1860,  a  prominent  candi- 
date for  the  presidency),  introduced,  in  1837,  "A  bill 
to  secure  the  freedom  of  elections."  In  the  course  of  a 
most  remarkable  speech  he  said  (G.  &  S.'s  Debates^  vol, 


SPOILS  SYSTEM  TOO  DANGEROUS  EVEN  FOR  WAR.       43 

xiii,  pt.  ii,  pp.  1455,  1462,  1475,  1478)  :  "  I  presume,  sir, 
it  will  scarcely  be  denied  that  a  large  proportion  of  the 
officers  of  the  Federal  government,  from  the  President 
down  to  the  lowest  grade  of  persons  employed  in  its 
service,  have  interfered  of  late  in  all  Federal  elections, 
directly,  openly,  and  industriously.  *  *  *  Offices  and 
employments  have  been  given  as  the  wages  of  political 
profligacy — the  rewards  of  hireling  service  in  support 
of  favorite  candidates.  *  *  *  The  abuse  of  patronage 
is  the  Pandora's  box  of  our  system.  It  is  the  original 
sin  of  our  political  condition,  to  which  every  other  sin 
of  the  times  may  be  fairly  ascribed.  *  *  *  It  is  labor 
thrown  away  to  pursue  with  research,  however  relent- 
less and  penetrating,  the  authors  of  corruption  in  the 
public  offices,  Avhile  the  prolific  j^arent  of  all  is  permit- 
ted to  survive.  *  *  *  It  is  *  *  *  not  so  much  the 
aggregate  amount  of  patronage  within  the  control  of 
the  government  as  it  is  the  want  of  proper  legal  limita- 
tions and  restrictions  upon  the  use  of  it,  in  the  hands  of 
the  Executive,  which  is  to  be  dreaded  and  guarded 
against.  All  other  dangers  in  the  operation  of  the  gov- 
ernment will  wear  out  by  time,  and  are  of  small  moment 
in  comparison  with  this  of  patronage.  *  *  *  If,  in 
war  between  civilized  nations,  the  spoils  principle  is 
regarded  as  too  dangerous  for  the  general  safety  of 
property  and  society,  how  much  more  dangerous  and 
insufferable  must  such  a  principle  be  when  applied  to 
the  contests  for  power  between  political  parties  in  a 
free  government  ?"* 

*  Mr.  Bell  quotes  copiously  from  English  history,  lie  says  (p.  1472) 
that,  in  1779,  "  A  Lord  Lieutenant  of  a  county,  an  officer  appointed  by 
the  Crown,  was  detected  in  writing  to  his  friends  in  the  county  of 
Southampton,  urging  them  to  give  their  support  to  his  friend,  who  was 
also  the  government  candidate  for  Parlian^nt.  When  his  conduct  was 
brought  before  the  House  of  CommonSj  and  some  of  the  letter^  whicU 


44         A  MEMOEABLE  PARLIAMENTARY  EESOLCTTION. 

Representative  Wm.  J.  Graves  of  Kentucky,  speak- 
ing of  Mr.  Bell's  freedom  of  elections  bill,  said  (Same 
Debates,  pp.  1517,  1518,  1525)  :  "In  1829  the  attention 
of  this  nation  was  called  to  this  subject,  in  the  most  sol- 
emn manner,  by  General  Jackson,  in  his  first  inaugural 
address,  in  which  he  employs  the  following  language  : 
*  The  recent  demonstrations  of  public  sentiment  inscribe 
on  the  list  of  executive  duties,  in  characters  too  legible 
to  be  overlooked,  the  task  of  reform,  which  will  require 
particularly  the  correction  of  abuses  that  have  brought 
the  patronage  of  the  Federal  government  into  conflict 
with  the  freedom  of  elections.'  *  *  *  This  was  the 
precept  of  President  Jackson  when  first  elected.  But, 
incredible  to  tell,  in  the  first  term  of  his  administration 
he  hurled  from  ofiice  between  nine  hundred  and  one 
thousand  ofiicers.  *  *  *  Just  as  well  might  General 
Jackson  march  the  regular  army  to  the  doors  of  this 
capitol,  and  demand  the  head  of  every  member  or  Sen- 
ator who  has  dared  to  speak  the  truth  of  him,  as  to 

he  had  written  exhibited,  Lord  North  ventured  to  say  that  he  thought 
the  case  presented  no  great  cause  of  alarm.  Instantly,  and  it  would 
appear  from  all  sides  of  the  House,  there  arose  such  indignant  clamors 
that  it  was  some  time  before  order  could  be  restored,  and  Lord  North 
was  obliged  to  explain  and  qualify  his  meaning.  But  the  most  decisive 
pio:>f  of  the  spirit  which  prevailed  upon  the  subject,  even  in  corrupt 
tiuies,  and  the  odium  in  which  all  intermeddling  of  officeholders  in  elec- 
tions has  ever  been  held  in  Great  Britain,  is  to  be  found  in  the  follow- 
ing resolution,  which  the  House  of  Commons  adopted  on  that  occasion 
(1779),  without  a  division,  and  without  a  dissenting  voice: 

"  '  Resolved,  That  it  is  highly  criminal  for  any  minister  or  ministers, 
or  any  other  servant  of  the  Crown  in  Great  Britain,  directly  or  indi- 
rectly to  make  use  of  the  power  of  his  office  in  order  to  influence  tlv« 
election  of  members  of  Parliament ;  and  that  an  attempt  to  exercise 
that  influence  is  an  attack  upon  the  dignity,  the  honor,  and  the  inde- 
pendence of  Parliament,  an  infringement  of  the  rights  and  liberties  of 
the  people,  and  an  attempt  to  sap  the  basis  of  our  free  and  happy  Con- 
Btitutiou,' " 


MH.  CUIiTiS  F0EMULATE9  CITIL  SERVICE  KtJLES.       iS 

wreak  his  vengeance,  or  that  of  Some  unprincipled  sub- 
altern, upon  the  helpless  officer,  by  hurling  him  from  his 
station,  for  daring  to  discharge  his  constitutional  right 
at  the  polls.  Yes,  a  thousand  times  better  would  it  be 
for  the  country,  for  in  the  one  case  the  people  would 
see  and  understand  the  object  of  the  movement,  and 
would  fly  to  the  rescue,  and  deal  out  vengeance  on  such 
a  blood-thirsty  despot ;  whilst  in  the  other  case  the 
same  object  is  attained  by  the  concentration  of  all  power 
in  the  hands  of  one  man,  but  in  a  secret,  sly,  and  insin- 
uating mode,  which  it  seems  the  acuteness  of  the  public 
vision  has  not  yet  so  clearly  discerned." 

George  William  Curtis  lays  down  the  following  fun- 
damental principles  for  the  general  guidance  of  office- 
holders ("Harper's  Weekly,"  Nov.  19,  1887):  "When 
a  man  accepts  public  office  he  necessarily  surrenders  the 
exercise  of  certain  private  rights  as  a  citizen.  He  is 
morally  bound  to  promote  public  respect  for  the  office 
that  he  holds  and  personal  confidence  in  himself.  He  is 
bound  in  every  proper  way  to  prevent  all  suspicion  that 
he  misuses  his  position  either  for  a  personal  or  a  partisan 
object.  He  is  indeed  a  member  of  a  party,  and  by  a 
party  he  is  nominated  and  elected.  But  he  administers 
his  office  not  for  the  benefit  of  a  party,  but  of  the  peo- 
ple ;  and  while  upon  fitting  occasions  and  in  a  becoming 
manner  he  may  justly  profefes  his  confidence  in  the  po- 
litical principles  that  he  holds,  he  cannot  without  gross 
improj^riety  descend  to  the  mere  details  of  party  conten- 
tion, and  endeavor  by  the  weight  of  his  official  position 
to  promote  the  interest  of  individual  party  candidates." 

As  before  said,  too  much  care  and  interest  cannot  be 
taken  in  elections.  The  recognition  of  this  fact  no 
doubt  accounts,  to  a  great  extent,  for  the  wonderful 
stability  of  the  English  government,  a  stability  that  has 
carried  it  through  war  after  -war,  civil  as  well  as  foreign, 


and  even  revolutions.  The  following  extracts  from  the 
chief  election  laws  passed  by  that  government,  show 
the  jealous  care  with  which  it  has  guarded,  defended, 
and  perfected  its  elective  franchise  system.  Every  act 
was  passed  for  the  purpose  of  remedying  dangerous 
evils. 

In  1275  (3  Edward  I)  it  was  provided:  "And  be- 
cause  elections  ought  to  be  free,  the  King  commandeth 
upon  great  forfeiture,  that  no  man  by  force  of  ai-ms,  nor 
by  malice  or  menacing,  shall  disturb  any  to  make  free 
elections."     (The  Statutes  :  Revised  Edition,  i,  16.) 

In  1429  (8  Henry  VI,  1)  Parliament  passed  the  fol- 
lowing law  :  "  Item,  whereas  the  elections  of  knights  of 
shires  to  come  to  the  Parliaments  of  our  Lord  the  King, 
in  many  counties  of  the  realm  of  England,  have  now  of 
late  been  made  by  very  great,  outrageous,  and  excessive 
number  of  people  dwelling  within  the  same  counties  of 
the  realm  of  England,  of  the  which  most  part  was  of 
people  of  small  substance,  and  of  no  value,  whereof 
every  of  them  pretended  a  voice  equivalent,  as  to  such 
elections  to  be  made,  with  the  most  worthy  knights  and 
esquires,  dwelling  within  the  same  counties,  whereby 
manslaughters,  riots,  batteries,  and  divisions  among  the 
gentlemen,  and  other  people  of  the  same  counties,  shall 
very  likely  rise  and  be,  unless  convenient  and  due  rem- 
edy be  provided  in  this  behalf  ;  our  Lord  the  King, 
considering  the  premises,  hath  provided,  ordained,  and 
established,  by  authority  of  this  present  Parliament, 
That  the  knights  of  the  shires  to  be  chosen  within  the 
same  realm  of  England  to  come  to  the  Parliaments  of 
our  Lord  the  King  hereafter  to  be  holden,  shall  be 
chosen  in  every  county  of  the  realm  of  England  by  peo- 
ple dwelling  and  resident  in  the  same  counties,  whereof 
every  one  of  them  shall  have  free  land  or  tenement  to 
the  value  of  forty  shillings  by  the  year  at  the  least 


P^HtAtflt  fOT3L  FALSE  ilLECTlON  RETURNS.  4  If 

above  all  charges  ;  and  such  as  have  the  greatest  num- 
ber of  them  that  may  expend  forty  shillings  by  year  and 
above,  as  afore  is  said,  shall  be  returned  by  the  sheriffs 
of  every  county,  knights  for  the  Parliament,  by  inden- 
tures sealed  between  the  said  sheriffs  and  the  said 
choosers  so  to  be  made."  *  *  *  (Ruffhead's  Statutes 
at  Large,  i,  481.) 

In  1444  (23  Henry  YI),  owing  to  sheriffs  returning 
"  knights,  citizens,  and  burgesses  *  *  *  which  were 
never  duly  chosen,"  and  other  fraudulent  practices,  a 
stringent  law  was  passed,  which,  among  other  things, 
imposed  a  fine  of  £100  to  the  King  and  £100  to  the 
aggrieved  person  for  false  election  returns. 

In  1690  (2  William  and  Mary,  1)  Parliament  passed 
"  An  act  to  declare  the  riglit  and  freedom  of  election  of 
members  to  serve  in  Parliament  for  the  Cinque  Ports  " 
as  follows  :  "  Whereas  the  election  of  members  to  serve 
in  Parliament  ought  to  be  free  ;  and  whereas  the  late 
Lord  Wardens  of  the  Cinque  Ports  have  j^retended 
unto,  and  claimed  as  of  right,  a  power  of  nominating 
and  recommending  to  each  of  the  said  Cinque  Ports, 
the  two  ancient  towns,  and  their  respective  members, 
one  person  whom  they  ought  to  elect  to  serve  as  a  baron 
or  member  of  Parliament  for  such  respective  port,  an- 
cient town,  or  member,  contrary  to  the  ancient  usage, 
right,  and  freedom  of  elections,  *  *  *  be  it  therefore 
declared  *  *  *  that  all  such  nominations  or  recom- 
mendations were  and  are  contrary  to  the  laws  and  con- 
stitutions of  this  realm,  and  for  the  future  shall  be  so 
deemed  and  construed.."     (Ruffhead,  &c.,  iii,  422.) 

In  1696*  (7  and  8  William  III,  4)  Parliament  passed 


*  T.  B.  Macaulay,  writing  of  this  period,  snys  ("  History  of  England," 
iv,  540) .  "  It  was  something  new  and  monstrous  to  see  a  trader  from 
Lombard  street,  who  had  no  tie  to  the  s.oU-«fc?QWt4«knd,  and  whose 

/  ^^'  OF  *rHi? 
//rndTTT'ttTl^lTTV^ 


4d       koKEY  1^  ELECTIONS  IN  SIXTEEN  NiNEl*Y-Sl^. 

**  An  act  for  preventing  charge  and  expense  in  elec- 
tions of  members  to  serve  in  Parliament "  as  follows  : 
"  Whereas  grievous  complaints  are  made  *  *  *  ^f 
undue  elections  of  members  to  Parliament,  by  excessive 
and  exorbitant  expenses,  contrary  to  the  laws,  and    *    * 

*  dishonorable,  and  may  be  destructive  to  the  constitu- 
tion of  Parliaments,  *  *  *  be  it  enacted  *  *  *  that 
no  person  or  persons  hereafter  to  be  elected  to  serve  in 
Parliament,  *  *  *  shall  *  *  *  directly  or  indirectly 
give,  present,  or  allow  to  any  person  or  persons,  having 
voice  or  vote  in  such  election,  any  money,  meat,  drink, 
entertainment,  or  provision  *  *  *  to  or  for  such 
person  or  persons  *  *  *  i^  order  to  be  elected,  or 
for  being  elected,  to  serve  in  Parliament.  *  *  * 
^jj(j     *     *     *    ^Yiat  every  person  and  persons  so  giving 

*  *     *      are  hereby  declared  and  enacted  disabled  and 
incapacitated,  upon  such  election,  to  serve  in  Parlia-' 
ment."     (Ruffhead,  iii,  570.) 

During  the  same  year  Parliament  passed  "  An  act  for 
the  further  regulating  elections  of  members  to  serve  in 
Parliament,  and  for  the  preventing  irregular  proceed- 
ings of  sheriffs  and  other  officers  in  the  electing  and 
returning  such  members."  The  preamble  charges  that 
"  freeholders  and  others,  in  their  right  of  election,  as 
also  the  persons  by  them  elected  to  be  their  representa- 

wealth  was  entirely  personal  and  movable,  post  down  to  Devonshire  or 
Sussex  with  a  portmanteau  full  of  guineas,  offer  himself  as  a  candidate 
for  a  borough  in  opposition  to  a  neighboring  gentleman,  whose  ances- 
tors had  been  regularly  returned  ever  since  the  Wars  of  the  Roses,  and 
come  in  at  the  head  of  the  poll.  Yet  even  this  was  not  the  worst. 
More  than  one  seat  in  Parliament,  it  was  said,  had  been  bought  and 
sold  over  a  dish  of  coffee  at  Garraway's.  The  purchaser  had  not  been 
required  even  to  go  through  the  form  of  showing  himself  to  the  elec- 
tors. Without  leaving  his  counting  house  in  Cheapside,  he  had  been 
chosen  to  repr  jnt  a  place  which  he  bad  never  seen.  Such  things 
were  intolerable,"  "        " ' 


MeaVy  t'Ei^ALTY  ^on  coERtrpt  VoTiKa.  4d 

lives,  have  heretofore  been  greatly  injured  and  abused.'* 
(iii,  589.) 

In  1729  (2  George  II,  24)  Parliament  passed  "  An  act 
for  the  more  effectual  preventing  bribery  and  corrup- 
tion in  the  elections  of  members  to  serve  in  Parliament." 
The  elector's  oath  is  as  follows  :    "  I,  A.  B.,  do  swear 

*  *  *  I  have  not  received,  *  *  *  directly  or 
indirectly,  any  sum  or  sums  of  money,  office,  place,  or 
employment,  gift  or  reward  *  *  *  j^  order  to  give 
my  vote  at  this  election,  and  that  I  have  not  been 
before  polled  at  this  election."  The  presiding  officer 
had  to  administer  the  oath  or  forfeit  £50,  and  a  bribed 
voter  forfeited  £500,  and  was  forever  disfranchised  and 
treated  as  if  he  **  was  naturally  dead."     (v,  510.) 

In  1734  (7  George  II,  16)  a  stringent  act  was  passed 
"  for  the  better  regulating  the  election  of  members  to 
serve  in  the  House  of  Commons  for  that  part  of  Great 
Britain  called  Scotland ;  and  for  incapacitating  the 
judges  of  the  Court  of  Session,  Court  of  Justiciary,  and 
barons  of  the  Court  of  Exchequer,  in  Scotland,  to  be 
elected  or  to  sit  or  vote  as  members  of  the  House  of 
Commons."     (v,  051.) 

"  An  act  for  regulating  the  quartering  of  soldiers 
during  the  time  of  the  elections  of  members  to  serve  in 
Parliament,"  passed  in  1735,  required  that,  inasmuch  as 
"  all  elections  ought  to  be  free,"  all  soldiers  should  be 
removed  two  miles  from  the  place  of  election,    (v,  681.) 

By  "  An  act  for  the  better  regulating  of  elections," 
&c.,  passed  in  1746  (19  George  II,  28),  voters  are  re- 
quired to  swear  that  they  have  '*  a  freehold  estate    *     * 

*  of  the  clear  yearly  value  of  forty  shillings,  *  *  * 
and  that  such  freehold  estate  has  not  been  granted  or 
made  to  you  fraudulently,  on  purpose  to  qualify  you  to 
give  your  vote."     (vi,  312.) 

In  1782  (22  George  III,  41)  Parliament  passed  "An 
i 


50        FoiiTY  Tkdt^sAiJi)  voters  i^lsi'KAKCfliSEfi. 

act  for  the  better  securing  the  freedom  of  elections,'^ 
&c.,  which  disfranchised  excise,  customs,  and  postoffice 
employes  to  the  number  of  about  40,000.  A  violation 
of  the  law  entailed  forfeiture  of  office  and  a  fine  of 
£100.     (ix,  230.) 

The  passage  of  this  act  was  the  result  of  corruption 
among  the  officials  named.  It  remained  in  force  till 
1858,  when,  on  account  of  the  reforms  brought  about 
by  the  present  British  civil  service  law,  an  act  of  re- 
enfranchisement  was  passed.  It  is  a  consolation  to 
know  that  this  course  has  never  been  necessary  in  this 
country. 

In  1827  (7  and  8  George  IV,  37)  Parliament  passed 
"  An  act  to  make  further  regulations  for  preventing 
corrupt  practices  at  elections,"  &c.,  wherein  it  is  de- 
clared that  **if  any  person  shall,  either  during  any 
election,  *  *  *  or  within  six  calendar  months  previ- 
ous to  such  election,  or  within  fourteen  days  after  it 
shall  have  been  completed,  be  employed  at  such  election 
as  counsel,  agent,  attorney,  poll  clerk,  flagman,  or  in 
any  other  capacity,  for  the  purposes  of  such  election, 
and  shall  at  any  time,  either  before,  during,  or  after 
such  election,  accept  or  take,  *  *  *  for  or  in  consid- 
eration of  or  vrith  reference  to  such  employment,  any 
sum  or  sums  of  money,  retaining  fee,  office,  place,  or 
employment,  *  *  *  such  person  shall  be  deemed  in- 
capable of  voting  at  such  election,  and  his  vote,  if  given, 
shall  be  utterly  void  and  of  none  effect."     (xi,  126.) 

The  present  English  election  law,  passed  in  1872, 
which  is  founded  on  the  Australian  election  system,  is 
perhaps  the  best  law  of  its  kind  ever  devised.  William 
M.  Ivins  says  ("  Machine  Politics  and  Money  in  Elec- 
tions in  New  York  City,"  pp.  90,  91,  94,  95,  96)  :  "This 
act  provides  that  at  every  poll  at  an  election  the  vote 
ehall  be  given  by  ballot  j  that  the  ballot  of  each  voter 


iraJE   MODEL   ELE.CTION    LAW.  51 

shall  contain  the  names  and  description  of  all  the  candi- 
dates for  tlie  particular  office  for  which  he  is  voting, 
which  ballot-paper  has  a  number  printed  on  the  back  of 
it,  and  is  attached  to  a  stub,  or  *  counter  foil,'  as  it  is 
called,  with  the  same  number  printed  on  the  face  of  the 
stub.  *  *  *  ^\\  voters  are  registered  before  each 
election,  and  when  the  voter  has  registered,  he  is  given 
a  registration  number.  This  registration  number  is 
marked  on  the  stub  of  the  ballot  at  the  time  the  ballot 
is  delivered  to  him.     *     *     * 

"The  following  is  the  form  of  directions  for  the  guid- 
ance of  the  voter  in  voting,  which  is  required  by  the 
English  law  to  be  printed  in  conspicuous  characters  and 
placarded  in  every  polling-station  and  in  every  compart- 
ment of  every  2)olling  station  : 

"  *  The  voter  may  vote   for  candidates.      The 

voter  will  go  into  one  of  the  compartments,  and  with  a 
pencil  provided  in  the  compartment,  place  a  cross  on 
the  right-hand  side  opposite  the  name  of  each  candidate 
for  whom  he  votes.  The  voter  will  then  fold  up  the 
ballot-paper,  so  as  to  show  the  official  mark  on  the  back, 
and  leaving  the  compartment,  will,  without  showing  the 
front  of  the  paper  to  any  person,  show  the  official  mark* 
on  the  back  to  the  presiding  officer,  and  then,  in  the 
presence  of  the  presiding  officer,  put  the  paper  into  the 
ballot-box,  and  forthwith  quit  the  polling  station.  If 
the  voter  inadvertently  spoils  a  ballot  paper,  he  can 
return  it  to  the  officer,  who  will,  if  satisfied  of  such 
inadvertence,  give  him  another  paper. 

" '  If  the  voter  votes  for  more  than  candidates, 

or  places  any  mark  on  the  paper  by  which  he  may  be 
afterward  identified,  liis  ballot-paper  will  be  void  and 
will  not  be  counted. 

*  Election  ofTicers  are  required  to  keep  the  official  mark  secret,  aud  a 
ballot  cast  without  it  is  void. 


^2  SIR  HENRY  JAMES'S   GREAT  LAW. 

"  '  If  the  voter  takes  a  ballot-paper  out  of  the  polling- 
station,  or  deposits  in  the  ballot-box  any  other  paper 
than  the  one  given  him  by  the  officer,  he  will  be  guilty 
of  a  misdemeanor,  and  be  subject  to  imprisonment  for 
any  term,  with  or  without  hard  labor. 

"  ^  Note. — These  directions  shall  be  illustrated  by  ex- 
amples of  the  ballot-paper.'  " 

Notwithstanding  this  admirable  law,  the  elections,  on 
account  of  the  immense  and  corrupt  use  of  money,  often 
miscarried.  A  remedy  was  sought,  and  it  was  found  in 
the  Prevention  of  Corrupt  Practices  Act  of  1883-84,  an 
act  that  limits  the  sum  of  money  that  may  be  used  for 
election  purposes  by  a  candidate  or  his  agent,  defines 
bribery,  treating,  and  undue  influence,  forbids  the  use 
of  liquor  saloons  for  committee-room  purposes,  &c. 

This  latter  act,  which  was  originated  by  Sir  Henry 
James,  produced  almost  phenomenal  results.  Mr.  Ivins 
says  (pp.  148-9)  :  "In  1880,  with  about  3,000,000  voters 
in  419  constituencies,  there  was  spent  over  £3,000,000,  or 
$15,000,000;  while  in  1886,  with  an  increased  number 
of  voters,  tliere  was  expended  but  £624,086,  or  about 
13,000,000.  In  1880  ninety-five  petitions  alleging  cor- 
rupt practices  were  presented,  while  only  two  were  pre- 
sented in  1885,  and  only  one  in  18S6.  *  *  *  As  was 
pointed  out  by  the  New  York  Eiiening  Post,  the  most 
significant  fact  disclosed  by  the  English  elections  of 
1886  is  ^t/iat  the  grand  total  of  expenditure  by  candi- 
dates is  only  a  little  more  than  one-half  of  the  grand 
total  allowed  by  the  law."^  " 

The  principles  of  the  two  preceding  laws  should  be 
adapted  to  all  American  elections.  What  has  been 
done  in  England  can  and  must  be  done  in  America.  It 
is  fortunate  for  the  nation  that  we  can  profit  by  Eng- 
land's six  hundred  years  of  experience  in  battling  for 
pure  elections.    Pure  elections  are  the  pillars  of  liberty  I 


CHAPTER    IV. 

THE   PATKONAGE   AND   MERIT   SYSTEMS   COMPARED. 

Tlie  Merit  System  more  favorable  to  ex-Soldiers  and  Suiloi-s. — Other 
points  of  difference  between  the  two  Systems. — How  the  President 
and  Congressmen  were  harassed  under  the  Patronage  System. 

Section  1754  of  the  United  States  Revised  Statutes 
gives  the  preference  of  appointment  to  office  to  only 
such  properly  qualilied  soldiers  and  sailors  as  have  been 
discharged  on  account  of  "wounds  or  sickness  incurred 
in  the  line  of  duty."  The  civil  sei-vice  law  gives  pref- 
erence to  all  honorably  discharged  and  properly  quali- 
fied soldiers  and  sailors.  * 

Under  the  patronage  system  partisanship  and  inter- 
ference at  elections  were  the  surest  means  of  retaining 
an  office.  Under  the  merit  system  they  are  the  surest 
means  of  losing  it. 

Under  the  patronage  system  officeholders  were  almost 
invariably  appointed  with  regard  to  politics,  and  usually 
had  to  vote  with  their  party  or  lose  their  offices.  Under 
the  merit  system  they  are  appointed  without  regard  to 
politics,  and  can  vote  as  they  choose. 

Under  the  patronage  system  officeholders,  as  a  rule, 
cannot  command  that  degree  of  public  respect  and  con- 

*  The  Massachusetts  Civil  Service  Commissioners  say  (Third  Annual 
Report,  p.  a2):  "The  veterans  have  triumphed  by  being  able  to  show 
that  they  possess  qualifications  equal  to  or  higher  than  their  competit- 
ors. It  has  been  a  triumph  in  a  fair  field,  with  no  favor,  except  that 
of  preference  in  case  of  equality."  This  s{)eaks  well  for  the  Massachu- 
setts soldiers  who  were  educated  over  a  quarter  of  a  century  ago. 


54  LOSS    OP   TIME   UNDER   PATRONAGE   SYSTEM. 

fidence  that  is  essential  to  good  government.*  As  tlie 
mode  of  obtaining  office  under  the  merit  system  is  the 
reverse  of  that  of  the  patronage  system,  officeholders 
appointed  in  accordance  with  its  provisions  ought  to 
command  both  the  respect  and  confidence  of  the  people. 
They  can  have  self-respect  at  least ;  and  self-respect 
begets  self-confidence  as  well  as  the  respect  and  con- 
fidence of  others. 

Under  the  patronage  system  nearly  all  the  chief  of- 
ficials of  the  government,  outside  of  as  well  as  in  Wasli- 
ington,  were  forced  to  devote  a  large  part  of  their  time 
to  the  selection  of  subordinate  officials,  of  whose  qualifi- 
cations, either  theoretical  or  practical,  they  knew  little 
or  nothing.  The  merit  system  has  not  only  stopped 
this  waste  of  valuable  time,  but  it  is  supplying  the  pub- 
lic service  with  officials  of  proved  ability  and  fitness. 

Under  the  patronage  system  an  officeholder  whose 
tenure  depended  on  the  mere  caprice  of  an  official  supe- 
rior, or  perhaps  a  Ward  or  some  other  kind  of  politician, 
was  little  better  than  a  slave.  Besides,  under  such  cir- 
cumstances, he  was  constantly  tempted  to  do  wrong. 
Under  the  merit  system  the  conditions  of  tenure  are 
precisely  the  reverse,  and  are  therefore  conducive  not 
only  of  a  feeling  of  freedom,  but  of  self-respect  and 
manly  independence. 

Again,  under  the  patronage  system  chief  as  well  as 
subordinate  public  officials  were  assessed  to  raise  money 
for  partisan  purposes,  and  as  a  natural  consequence  the}^ 

*  A  few  years  ago  the  Rev.  Dr.  Howard  Crosby  said  a  person  would 
as  soon  think  of  admitting  the  small-pox  into  his  house  as  some  Xew 
York  City  politicians.  The  only  thing  that  can  be  said  in  extenuation 
of  their  offenses  is  that  they  were,  and  to  some  extent  stilj  are,  the  vic- 
tims of  a  corrupt  system  of  politics,  and  that  is  saying  a  great  deal.  It 
is  always  in  order  to  fight  corrupt  systems  j  but,  as  a  rule,  unless  it  is 
unavoidable,  individuals  should  not  be  attacked, 


INTELLIGENT  VEESUS  IGXOKANT  OFFICEHOLDERS.       65 

were  sometimes  tempted  to  do  wrong  in  order  to  reim- 
burse themselves.  Under  the  merit  system  assessments 
for  partisan  purposes  are  not  allowed. 

Under  the  patronage  system  many  honorable  and 
meritorious  persons  were  deterred  from  even  attempting 
to  enter  the  public  service,  because,  as  a  rule,  only  poli- 
ticians, or  the  subservient  henchmen  of  politicians,  ap- 
plied for  office.  Under  the  merit  system  the  rule  is 
practically  the  reverse  of  this. 

Under  the  patronage  system  many  of  the  subordinate 
public  officials  were  incompetent.  Under  the  merit  sys- 
ton  applicants  have  to  pass  a  competitive  examination, 
and  then  prove  their  competency  by  trial  by  probation 
before  appointment.  Therefore  all,  or  practically  all, 
are  competent. 

Under  the  patronage  system  some  officeholders  did 
not  know  even  the  rudiments  of  the  business  of  the 
offices  they  held.  Some  years  ago  a  newspaper  corre- 
spondent called  at  a  public  office  in  Washington  to  get 
some  official  information.  The  officeholder  whom  he 
chanced  to  meet  could  not  give  him  a  word  of  the  infor- 
mation he  desired,  but  he  could  and  did,  so  the  corre- 
spondent said,  tell  him  precisely  how  the  election  was 
going  in  Ohio  the  next  fall !  Under  the  merit  system 
the  case  ought  to  be  about  the  reverse. 

Under  the  patronage  system  officeholders  whose  ten- 
ures depended  on  the  success  of  their  own  political  party 
naturally  favored  members  of  it  in  preference  to  mem- 
bers of  an  opposite  party,  especially  about  election  time. 
Favoritism  is  a  form  of  injustice  that  cannot  be  wholly 
eradicated.  It  is  an  inherent  if  not  necessary  fault  of 
humanity.  A  law  may  restrain  a  man,  but  it  cannot 
change  his  nature.  Yet  in  this  case  the  merit  system 
will  have  a  beneficial  effect  at  least,  for  there  is  one 
reason  less  for  showing  favoritism. 


M  THE  DANGER  OP  SWEEPING  REMOVALS. 

Under  the  patronage  system  the  public  service  was 
injured  by  sweeping  removals  from  office.  Under  the 
merit  system  no  sweeping  removals  are  made.  The 
injury  caused  by  sweeping  removals  is  of  course  in 
proportion  to  the  number  of  offices.  As  these  are  con- 
stantly multiplying,  the  injury,  under  the  patronage 
system,  would  in  the  course  of  time  not  only  be  serious, 
but  in  case  of  the  success  of  a  party  with  corrupt  lead- 
ers, it  would  sooner  or  later  become  a  source  of  absolute 
danger.  Under  the  merit  system,  with  solid,  tranquil, 
educated  men  guarding  the  thousands  of  minor  but  im- 
portant offices,  whose  tenures  depend  solely  on  efficiency 
and  fidelity,  the  country  is  comparatively  safe,  with  or 
without  the  President.  Further,  even  if  the  President 
should  remove  every  chief  official  in  the  service,  the 
public  business  would  not  be  much  injured,  for  the  sub- 
ordinate officials,  owing  to  security  of  tenure,  can  trans- 
act all  ordinary  business  as  well  during  as  before  or 
after  the  change  of  the  chief  official. 

In  1883  Governor  Cleveland  sent  the  name  of  ex-State 
Senator  William  H.  Murtha  of  Brooklyn  to  the  Senate 
of  New  York  for  confirmation  as  Emigration  Commis- 
sioner. But  as  Mr.  Murtha  would  not  promise  patron- 
age in  advance,  the  Senate  refused  to  confirm  him. 
Under  the  merit  system  this  disgraceful  action  of  the 
Senate  would  not  occur,  for  under  it  there  is  no  patron- 
age to  either  promise  or  bestow.  The  execution  of  the 
then  new  law  which  was  designed  to  correct  abuses  at 
Castle  Garden,  depended  on  Mr.  Murtha's  confirmation. 
Therefore  a  few  minutes  before  the  final  adjournment 
of  the  Senate,  Governor  Cleveland  sent  a  special  mes- 
sage to  that  body  urging  Mr.  Murtha's  confirmation,  in 
the  course  of  which  he  said  of  the  then  management  at 
Castle  Garden  :  "  The  present  management  of  this  very 
important  department  is  a  scandal  and  a  reproach  to 


GEEAT    COST    OF    liEVENU".    C01.LECT10NS.  57 

civilization.  Bare-faced  robbery  has  been  committed, 
and  the  poor  immigrant  who  looks  to  the  Institution  for 
protection  finds  that  his  helplessness  and  forlorn  condi- 
tion afford  but  a  readily  seized  opportunity  for  imposi- 
tion and  swindling."  And  yet  the  Senate  of  the  great 
State  of  ]Sew  York  was  so  debauched  by  the  vicious 
patronage  system  that  it  refused  to  confirm  the  man 
who  would  have  stopped  this  imposition  and  swindling ! 

In  1877  the  Jay  Commission,*  among  other  things, 
reported  to  President  Hayes  that  the  expense  of  collect- 
ing customs  revenue  in  the  United  States  was  more 
than  three  times  as  large  as  in  France,  more  than  four 
times  as  large  as  in  Germany,  and  nearly  five  times  as 
large  as  in  Great  Britain.  The  revenue  collections  in 
this  country  were  then  made  under  the  patronage  sys- 
tem, while  those  of  the  foreign  countries  named  were 
made  under  the  merit  system.  Again,  the  Commission 
said,  on  the  authority  of  the  New  York  Chamber  of 
Commerce,  that  in  1874  it  cost  the  United  States  about 
$7,000,000  to  collect  the  duties  on  imports  of  the  value 
of  $642,000,000,  while  in  the  same  year  it  cost  Great 
Britain  only  $5,000,000  to  collect  the  duties  on  imports 
valued  at  $1,800,000,000  ! 

Under  the  patronage  system  it  was  frequently  difficult 
to  remove  incompetent  and  unworthy  officials  because 
of  the  "  influence  "  of  the  politicians  who  vouched  for 
them.  "  The  same  vicious,  extraneous  influence,"  says 
Mr.  D.  B.  Eaton,  "  which  puts  them  in  office,  keeps 
them   there."     Under   the   merit   system   they  can   be 

*  The  Commission  was  composed  of  John  Jay  and  Lawrence  Turnure 
of  New  York  and  J.  H.  Robinson  of  the  Department  of  Justice  at  Wash- 
ington. Mr.  Jay  has  since  served  as  a  New  York  State  Civil  Service 
Commissioner  from  1883  till  the  fall  of  1887,  when  he  and  his  equally 
faithful  colleague,  Henry  A.  Richmond,  were  removed  without  fault  of 
theirs,  Mr.  Augustus  Schoonmaker  having  resigned  in  June,  1887. 


^8  DUPLICITY   CAUSED  BY  fATEOKAGU   SYSfEM. 

readily  removed,  because  there  is  no  power  behind  the 
throne  to  protect  them.  * 

Under  the  patronage  system  the  President  was  now 
and  then  greatly  embarrassed  on  account  of  some  Con- 
gressmen reporting  on  some  applications  for  office  both 
favorably  and  unfavorably.  Under  the  merit  system 
Congressmen  are  not  allowed  to  sign  recommendations 
for  office,  except  as  to  an  applicant's  character  and  resi- 
dence. J.  D.  Cox  says  ("North  American  Review," 
1871,  p.  84)  :  "It  is  no  uncommon  thing  for  one  who 
has  written  a  high  eulogium  on  the  character  and  ac- 
quirements of  a  place-hunter,  to  write  a  private  note 
begging  that  his  formal  indorsement  may  not  be  re- 
garded as  of  any  weight,  or  to  seek  a  private  interview, 
in  which  he  will  state  that  the  person  is  quite  the  re- 
verse of  the  picture  drawn  of  him  in  the  testimonial 
filed."  Sometimes,  says  Mr.  Cox,  the  President  and  his 
Secretaries  are  confronted  by  both  the  officeseeker  and 
his  sponsor,  while  in  the  drawer  of  the  table  at  which 
they  sit,  listening  to  the  latter's  mock  praises,  is  the  be- 
fore mentioned  private  note  contradicting  every  word 
uttered.  It  is  not  strange  that  Mr.  Cox  should  say  that 
Congressmen  in  those  days  (1869-70)  often  apologized 
for  their  importunity,  nor  that  an  effort  was  made  to 
stop  the  disgraceful  practice.  Senator  Lyman  Trumbull 
introduced  a  bill  in  1869  making  it  a  misdemeanor  for 

*  The  Chairman :  The  common  question  among  employes  is,  "  Who  is 
your  influence  ?  " 

Mr.  Graves :  That  is  a  standard  phrase  in  the  Department,  "  Who  is 
your  influence  ?  "  Where  persons  have  very  strong  influence,  they  are 
apt,  if  any  difficulty  occurs  in  the  Department,  to  threaten  to  go  and  get 
their  '*  influence  "  aod  have  the  matter  set  right.  Manliness  and  inde- 
pendence are  destroyed  by  such  a  system.  (Senate  Report  No.  576,  for 
1882,  p.  132.) 

Mr.  Edward  0.  Graves  at  the  time  (1882)  had  had  eighteen  years'  ex- 
perience in  the  Treasury  Department  at  Washington. 


THE    WHITE    HOUSE    BESIEGED.  5§ 

Congressmen  to  directly  or  indirectly  recommend  men 
for  office,  "  except  such  recommendation  be  in  writing, 
in  response  to  a  written  request  from  the  President  or 
head  of  a  Department  asking  information,  or  a  Senator 
giving  his  advice  and  consent  in  the  manner  provided 
by  the  Constitution." 

The  unanimous  report  of  the  Senate  Committee  on 
Civil  Service  and  Retrenchment,*  made  on  May  15, 
1882,  by  Senator  Hawley,  both  corroborates  and  supple- 
ments Mr.  Cox's  statements.  The  following  extracts 
speak  for  themselves  (Senate  Report  No.  576,  for  1882, 
pp.  2,  3)  :  "  It  has  come  to  pass  that  the  work  of  paying 
political  debts  and  discharging  political  obligations,  of 
rewarding  personal  friends  and  punishing  j^ersonal  foes, 
is  the  first  to  confront  each  President  on  assuming  the 
duties  of  his  office.  *  *  *  Instead  of  the  study  of 
great  questions  of  statesmanship,  of  broad  and  compre- 
hensive administrative  policy,  either  as  it  may  concern 
this  particular  country  at  home,  or  the  relations  of  this 
great  nation  to  the  other  nations  of  the  earth,  he  must 
devote  himself  to  the  petty  business  of  weighing  in  the 
balance  the  political  considerations  that  shall  determine 
the  claim  of  this  friend  or  that  political  supporter  to  the 
possession  of  some  office  of  profit  or  honor  under  him. 
*  *  *  r^i^Q  executive  mansion  is  besieged,  if  not 
sacked,  and  its  corridors  and  chambers  are  crowded 
each  day  with  the  ever -changing  but  never-ending 
throng.  Every  Chief  Magistrate,  since  the  evil  has 
grown  to  its  present  proportions,  has  cried  out  for  de- 

*  The  Committee  was  composed  of  members  of  both  parties  as  fol- 
lows :  Joseph  R.  Hawley  of  Connecticut,  Chairman ;  George  H.  Pendle- 
ton of  Ohio,  Henry  L.  Dawes  of  Massachusetts,  John  I,  Mitchell  of 
Pennsylvania,  M,  C.  Butler  of  South  Carolina,  James  D.  Walker  of 
Arkansas,  John  S.  Williams  of  Kentucky,  Edward  H.  Rollins  of  New 
Hampshire,  and  John  P.  Jones  of  Nevada. 


60  CONGRESSMEN    HAUNTED    NIGHT    AND    DAY. 

liverauce.  Physical  endurance  even  is  taxed  beyond  its 
power.  More  than  one  President  is  believed  to  have 
lost  his  life  from  this  cause.     *     *     * 

"  The  malign  influence  of  political  domination  in  ap- 
pointments to  office  is  wide-spread,  and  reaches  out  from 
the  President  himself  to  all  possible  means  of  approach 
to  the  appointing  power.  It  poisons  the  very  air  we 
breathe.  No  Congressman  in  accord  with  the  dispenser 
of  power  can  wholly  escape  it.  It  is  ever  present. 
When  he  awakes  in  the  morning  it  is  at  his  door,  and 
when  he  retires  at  night  it  haunts  his  chamber.  It  goes 
before  him,  it  follows  after  him,  and  it  meets  him  on 
the  way.  It  levies  contributions  on  all  the  relationships 
of  a  Congressman's  life,  summons  kinshijj  and  friend- 
ship and  interest  to  its  aid,  and  imposes  upon  him  a 
work  which  is  never  finished,  and  from  which  there  is 
no  release.  Time  is  consumed,  strength  is  exhausted, 
the  mind  is  absorbed,  and  the  vital  forces  of  the  legisla- 
tor, mental  as  well  as  physical,  are  spent  in  the  never- 
ending  struggle  for  offices." 

Representative  John  J.  Kleiner  of  Indiana  declined  a 
renomination  for  Congress  in  1886  because  of  the  an- 
noyance of  officeseekers.  As  reported  by  many  daily 
newspapers,  he  said  :  "  It  is  no  w^onder  to  me  that  the 
House  w^as  charged  with  inefficiency  last  session.  The 
Democratic  members  were  kept  so  constantly  engaged 
in  looking  after  places  for  constituents  that  they  had 
not  time  to  give  legislative  subjects  consideration.  I 
know  that  I  found  it  impossible  to  keep  the  run  of  cur- 
rent business.  The  greatest  reform  we  could  bring 
about  would  be  to  free  Senators  and  Representatives  of 
all  responsibility  as  to  the  distribution  of  offices." 


CHAPTER    V. 

THE   DANGER    OF    AN    OFFCEHOLDERS'    ARISTOCRACY. 

The  importance  of  the  Subject. — The  Cause  of  and  Remedy  for  Aristoc- 
racies.— No  danger  in  Life  Tenures  when  based  on  Merit. — George 
William  Curtis's  opinion  of  them. — Insolence  of  Office. 

It  is  feared  by  some  that  the  civil  service  law  system 
will  create  an  officeholders'  aristocracy.  This  is  a  mat- 
ter of  importance,  and  is  not  to  be  pooh-poohed,  not- 
withstanding the  fact  that  the  same  system  has  not  only 
checked  the  English  aristocracy's  long  monopoly  of 
public  office,  but  has,  as  before  said,  so  purified  the 
English  civil  service  as  to  cause  the  annuUment  of  the 
act  of  1782,  an  act  that  disfranchised  40,000  customs, 
postoffice,  and  other  officials  for  corrupt  practices  at 
elections.  But  the  fear,  it  may  as  well  be  said  first  as 
last,  so  far  as  officeholders  who  draw  low  salaries  are 
concerned,  is  certainly  unfounded,  notwithstanding  of- 
ficeholders are  human,  and  are  therefore  liable  to  err. 
The  idea  of  an  aristocracy  of  public  inspectors,  account- 
ants, weighers,  clerks,  &c.,  in  this  country,  is  almost 
ridiculous.  It  is  as  improbable  perhaps  as  an  aristoc- 
racy among  soldiers,  sailors,  or  private  employes.  Mr. 
E.  L.  Godkin  says  ("The  Danger  of  an  Officeholding 
Aristocracy,"  p.  13)  :  "There  is  no  country  in  which  it 
would  be  so  hard  for  an  aristocracy  of  any  kind  to  be 
built  up  as  this,  and  probably  no  class  seeking  to  make 
itself  an  aristocracy  would,  in  the  United  States,  have  a 
smaller  chance  of  success  than  a  body  composed  of  un- 


62        THE  EEAL  AND  THE  Afl'AREKT  AElSTOCEAT. 

ambitious,  quiet-minded,  unadventurous  government  of- 
ficers, doing  routine  work  on  small  salaries,  and  with 
but  little  chance  or  desire  of  ever  passing  from  the  em- 
ployed into  the  employing  class.  One  might  nearly  as 
well  try  to  make  an  aristocracy  out  of  the  college  pro- 
fessors or  public  school  teachers."  Mr.  T.  A.  Jenckes 
says  ("Congressional  Globe,"  1869,  p.  521)  :  "There  is 
not  enough  in  this  aristocratical  notion  to  bring  out  of 
it  a  new  farce  of  *  High  Life  below  Stairs.'  It  runs 
itself  into  the  ground  without  comicality." 

But  the  question,  as  before  said,  is  a  matter  of  impor- 
tance, for,  as  Mr.  Godkin  says,  "  Nothing  is  more  diffi- 
cult to  eradicate  than  the  remembrance  of  insulting 
treatment  at  the  hands  of  an  aristocracy  of  any  kind." 
It  has  therefore  a  serious  as  well  as  a  semi-comic  aspect. 
The  law  may  sooner  or  later  be  applied  to  officeholders 
who  draw  high  salaries.  This  would  put  a  diiferent 
face  on  the  matter,  for  high  salaries  certainly  have 
a  tendency  to  create  aristocracies.  Aristocracies  may 
have  their  uses  in  some  countries,  but  we  certainly  have 
no  use  for  them  in  this  country.  They  are  stern  reali- 
ties. They  are  as  undemocratic  as  they  are  undesirable. 
They  are  antagonistic  to  American  ideas  and  institu- 
tions. Therefore  it  is  our  duty  to  study  the  causes  of 
aristocracies,  in  order  that  we  may  guard  against  them« 
But  we  must  learn  to  discriminate  between  the  real  and 
the  apparent  aristocrat.  For  example,  learned  men  are 
often  denounced  as  aristocrats  because  they  do  not  asso- 
ciate with  the  unlearned.  This  is  a  mistake,  for  it  is 
as  natural  for  learned  men  to  associate  together  as  it 
is  for  the  unlearned  to  do  so.  Learned  men  are  often 
eminently  democratic,  as  indeed  are  many  rich  men.  It 
is  the  driving  and  selfish  capitalist  that  is  mostly  to  be 
feared.  The  idle  and  selfish  capitalist  is  also  bad,  but 
is  of  course  not  so  dangerous. 


ItHE  CAUSE   OF  AEISTOCEACtES.  63 

What  is  the  real  cause  of  aristocracies  ?  Aristocra- 
cies are  caused  by  great  and  broad  distinctions  between 
people.  There  are  many  causes  for  the  distinctions  be- 
tween people,  but  the  chief  cause  is  the  possession  by 
some  people  of  more  money  and  property  and  conse- 
quently greater  power  than  others.  What  but  money 
causes  the  aristocracies  of  monarchical  Europe?  And 
what  but  money  has  planted  a  pale,  sickly,  mushroom- 
like variety  of  aristocracy  in  the  uncongenial  soil  of 
republican  America  ?  * 

*  John  W.  Draper  says  ("  History  of  the  Intellectual  Development  of 
Europe,"  i,  252,  253):  "An  evil  day  is  approaching  when  it  becomes 
recognized  in  a  community  that  the  only  standard  of  social  distinction 
is  wealth.  That  day  was  soon  followed  in  Rome  by  its  unavoidable 
consequence,  a  government  founded  upon  two  domestic  elements,  cor- 
ruption and  terrorism.  No  language  can  describe  the  state  of  that  cap- 
ital after  the  civil  wars.  The  accumulation  of  power  and  wealth  gave 
rise  to  a  universal  depravity.  Law  ceased  to  be  of  any  value.  A  suitor 
must  deposit  a  bribe  before  a  trial  could  be  had.  The  social  fabric  was 
a  festering  mass  of  rottenness.  The  people  had  become  a  populace ; 
the  aristocracy  was  demoniac ;  the  city  was  a  hell.  No  crime  that  the 
annals  of  human  wickedness  can  show  was  left  un perpetrated — re- 
morseless murders ;  the  betrayal  of  parents,  husbands,  wives,  friends ; 
poisoning  reduced  to  a  system ;  adultery  degenerating  into  incests,  and 
crimes  that  cannot  be  written.  Women  of  the  higher  class  were  so 
lascivious,  depraved,  and  dangerous  that  men  could  not  be  compelled 
to  contract  matrimony  with  them;  marriage  was  displaced  by  concu- 
binage; even  virgins  were  guilty  of  inconceivable  immodesties;  great 
oflBcers  of  state  and  ladies  of  the  court,  of  promiscuous  bathings  and 
naked  exhibitions.  In  the  time  of  Caesar  it  had  become  necessary  for 
the  government  to  interfere,  and  actually  put  a  premium  on  marriage. 
*  *  *  They  (the  women)  actually  reckoned  the  years,  not  by  the 
consuls,  but  by  the  men  they  had  lived  with.  To  be  childless,  and 
therefore  without  the  natural  restraint  of  a  family,  was  looked  upon 
as  a  singular  felicity.  Plutarch  correctly  touched  the  point  when  he 
said  that  the  Romans  married  to  be  heirs  and  not  to  have  heirs.  Of 
offenses  that  do  not  rise  to  the  dignity  of  atrocity,  but  which  excite  our 
loathing,  such  as  gluttony  and  the  most  debauched  luxury,  the  annals 


64  THE    WANING   ENGLISH    ARISTOCRACY 

These  propositions  being  admitted,  then  it  follows 
that  if  ever  we  have  an  officeholders'  aristocracy  in  this 
country,  it  will  be  caused  chiefly  by  money.  Therefore 
the  subject  of  officeholders'  salaries  should  receive  care- 
ful attention. 

There  is  too  much  difference  in  officeholders'  salaries. 
Some  are  too  high  and  some  are  too  low.*  Of  course 
all  cannot  be  put  on  an  exact  equality,  for,  among  other 
things,  an  officeholder's  expenses  must  be  taken  into  ac- 

of  the  times  furnish  disgusting  proofs.  It  was  said,  '  They  eat  that 
they  may  vomit,  and  vomit  that  they  may  eat.'  " 

Professor  Draper  quotes  from  Tacitus  to  prove  that  his  statements 
are  not  exaggerated.  The  times  described  are  before,  during,  and  after 
the  reign  of  Julius  Caesar. 

It  is  related  of  Csesar  that  on  receiving  a  letter  one  day  in  the  Senate 
a  fellow-Senator  accused  him  of  receiving  communications  from  the  en- 
emy. Csesar  passed  the  document  over  to  the  Senator.  It  was  a  lewd 
letter  from  the  Senator's  own  sister,  and  was  flung  back  with  the  re- 
mark, "  Take  it,  you  sot !  " 

Mr.  A.  J.  Mundella,  a  member  of  Parliament,  in  a  lecture,  in  1870, 
said :  "  Until  long  after  the  passing  of  the  first  reform  bill,  offices 
were  the  reward  of  political  services,  and  very  frequently  of  political 
dishonor.  *  *  *  Mr.  Bright  characterized  our  civil  and  military 
services  as  a  system  of  out-door  relief  for  the  aristocracy." 

This  is  not  complimentary  to  the  English  aristocracy;  nor  is  it  en- 
couraging to  would-be  imitators  of  it  here  or  elsewhere.  It  proves,  if 
it  proves  anything,  that  while  money  may  create  an  aristocracy,  it  can- 
not teach  it  how  to  use  it.  The  words  "  political  dishonor  "  may  speak 
for  themselves ;  but  they  are  no  more  applicable  to  an  aristocracy  than 
to  any  other  class  of  people  who  are  cursed  by  the  patronage  system. 
According  to  James  Russell  Lowell,  the  famous  speeches  of  the  Prince 
of  Wales  are  written  for  him  by  another  man!  (See  "New  York 
World,"  October  24,  1886,  p.  9.) 

Note. — Learning  that  Mr.  Lowell  was  greatly  displeased  with  the 
"  World's "  article,  I  wrote  to  him  and  asked  if  the  above  statement 
was  true.  I  did  not  receive  a  reply  from  him.  Therefore  I  take  it 
for  granted  that  Mr.  Julian  Hawthorne  reported  Mr.  Lowell's  words 
correctly. 

*  Franklin  deprecated  high  salaries  (v,  147) ;  Webster  also  (iv,  183). 


THE  EVIL  OF  HIGH  AKD  LOW  SALARIES.  QS 

count.  But  it  is  wrong  to  give  one  man  from  110,000  to 
$50,000  a  year,  and  another,  in  his  way  equally  capable, 
reliable,  and  meritorious,  only  $500.  No  man  with  a  fam- 
ily can  live  comfortably  in  this  country  on  f 500  a  year. 
The  claim  sometimes  made  that  competent  men  cannot 
be  induced  to  accept  office  unless  the  salary  is  high,  is 
usually  not  true.  There  are  plenty  of  competent  men 
who  would  be  glad  to  fill  some  offices  for  a  third  of 
the  present  salary,  and  they  could  live  comfortably  and 
honestly  too.  No  officeholder  should  receive  greater 
compensation  than  the  average  sum  paid  for  similar  ser- 
vices, where  there  are  such,  in  private  business,  and  he 
should  be  held  to  as  strict  an  accountability  as  to  service 
as  is  the  private  employe.*  It  is  a  high  salary  and  little 
work  that  make  the  aristocrat.  Extremely  high  salaries 
are  conducive  of  extravagance,  a  feeling  of  superiority,! 
and  sometimes  of  the  assumption  of  unwarrantable  priv- 
ileges. Extremely  low  salaries  are  conducive  chiefly  of 
want  and  a  feeling  of  inferiority.  It  is  bad  for  the  pub- 
lic service  when  some  officials,  because  of  high  salaries, 
feel  that  they  are  autocrats  instead  of  servants  ;  but  it 

*  Erastus  Brooks,  the  veteran  editor,  who  believed  "  in  competitive 
test  and  standards  of  the  persons  appointed  to  all  responsible  places," 
writing  on  October  22,  1883,  says  (First  Report  New  York  State  C.  S. 
Com.,  p.  2«»3) :  "  Men  in  public  service  should  receive  no  more  favors, 
and  no  better  pay,  and  serve  neither  more  nor  less  time  during  the  day 
or  year,  than  is  required  of  qualified  and  responsible  men  in  the  highest 
or  comparative  grades  in  commercial,  mechanical,  and  general  business 
life." 

f  Nothing  has  so  much  to  do  with  a  man's  manners  as  the  manners 
of  the  society  in  which  he  lives.  *  *  *  The  English  or  German 
official  gives  himself  airs  and  thinks  himself  an  aristocrat  because,  as  a 
matter  of  fact,  his  official  superiors  are  aristocrats,  and  the  government 
is  administered  in  all  the  higher  branches  by  an  aristocracy.  *  *  * 
In  any  country  In  which  politics  is  largely  managed  by  an  aristocracy, 
the  aristocratic  view  of  life  is  sure  to  permeate  the  civil  as  well  as  the 
military  service,  be  the  terms  long  or  short. — E.  L.  Godkin, 


66  MERIT  LIFE  TENURES  DEMOCRATIC. 

is  worse  when  others,  because  of  low  salaries,  feel  that 
they  are  menials,  and  are  sometimes  tempted  to  act  dis- 
honestly. 

The  way  to  remedy  as  well  as  to  prevent  an  aristoc- 
racy is  to  remove  its  cause.  Therefore  the  way  to  pre- 
vent an  officeholders'  aristocracy  is  to  pay  no  extremely 
high  or  extremely  low  salaries.  There  is  probabl}?"  no 
immediate  danger,  but  the  principle  is  none  the  less 
sound,  for  aristocracies  will  disappear  exactly  in  propor- 
tion as  the  distinctions  between  people  disappear.  An 
equitable  readjustment  of  salaries  is  what  is  wanted.  * 

The  fear  of  an  officeholders'  aristocracy  seems  to  be 
based  chiefly  on  the  life  tenures  of  office  that  may  occur 
under  the  civil  service  law  system.  But  the  fear,  so  far 
as  life  tenures,  as  such,  are  concerned,  is  certainly  un- 
founded. Do  not  life  tenures  occur  under  all  systems 
and  in  all  governments  ?  But,  unless  the  officeholder  is 
eminently  qualified  to  fill  his  office,  is  it  not  seldom  that 
they  occur  in  this  government  ?  Therefore  life  tenures, 
when  they  are  solely  the  reward  of  merit,  are,  on  the 
whole,  democratic  instead  of  aristocratic.  Such  life 
tenures  as  these  strengthen  the  government ;  and  any- 
thing that  strengthens  republican  government  is  demo- 
cratic. 

But  life  tenures,  even  under  the  civil  service  law 
system,  will  probably  be  the  exception  rather  than  the 

♦On  January  24,  1817,  on  motion  of  Representative  Samuel  McKee 
of  Kentucky,  the  following  resolution  was  passed  by  the  national  House 
of  Representatives  : 

Resolved,  That  the  said  Committee  be  instructed  to  inquire  into  the 
expediency  of  equalizin;^  the  pay  and  emoluments  of  the  officers  and 
persons  employed  in  the  civil,  military,  and  naval  departments  of  the 
government." 

The  New  York  State  Civil  Service  Commission  recognizes  the  need  of 
"  a  jtidicious  readjustment  of  salaries."     (First  Report,  1884,  p.  4.) 


WHY   LIFE   TENURES  WILL  BE   RARE.  67 

rule.  Changes  will  occur.  The  characteristic  ambition 
of  Americans  to  better  their  condition  in  life  will  alone 
cause  many  resignations.  Some  will  resign  because  a 
few  years  of  experience  in  many  public  offices  qualifies 
an  intelligent  and  ambitious  man  to  discharge  the  duties 
of  better  paying  stations  in  private  life  ;  *  some  will 
save  their  money  and  resign  in  order  to  establish  them- 
selves in  private  business  ;  some  will  resign  from  sheer 
dislike  of  public  life  ;  some  from  other  causes,  and 
some  will  doubtless  be  removed. 

George  AVilliam  Curtis  says  ("  Civil  Service  Reform 
League  Proceedings,"  1884,  pp.  11,  12):  "The  objec- 
tion which  is  expressed  in  the  cry  of  *  life  tenure '  and 
*a  privileged  class'  is  one  of  the  most  ancient  and 
familiar  appeals  of  the  spoils  system  to  ignorance  and 
prejudice.  Whenever  it  has  been  proposed  to  recur  to 
the  constitutional  principle  and  the  early  practice  by 
treating  the  public  clerk  as  the  private  clerk  is  treated, 
by  ordaining  that  the  public  business  shall  be  trans- 
acted upon  business  principles,  and  that  filching  politi- 
cians shall  be  forbidden  to  turn  the  public  service  to 
thfeir  private  profit,  we  are  told  that  a  life  tenure  and  a 
privileged  class  are  odious  and  un-Ainerican,  as  if  any- 
thing were  so  odious  as  a  system  tending  to  destroy  the 
self-respect  of  public  officers,  or  anything  so  really  un- 
American  as  turning  out  an  honest,  efficient,  and  experi- 
enced agent  because  somebody  else  wants  his  place. 
There  can  indeed  be  no  life  tenure  in  an  offensive  sense 
so  long  as  the  power  of  removal  is  unchecked  except  by 
a  sole  consideration  for  justice  and  the  public  service  ; 
and  the  retention  of  a  faithful,  capable,  and  tried  public 
servant  confers  no  privilege  which  every  such  servant 
of  every  great  corporation  and  of  every  great  or  small 

*  A  fact  practically  the  saipe  as  the  above  is  shown  iu  Chapter  II, 
page  30, 


68  THE  KIND   OP  COAL-HEAVEES   WANTED. 

business  house,  and  of  every  well-ordered  department 
of  human  industry,  does  not  already  enjoy.  Of  all  the 
familiar  tricks  of  the  American  demagogue  none  is 
more  amusingly  contemptible  than  the  effort  to  show 
that  a  system  which  tends  to  promote  a  degrading  loss 
of  self-respect  and  a  cringing  dependence  upon  personal 
favor  is  peculiarly  a  manly  and  American  system.  It 
is  a  cry  raised  most  vociferously  by  those  who  most 
despise  and  distrust  the  people,  and  as  the  sure  and 
steady  progress  of  reform  plainly  shows,  it  no  more 
deceives  and  alarms  an  intelligent  public  opinion  than 
the  ridiculous  assertion  that  civil  service  reform  is  a 
system  which  requires  that  a  man  shall  pass  a  satisfac- 
tory examination  in  astronomy  and  the  higher  mathe- 
matics in  order  to  be  eligible  to  appointment  as  a  night- 
watchman  in  the  Custom  House.*    In  the  familiar  story 

*  On  page  16  Mr.  Curtis  says :  "  The  essential  point  is  not  to  find 
coal-heavers  who  can  scan  Virgil  correctly,  but  coal-heavers  who,  being 
properly  qualified  for  heaving  coal,  are  their  own  masters  and  not  the 
tools  of  politicians," 

Mr.  Curtis  closes  his  address  for  1885  in  this  lofty,  hopeful,  and  pa- 
triotic strain :  "  Gentlemen,  the  stars  in  their  courses  fought  against 
Sisera.  But  they  fight  for  us.  The  desire  of  good  government,  of 
honest  politics,  of  parties  which  shall  be  legitimate  agencies  of  great 
policies ;  all  the  high  instincts  of  good  citizenship  ;  all  the  lofty  im- 
pulses of  American  patriotism,  are  the  '  sweet  influences  '  that  favor 
reform.     Every  patriotic  American  has  already  seen  their  power, 

"  *  And  by  the  vision  splendid 
Is  on  his  way  attended.' 

*'  Sir  Philip  Sidney  wrote  to  his  brother  upon  his  travels,  *  Whenever 
you  hear  of  a  good  war,  go  to  it.'  That  is  the  call  which  we  have  heard 
and  obeyed.  And  a  good  war  it  has  been,  and  is.  Everywhere  indeed 
there  are  signs  of  un  alert  and  adroit  liostility.  They  are  the  shots  of 
outposts  that  foretell  the  battle.  But  everywhere  also  there  are  signs 
of  the  advance  of  the  whole  line,  the  inspiring  harbingers  of  victory. 
Never  was  the  prospect  fairer.  If  the  shadows  still  linger,  the  dawn  is 
deepening, — the  dawn  that  announces  our  suu  of  Austerlitz," 


ENGLISH  VIEW   VERSUS  AMEitiCAN  ¥lKT^.  6d 

the  young  lawyer  was  reminded  by  the  judge  that  the 
court  might  be  supposed  to  know  some  law.  The 
American  demagogue  is  incessantly  taught  by  the  ex- 
perience of  this  country  that  the  American  people  may 
be  supposed  to  have  some  common-sense." 

Mr.  Curtis  again  says  (C.  S.  R.  L.  Proceedings,  1885, 
p.  22)  :  "  So  long  as  the  power  of  removal  remains  free, 
and  while  it  is  committed  to  agents  appointed  by  of- 
ficers whom  the  people  elect,  a  life  tenure  in  any  un- 
American  or  undesirable  sense  is  impossible." 

The  power  of  removal,  for  cause — and  even  without 
cause,  if  the  chief  officer  is  willing  to  take  the  risk  of 
abusing  his  power — is  as  free  under  the  civil  service  law 
system  as  it  is  in  private  business. 

The  view  taken  by  the  aristocracy  of  England,  in 
1855,  of  the  probable  effect  of  the  British  civil  service 
law  was  the  opposite  of  that  taken  now  by  some  Ameri- 
cans as  to  the  probable  effect  of  the  American  civil  ser- 
vice law.  The  following  extract  from  the  Third  An- 
nual Report  of  the  United  States  Civil  Service  Com- 
mission (p.  31)  speaks  for  itself:  "The  aristocratic 
classes,  with  many  honorable  exceptions,  opposed  the 
introduction  of  the  merit  system  on  the  same  ground 
that  they  opposed  popular  education  at  the  public  ex- 
pense ;  that  is,  that  both  would  weaken  their  means  of 
controlling  the  government,  at  the  same  time  that  they 
would  give  greater  opportunities  and  influence  to  the 
sons  and  daughters  of  the  common  people. 

"  In  a  volume  of  official  papers  issued  by  the  British 
government,  in  1855,  when  the  subject  of  introducing 
examinations  was  under  consideration,  it  is  declared 
that  *  The  encouragement  given  to  education  would  no 
doubt  be  great,  but  it  will  all  be  in  favor  of  the  lower 
classes  of  society  and  not  of  the  higher.  *  *  *  Ap- 
pointments now  conferred  on  young  men  of  aristocratic 


^0        UEMEDY  FOR  HABITUAL  IKSOLKKCE  OF  OFE'ICE. 

connection  will  fall  into  the  hands  of  a  much  lower 
grade  in  society.  *  *  *  Such  a  measure  will  exercise 
the  happiest  influence  on  the  education  of  the  lower 
classes  throughout  England,  acting  by  the  surest  of  all 
motives,  the  desire  a  man  has  of  bettering  himself  in 
life.'  The  volume  shows  that  the  examinations  were 
opposed  by  the  privileged  classes  because  they  foresaw 
that  such  would  be  the  effects." 

It  is  an  interesting  question  whether  the  civil  service 
law  system  will  or  will  not  cause  an  increase  in  what 
Shakespeare  calls  "  insolence  of  office,"  a  phase  of  pub- 
lic life  that  is  a  kind  of  first  cousin  to  an  officeholders' 
aristocracy,  with  this  distinction,  that  insolence  is  more 
the  result  of  a  personal  than  an  official  defect  of  charac- 
ter, and  is  therefore  not  so  easily  cured.  "  Nothing  is 
older  in  story,"  says  Mr.  Godkin,  "  than  the  *  insolence 
of  office.'  We  can  go  back  to  no  time,  in  the  annals  of 
the  Old  World,  when  the  man  *  dressed  in  a  little  brief 
authority '  was  not  an  object  of  popular  odium."  This 
seems  to  settle  the  question,  if  such  a  question  can  be 
settled,  in  favor  of  the  civil  service  law  system,  for  is  it 
not  reasonable  that  the  man  "  dressed  in  a  little  brief 
authority,"  which  is  a  good  description  of  the  usually 
precarious  tenure  of  office  under  the  patronage  system, 
is  more  likely  to  be  insolent  than  the  man  who  holds  his 
office  on  condition  of  good  behavior  and  efficient  and 
faithful  service  ?  Insolence  is  not  good  behavior.  As 
before  said,  the  defect  is  not  easily  cured,  but  the  rem- 
edy for  habitual  insolence  of  office  is  removal.  As  a 
rule  men  of  merit  are  not  insolent.  It  is  contrary  to 
their  nature. 


CHAPTER    VI. 

THE     PATRONAGE     SYSTEM. 

The  practicability  of  the  System  only  Apparent.— General  Jackson  ver- 
sus President  Jackson. — Probable  causes  of  his  Radical  Change. — 
Probable  cause  of  Senator  Marcy's  use  of  the  word  "Spoils." — 
The  spoils  doctrine  Undemocratic  and  Ruinous. — Appalling  Cor- 
ruption at  Washington  after  the  Civil  War.— The  Civil  Service 
Law  a  Rock  to  build  upon. 

The  patronage  system  of  distributing  public  offices 
was  first  practiced  in  this  country  in  the  State  of  New- 
York.*     But  as  President  Jackson  was  the  first  to  prac- 

*  Mr.  George  William  Curtis  says  that  in  1801  "  the  spoils  system 
was  as  much  in  vogue  in  the  State  of  New  York  as  it  ever  has  been  in 
the  country  since.  Under  the  old  New  York  Council  of  Appointment  a 
man  could  not  be  an  auctioneer  unless  he  was  on  the  right  side  in  poli- 
tics. *  *  *  III  our  political  history  in  New  York,  one  of  the  amus- 
ing incidents  is  that  the  charter  of  the  Manhattan  Bank,  which  is  one 
of  the  chief  banks  in  the  city  of  New  York,  was  procured  by  Aaron 
Burr  in  what  was  really  a  charter  for  a  water  company.  The  trick  was 
ventured  in  order  to  hide  the  fact  that  the  persons  who  asked  for  this 
bank  were  of  the  wrong  side  in  politics."  (Senate  Report  No.  576,  for 
1882,  pp.  153,  154.) 

Mr.  Dorman  B.  Eaton  says:  "  Unfortunately  for  the  politics  of  New 
York,  one  of  the  first  of  her  great  politicians  and  officers  was  the  most 
adroit  and  unscrupulous  political  manipulator  this  country  has  pro- 
duced. Aaron  Burr  was  our  first  partisan  despot.  *  *  *  Martin 
Van  Buren,  probably  without  knowing  the  true  character  of  Burr,  early 
became  his  admirer  and  follower.  '  lie  learned  his  tactics  from  Aaron 
Burr.'  He  was  so  adroit  in  applying  them  to  his  own  use,  that  as  early 
as  1808  he  got  the  office  of  Surrogate  of  Columbia  county  as  the  price 
gf  his  support  of  Tompkins  for  Governor.     This  perhaps  is  the  earliest 


*J^  JOfiN  LA^WRiNCiJ   ON   tATUOlfACtti. 

tice  it  nationally,  the  history  of  the  beginning  of  the 
system  naturally  pertains  chiefly  to  him  and  his  admin- 
istration. 

The  system,  as  explained  by  its  advocates,  and  when 
abstractly  considered,  is  apparently  reasonable  and  prac- 
ticable. For  example,  its  advocates  say  that  when  A  is 
President,  he  should  have  none  but  his  own  political 

instance  in  our  politics  of  an  office,  especially  a  judicial  office,  being 
pledged  and  delivered  for  political  support."  ("  Spoils  System,"  &c., 
pp.  4,  6.) 

*'  His  (Jackson's)  election  was  notoriously  the  work  of  Martin  Van 
Buren,  inspired  by  Aaron  Burr,  and  with  his  inauguration  was  initiated 
a  sordidly  selfish  political  system  entirely  at  variance  with  the  broad 
views  of  Washington  and  of  Hamilton."  ("  Atlantic  Monthly,"  April, 
1880,  p.  537.) 

"  Among  the  maxims  of  Colonel  Burr  for  the  guidance  of  politicians, 
one  of  the  most  prominent  was  that  the  people  at  elections  were  to  be 
managed  by  the  same  rules  of  discipline  as  the  soldiers  of  an  army; 
that  a  few  leaders  were  to  think  for  the  masses,  and  that  the  latter 
were  to  obey  implicitly  their  leaders,  and  to  move  only  at  the  word  of 
command.  He  had  therefore  great  confidence  in  the  machinery  of 
party,  and  that  system  of  regular  nominations  in  American  politics  of 
which  he  may  perhaps  be  considered  one  of  the  founders.  Educated  as 
a  military  man,  and  imbibing  his  early  views  with  regard  to  governing 
others  in  the  camp,  it  is  not  surprising  that  Colonel  Burr  should  have 
applied  the  rules  of  military  life  to  politics."  ("  Statesman's  Manual," 
ii,  1139.) 

Representative  John  Lawrence  of  New  York  appears  to  have  ante- 
dated Aaron  Burr  several  years  in  the  advocacy  of  the  patronage  sys- 
tem. In  the  great  debate  in  the  first  Congress  (IVSQ)  on  the  power  of 
removal  he  said  ("  Gales  &  Seaton's  Debates,"  vol.  i,  pt.  i,  p.  504) :  "  It 
has  been  said  that  if  it  (the  power  of  removal)  is  lodged  here  (in  the 
President),  it  will  be  subject  to  abuse ;  that  there  may  be  a  change  of 
officers,  and  a  complete  revolution  throughout  the  whole  Executive  De- 
partment on  the  election  of  every  new  President.  I  admit  this  may  be 
the  case,  and  I  contend  that  it  should  be  the  case,  if  the  President 
thinks  it  necessary.  I  contend  that  every  President  ought  to  have 
those  men  about  him  in  whom  he  can  place  the  most  confidence,  pro* 
Tidi'd  the  Senate  approve  his  choice," 


?Al^ftO*fAGE   SifSTfiM  LEAfeg  TO   CORUUPxlOi^.  75 

friends  in  the  subordinate  as  well  as  the  chief  offices  at 
his  disposal ;  for  in  what  other  way,  they  ask,  can  he  be 
responsible  for  the  execution  of  the  laws?  There  is 
besides,  they  say,  another  advantage,  for  his  political 
friends  have  a  double  incentive  to  be  faithful  and  effi- 
cient— their  own  good  names  as  well  as  that  of  the 
party  in  power.  But  this  reasoning  is  fallacious.  First, 
because  the  system  is  diametrically  opposed  to  business 
principles  ;  second,  because  long  and  sad  experience  has 
proved,  in  this  as  well  as  in  other  nations,  that  it  leads 
to  corruption. 

Again,  an  equitable  division  of  patronage  between 
political  parties,  as  was  favored  by  President  Jefferson 
and  also  Governor  De  Witt  Clinton  of  New  York,  is 
politically  fair,  and  might  lessen  the  evils  of  the  wholly 
partisan  system.  But,  like  the  preceding  proposition,  it 
is  not  in  accordance  with  sound  business  principles. 

General  Jackson's  preaching  and  President  Jackson's 
practicing  were  very  different.  General  Jackson,  writ- 
ing from  Washington,  in  1804,  said  (Parton's''  Life  of 
Jackson,"  i,  237)  :  "  Of  all  characters  my  feelings  de- 
spise a  man  capable  of  cringing  to  power  for  a  benefit 
or  office.  Such  characters  are  *  *  *  badly  calculated 
for  a  representative  system.  *  *  *  Merit  alone  should 
lead  to  preferment."  The  General  desired  to  be  Gover- 
nor of  Louisiana  Territory,  but  he  doubted  the  propri- 
ety of  calling  on  the  President  in  the  capacity  of  an 
officeseeker.  **  Before  I  would  violate  my  ideas  of  pro- 
priety," he  said,  "  I  would  yield  up  any  office  in  the 
government."  Writing  to  President-elect  Monroe,  in 
1816,  he  said  (ii,  360):  "Everything  depends  on  the 
selection  of  your  ministry.  In  every  selection  party  and 
party  feeling  should  be  avoided.  Now  is  the  time  to 
exterminate  the  monster  called  party  spirit.  *  *  * 
The  Chief  Magistrate  of  a  great  and  powerful  natioij 
7 


74  PRESlftEifT  JACKSON  B'ifiHfS  t>0Ln?lCALL1f. 

should  never  indulge  in  party  feeling."  In  1829  Presi- 
dent Jackson  practiced  almost  the  reverse  of  what  he 
preached  in  1804  and  1816.  His  most  notable  departure 
was  the  removal  of  hundreds  of  faithful  civil  service 
officials,  and  for  purely  partisan  reasons. 

What  caused  this  change?  There  may  have  been 
many  causes,  but  the  chief  cause  was  probably  the  fol- 
lowing. During  the  campaign  of  1828  some  newspapers 
abused  the  General's  wife,  and  even  assailed  the  memory 
of  his  dead  mother.*  This  was  bad  enough,  but  the 
death  of  Mrs.  Jackson,  which  was  accelerated  if  not 
caused  by  campaign  abuse,  was  too  much  for  human 
nature.  General  Jackson  had  years  before  killed  Charles 
Dickinson  in  a  duel  on  account  of  trouble  that  probably 
originated  in  the  latter's  alleged  abuse  of  Mrs.  Jackson. 
He  could  not  now  fight  his  enemies  personally,  but  he 
could  and  did  fight  them  politically  ;  f  and  under  such 
circumstances  it  was  as  natural  for  him  to  fight  them  as 
it  was  for  him  to  fight  Dickinson  or  the  British  at  New 
Orleans. 

Are  not  these  facts  alone  sufficient  to  account  for  the 

*  Mra.  Jackson,  whom  Major  Lewis  describes  as  "  that  good  woman," 
once,  in  1828,  found  her  husband  in  tears.  Pointing  to  a  newspaper 
paragraph,  he  said :  "  Myself  I  can  defend,  you  I  can  defend,  but  now 
they  have  assailed  even  the  memory  of  my  mother."     (iii,  141.) 

Mr.  Parton,  speaking  of  Mrs.  Jackson,  says  (iii,  154):  "Perhaps,  if 
the  truth  were  known,  it  would  be  found  that  she  is  not  the  only  female 
victim  of  our  indecent  party  contentions." 

f  The  *'  Atlantic  Monthly,"  in  speaking  of  the  life  and  death  of  Mrs. 
Jackson,  says  (April,  1880,  pp.  537,  538):  "Her  sorrow-stricken  hus- 
band came  to  Washington  with  a  stern  determination  to  punish  those 
who  had  maligned  her  during  the  preceding  campaign ;  and  those  who 
eulogized  her  always  found  favor  with  him." 

The  Washington  "  Telegraph  "  said :  "  We  know  not  what  line  of 
policy  General  Jackson  will  adopt.  We  take  it  for  granted,  however, 
that  ho  will  reward  bis  friends  and  punish  his  enemies," 


MAJOR   LEWIS   DIFFJERS   WitH   JJlCKSOJi'.  ^^ 

change  ?  In  fact  does  not  the  General's  high  character 
preclude  almost  any  otlier  explanation  of  it?  But  the 
General's  own  words  arc  the  most  convincing.  For 
example,  shortly  after  his  inauguration  he  told  a  promi- 
nent and  faithful  official,  Colonel  Thomas  L.  McKenney, 
Superintendent  of  Indian  Affairs,  that  he  was  charged 
with  being  "  one  of  the  principal  promoters  of  that  vile 
paper,  We  the  Peoj^le,  in  which  my  wife  Rachel  was  so 
shamefully  abused."     (iii,  216.) 

Thus  did  a  wrong  beget  a  wrong.  Thus  did  a  private 
curse  become  a  public  curse.  In  a  word,  thus  did  like 
beget  like.  Mr.  Parton  says  President  Jackson  ''  was  a 
sick,  unhappy,  and  perplexed  old  man,  *  *  *  always 
mourning  for  his  dead  wife." 

President  Jackson's  course,  which  was  at  war  with 
that  of  all  his  predecessors  in  office,  and  even,  as  has 
been  shown,  with  his  own  sentiments  as  expressed  in 
1804  and  1816,  was  condemned  by  many  of  his  contem- 
poraries, as  is  shown  by  extracts  from  their  works  in 
this  and  the  two  succeeding  chapters. 

Major  William  B.  Lewis,  the  man,  says  Mr.  Parton 
(iii,  224),  who  contributed  the  most  to  General  Jack- 
son's election  to  the  presidency,  and  his  most  intimate 
and  constant  companion,  wrote  to  him  as  follows  :  '*  In 
relation  to  the  principle  of  rotation  *  *  *  I  hold  it  to 
be  fraught  with  the  greatest  mischief  to  the  country. 
*  *  *  Whenever  the  impression  shall  become  gen- 
eral that  the  government  is  only  valuable  on  account 
of  its  offices,  the  great  and  paramount  interests  of  the 
country  will  be  lost  sight  of,  and  the  government  itself 
ultimately  destroyed." 

Another  material  cause  of  President  Jackson's  change 
of  policy — namely,  the  influence  over  him  of  Mr.  Martin 
Van  Buren — is  best  described  in  the  words  of  members 
of  the  United  States  Senate,  who  were  considering,  in 


id 


MR.    VAN   BUEEN   CRITICISED. 


1832,  the  confirmation  of  the  latter  gentleman  as  Minis- 
ter to  England. 

Senator  Clay  of  Kentucky  said  {"  Gales  &  Seaton's 
Debates  in  Congress,"  1831-32,  vol.  viii,  pt.  i,  p.  1324)  : 
"I  have  another  objection  to  this  nomination.  I  be- 
lieve *  *  *  that  to  this  gentleman  is  principally  to  be 
ascribed  the  introduction  of  the  odious  system  of  pro- 
scription for  the  exercise  of  the  elective  franchise.  I 
understand  that  it  is  the  system  on  which  the  party  in 
his  own  State,  of  which  he  is  the  reputed  head,  con- 
stantly acts.  He  was  among  the  first  of  the  Secretaries 
to  apply  that  system  to  the  dismission  of  clerks  in  his 
department,  known  to  me  to  be  highly  meritorious,  and 
among  them  one  who  is  now  a  representative  in  the 
other  House.  It  is  a  detestable  system,  drawn  from  the 
worst  periods  of  the  Roman  republic,  and  if  it  were  to 
be  perpetuated,  *  *  *  our  government  would  finally 
end  in  a  despotism  as  inexorable  as  that  at  Constanti- 
nople." * 

Senator  Samuel  A.  Foot  of  Connecticut  went  even 
further  in  his  criticisms  of  Mr.  Yan  Buren  than  Senator 
Clay.  He  said  (Same  Debates,  p.  1328)  :  "  In  my  opin- 
ion there  is  not  a  Senator  on  this  floor,  or  any  other 
careful  observer,  who  has  noticed  the  proceedings  of 
this  administration  from  its  commencement,  who  is  not 
fully  convinced  that  there  had  been  *  behind  the  throne 
a  power  greater  than  the  throne  itself,'  which  has  di- 

*  Mr.  Clay,  in  a  speech  delivered  on  June  27,  1840,  relates  the  fol- 
lowing extraordinary  ease  of  court-martial  ("  Speeches,"  ii,  203):  *'  Two 
officers  of  the  army  of  the  United  States  have  been  put  upon  their  sol- 
emn trial,  on  the  charge  of  prejudicing  the  Democratic  party  by  making 
purchases  for  the  supply  of  the  army  from  members  of  the  Whig  party  ! 
•  ♦  *  And  this  trial  was  commenced  at  the  instance  of  a  Committee 
of  a  Democratic  Convention,  and  conducted  and  prosecuted  by  them." 

The  trial  took  place  at  Baltimore,  where  the  Convention  met, 


HE    FLATTEES   PRESIDENT   JACKSON.  ^7 

reeled  m,ost  of  its  movements.  I  will  not  say  there  is 
legal  evidence  sufficient  to  convict  a  man  before  a  court 
of  justice  ;  but  there  is  enough  to  produce  conviction  in 
my  mind,  and  I  sincerely  believe  that  General  Jackson 
came  to  this  place  fully  determined  to  remove  no  man 
from  office  but  for  good  cause  of  removal.  I  am  fully 
convinced  that  the  whole  *  system  of  proscription'  owes 
its  existence  to  Martin  Van  Buren  !  that  the  dissolution 
of  the  Cabinet  was  effected  by  his  management,  and  for 
his  benefit !  and  that  the  hand  of  the  late  Secretary  of 
State  may  be  traced  distinctly  in  another  affair,  which 
has  produced  an  alienation  between  the  first  and  second 
officers  of  the  government,  and  also  *  *  *  £qj.  ^i^q 
great  abuse  of  the  patronage  of  the  government ! " 

Senator  George  Poindexter  of  Mississippi  said,  among 
other  things,  that  Mr.  Van  Buren,  "whose  whole  course 
was  marked  by  a  systematic  tissue  of  dark  and  studied 
intrigue,"  had  "seized  on  circumstances  which  pre- 
existed his  induction  into  office,  novel  in  their  character 
in  this  country,  but  familiar  at  the  court  of  Louis  the 
Fifteenth,  in  France,  and  of  Charles  the  Second  of  Eng- 
land, by  means  of  which  he  contrived  to  *  ride  upon  the 
whirlwind  and  direct  the  storm,'  and  to  render  the  cred- 
ulous* and  confiding  chief,  whose  weakness  he  flattered 
and  whose  prejudices  he  nourished,  subservient  to  all 
his  purposes,  personal  and  political.  *  *  *  Possessed, 
as  he  was,  of  the  unlimited  confidence  of  General  Jack- 
son, he  very  soon  found  free  access  to  his  ear,  and,  by 
appropriate  advances,  led  him  into  excesses  and  errors 


*  David  Crockett  says  ("  Life  of  Martin  Van  Buren,"  p.  12):  "  For  a 
man  that  has  as  much  resohition  and  fight  in  him  as  General  Jackson, 
there  never  was  one  that  was  so  easy  to  be  duped." 

Colonel  Crockett  served  under  General  Jackson  during  the  Creek  In- 
dian WM-  of  1813.  His  "  Life  of  Martin  Van  Buren  "  is  unique  if  not 
unprejudiced  and  CJihaustive, 


^8  SENATOB  FORSYTH'S  TWISTED   ARGUMENT. 

fatal  to  the  tranquillity  of  the  country,  without  affording 
the  slightest  evidence  that  he  in  any  manner  participated 
in  producing  the  results  which  he  anxiously  desired  to 
accomplish.  The  prescriptive  policy,  pushed,  as  it  was, 
to  extremities  which  the  public  interest  did  not  seem  to 
require,  and  far  beyond  the  practice  of  any  other  Chief 
Magistrate,  has  been  universally  attributed  to  the  advice 
and  influence  of  Mr.  Van  Buren.  This  system,  com- 
bined with  the  whole  patronage  of  government,  was,  as 
far  as  practicable,  placed  at  his  discretion,  to  smooth 
the  way  to  the  ulterior  object  of  his  ambition."  (pp. 
1340,  1341,  1342.) 

Senator  John  Forsyth  of  Georgia,  who  favored  Mr. 
Van  Buren's  confirmation,  in  reply  to  Mr.  Poiudexter, 
said  (p.  1346)  :  "  What,  sir,  the  most  artful  man  in  the 
world  proclaim  to  a  paltry  editor  that  he  acted  in  the 
manner  indicated  to  escape  the  storm  consequent  on  the 
dissolution  of  the  Cabinet ! "  And  yet  on  the  very  next 
page  he  says  :  "  He  is  called  an  artful  man — a  giant  of 
artifice — a  wily  magician.  From  whom  does  he  receive 
these  0]iprobrious  names  ?  From  open  enemies  and  pre- 
tended friends." 

Senator  Stephen  D.  Miller  of  South  Carolina  said  (pp. 
13V2,  1373)  :  "  Sir,  one  of  the  most  decided  objections  I 
have  to  the  confirmation  of  this  appointment  is  that  the 
patronage  of  the  government  was  exercised  with  a  view 
to  make  this  nominee,  at  the  end  of  the  present  incum- 
bent's term  of  oflfice,  the  President.  I  believe  this  power 
was  exercised  to  a  criminal  extent.  *  *  *  I  do  not 
think  the  power  to  turn  out  one  man  and  put  in  another, 
as  a  mere  arbitrary  exercise  of  executive  authority,  does 
exist.  *  *  *  I  tliink  it  a  violation  of  the  Constitution. 
*    *    *    It  is  the  essence  of  tyranny." 

Senator  Robert  Y.  Hayne  of  South  Carolina  said  (p. 
1381)  be  had  no  doubt  that  Mr.  Van  Buren  had  ad- 


MR.  VAN  BUREN  PHILOSOPHIZES  ON  PATRONAGE.        19 

vanced  "  himself  at  the  expense  of  all  who  were  sup- 
posed to  stand  in  his  way  ;  and,  what  is  worse,  at  the 
expense  of  the  success  of  the  administration,  and  at  the 
imminent  hazard  to  the  best  interests  of  the  country." 
He  further  said  that  he  believed  "  that  Mr.  Van  Buren, 
while  Secretary  of  State,  used  the  influence  derived 
from  his  high  office  for  the  purpose  of  controlling  in- 
juriously the  domestic  and  social  relations  of  this  com- 
munity ;*  and  that  his  conduct  was  in  other  respects 
inconsistent  with  the  dignity  of  his  station  and  the 
character  of  the  country." 

Representative  Henry  A.  Wise  of  Virginia,  speaking, 
in  1836,  of  Mr.  Van  Buren,  said  (Same  Debates,  vol. 
xiii,  pt.  i,  p.  1066)  that  he  held  him  "  responsible  for 
most  mischief  that  has  been  done,  and  most  that  is  now 
doing,"  and  that  he  was  "  elected  by  executive  patron- 
age, corruption,  and  dictation." 

Mr.  James  Parton,  speaking  of  Martin  Van  Buren, 
says  ("Life  of  Jackson,"  iii,  120):  "How  are  we  to 
know  anything  about  a  man  who  was  supposed  to  excel 
all  men  in  concealing  his  motives  and  his  movements?" 

Again  (p.  126)  Mr.  Parton  says  that  President  Van 
Buren,  speaking  of  official  patronage,  once  said  :  "  I 
prefer  an  office  which  has  no  patronage.  When  I  give 
a  man  an  office,  I  offend  his  disappointed  competitors 
and  their  friends,  and  make  enemies  of  the  man  I  re- 
move and  his  friends.  Nor  am  I  certain  of  gaining  a 
friend  in  the  man  I  appoint,  for  in  all  probability  he 
expected  something  better." 

I  wrote  to  Mr.  Parton  and  asked  him  where  he  got 

*  "  It  is  odd  enough,"  wrote  Daniel  Webster  to  a  personal  friend, 
"  that  the  consequence  of  this  dispute  in  the  sociable  and  fashionable 
world  is  producing  great  political  effects,  and  may  very  probably  deter- 
mine who  shall  be  successor  to  the  present  Chief  Magistrate."  ("  At- 
lantic Monthly,"  April,  1880. 


80  A  GOOD  WOBD  FOB  MB.   VAN  BUEEN. 

his  information  concerning  Mr.  Van  Buren's  opinion  of 
the  drawbacks  of  official  patronage.  With  his  permis- 
sion, I  give  his  reply  in  full. 

Newburyport,  Mass.,  August  24,  1887. 

Dear  Sir:  Martin  Van  Buren,  I  think,  was  a  far  more 
respectable  human  being  than  many  of  his  more  gifted 
contemporaries,  such  as  Webster,  Clay,  Calhoun,  and 
others.  The  best  and  fairest  view  of  him  is  given  by 
himself  in  his  work  entitled  "  Inquiry  into  the  Origin 
and  Course  of  Political  Parties  in  the  United  States," 
N.  Y.,  1867.  He  was  a  good  democrat,  but  fell  upon  a 
difficult  time,  inherited  a  developing  system,  and  had 
very  strict  personal  limitations.  I  believe  it  was  the 
late  Coventry  Waddell  (the  "  X.  Clark  "  of  Chap,  xix, 
vol.  iii,  of  my  Jackson),  who  told  me  Van  Buren's  re- 
marks on  appointments  to  office. 

All  the  men  who  surrounded  Jackson  in  1829  knew 
very  well  that  Jackson  alone  had  the  courage  and  har- 
dihood to  introduce  the  system  of  turning  out  political 
opponents  from  minor  offices.  It  was  his  fell  work,  and 
his  alone.  All  was  done  to  wreak  revenge  upon  Clay 
for  wrongs  purely  imaginary.  If  he  turned  out  a  post- 
master in  Kentucky,  he  thought  he  was  hitting  Henry 
Clay. 

I  hope  you  will  put  all  your  force  into  the  work  in 
hand.     If  the  people  of  free  countries  cannot  learn  to 
be  good  employers  of  labor,  freedom  is  not  for  man. 
Very  truly  yours, 

JAMES  PARTON. 

Mr.  Parton  is  a  stanch  opponent  of  the  patronage  sys- 
tem, and  he  devotes  much  space  in  his  "  Life  of  Jack- 
son" to  a  scathing  denunciation  and  exposure  of  it. 
He  attributes  its  origin  to  Aaron  Burr,  and  says  that 
Martin  Van   Buren  "learned  his  tactics  from   Burr." 


SENATOR   MARCY'S    FAMOUS    SPEECH.  81 

His  portrayal  of  what  he  calls  the  "  Burrian  Code,"  is 
an  excellent  description  of  the  patronage  system  in  its 
worst  form. 

It  was  during  the  debate  on  Mr.  Van  Biireu's  con- 
firmation that  Senator  William  L.  Marcy  of  New  York, 
in  reply  to  Senator  Clay,  made  his  famous  spoils  doc- 
trine speech,  the  gist  of  which  is  as  follows  (G.  &  S.'s 
Debates,  vol.  viii,  pt.  i,  p.  1326)  : 

"It  may  be,  sir,  that  the  politicians  of  the  United 
States  are  not  so  fastidious  as  some  gentlemen  are  as 
to  disclosing  the  principles  on  which  they.  act.  They 
boldly  preach  what  they  practice.  When  they  are  con- 
tending for  victory,  they  avow  their  intention  of  enjoy- 
ing the  fruits  of  it.  If  they  are  defeated,  they  expect 
to  retire  from  office.  If  they  are  successful,  they  claim, 
as  a  matter  of  right,  the  advantages  of  success.  They 
see  nothing  wrong  in  the  rule  that  to  the  victor  belong 
the  spoils  of  the  enemy."* 

Mr.  Parton  ("Life  of  Jackson,"  iii,  377)  says  that 
Senator  Marcy,  when  writing  out  his  speech,  said  he 
would  willingly  recall  the  last  quoted  words.  President 
Madison  says  (iv,  357)  :  "The  first,  I  believe,  who  pro- 
claimed the  right,  is  now  the  most  vehement  in  brand- 
ing the  practice."    I  wrote  to  Mr.  Parton  and  asked 

*  Mr.  Marcy,  wliose  speech  was  mostly  in  reply  to  Mr.  Clay,  said  that 
Mr.  Clay's  "  own  political  friends  "  had  practiced  the  patronage  system 
in  Kentucky.  Mr.  Clay  said  (p.  1356):  "It  is  not  practiced  in  Ken- 
tucky by  the  State  government  when  in  the  hands  of  the  opposition  to 
this  administration.  Very  lately  Governor  Metcalfe  has  appointed  to 
one  of  the  three  highest  judicial  stations  in  the  State  a  supporter  of 
this  administration.  *  *  *  The  Governor  also  renewed  the  appoint- 
ment, or  commissioned  several  gentlemen  opposed  to  him  in  politics,  as 
State  attorneys.  And  recently  th  •  Legislature  appointed  a  President  of 
one  of  the  banks  from  the  ranks  of  one  of  the  friends  of  this  adminis- 
tration, and  several  other  oflScers." 


82  MRS.    MAKCY  VERSUS   MR.    MARCTf. 

him  what  he  thought  of  Mr.  Madison's  statement.  In 
a  letter  dated  May  4,  1886,  he  said  :  "  Mr.  Marcy,  as  I 
understood,  did  not  renounce  the  doctrine  of  the  spoils, 
but  merely  regretted  the  blunt,  impolitic  words  in  which 
he  expressed  the  same.  He  was  simply  too  honest  a 
man  to  alter  or  recall  his  words.  My  impression  is  that 
he  lived  and  died  a  spoilsman." 

The  word  spoils,  if  not  military,  is  frequently  used 
by  military  men.  Therefore  its  use  by  the  soldier- 
statesman  Marcy  was  perhaps  only  the  result  of  habit. 
Here  is  an  example  of  his  use  of  military  figures  of 
speech  (Curtis's  "  Life  of  James  Buchanan,"  ii,  36)  : 
"  This  little  battery  has  kept  up  a  brisk  fire  for  you. 
*  *  *  For  want  of  experience  you  do  not  know  the 
potency  of  such  an  adversary.  An  enemy  in  the  camp 
is  more  dangerous  than  one  outside  of  it."  Here  are 
three  military  figures  of  speech  in  almost  as  many  lines. 

"This  little  battery,"  which  was  "an  enemy  in  the 
camp,"  was  Mrs.  Marcy ^  and  the  gentleman  in  whose 
behalf  she  "  kept  up  a  brisk  fire,"  and  to  whom  Mr. 
Marcy  was  writing,  was  James  Buchanan,  a  bachelory 
and  Mr.  Marcy'^s  rival  for  the  then  coming  Democratic 
presidential  nomination  of  1852.  The  letter  is  as  hu- 
morous as  it  is  kind  and  noble. 

In  the  political  lottery  of  1852-53  Governor  Marcy 
drew  the  prize  of  Secretary  of  State,  and  it  is  note- 
worthy that  he  told  Mr.  Buchanan  some  months  after 
accepting  the  office  that,  on  account  of  officeseekers  and 
Cabinet  Councils,  "  he  had  not  been  able  to  devote  one 
single  hour  together  to  his  proper  official  duties."  (ii, 
81.)  So  his  change  of  mind,  if  it  came  at  all,  must  have 
come  late  in  life. 

Senator  Marcy  was  not  the  first  person  to  distinguish 
himself  during  the  Jackson  administration  by  making 
pointed  and  figurative  spoils  doctrine  speeches.     Gover- 


AKOTHER   SPOILS    DOCTRINE    SPEECH.  83 

nor  John  Reynolds  of  Illinois  relates  the  following  by- 
lieutenant  Governor  William  Kinney  of'  Illinois  ("  My 
Own  Times,"  p.  185)  :  "  Governor  Kinney*  had  been  to 
the  city  of  Washington  at  the  inauguration  of  General 
Jackson,  and  had  considerable  agency  at  the  Federal 
city  in  the  proscription  visited  on  the  Whigs  of  Illinois. 
It  was  said  he  remarked  that  the  Whigs  should  be 
whipped  out  of  office  like  dogs  out  of  a  meat-house." 

On  page  199  Governor  Reynolds  says  (inaugural  ad- 
dress) :  "  My  official  care  and  patronage  shall  not  be 
exclusively  bestowed  upon  a  few  men,  and  on  a  partic- 
ular section  of  the  State,  and  proscribe  the  balance. 
Proscription  for  opinion's  sake  is,  in  my  oj)inion,  the 
worst  enemy  to  a  republic.  It  is  the  birthright  of  every 
freeman  to  express  his  political  sentiments  frankly  and 
freely  at  the  polls  of  an  election,  or  elsewhere,  without 
the  hope  of  reward  or  the  fear  of  punishment." 

President  Lincoln,  like  President  Jackson,  preached 
one  thing  and  practiced  another.  His  administration, 
so  far  as  political  parties  are  concerned,  is  therefore  par- 
allel with  and  an  offset  to  President  Jackson's.  Writing 
to  Congressman  John  T.  Stuart  of  Illinois,  on  December 
17,  1840,  he  said  ("Century  Magazine,"  January,  1887, 
p.  377): 

"  This  affair  of  appointments  to  office  is  very  annoy- 
ing— more  so  to  you  than  to  me  doubtless.  I  am,  as 
you  know,  opposed  to  removals  to  make  places  for  our 
friends." 

*  As  Governor  Reynolds  merely  says  "  Governor  Kinney,"  I  wrote  to 
the  Chicago  Historical  Society  and  asked  when  Mr.  Kinney  was  Gover- 
nor of  Illinois.  In  reply  the  Secretary,  Mr.  Albert  D.  Hager,  said: 
"  '  Governor  Kinney  of  Illinois '  is  a  myth.  On  the  6th  of  December, 
1826,  at  the  time  Ninian  Edwards  was  inaugurated  Governor  of  Illinois, 
William  Kinney  of  St.  Clair  county  was  installed  Lieutenant  Governor, 
and  held  the  position  till  December  9,  1830." 


84  LAMON'S   DARK   PICTtJKE    OF   LINCOLN. 

President  Lincoln,  however,  unlike  President  Jackson, 
made  what  is  called  "  a  clean  sweep,"  that  is,  he  prac- 
ticed the  patronage  system  to  its  full  extent.  But  he 
appears  to  have  regretted  his  course,  and  to  have  had 
his  early  convictions  confirmed  by  experience.  In  1865, 
pointing  toward  a  group  of  officeseekers,  he  said  :  "  Be- 
hold this  spectacle  !  We  have  conquered  the  rebellion  ; 
but  here  is  a  greater  danger  to  the  country  than  was 
the  rebellion."  Senator  Charles  Sumner  vouched  for 
these  words  to  Senator  Carl  Schurz.  Again,  shortly  be- 
fore the  fall  of  Richmond,  Mr.  Lincoln  left  Washington 
for  City  Point,  Virginia,  partly,  he  said,  to  be  near 
the  important  military  operations  then  in  progress  and 
partly  to  get  away  from  the  officeseekers.  To  the  then 
General  Schurz,  speaking  of  officeseeking,  he  said  :  "  I 
am  afraid  that  thing  is  going  to  ruin  republican  govern- 
ment," and  much  more  to  the  same  effect,  says  Mr. 
Schurz  in  a  letter  of  April  30,  1886.  And  again.  Ward 
H.  Lamon  says  President  Lincoln  said  that  if  ever  the 
government  was  overthrown  it  would  be  caused  by  "  the 
voracious  desire  of  office — this  wriggle  to  live  without 
toil,  from  which  I  am  not  free  myself."* 

♦Ward  H.  Lamon  says  (''Life  of  Lincoln,"  pp.  23'7,  483,  480,  481, 
242):  "There  is  no  instance  where  an  important  office  seemed  to  be 
within  his  reach  and  he  did  not  try  to  get  it.  *  *  *  Notwithstanding 
his  overweening  ambition,  he  had  not  a  particle  of  sympathy  with  the 
great  mass  of  Viis  fellow-citizens  who  were  engaged  in  similar  scrambles 
for  place.  When  a  candidate  himself,  he  thought  the  whole  canvass 
ought  to  be  conducted  with  reference  to  his  success.  He  would  say  to 
a  man,  *  Your  continuance  in  the  field  injures  me,'  and  be  quite  sure  he 
had  given  a  perfect  reason  for  his  withdrawal.  He  did  nothing  out  of 
mere  gratitude,  .ind  forgot  the  devotion  of  his  warmest  partisans  as 
Boon  as  the  occasion  for  their  services  was  past.  What  they  did  for 
him  was  quietly  appropriated  as  the  reward  of  superior  merit,  calling 
for  no  return  in  kind.  *  *  *  It  was  seldom  that  he  praised  anybody; 
and  when  he  did,  it  was  not  a  rival  or  an  equal  in  the  struggle  for  pop- 


LINCOLN    ABUSES    HIS   LADY-LOVE.  85 

A  few  more  words  concerning  the  rise,  progress,  and 
probable  fall  of  the  patronage  system  in  this  country  is 
not  inappropriate  as  a  conclusion  to  this  chapter. 

The  doctrine  that  to  the  victors  belong  the  spoils, 
which,  as  before  said,  was  first  practiced  nationally  in 
this  country  by  President  Jackson,  has  probably  had 
its  day.  If  it  has,  it  is  well.  Like  the  doctrine  itself, 
spoils  is  a  bad  word.  It  is  synonymous  with  robbery, 
pillage,  destruction  !     It  is  suggestive  of  the  days  of 


Erratum.— Fsigc  85,  line  19.  For  the  words  "  his  public  life," 
rend  Jiis  civil  service  record. 

LEONARD  SWETT  CORROBORATES  LAMON. 

In  dealing  with  men  he  was  a  trimmer,  and  such  a  trimmer 
the  world  has  never  seen.  Halifax,  who  was  great  in  his  day  as 
a  trimmer,  would  blush  by  the  side  of  Lincoln  ;  yet  Lincoln 
never  trimmed  in  principles,  it  was  only  in  his  conduct  with 
men.  He  used  the  patronage  of  his  office  to  feed  the  hunger  of 
various  factions.  *  *  *  He  used  every  force 

to  the  best  possible  advantage.  He  never  wasted  anything,  and 
would  always  give  more  to  his  enemies  than  he  would  to  his 
friends ;  and  the  reason  was  because  he  never  had  anything  to 
spare,  and  in  the  close  calculation  of  attaching  the  factions  to 
him,  he  counted  upon  the  abstract  affection  of  his  friends  as  an 
element  to  be  offset  against  some  gift  with  which  he  must 
appease  his  enemies.  Hence  there  was  always  some  truth  in  the 
charge  of  his  friends  that  he  failed  to  reciprocate  their  devotion 
with   his  favors.  *         *  *        Adhesion  was    what  he 

wanted  ;,  if  he  got  it  gratuitously  he  never  wasted  his  substance 
paying  for  it. 

One  jjreat  public  mistake  of  his  character,  as  generally  received 


Lincoln  and  himself,  in  1842,  were  very  friendly;  that  Lincoln  came  to 
him  one  evening  and  said:  'Jim,  I  will  have  to  marry  that  girl.'  He 
was  married  that  evening,  but  Matheny  says  '  he  looked  as  if  he  was 
going  to  the  slaughter.'  " 

It  was  fitting  that  such  a  spoils  administration  should  end  in  the  rob- 
bery of  the  White  House. 


84  LAMON'S   DAKK   PICTt^KE   OF   LINCOLN. 

President  Lincoln,  however,  unlike  President  Jackson, 
made  what  is  called  "  a  clean  sweep,"  that  is,  he  prac- 
ticed the  patronage  system  to  its  full  extent.  But  he 
appears  to  have  regretted  his  course,  and  to  have  had 
his  early  convictions  confirmed  by  experience.  In  1865, 
pointing  toward  a  group  of  officeseekers,  he  said  :  "  Be- 
hold this  spectacle  !  We  have  conquered  the  rebellion  ; 
but  here  is  a  greater  danger  to  the  country  than  was 
the  rebellion."  Senator  Charles  Sumner  vouched  for 
these  words  to  Senator  Carl  Schurz.     Aerain.  shortlv  be- 


and  acquiesced  in,  is  that  he  is  considered  by  the  people  of  this 
country  as  a  frank,  guileless  and  unsophisticated  man.  There 
never  was  a  greater  mistake.  Beneath  a  smooth  surface  of 
candor  and  apparent  declaration  of  all  his  thoughts  and  feelings, 
he  exercised,  the  most  exalted  tact  and  the  wisest  discrimination. 
He  handled  and  moved  men  remotely  as  we  do  pieces  upon  a 
chess-board.  He  retained  through  life  all  the  friends  he  ever 
had,  and  he  made  the  wrath  of  his  enemies  to  praise  him.  This 
was  not  by  cunning  and  intrigue,  in  the  low  acceptation  of  the 
term,  but  by  far-seeing  reason  and  discernment.  He  always 
told  enough  only  of  his  plans  and  purposes  to  induce  the  belief 
that  he  had  communicated  all,  yet  he  reserved  enough  to  have 
communicated  nothing.  He  told  all  that  was  unimportant  with 
a  gushing  frankness,  yet  no  man  ever  kept  his  real  purposes 
closer,  or  penetrated  the  future  further  with  his  deep  designs. — 
"Rerndon's  Lincoln"  (1889),  Vol.  HI,  pp.  533,  534,  537. 

Judge  Davis  says  Lincoln  was  the  most  reticent,  secretive  man 
he  ever  knew.  Herndon  describes  his  ambition  as  overflowing, 
restless.  He  says  Swett's  letter  makes  the  Lincoln  historical 
picture  more  life  like.  The  four  men  were  Lincoln's  life-long 
friends. 


had  given  a  perfect  reason  for  his  withdrawal.  He  did  nothing  out  of 
mere  gratitude,  and  forgot  the  devotion  of  his  warmest  partisans  as 
soon  as  the  occasion  for  their  services  was  past.  Wiiat  they  did  for 
him  was  quietly  appropriated  as  the  reward  of  superior  merit,  calling 
for  no  return  in  kind.  *  *  *  It  was  seldom  that  he  praised  anybody; 
and  when  he  did,  it  was  not  a  rival  or  an  equal  in  the  struggle  for  pop- 


LINCOLN   ABUSES    HIS    LADY-LOVE.  85 

A  few  more  words  concerning  the  rise,  progress,  and 
probable  fall  of  the  patronage  system  in  this  country  is 
not  inappropriate  as  a  conclusion  to  this  chapter. 

The  doctrine  that  to  the  victors  belong  the  spoils, 
which,  as  before  said,  was  first  practiced  nationally  in 
this  country  by  President  Jackson,  has  probably  had 
its  day.  If  it  has,  it  is  well.  Like  the  doctrine  itself, 
spoils  is  a  bad  word.  It  is  synonymous  with  robbery, 
pillage,  destruction  !     It  is  suggestive  of  the  days  of 

ularity  and  power.  No  one  knew  better  how  to  '  dam!i  with  faint 
praise,'  or  to  divide  the  glory  of  another  by  being  the  first  and  frankest 
to  acknowledge  it.  His  encomiums  were  sometimes  mere  strategems  to 
catch  the  applause  he  pretended  to  bestow.  *  *  *  Fully  alive  to  the 
fact  that  no  qualities  of  a  public  man  are  so  charming  to  the  people  as 
simplicity  and  candor,  he  made  simplicity  and  candor  the  mask  of  deep 
feelings  carefully  concealed  and  subtle  plans  studiously  vailed  from  all 
eyes  but  one." 

His  private  life  appears  to  have  been,  in  some  respects,  as  false  as 
his  public  life.  Mr.  Lamon  says:  "  For  many  reasons  the  publication  of 
this  letter  (a  document  which  sheds  so  broad  a  light  on  one  part  of  his 
life  and  one  phase  of  his  character),  is  an  extremely  painful  duty.  If  it 
could  be  withheld,  and  the  act  decently  reconciled  to  the  conscience  of 
a  biographer  professing  to  be  honest  and  candid,  it  should  never  see 
the  light  of  these  pages.  Its  grotesque  humor,  its  coarse  exaggerations 
in  describing  the  person  of  a  lady  whom  the  writer  was  willing  to  marry, 
its  imputation  of  toothless  and  weather-beaten  old  age  to  a  woman  really 
young  and  handsome,"  &c.  (The  letter  is  too  long  and  irrelevant  for 
insertion  here.     The  picture  is  black  enough  without  it.) 

His  final  marriage  looks  like  retributive  justice.  Mr.  Lamon  says : 
*'  The  marriage  of  Mr.  Lincoln  and  Mary  was  quick  and  sudden — one  or 
two  hours'  notice.  How  poor  Mr.  Lincoln  felt  about  it  may  be  gathered 
from  the  reminiscences  of  his  friend,  J.  11,  Matheny,  who  says  that 
Lincoln  and  himself,  in  1842,  were  very  friendly ;  that  Lincoln  came  to 
him  one  evening  and  said:  'Jim,  I  will  have  to  marry  that  girl.'  He 
was  married  that  evening,  but  Matheny  says  '  he  looked  as  if  he  was 
going  to  the  slaughter.'  " 

It  was  fitting  that  such  a  spoils  administration  should  end  in  the  rob- 
bery of  the  White  House. 


86  THE  EUK»MAD   I'ATJEIOKAGE   SYSTEM 

Nero.  It  is  akin  to  barbarism,  not  to  civilization.  It 
is  adapted  to  war  and  a  description  of  war  times,  not  to 
peace.  If  Americans,  when  talking  about  public  offices, 
would  stop  to  think  of  the  exact  meaning  of  this  word, 
it  would  no  longer  mar  our  political  vocabulary.  In 
private  life  what  chance  of  success  would  a  man  have 
who,  when  he  applied  for  employment,  talked  about  the 
spoils  of  private  business  ?  Of  course  he  would  have 
none.  Then  why  should  such  a  man  have  a  chance  in 
public  life?  Is  not  the  spoils  system  as  unreasonable, 
reprehensible,  and  ruinous  in  public  as  in  private  busi- 
ness ?  If  it  is,  then  is  it  not  undemocratic  ?  And  being 
undemocratic,  does  it  not  logically  follow  that  it  is  un- 
American  ?  If  a  system  is  wrong,  is  not  the  true  rem- 
edy the  application  of  a  precisely  opposite  system  ?  Is 
not  the  civil  service  law  system  the  precise  opposite  of 
the  patronage  system  ?  If  it  is,  then  is  it  not  both  dem- 
ocratic and  American  ?  But  some  people  say  it  is  both 
undemocratic  and  un-American.  Can  this  be  possible? 
If  Washington,  the  Adamses,  Jefferson,  Madison,  Mon- 
roe, Franklin,  Jay,  Hamilton,  Gallatin,  Quincy,  Web- 
ster, Clay,  Calhoun,  Benton,  Barton,  Bell,  and  the  many 
other  statesmen  and  patriots  whose  words  of  wisdom 
are  quoted  in  this  volume,  are  not  specimen  democrats 
and  Americans,  then  who  are  ? 

We  now  come  to  a  period  in  the  history  of  the  gov- 
ernment when  the  patronage  system  reached  its  natural 
and  legitimate  conclusion  ;  that  is,  it  became  a  system 
of  spoils.  The  patronage  system  is  bad  enough,  but 
the  spoils  system  is  the  patronage  system  run  mad. 
The  patronage  pandemonium  reached  its  hight  appar- 
ently during  the  administration  of  President  Johnson, 
who,  on  account  of  the  then  peculiar  and  extraordinary 
state  of  national  affairs,  made  nearly  as  many  official 
removals  as  if  he  had  been  the  leader  of  a  new  party. 


DESCBIBED    BY    JACOB    D.    COX.  87 

But  some  of  his  appointments  were  caused  by  resigna- 
tions instead  of  removals.  The  resignations  were  caused 
by  dissatisfaction  with  President  Johnson's  change  of 
policy ;  for  after  his  war  passions  cooled  down,  he 
chose  to  stand,  as  it  were,  almost  between  rather  than 
on  the  side  of  either  the  Republican  or  Democratic 
party.  And  thus  was  this  iron-willed  and  tried  Union 
man  enabled,  despite  the  intense  turmoil  and  strife  of 
the  times,  and  despite  his  naturally  combative  nature, 
to  pursue  a  comparatively  conservative  course  till  the 
passions  of  the  people  had  also  cooled  down.  Person- 
ally Andrew  Johnson  was  incorruptible  ;  but  the  cor- 
ruption among  officeseekers  during  his  administration, 
and  for  some  years  afterward,  caused  as  much  perhaps 
by  the  demoralization  of  the  unparalleled  civil  war  that 
had  just  closed  as  by  the  then  runrmad  patronage  sys- 
tem, and  aggravated  by  the  complications  of  reconstruc- 
tion and  the  President's  quarrel  with  and  impeachment 
by  Congress,  was  simply  appalling.  Much  documen- 
tary evidence  might  be  cited,  but  the  testimony  of 
one  person  will  suffice.  Jacob  D.  Cox,  a  distinguished 
Union  soldier,  who  was  a  State  Senator  in  Ohio  before 
the  war.  Governor  of  Ohio  after  the  war  (1866),  and 
Secretary  of  the  Interior  in  1869,  says  ("North  Ameri- 
can Review,"  1871,  pp.  87,  88)  ; 

"  During  Mr.  Johnson's  administration  *  *  *  ^^  con- 
dition of  things  existed  which  rivals  the  most  corrupt 
era  that  can  be  found  in  the  history  of  any  nation. 
Men  were  known  to  offer  $5,000  for  the  influence  which 
might  secure  an  appointment  to  a  ganger's  situation  in 
the  revenue  service,  where  $1,500  was  the  limit  of  the 
pay  that  could  be  honestly  earned,  and  when  it  was 
morally  certain  that  the  advent  of  a  new  administration 
would  terminate  the  employment  within  a  year.    This  ia 


88  FRAXKLIX'S    WARNING    VOICE. 

simply  a  type  of  similar  transactions  extending  through 
many  grades  of  the  public  service." 

Speaking  of  the  duplicity  used  to  obtain  "  an  appoint- 
ment from  one  end  of  the  Avenue  and  a  confirmation 
from  the  other,"  Mr.  Cox  says  (p.  87)  : 

"  In  many  instances  two  wholly  separate  sets  of  recom- 
mendations were  procured,  one  proving  that  the  appli- 
cant was  a  faithful  supporter  of  the  President,  the  other 
proving  him  an  utter  despiser  of  the  presidential  policy. 
More  than  this,  it  may  be  easily  proven  that  one  or  the 
other  party  was  often  cognizant  of  the  fraud  perpetra- 
ted, and  the  partisans  of  either  side  congratulated  each 
other  that  an  appointment  or  a  confirmation  had  been 
procured  by  which  the  other  party  was  completely 
cheated.  *  *  *  j^  ^j^g  ^  game  of  *  diamond  cut 
diamond,'  in  which  the  two  parties  were  using  all  the 
resources  and  refinements  of  intrigue  to  get  the  start  of 
the  other  in  the  control  of  the  offices."* 

The  spoils  doctrine  has  done  more  perhaps  to  corrupt 

*  Benjamin  Franklin,  addressing  the  Constitutional  Convention  of 
178*7  on  the  subject  of  salaries,  seems  to  have  had  a  prevision  of  the 
scenes  above  described.  He  said  ("Franklin's  Works,'"  v,  146):  "Sir, 
there  are  two  passions  which  have  a  powerful  influence  in  the  affairs  of 
men.  Those  are  *  ambition '  and  '  avarice ' — the  love  of  power  and  the 
love  of  money.  Separately  each  of  these  has  great  force  in  prompting 
men  to  action  ;  but  when  united  in  view  of  the  same  object,  they  have 
in  many  minds  the  most  violent  effects.  Place  before  such  men  a 
post  of  '  honor,'  that  shall  at  the  same  time  be  a  place  of  '  profit,'  and 
they  will  move  heaven  and  earth  to  obtain  it.  *  *  * 

And  of  what  kind  are  the  men  who  will  strive  for  this  profitable  pre- 
eminence ?  It  will  not  be  the  wise  and  moderate,  the  lovers  of  peace 
and  good  order,  the  men  fittest  for  the  trust.  It  will  be  the  bold  and 
the  violent,  the  men  of  strong  passions  and  indefatigable  activity  in 
their  selfish  pursuits.  These  will  thrust  themselves  into  your  govern- 
ment and  be  your  rulers." 


THE  EVILS   OP   SPOILS   SCHEMES   INSIDIOUS.  89 

American  politics  than  all  other  causes  combined.  Its 
evils,  which  are  reflected  in  the  darkest  pages  of  the 
world's  history,  are  insidious.  This  fact  has  just  been 
well  illustrated,  for  what  did  the  general  public  know, 
at  the  time,  of  the  corruption  described  by  Mr.  Cox? 
Again,  who  but  the  principals  and  their  accomplices 
would  know  of  the  corruption  of  New  York's  fugitive 
(1884)  Aldermen,  if  the  facts  had  not  been  published? 
Further,  spoils  and  insidious  spoils  schemes  are  not  con- 
fined to  public  business.  Many  are  private,  or  semi- 
private  ;  such,  for  example,  as  the  numerous  "  rings " 
and  monopolies  throughout  the  country,  the  corruption 
of  many  of  which  has  been  exposed  by  newspapers  dur- 
ing the  past  twenty-five  years. 

But,  as  before  said,  this  bad  doctrine,  which  for  full 
fifty  years  hung  over  the  nation  like  the  black  clouds 
that  precede  as  well  as  attend  the  coming  storm,  but  no 
blacker  than  the  picture  of  partisan  patronage  just  por- 
trayed, has  probably  had  its  day.  And  again,  as  before 
said,  if  it  has,  it  is  well,  for  fifty  years  more  of  such 
corruption  would  imperil  the  safety  of  the  nation.  * 
Fortunately  a  welcome,  timely,  and  salutary  change 
has  come.  The  beclouded  skies  are  slowly  but  surely 
clearing,  and  the  outlook  is  hopeful.  A  great  political 
storm  is  subsiding  and  is  being  succeeded  by  a  political 
sunshine  that  not  only  makes  the  dangers  through  which 
we  have  passed  plainer,  but  is  teaching  us  how  to  avoid 
them  in  the  future. 

Our  course  is  plain.  The  civil  service  law,  in  order 
to  make  it  a  complete  success,  must  be  enforced  and 
perfected  and  its  scope  gradually  increased.  Its  en- 
forcement will  naturally  lead  to  its  perfection,  and  its 

*  Doubts  may  well  be  entertained  whether  our  government  could  sur- 
vive the  strain  of  a  continuance  of  this  system. — Grover  Cleveland, 


So  SOMETHING  BETTER  THAN   OFFICEHOLDING. 

perfection  to  its  increase  of  scope.  As  before  said,  the 
law  has  made  a  good  beginning.  It  must  also  make  a 
good  ending.  The  increase  of  its  usefulness  must  not 
cease  till  it  has  utterly  destroyed  the  political  dragon 
that  has  done  so  much  to  degrade  American  politics. 
Safety  itself  demands  that,  no  matter  what  the  circum- 
stances may  be,  a  repetition  of  the  scenes  described  by 
Mr.  Cox  shall  be  rendered  impossible.  This,  notwith- 
standing it  requires  the  practical  abolition  of  the  pat- 
ronage system,  is  not  as  difficult  as  it  seems.  When 
business  men  and  business  men  only,  without  regard  to 
politics,  fill  all  non-political  public  offices,  the  patronage 
system  will  be  practically  dead,  and  the  complete  reform 
of  the  civil  service  will  be  a  question  of  only  a  few 
years. 

The  civil  service  law  promises  to  gradually  accom- 
plish this  result.  It  will  then  have  been  carried  to  its 
legitimate  conclusion.  And  it  is  well.  There  is  some- 
thing higher,  better,  and  more  important  for  Americans 
than  ordinary  officeholding.*  The  time  and  talent  here- 
tofore spent  in  striving  for  office  can  hereafter  be  more 
usefully  devoted  to  studying  the  exact  nature  of  public 
grievances  and  to  originating  corrective  measures  for 
them.  This  is  noble,  patriotic,  and  useful  work,  for  it 
subserves  the  interests  of  the  people  as  a  body.  Ameri- 
cans who  are  not  already  qualified,  should  qualify  them- 
selves for  this  work.  In  short,  they  should  imitate  the 
statesmen  whose  wise  words  and  examples  are  given  in 
the  succeeding  as  well  as  other  chapters  of  this  volume. 

*  The  support  which  has  been  given  to  the  present  administration  in 
its  efforts  to  preserve  and  advance  this  reform  *  *  *  shouhl  con- 
firm our  belief  that  there  is  a  sentiment  among  the  people  better  than  a 
desire  to  hold  office,  and  a  patriotic  impulse  upon  which  may  safely  r«st 
the  integrity  of  our  institutions  and  the  strength  and  perpetuity  of  our 
government. — Grover  Clevkland, 


CHAPTER    VII. 

LEADING    STATESMEN'S    PKINCIPLES. 

The  Merit  System  both  Preached  and  Practiced  by  the  six  first  Presi- 
dents (forty  years). — Powerful  blows  at  the  Patronage  System. — 
A  profound  disquisition  on  its  Evils  by  William  Paley  of  England 
(1785). — James  Wilson  on  Patronage  and  OflScial  Appointments. 

President  Washington's  three  cardinal  rules  were 
("  Writings,"  ix,  479)  :  1.  He  would  not  be  under  en- 
gagements to  any  person.  2.  He  would  not  be  influ- 
enced by  "  ties  of  family  blood."  3.  Three  things  were 
to  be  considered  :  («)  Fitness,  (b)  The  *'  comparative 
merits  and  sufferings  in  service."  (c)  The  equal  distri- 
bution of  appointments  among  the  States. 

It  is  noteworthy  that  the  civil  service  law  is  practic- 
ally the  same  as  the  three  last  requirements.  It  is  there- 
fore Washingtonian. 

President  John  Adams  went  into  oftice  with  the  "  de- 
termination to  make  as  few  removals  as  possible — not 
one  from  personal  motives,  not  one  from  party  consid- 
erations" (ix,  47).  But  he  would  not  countenance  "  mis- 
conduct in  oflice,"  and  he  removed  "several  ofticers  at 
Portsmouth  "  because  their  "  daily  language,"  reported 
to  him,  implied  "aversion  if  not  hostility  to  the  govern- 
ment." 

President  Jefferson's  principles  are  expressed  in  thirty- 
three  words,  thus  (iv,  391)  :  "  Good  men,  in  whom  there 
is  no  objection  but  a  difference  of  political  principle, 
practiced  only  as  far  as  the  right  of  a  private  citizen 


92        JEFFERSON,   MADISON,   MONEOE,   J.    Q.    ADAMS. 

will  justify,  are  not  proper  subjects  of  removal."  Re- 
ferring to  removals  from  office,  Jefferson  says  (iv,  409)  : 
"  I  had  foreseen,  years  ago,  that  the  first  Republican 
President  *  *  *  would  have  a  dreadful  operation  to 
perform."  The  Marshals  removed  by  him  were  charged 
with  packing  juries.  When  urged  by  a  representative 
of  the  Tammany  Society  of  Baltimore  to  remove  Feder- 
alists from  office,  the  philosopher  said  (Parton's  "  Life 
of  Jefferson,"  p.  611)  :  "  What  is  the  difference  between 
denying  the  right  of  suffrage  and  punishing  a  man  for 
exercising  it  by  turning  him  out  of  office  ?" 

President  Madison,  writing  to  Edward  Coles,  August 
29,  1834,  said  (iv,  356)  :  "  You  call  my  attention,  with 
much  emphasis,  to  the  princij^le  *  *  *  that  offices 
were  the  spoils  of  victory.  *  *  *  I  fully  agree  in  all 
the  odium  you  attach  to  such  a  rule.  *  *  *  The  prin- 
ciple could  not  fail  to  degrade  any  administration." 

President  Monroe  says  (Gilraan's  "  Monroe,"  p.  202)  : 
"  No  person  at  the  head  of  the  government  has,  in  my 
opinion,  any  claim  to  the  active  partisan  exertions  of 
those  in  office  under  him." 

President  John  Quincy  Adams,  not  only  refused  to 
remove  political  opponents,  but  he  even  refused  to  re- 
move a  naval  officer  who  had  been  concerned  in  an 
unexecuted  project  to  insult  one  of  his  (Adams's)  polit- 
ical friends.  He  says  (Morse's  "Adams,"  p.  180):  "I 
have  been  urged  to  sweep  away  my  opponents  and  pro- 
vide for  my  friends.  I  can  justify  the  refusal  to  adopt 
this  policy  only  by  the  steadiness  and  consistency  of  my 
adherence  to  my  own.  If  I  depart  from  this  in  one  in- 
stance, I  shall  be  called  upon  to  do  the  same  in  many. 
An  invidious  and  inquisitorial  scrutiny  into  the  personal 
dispositions  of  public  officers  will  creep  through  the 
whole  Union,  and  the  most  selfish  and  sordid  passions 
will  be  kindled  into  activity  to  distort  the  conduct  and 


SifLEfi,    BUCHANAN,    JOHNSON.  ^3 

misrepresent  the  feelings  of  men  whose  places  may  be- 
come the  prize  of  slander  upon  them."* 

President  Tyler  was  opposed  to  making  removals  on 
account  of  political  opinions.  In  his  first  annual  mes- 
sage he  said  he  had  used  the  power  only  in  cases  of 
unfaithfulness,  incompetency,  and  partisanship  that  led 
to  undue  influence  over  elections.  He  further  said 
(Benton's  Debates,  xiv,  375)  :  "I  shall  cordially  concur 
in  any  constitutional  measures  for  regulating  and  re- 
straining the  power  of  removal." 

James  Buchanan,  in  discussing  in  the  Senate,  in  1839, 
a  bill  to  prevent  the  interference  of  Federal  officers  with 
elections,  said  (Curtis'a  "Buchanan,"  i,  395):  "Now, 
sir,  if  any  freak  of  destiny  should  ever  place  me  in  one 
of  these  executive  departments  *  *  *  I  shall  tell  you 
the  course  I  would  pursue.  I  should  not  become  an 
inquisitor  of  the  political  opinions  of  the  subordinate 
officeholders.  *  *  *  For  the  higher  and  more  respon- 
sible offices,  however,  I  would  select  able,  faithful,  and 
well  tried  political  friends.  *  *  *  With  General 
Washington,  I  believe  that  any  other  course  *  would  be 
a  sort  of  political  suicide.'  "  f 

President  Johnson  says  (Appendix  to  Cong.  Globe, 
1867,  p.  4)  :  "  The  unrestricted  power  of  removal  from 
office  is  a  very  great  one  to  be  trusted  even  to  a  Magis- 
trate chosen  by  the  general  suffrage  of  the  whole  peo- 
ple, and  accountable  directly  to  them  for  his  acts.  It  is 
undoubtedly  liable  to  abuse,  and  at  some  period  of  our 
history  perhaps  has  been  abused.^' 

*  Washington,  says  Mr.  James  Parton,  made  9  removals,  J.  Adams  9, 
Jefferson  39,  Madison  5,  Monroe  9,  and  J.  Q.  Adams  2.  Total,  73.  J. 
C.  Calhotm  (ii,  438)  says  J.  Adams  made  10  removals  and  JeflFerson  42. 
President  Jackson's  removals,  in  eight  years,  aggregated  nearly  1,000. 

f  Washington's  Writings,  xi,  76.  On  page  78  of  the  same  volume  he 
speaks  of  "  governmental  suicide," 


04  GEANl^,   HAYES,   tlLDfii^^. 

President  Grant  was  not  long  in  perceiving  the  need 
of  reform  in  the  civil  service.  In  his  first  annual  mes- 
sage he  says  (Cong.  Globe,  ISlO,  p.  9)  :  "I  would  re- 
spectfully call  your  attention  to  *  *  *  a  reform  in 
the  civil  service  of  the  country.  I  would  have  it  go 
beyond  the  mere  fixing  of  the  tenure  of  ofiice  of  clerks 
and  employes,  *  *  *  J  would  have  it  govern  *  *  * 
the  manner  of  making  all  appointments.  There  is  no 
duty  which  so  much  embarrasses  the  Executive  and 
heads  of  Departments  as  that  of  appointments.  *  *  * 
The  present  system  does  not  secure  the  best  men,  and 
often  not  even  fit  men  for  public  place." 

President  Hayes  denounced  the/  patronage  system  and 
advocated  '*  a  return  to  the  principles  and  practices  of 
the  founders  of  the  government  y  in  both  his  letter  of 
acceptance  and  his  inaugural  address.  He  also  de- 
nounced the  farming  out  of  appoint«jents  among  Con- 

*  The  following  "  plank  "  from  the  national  Democratic  "  platform  " 
of  181G  favors  the  requirement  of  "  proved  competency"  in  filling  pub- 
lic offices,  which  is  precisely  what  the  competitive  examination  system 
has  accomplished.  It  is  statesman-like  and  is  in  harmony  with  the 
present  civil  service  law : 

"  Reform  is  necessary  in  the  civil  service.  Experience  proves  that 
efficient,  economical  conduct  of  the  governmental  business  is  not  possi- 
ble if  its  civil  service  be  subject  to  change  at  every  election ;  be  a  prize 
fought  for  at  the  ballot-box ;  be  a  brief  reward  of  party  zeal,  instead  of 
posts  of  honor,  assigned  for  proved  competency,  and  held  for  fidelity  in 
the  public  employ ;  that  the  dispensing  of  patronage  should  neither  be 
a  tax  upon  the  time  of  all  our  public  men  nor  the  instrument  of  their 
ambition." 

Mr.  Tilden,  in  his  letter  of  acceptance,  favors  the  "  organization  of  a 
better  civil  service  system,  under  the  tests,  wherever  practicable,  of 
proved  competency  and  fidelity."  It  is  noteworthy  that  he  repeats  the 
words  "  proved  competency."  It  is  clear  therefore  what  his  course 
would  have  probably  been  had  the  Electoral  Commission  declared  him 
elected  President  instead  of  Hayes. 


GABflELB   A^^D   ARTllUK.  Do 

gressmen,  saying :  "  The  offices  in  these  cases  have 
become  not  merely  rewards  for  party  services,  but  re- 
wards for  services  to  party  leaders." 

President  Garfield  says  (Cong.  Record,  1881,  p.  3)  : 
"  The  civil  service  can  never  be  placed  on  a  satisfactory 
basis  until  it  is  regulated  by  law.  For  the  good  of  the 
service  itself,  for  the  protection  of  those  who  are  in- 
trusted with  the  appointing  power  against  the  waste  of 
time  and  obstruction  to  the  public  business,  caused  by 
the  inordinate  pressure*  for  place,  and  for  the  protec- 
tion of  incumbents  against  intrigue  and  lorong,  \  I  shall, 
at  the  proper  time,  ask  Congress  to  fix  the  tenure  of  the 
minor  offices  of  the  several  Executive  Departments,  and 
to  prescribe  the  grounds  upon  which  removals  shall  be 
made  during  the  terms  for  which  incumbents  have  been 
appointed." 

^President  Arthur  favored  civil  service  reform  in  his 
letter  of  acceptance  of  the  nomination  for  Vice-Presi- 
dent as  well  as  in  two  annual  messages.     He  found  the 

*  We  press  such  appointments  upon  tlie  Departments;  we  crowd  the 
doors;  we  fill  the  corridors ;  Senators  and  Representatives  throng  the 
offices  and  bureaus  until  the  public  business  is  obstructed ;  the  patience 
of  officers  is  worn  out,  and  sometimes,  for  fear  of  losing  their  pl.'ices  by 
our  influence,  they  at  last  give  way,  and  appoint  men,  not  because  they 
are  fit  for  the  position,  but  because  we  ask  it. — Garfield's  Speech  in 
Congress,  1870. 

Let  it  once  be  fully  understood  that  continuance  in  office  depends 
solely  upon  the  faithful  and  efficient  discharge  of  duties,  and  that  no 
man  will  be  removed  to  make  place  for  anoth.  r,  and  the  reform  will  be 
half  accomplished. — Garfield  at  Athens,  Ohio,  1879. 

To  reform  this  service  is  one  of  the  highest  and  most  imperative 
duties  of  statesmanship, — Garfield  in  "Atlantic  Monthly,"  July, 
1877,  p.  61. 

f  The  italics  are  mine.  The  civil  service  law  does  not  make  suffi- 
cient provision  "  for  the  protection  of  incumbents  against  intrigue  and 
wrong ; "  neither  does  it  "  prescribe  the  grounds  upon  which  removals 
shall  be  made,"    (See  introduction  to  Chapter  VIII.) 


96         PRESIDENT  Cleveland's  decided  vieWS. 

"  inordinate  pressure  for  place  '^  too  great  to  bear,  and 
further  that  it  diverts  the  President's  •'time  and  at- 
tention from  the  proper  discharge  of  other  duties  no 
less  delicate  and  responsible,  and  which,  in  the  very 
nature  of  things,  cannot  be  delegated  to  other  hands." 
Among  other  things,  he  said  :  "  Original  appointments 
should  be  based  upon  ascertained  fitness.  The  tenure 
of  office  should  be  stable.  Positions  of  responsibility 
should,  as  far  as  practicable,  be  filled  by  the  promotion 
of  worthy  and  efficient  officers." 

President  Cleveland  has  proved  himself  a  civil  service 
reformer  in  deed  as  well  as  in  word,  not  only  as  Presi- 
dent, but  as  Governor  of  New  York./T[n  his  inaugural 
address  he  says  (Cong.  Record,  1885,  p.  3)  :  "  The  peo- 
ple demand  reform  in  the  administration  of  the  govern- 
ment and  the  application  of  business  principles  to  public 
affairs.  As  a  means  to  this  end  civil  service  reform 
should  be  in  good  faith  enforced.  Our  citizens  have 
the  right  to  protection  from  the  incompetency  of  public 
employes  who  hold  their  places  solely  as  the  reward  of 
partisan  service,  and  from  the  corrupting  influence  of 
those  who  promise  and  the  vicious  methods  of  those 
who  expect  such  rewards.  And  those  who  worthily 
seek  public  employment,  have  the  right  to  insist  that 
merit  and  competency  shall  be  recognized  instead  of 
party  subserviency,  or  the  surrender  of  honest  political 
belief." 

Again,  in  his  second  annual  message,  President  Cleve- 
land says  (Cong.  Record,  Dec.  7,  1886,  p.  11):  "The 
continued  operation  of  the  law  relating  to  our  civil  ser- 
vice has  added  the  most  convincing  proofs  of  its  neces- 
sity and  usefulness.  It  is  a  fact  worthy  of  note  that 
every  public  officer  who  has  a  just  idea  of  his  duty  to 
the  people,  testifies  to  the  value  of  this  reform.  Its 
ptanchest  friends  are  found  among  those  who  under- 


koft'TGAdiNd  EiEatf'^tVB  j^Alftdj^A^ti.  67 

stand  it  best,  and  its  warmest  supporters  are  those  who 
are  restrained  and  protected  by  its  requirements. 

"  The  meaning  of  such  restraint  and  protection  is  not 
appreciated  by  those  who  want  places  under  the  gov- 
ernment, regardless  of  merit  and  efficiency,  nor  by  those 
who  insist  that  tbe  selection  for  such  places  should  rest 
upon  a  proper  credential  showing  active  partisan  work. 
They  mean  to  public  officers,  if  not  their  lives,  the  only 
opportunity  aiforded  them  to  attend  to  public  business, 
and  they  mean  to  the  good  people  of  the  country  the 
better  performance  of  the  work  of  their  government. 

"  It  is  exceedingly  strange  that  the  scope  and  nature 
of  this  reform  are  so  little  understood,  and  that  so  many 
things  not  included  within  its  plan  are  called  by  its 
name.  When  cavil  yields  more  fully  to  examination, 
the  system  will  have  large  additions  to  the  number  of 
its  friends. 

"  Our  civil  service  reform  may  be  imperfect  in  some 
of  its  details  ;  it  may  be  misunderstood  and  opposed  ; 
it  may  not  always  be  faithfully  applied  ;  its  designs 
may  sometimes  miscarry  through  mistake  or  willful  in- 
tent ;  it  may  sometimes  tremble  under  the  assaults  of 
its  enemies  or  languish  under  the  misguided  zeal  of  im- 
practicable friends  ;  but  if  the  people  of  this  country 
ever  submit  to  the  banishment  of  its  underlying  princi- 
ple from  the  operation  of  their  government,  they  will 
abandon  the  surest  guarantee  of  the  safety  and  success 
of  American  institutions."^^ 

Representative  James  iCT  Bayard  of  Delaware  (after- 
ward  United  States  Senator),  the  grandfather  of  Secre- 
tary of  State  Thomas  F.  Bayard,  to  whose  patriotic  and 
disinterested  exertions  is  largely  due  Thomas  Jefferson's 
election  to  the  presidency  in  1801,  was  decidedly  op- 
posed to  '*  mortgaging  the  patronage  of  the  Executive," 
to  use  his  own  words.    His  views  ou  the  civil  service 


OS  Mr.    bayard's   HOKORABLti   CON£>Ud¥. 

problem  are  expressed  in  a  deposition,*  made  on  April 
3,  1806,  *'in  a  cause  depending  in  the  Supreme  Court 
of  the  State  of  New  York,  between  James  Gillespie, 
plaintiff,  and  Abram  Smith,  defendant."  Mr.  Bayard 
was  a  Federalist,  but  in  the  long  contest  (thirty-six  bal- 
lots) for  the  presidency  in  the  House  of  Representatives 
between  the  two  great  Republicans,  Thomas  Jefferson 
and  Aaron  Burr,  was  inclined,  with  the  rest  of  his  party 
(Federal),  to  support  Burr,  as  being  less  opposed  to 
them  than  Jefferson.  But,  after  consultation  and  cor- 
respondence with  Alexander  Hamilton,  Burr's  personal 
character  became  better  known  to  Mr.  Bayard.  There- 
fore, in  order  to  keep  Burr  out  of  the  presidency,  and 
to  prevent  a  failure  to  elect  a  President,  and  a  conse- 
quent disruption  of  the  new  government,  it  was  decided 
to  put  an  end  to  the  contest  by  the  election  of  Jefferson. 
This  was  accomplished  by  Mr.  Bayard,  who  held  the 
vote  of  one  State,  casting  a  blank  ballot.f     But  before 

*  The  deposition  is  adduced  as  evidence  in  the  course  of  a  "  Vindica- 
tion of  the  late  James  A.  Bayard,"  by  his  son,  Senator  James  A.  Bay- 
ard of  Delaware,  and  may  be  found,  with  much  other  documentary  evi- 
dence, in  the  Congressional  Globe  for  January  31,  1855,  page  ISI.  Mr. 
Bayard's  vindication  of  his  father  from  the  charge  of  falsehood  made 
against  him  by  Mr.  Jefferson  in  his  "  Anas "'  papers  (ix,  209),  is  com- 
plete and  overwhelming.  Mr.  Jefferson's  charge  was  undoubtedly  made 
under  a  misunderstanding  of  the  facts  of  the  case ;  and  something  may 
also  be  attributed  perhaps  to  the  adroitness  of  Senator  Smith  (whose 
deposition  appears  on  page  100)  in  drawing  him  out. 

f  Mr.  Bayard,  in  order  to  avoid  even  the  suspicion  of  impure  motives 
in  giving,  as  he  said,  "  the  '  turn '  to  the  election,"  declined  an  appoint- 
ment as  Minister  to  France,  tendered  to  him  by  President  Adams  in  Feb- 
ruary, 1801,  and  to  which  he  had  been  confirmed  by  the  Senate,  because 
it  "  would  be  held  on  the  tenure  of  Mr.  Jefferson's  pleasure."  He  said : 
"  My  ambition  shall  never  be  gratified  at  the  expense  of  a  suspicion." 

Note. — I  am  indebted  to  Secretary  of  State  T.  F.  Bayard  for  the 
minute  details  concerning  his  grandfather's  course  and  change  of  senti^ 
meut  in  the  presidential  election  of  1801, 


\^HAT   MR.    BAYARD   WAXTEI).  §^ 

this  was  done,  it  was  thought  proper  to  secure  Mr. 
Jefferson's  engagement  in  certain  important  political 
matters,  which  are  explained  in  the  following  extract 
from  the  deposition  of  Mr.  Bayard  : 

"I  stated  to  Mr.  Nicholas*  that  if  certain  points  of 
the  future  administration  could  be  understood  and  ar- 
ranged with  Mr  Jefferson,  I  was  authorized  to  say  that 
three  States  would  withdraw  from  an  opposition  to  his 
election.  He  asked  me  what  those  points  were.  I  an- 
swered :  First,  sir,  the  support  of  public  credit  ;  sec- 
ondly, the  maintenance  of  the  naval  system  ;  and  lastly, 
that  subordinate  public  officers,  employed  only  in  the 
execution  of  details  established  by  law,  shall  not  be 
removed  from  office  on  the  ground  of  their  political 
character,  nor  without  complaint  against  their  conduct. 
I  explained  myself,  that  I  considered  it  not  only  rea- 
sonable, but  necessary,  that  offices  of  high  discretion 
and  confidence  should  be  filled  by  men  of  Mr.  Jeffer- 
son's choice.  I  exemplified  by  mentioning,  on  the  one 
hand,  the  offices  of  the  Secretaries  of  States,  Treasury, 
foreign  Ministers,  &c.,  and  on  the  other  the  Collectors 
of  ports,  &c.  Mr.  Nicholas  answered  me,  that  he  con- 
sidered the  points  as  very  reasonable  ;  that  he  was  sat- 
isfied that  they  corresponded  with  the  views  and  inten- 
tions of  Mr.  Jefferson,  and  [that  he]  knew  him  well. 
That  he  was  acquainted  with  most  of  the  gentlemen 
who  would  probably  be  about  him  and  enjoying  his 
confidence,  in  case  he  became  President,  and  that  if  I 
would  be  satisfied  with  his  assurance,  he  could  solemnly 
declare  it  as  his  opinion  that  Mr.  Jefferson,  in  his  ad- 
ministration, would  not  depart  from  the  points  I  had 
proposed."! 

*  Representative  John  Nicholas  of  Virginia. 

j-  Mr.  Bayard's  deposition  is  corroborated  by  a  deposition  of  United 


iOO  MR.   SMITfl  CORfeOBORAtfiS  MR.   fiAtAfti3. 

Representative  Josiah  Quincy  of  Massachusetts,  on 
January  30,  1811,  made  a  very  original  and  unique 
speech  on  the  subject  of  officeholding  and  the  appoint- 
ment of  Congressmen  to  office. 

"  Early  in  the  session,"  says  Mr.  Edmund  Quincy 
("Life  of  Josiah  Quincy,"  p.  219),  "Mr.  Macon*  of 
North  Carolina  moved  the  following  amendment  to  the 
Constitution  : 

"  *  Besolved,  That  no  Senator  or  Representative  shall 
be  appointed  to  any  civil  office,  place,  or  emolument, 
under  the  authority  of  the  United  States,  until  the  ex- 
piration of  the  presidential  term  in  which  such  person 
shall  have  served  as  a  Senator  or  Representative.' 

States  Senator  Samuel  Smith  of  Maryland,  who  was  also  a  witness  in 
the  case  of  Gillespie  vs.  Smith,  and  who  was  requested  by  Mr,  Bayard, 
in  1801,  to  inquire  of  Mr.  Jefferson  personally  concerning  the  political 
topics  named  (p.  99),  and  to  bring  a  direct  reply  the  next  day.  Senator 
Smith  says  (Appendix  to  Cong.  Globe,  vol.  xxxi,  p.  138):  "I  did  so. 
And  the  next  day  (Saturday)  told  him  that  Mr.  Jefferson  had  said  that 
he  did  not  think  that  such  officers  ought  to  be  dismissed  on  political 
grounds  only,  except  in  cases  where  they  had  made  improper  use  of 
their  offices  to  force  the  officers  under  them  to  vote  contrary  to  their 
judgment.  That  as  to  Mr.  McLane,  he  had  already  been  spoken  to  in 
his  behalf  by  Major  Eccleston,  and  from  the  character  given  him  by 
that  gentleman,  he  considered  him  a  meritorious  officer ;  of  course  that 
he  would  not  be  displaced,  or  ought  not  to  be  displaced.  I  further 
added  that  Mr.  Bayard  might  rest  assured  (or  words  to  that  effect), 
that  Mr.  Jefferson  would  conduct,  as  to  those  points,  agreeably  to  the 
opinions  I  had  stated  as  his." 

*  Nathaniel  Macon,  born  in  North  Carolina,  1757 ;  served  as  a  private 
in  the  Revolutionary  War,  having  declined  a  commission.  He  was  ia 
the  House  and  Senate  frjom  1791  to  1828,  the  longest  term  of  congres- 
sional service,  I  believe,  on  record.  He  was  Speaker  from  1801  to 
1807;  and  president  pro  tern,  of  the  Senate  from  1825  to  1828.  Died 
1837.— E.  Qdincy. 

It  is  noteworthy  that  'Mr.  Macon's  proposed  amendment,  which  was 
again  presented  and  urged  in  1826,  is  in  substance  the  same  as  that 
of  Representative  Tucker  in  the  first  Congress.     (See  note,  page  152,^ 


MR.    QUINCY'S   GREAT   SPEECH.  101 

*'  Mr.  Quincy  moved  that  the  following  proposition 
be  added  to  it : 

"  *  And  no  person  standing  to  any  Senator  or  Rep- 
resentative in  the  relation  of  father,  brother,  or  sou,  by 
blood  or  marriage,  shall  be  appointed  to  any  civil  office 
under  the  United  States,  or  shall  receive  any  place, 
agency,  contract,  or  emolument  from  or  under  any  de- 
partment or  officer  thereof.' " 

The  following  are  extracts  from  Mr.  Quincy's  speech, 
as  reported  by  his  son  : 

"  Upon  this  subject  of  offices  my  sentiments  may  per- 
haps be  too  refined  for  the  present  condition  of  human 
nature.  And  I  am  aware,  in  what  I  am  about  to  say, 
that  I  may  run  athwart  political  friends  as  well  as 
political  foes.  Such  considerations  as  these  shall  not, 
however,  deter  me  from  introducing  just  and  high 
notions  of  their  duties  to  the  consideration  of  the 
members  of  tlie  Legislature.  I  hold,  sir,  the  accept- 
ance of  an  office  of  mere  emolument,  or  which  is 
principally  emolument,  by  a  member  of  Congress  from 
the  Executive,  as  unworthy  his  station,  and  incompati- 
ble with  that  high  sense  of  irreproachable  character 
which  it  is  one  of  the  choicest  terrestrial  boons  of  vir- 
tue to  attain.  For  while  the  attainment  of  office  is 
to  members  of  Congress  the  consequence  solely  of  co- 
Incidence  with  the  'Executive,  he  who  has  the  office 
carries  on  his  forehead  the  mark  of  having  fulfilled 
the  condition.  And  although  his  self-love  may  denom- 
inate his  attainment  of  the  office  to  be  the  reward  of 
merit,  the  world,  which  usually  judges  acutely  on  these 
matters,  will  denominate  it  the  reward  of  service.  *  *  * 

"  Such  is  the  opinion  which,  in  my  judgment,  ought 
to  be  entertained  of  the  mere  acceptance  of  office  by 
members   of  Congress,     But  as  to  that  other  class  of 


102       EXCOBIATING   PROFESSIONAL   OFFICESEEKERS. 

persons,  who  are  open,  notorious  solicitors  of  office, 
they  give  occasion  to  reflections  of  a  very  different  na- 
ture. This  class  of  persons  in  all  times  past  have 
appeared,  and  (for  I  say  nothing  of  times  present)  in 
all  times  future  will  appear,  on  this  and  the  other 
floor  of  Congress,  creatures  who,  under  pretense  of 
serving  the  people,  are  in  fact  serving  themselves  ; 
creatures  who,  while  their  distant  constituents — good, 
easy  men,  industrious,  frugal,  and  unsuspicious — dream, 
in  visions,  that  they  are  laboring  for  their  country's 
welfare,  are  in  truth  spending  their  time  mousing  at 
the  doors  of  the  palace  or  the  crannies  of  the  depart- 
ments, and  laying  low  snares  to  catch  for  themselves 
a-nd  their  relations  every  stray  office  that  flits  by  them. 
For  such  men,  chosen  into  this  high  and  responsible 
trust,  to  whom  have  been  confided  the  precious  desti- 
nies of  this  people,  and  who  thus  openly  abandon  their 
duties,  and  set  their  places  and  their  consciences  to 
sale,  in  defiance  of  the  multiplied,  strong,  and  tender 
ties  by  which  they  are  bound  to  their  country,  I  have 
no  language  to  express  my  contempt.  I  never  have 
seen,  and  I  never  shall  see,  any  of  these  notorious 
solicitors  of  office,  for  themselves  or  their  relations, 
standing  on  this  or  the  other  floor,  bawling  and  bully- 
ing, or  coming  down  with  dead  votes  in  support  of 
executive  measures,  but  I  think  I  see  a  hackney  labor- 
ing for  hire  in  a  most  degrading  service  ;  a  poor,  earth- 
spirited  animal,  trudging  in  his  traces,  with  much  at- 
trition of  the  sides  and  induration  of  the  membranes, 
encouraged  by  this  special  certainty,  that,  at  the  end 
of  his  journey,  he  shall  have  measured  out  to  him  his 
proportion  of  provender. 

"  But  I  have  heard  that  the  bare  suggestion  of  such 
corruption  was  a  libel  upon  this  House  and  upon  this 
people,     I  h^ve  he^rd  that  we  were  in  this  country  so 


AFTER  MANS  OFFICE  BEFORE  CORPSE  IS  COLD.       103 

virtuous  that  we  were  above  the  influence  of  these 
allurements  ;  that  beyond  the  Atlantic,  in  old  govern- 
ments, such  things  might  be  suspected,  but  that  here 
we  were  too  pure  for  such  guilt,  too  innocent  for  such 
suspicions.  Mr.  Cliairman,  I  shall  not  hesitate,  in  spite 
of  such  popular  declamation,  to  believe  and  follow  the 
evidence  of  my  senses  and  the  concurrent  testimonies 
of  contemporaneous  beholders.  I  shall  not,  in  my  esti* 
mation  of  character,  degrade  this  people  below,  nor* 
exalt  them  far  above,  the  ordinary  condition  of  culti- 
vated humanity.  And  of  this  be  assured,  that  every 
system  of  conduct  or  course  of  policy  which  has  for 
its  basis  an  excess  of  virtue  in  this  country  beyond 
what  human  nature  exhibits  in  its  improved  state  else- 
where, will  be  found  on  trial  fallacious.  Is  there  on 
this  earth  any  collection  of  men  in  which  there  exists  a 
more  intrinsic,  hearty,  and  desperate  love  of  oflice  or 
place — particularly  of  fat  places  ?  Is  there  any  country 
more  infested  than  this  with  the  vermin  that  breed  in 
the  corruptions  of  power  ?  Is  there  any  in  which  place 
and  official  emolument  more  certainly  follow  distin- 
guished servility  at  elections,  or  base  scurrility  in  the 
press  ?  And  as  to  eagerness  for  the  reward,  what  is 
the  fact?  Let  now  one  of  your  great  officeholders,  a 
collector  of  the  customs,  a  marshal,  a  commissioner  of 
loans,  a  postmaster  in  one  of  your  cities,  or  any  officer, 
agent,  or  factor  for  your  territories  or  public  lands,  or 
person  holding  a  place  of  minor  distinction,  but  of 
considerable  profit,  be  called  on  to  pay  the  last  great 
debt  of  nature.  The  poor  man  shall  hardly  be  dead  ; 
lie  shall  not  be  cold  ;  long  before  the  corpse  is  in  the 
coffin,  the  mail  shall  be  crowded  to  repletion  with  let- 
ters and  certificates,  and  recommendations  and  repre- 
sentations, and  every  species  of  sturdy,  sycophantic 
BoUcitation  by  which  obtrusive  mendicity  seeks  charity 


104  UNSrRPASSKD  WORD  PAINTINGS. 

or  invites  compassion.  Why,  sir,  we  hear  the  clamor 
of  the  craving  animals  at  the  treasury-trough  here  in 
this  capitol.  Such  running,  such  jostling,  such  wrig- 
gling, such  clambering  over  one  another's  backs,  such 
squealing  because  the  tub  is  so  narrow  and  the  com- 
pany so  crowded  !  No,  sir,  let  us  not  talk  of  stoical 
apathy  toward  the  things  of  the  national  treasury,  either 
in  this  people  or  in  their  Representatives  or  Senators. 

"  But  it  will  be  asked  (for  it  has  been  asked),  Shall 
the  Executive  be  suspected  of  ccy-rupting  the  national 
Legislature?  Is  he  not  virtuous?  Without  making 
personal  distinctions  or  references,  for  the  sake  of 
argument  it  may  be  admitted  that  all  Executives  for 
the  time  being  are  virtuous  —  reasonably  virtuous,  Mr. 
Chairman  —  flesh  and  blood  notwithstanding.  And 
without  meaning  in  this  place  to  cast  any  particular 
reflections  upon  this  or  upon  any  other  Executive,  this 
I  will  say,  that  if  no  additional  guards  are  provided, 
and  now  after  the  spirit  of  party  has  brought  into  so 
full  activity  the  spirit  of  patronage,  there  never  will 
be  a  President  of  these  United  States,  elected  by  means 
now  in  use,  who,  if  he  deals  honestly  with  himself, 
will  not  be  able,  on  quitting  his  presidential  chair,  to 
address  it  as  John  Falstaff  addressed  Prince  Hal :  *  Be- 
fore I  knew  thee,  I  knew  nothing  ;  and  now  I  am  but 
little  better  than  one  of  the  wicked.'  The  possession 
of  that  station  under  the  reign  of  party  will  make  a 
man  so  acquainted  with  the  corrupt  principles  of  hu- 
man conduct ;  he  will  behold  oar  nature  in  so  hungry 
and  shivering  and  craving  a  state,  and  be  compelled 
so  constantly  to  observe  the  solid  rewards  daily  de- 
manded by  way  of  compensation  for  outrageous  patri- 
otism, that  if  he  escape  out  of  that  atmosphere  with- 
out partaking  of  its  corruption,  he  must  be  below  or 
above  the  ordinary  condition  of  mortal  nature.     Is  it 


A  GOOD  OFFICE  FOB  A  GOOD  OFFICE.       105 

possible,  sir,  that  he  should  remain  altogether  unin- 
fected? What  is  the  fact?  The  Constitution  prohib- 
its the  members  of  this  and  of  the  other  branch  of 
the  Legislature  from  being  electors  of  the  President 
of  the  United  States.  Yet  what  is  done  ?  The  prac- 
tice of  late  is  so  prevalent  as  to  liave  grown  almost 
into  a  sanctioned  usage  of  party.  Prior  to  the  presi- 
dential terms  of  four  years,  members  of  Congress,  hav- 
ing received  the  privileged  ticket  of  admission,  as- 
semble themselves  in  a  sort  of  electoral  college,  on  the 
floor  of  the  Senate  or  of  the  House  of  Representatives. 
They  select  a  candidate  for  the  presidency.  *  To  their 
voice,  to  their  influence,  he  is  indebted  for  his  eleva- 
tion. So  long  as  this  condition  of  things  continues, 
what  ordinary  Executive  will  refuse  to  accommodate 
those  who  in  so  distinguished  a  manner  have  accom- 
modated him?  Is  there  a  better  reason  in  the  world 
why  a  man  should  give  you,  Mr.  Chairman,  an  oflice 
worth  two  or  three  thousand  dollars  a  year,  for  which 
you  are  qualified,  and  which  he  could  give  as  well  as 
not,  than  this — that  you  had  been  greatly  instrumental 
in  giving  him  one  worth  five  and  twenty  thousand,  for 
which  he  was  equally  qualified  ?  It  is  in  vain  to  con- 
ceal it.  So  long  as  the  present  condition  of  things 
continues,  it  may  reasonably  be  expected  that  there 
shall  take  place  regularly  between  the  President  of  the 

*  This  system  continued  till  1824,  when  William  H.  Crawford,  who 
was  nominated  in  accordance  with  it,  ran  behind  both  Adams  and  Jack- 
son. In  1828  Jackson  and  Adams  ran  without  any  formal  nomination. 
The  first  national  Convention  was  held  by  the  Democratic  party  in  Bal- 
timore in  1832,  when  Jackson  and  Van  Buren  were  nominated.  The 
Whigs  held  their  first  national  Convention  in  Harrisburg  in  December, 
1839,  when  General  Harrison  and  John  Tyler  were  nominated.  In  New 
York  and  Pennsylvania  the  caucus  system  was  superseded  by  State  Con- 
rentions  between  1820  and  1830.  Mr.  Qnincy  helped  to  kill  "King 
Caucus,"  as  the  system  was  sometimes  called. 


106  WHAT   MR.    QUINCY'S   FATHER   SAID. 

United  States  and  a  portion  of  both  Houses  of  Congress 
an  interchange,  strictly  speaking,  of  good  offices."  * 

Mr.  Quincy's  speech,  which  may  be  found  in  full  in 
Gales  &  Seaton's  "Debates"  for  1810-18]!,  beginning 
at  page  843,  closed  as  follows  : 

"The  principle  for  which  I  contend,  and  which  is 
the  basis  both  of  the  original  amendment  and  of  my 
proposition,  is  this  :  Put  it  out  of  the  power  of  the 
Executive  to  seem  to  pay  any  of  the  members  of  Con- 
gress, by  putting  it  out  of  their  power  to  receive. 
*  Avoid  the  appearance  of  evil.'  We  have  been  taught 
to  pray,  *  Lead  us  not  into  temptation.'  They  who 
rightly  estimate  their  duties  may  find  in  public  life  no 
less  necessity  than  in  private  life  frequently  to  repeat 
this  aspiration."* 

Josiah  Quincy,  Jr.,  father  of  the  author  of  the  fore- 
going remarkable  speech,  who  died  just  before  the  Rev- 
olutionary War  (1775),  but  whose  able  pen  helped  to 
gain  American  independence,  says  that  "  quam  dm  se 
bene  gessermt^^  (during  good  behavior),  is  "a  regula- 
tion which  ought  to  be  the  tenure  of  all  offices  of  public 
trust."     ("  Life  of  J.  Quincy,  Jr.,"  p.  443.) 

Senator  John  C.  Calhoun  of  South  Carolina,  in  1835, 
in  a  "  Report  on  the  extent  of  Executive  Patronage," 
said  (Cralle's  "  Calhoun,"  v,  152)  :  "  Were  a  premium 
offered  for  the  best  means  of  extending  to  the  utmost 
the  power  of  patronage  ;  to  destroy  the  love  of  coun- 
try, and  to  substitute  a  spirit  of  subserviency  and  man- 
worship  ;    to   encourage   vice   and   discourage    virtue ; 

*  Josiah  Quincy  (born  Feb.  4,  1772,  died  July  1,  1864)  "first  laid 
down  the  law  (1822)  *  *  *  that  the  publication  of  the  truth,  with 
a  good  intention,  and  for  a  justifiable  end,  is  not  libelous.  This  ruling 
excited  much  censure  at  the  time,  but  is  now  the  acknowledged  rule  of 
law  in  this  country  and  in  England."    (Am.  Cyclopedia,  xiv,  154.) 


THE  problem:  in  a  nutshell.  107 

and,  in  a  word,  to  prepare  for  the  subversion  of  lib- 
erty and  the  establishment  of  despotism,  no  scheme 
more  perfect  could  be  devised." 

Again,  in  1846,  in  a  speech  in  the  Senate,  Mr.  Cal- 
houn said  (iv,  302)  :  "  The  presidential  election  is  no 
longer  a  straggle  for  great  principles,  but  only  a  great 
struggle  as  to  who  shall  have  the  spoils  of  office." 

Senator  John  Holmes  of  Maine,  speaking  of  "Exec- 
utive power  of  Removal,"  explained  the  civil  service 
problem  in  a  nutshell.  He  said  (G.  &  S.'s  "  Debates," 
1829-30,  vol.  vi,  pt.  i,  p.  389)  :  "  The  ability  and  fidel- 
ity of  the  officer  in  office  would  be  better  evidence 
than  ten  thousand  recommendations  in  favor  of  the 
candidate  who  would  supersede  him.  *  *  *  The 
longer  a  faithful  officer  is  in,  the  better  will  his  experi- 
ence enable  him  to  perform  the  duties." 

Secretary  of  State  Thomas  F.  Bayard,  who  has  per- 
haps seen  as  much  of  the  evils  of  the  machine  in  poli- 
tics as  any  man  in  this  country,  says  ("  Dartmouth 
Oration,"  1882)  :  "  We  see  *  *  *  hungry  seekers  for 
office,  savage  with  delay  and  disappointment,  and  furi- 
ous for  success.  *  *  *  From  such  scenes  and  contro- 
versies men  of  dignity,  refinement,  and  self-respect  nat- 
urally shrink,  *  *  *  and  places  that  should  be  filled 
by  men  possessing  qualities  that  win  and  deserve  pri- 
vate and  public  confidence,  are  filled  by  adroit,  schem- 
ing, unblushing  manipulators,  who  scoff  at  personal 
dignity  and  self-respect,  and  avow  themselves  *  prac- 
tical politicians.'  *  *  *  Personal  independence,  indi- 
vidual conscience,  fidelity  to  honest  conviction,  weigh 
nothing  and  can  avail  nothing  to  the  man  enlisted  in 
the  spoils  system  of  politics."* 

*  The  views  of  many  other  statesmen  of  the  present  day  might  be 
given,  but  they  would  malce  a  small  volume  of  themselves.  The  views 
of  a  few  have  already  been  given  here  and  there.     They  are  typical 


108  P1.TI10JTAGE   IS   POWEB. 

William  Paley,  D.D.,  writing  (about  1785)  of  "The 
British  Constitution,"  says  ("  Moral  and  Political  Phil- 
osophy," p.  205)  :  "  When  the  Constitution  conferred 
upon  the  Crown  the  nomination  to  all  employments  in 
the  public  service,  the  authors  of  this  arrangement 
were  led  to  it  by  the  obvious  propriety  of  leaving  to  a 
master  the  choice  of  his  servants,  and  by  tlie  manifest 
inconveniency  of  engaging  the  National  Council,  upon 
every  vacancy,  in  those  personal  interests  which  attend 
elections  to  places  of  honor  and  emolument.  Our  an- 
cestors did  not  observe  that  this  disposition  added  an 
influence  to  the  regal  office  which,  as  the  number  and 
value  of  public  employments  increased,'^  would  super- 
sede in  a  great  measure  the  forms  and  change  the  char- 
acter of  the  ancient  Constitution.  They  knew,  not, 
what  the  experience  and  reflection  of  modern  ages  have 
discovered,  that  patronage  universally  is  power  ;  that 
he  who  possesses  in  a  sufficient  degree  the  means  of 
gratifying  the  desires  of  mankind  after  wealth  and  dis- 
tinction, by  whatever  checks  and  forms  his  authority 
may  be  limited  or  disguised,  will  direct  the  manage- 
ment of  public  affairs.  Whatever  be  the  mechanism  of 
the  political  engine,  he  will  guide  the  motion.  *  *  * 
Changes  ought  not  to  be  adventured  upon  without  a 
comprehensive  discernment  of  the  consequences — with- 
out a  knowledge  as  well  of  the  remote  tendency  as  of 
the  immediate  design." 

In  speaking  of  the  checks  and  balances  of  the  British 
Constitution,  Doctor  Paley  says  (p.  211)  :  "  The  King's 
choice  of  his  Ministers  is  controlled  by  the  obligation 
he  is  under  of  appointing  those  men  to  offices  in  the 

cases,  and  ought  therefore  to  suffice.  Many  *'  leading  statesmen's  prin- 
ciples "  appear  in  the  succeeding  chapter  in  preference  to  this  because 
they  treat  of  the  power  of  removal. 

*  The  italics  are  mine.     Compare  with  page  56. 


INTLTTEKCE   OF   FAVOEITISM   SUBDUED.  109 

state  who  are  found  capable  of  managing  the  affairs  of 
his  government  with  the  two  Houses  of  Parliament. 
Which  consideration  imposes  such  a  necessity  upon  the 
Crown  as  hath  in  a  great  measure  subdued  the  influ- 
ence of  favoritism  ;  insomuch  that  it  is  become  no 
uncommon  spectacle  in  this  country  to  see  men  pro- 
moted by  the  King  to  the  highest  offices  and  richest 
preferments  which  he  has  in  his  power  to  bestow,  who 
have  been  distinguished  by  their  opposition  to  his  per- 
sonal inclinations." 

In  speaking  of  plans  for  "  an  equal  or  a  reformed 
representation,"  he  says  (pp.  215,  216):  "One  conse- 
quence, however,  may  be  expected  from  these  projects, 
namely,  *  less  flexibility  to  the  influence  of  the  Crown.' 
And  since  the  diminution  of  this  influence  is  the  de- 
clared and  perhaps  the  sole  design  of  the  various 
schemes  that  have  been  produced,  whether  for  ri*gu- 
lating  the  elections,  contracting  the  duration,  or  for 
purifying  the  constitution  of  Parliament  by  the  ex- 
clusion of  placemen  and  pensioners,  it  is  obvious  to 
remark  that  the  more  apt  and  natural  as  well  as  the 
more  safe  and  quiet  way  of  attaining  the  same  end 
would  be  by  a  direct  reduction  of  the  patronage  of  the 
Crown,  which  might  be  effected  to  a  certain  extent 
without  hazarding  further  consequences.  Superfluous 
and  exorbitant  emoluments  of  office  may  not  only  be 
suppressed  for  the  present,  but  provisions  of  law  be 
devised  which  should  for  the  future  restrain  within 
certain  limits  the  number  and  value  of  the  offices  in 
the  donation  of  the  King.  *  *  *  It  is  the  nature 
of  power  always  to  press  upon  the  boundaries  which 
confine  it."* 

*  It  is  noteworthy  that  so  profound  a  thinker  as  Dr.  Paley  should 
favor  woman  suffrnge.  Speaking  of  the  right  of  representation,  he  says 
(p.  214):  "  We  waive  a  controversy  with  those  writers  who  insist  upon 


110  PATRONAGE   THE  BOX   OF  PANDORA* 

James  Wilson,  LL.D.,  one  of  the  framers  of  the  na- 
tional Constitution,*  and  afterward  an  Associate  Jus- 
tice of  the  United  States  Supreme  Court,  in  the  course 
of  a  lecture  entitled  a  "  Comparison  of  the  Constitution 
of  the  United  States  with  that  of  Great  Britain,"  thus 
expatiates  concerning  the  evils  of  patronage  ("  Lectures 
on  Law,"  i,  446)  :  "  We  are  now  arrived,  in  our  pro- 
gress, at  another  fountain,  from  which,  in  Great  Brit- 
ain, the  waters  of  bitterness  have  plentifully  flowed — 
I  mean  the  fountain  of  office.  *  *  *  Offices  of  trust 
and  profit  are  scattered,  with  a  lavish  hand,  among 
those  by  whom  a  return,  very  dangerous  to  the  liber- 
ties of  the  nation,  may  be  made,  and  from  whom  such 
a  return  is  but  too  often  expected.  This  is  the  box  of 
Pandora,  which  has  been  opened  on  Britain.  To  its 
poisonous  emanations  have  been  owing  the  contamina- 
ted and  contaminating  scenes  of  venality,  of  prostitu- 
tion, and  corruption  which  have  crowded  and  disgraced 
her  political  theater.  To  the  same  efficacy  have  been 
owing  the  indiscriminate  profligacy  and  universal  de- 
generacy which  have  been  diffused  through  every  chan- 
nel into  which  the  treasures  of  the  public  have  pro- 
cured admission." 

representation  as  a  'natural'  right.  We  consider  it  so  far  only,  as  a 
right  at  all,  as  it  conduces  to  public  utility ;  that  is,  as  it  contributes  to 
the  establishment  of  good  laws,  or  as  it  secures  to  the  people  the  just 
administration  of  these  laws.  These  effects  depend  upon  the  disposition 
and  abilities  of  the  national  counselors.  *  *  *  jf  this  right  bo 
•  natural,'  no  doubt  it  must  be  equal,  and  the  right,  we  may  add,  of  one 
sex  as  well  as  of  the  other.  Whereas  every  plan  of  representation  that 
we  have  heard  of  begins  by  excluding  the  votes  of  women,  thus  cutting 
off,  at  a  single  stroke,  one-half  the  public  from  a  right  which  is  as- 
serted to  be  inherent  in  all ;  a  right  too,  as  some  represent  it,  not  only 
universal,  but  inalienable,  and  indefeasible,  and  imprescriptible." 

*  Washington  called  Mr.  Wilson  "  as  able,  candid,  and  honest  a  mem- 
ber as  was  in  the  Convention."     (Bancroft's  His.  of  the  Const.,  ii,  241.) 


HOW  BAD  APPOINTMEJTTS  SOMETIMES  OCCUR.         Ill 

In  another  lecture,  entitled  "Of  Government"  (i, 
401,  402),  Justice  Wilson  lays  down  the  following  fun- 
damental principles  for  guidance  in  appointments  to 
office  :  "  The  appointment  to  offices  is  an  important 
part  of  the  executive  authority.  Much  of  the  ease, 
much  of  the  reputation,  much  of  the  energy,  and  much 
of  the  safety  of  the  nation  depends  on  judicious  and 
impartial  appointments.  But  are  impartiality  and  fine 
discernment  likely  to  predominate  in  a  numerous  exec- 
utive body  ?  In  proportion  to  their  own  number  will 
be  the  number  of  their  friends,  favorites,  and  depend- 
ents. An  office  is  to  be  filled.  A  person  nearly  con- 
nected by  some  of  the  foregoing  ties  with  one  of  those 
who  are  to  vote  in  filling  it,  is  named  as  a  candidate. 
His  patron  is  under  no  necessity  to  take  any  part,  par- 
ticularly responsible,  in  his  appointment.  He  may  ap- 
pear even  cold  and  indiiferent  on  the  occasion.  But 
he  possesses  an  advantage,  the  value  of  which  is  well 
understood  in  bodies  of  this  kind.  Every  member  who 
gives,  on  his  account,  a  vote  for  his  friend,  will  ex- 
pect the  return  of  a  similar  favor  on  the  first  con- 
venient opportunity.  In  this  manner  a  reciprocal  in- 
tercourse of  partiality,  of  interestedness,  of  favoritism, 
perhaps  of  venality,  is  established  ;  and  in  no  partic- 
ular instance  is  there  a  practicability  of  tracing  the 
poison  to  its  source.  Ignorant,  vicious,  and  prostituted 
characters  are  introduced  into  office  ;  and  some  of  those 
who  voted,  and  procured  others  to  vote  for  them,  are 
the  first  and  loudest  in  expressing  their  astonishment 
that  the  door  of  admission  was  ever  opened  to  men  of 
their  infamous  description.  *  *  *  Those  who  j^ossess 
talents  and  virtues,  which  would  reflect  honor  on  office, 
will  be  reluctant  to  appear  as  candidates  for  appoint- 
ments. If  they  should  be  brought  into  view,  what 
weight  will  virtue,  merit,  and  -  taleiH^^£oas^)ffice  have 

/>^^  OP  THB     ^"^^ 


ll^  HOW    TO    MAKE    GOOD    APPOINTMENTS. 

in  a  balance  held  and   poised   by  partiality,   intrigue, 
and  chicane  ? 

"  The  person  who  nominates  or  makes  appointments 
to  office  should  be  known.  His  own  office,  his  own 
character,  his  own  fortune  should  be  responsible.  He 
should  be  alike  unfettered  and  unsheltered  by  counsel- 
ors. No  constitutional  stalking-horse  should  be  pro- 
vided for  him  to  conceal  his  turnings  and  windings, 
when  they  are  too  dark  and  too  crooked  to  be  exposed 
to  public  view.  Instead  of  the  dishonorable  inter- 
course, which  I  have  already  mentioned,  an  intercourse 
of  a  very  different  kind  should  be  established — an  in- 
tercourse of  integrity  and  discernment  on  the  part  of 
the  magistrate  who  appoints,  and  of  gratitude  and  con- 
fidence on  the  part  of  the  people  who  will  receive  the 
benefit  of  his  appointments.  Appointments  made  and 
sanctioned  in  this  highly  respectable  manner  will,  like 
a  fragrant  and  beneficent  atmosphere,  diffuse  sweetness 
and  gladness  around  those  to  whom  they  are  given. 
Modest  merit  will  be  beckoned  to  in  order  to  encour- 
age her  to  come  forward.  Bare-faced  impudence  and 
unprincipled  intrigue  will  receive  repulse  and  disap- 
pointment, deservedly  their  portion." 


CHAPTER    VIII. 

THE     POWER     OF     REMOVAL. 

A  remedy  for  its  Mistakes  or  Abuse. — A  synopsis  of  the  great  debate 
in  the  first  Congress  (1789)  on  the  Power  of  Removal. — The  con- 
gressional decision  then  made  criticised  by  Benton,  Webster,  and 
others. — The  Four-years'  Term  Law  and  some  opinions  of  it  (note). 

-  The  debate  in  the  first  Congress  on  the  power  to 
remove  public  officials  was  one  of  great  interest  and 
importance,  and  was  besides  very  instructive.  A  bill 
was  introduced  in  the  House  creating  "  The  Depart- 
ment of  Foreign  Affairs,"  the  Secretary  of  which  was, 
in  the  words  of  the  bill,  "  to  be  removable  by  the 
President  of  the  United  States."*  The  discussion  was 
on  striking  out  the  last  quoted  words.  The  majority 
claimed  that  the  President  alone  had  the  power  of  re- 
moval, while  the  minority  claimed  that  the  consent  of 
the  Senate  was  necessary  ;  that  is,  in  the  case  of  of- 
ficers confirmed  by  the  Senate. 

Judged  by  the  light  of  nearly  a  century  of  experi- 
ence, it  is  plain  that  both  sides  were  partly  right  and 
partly  wrong.  The  forefathers,  who  were  legislating 
for  only  about  three  million  of  people,  were  construct- 
ing a  political  chart  to  guide  and  protect  future  gen- 
erations, and  it  is  not  strange  that  they  should  have 
made  a  few  mistakes.  While  it  is  clear,  as  pointed 
out  by  the  majority,  that  the  President  should  have 


*  The  motion  to  establish  the  above  mid  other  Executive  Departments 
was  made  originally  by  Keprosontative  lioudin.ot,  in  a  speech,  on  M.iy 
19,  1789. 


114        A  PROPOSED  BOARD  OF  APPEALS. 

the  power  of  removal,  it  is  equally  clear,  as  pointed 
out  by  the  minority,  that  there  should  be  a  check  to 
prevent  him  or  anybody  else  from  abusing  it.  Fur- 
ther, the  President  and  his  chief  officials  are  as  liable 
to  make  mistakes  as  other  men.  Of  all  public  men 
they  should  be  the  first  to  correct  a  mistake  or  to 
right  a  wrong,  and  thus  set  an  example  for  others  to 
follow. 

We  should  give  officeholders,  chief  as  well  as  sub- 
ordinate, all  the  protection  we  can  from  mistakes,  dis- 
likes, fits  of  passion,  prejudices,  cajirices,  intrigues,  and 
wrongs.  But  what  kind  of  protection  can  we  give 
them?  It  appears  to  me  that,  under  the  civil  service 
law  system,  a  Board  of  Appeals  should  be  established, 
which  could  be  increased  in  number  as  the  number  of 
offices  and  the  scope  of  the  law  increase,  before  which 
all  reasonable  complaints  could  be  /icard,  and  that  where 
the  complaint  is  sustained,  the  aggrieved  official  should 
be  reinstated  with  full  pay.*  It  is  required  by  Rule 
16  that  the  Civil  Service  Commissioners  shall  perform 
the  work  of  this  proposed  Board.     But  as  the  Commis- 

*  There  is  a  remedy  for  every  distemper  in  government,  if  the  people 
are  not  wanting  to  themselves.  For  a  people  wanting  to  themselves, 
there  is  no  remedy. — James  Wilson. 

Napoleon  was  a  despot,  it  is  said.  Yet  he  never  dismissed  any  one 
from  public  office  without  an  inquiry  and  report  of  facts,  and  rarely 
ever  without  hearing  the  accused  functionary ;  never  when  the  questions 
involved  were  civil  or  administrative. — Napoleonic  Ideas.  By  Louis 
Napoleon. 

But  Napoleon,  who  was  a  statesman  as  well  as  a  soldier,  sometimes 
dismissed  officials  without  much  ceremony.  " '  You  cannot  find  me 
guilty  of  dishonesty,'  observed  the  minister,  Barbe-Marbois,  on  receiving 
his  dismissal.  '  I  had  rather,'  replied  Napoleon,  '  that  you  had  shown 
yourself  dishonest  than  a  fool.  There  is  a  limit  to  one;  there  is  none 
whatever  to  the  other.'  "     (Crowe's  "  History  of  France,"  v,  147.) 

Napoleon  was  riglit  in  one  respect  at  least,  namely,  that  fools  are  not 
proper  persons  to  fill  public  offic?^ 


RESTRAINT  THE  BODY-POLITIC  SAFETY-VALVE.        115 

sioners  are  already  overworked,  the  proposition  is  not 
practical.  The  functions  of  this  proposed  Board  would 
resemble  in  one  respect  those  of  the  Supreme  Court  of 
the  United  States,  for  one  of  the  most  important  func- 
tions of  the  Supreme  Court  is  to  correct  the  mistakes 
of  the  legislative  and  executive  departments.  Again, 
having  had  nothing  to  do  with  the  nomination,  confir- 
mation, or  appointment  of  officers,  it  would,  like  the 
Supreme  Court,  be  free  of  prejudice.  Such  a  Board 
would  be  at  least  a  partial  check  on  the  President  and 
all  other  chief  officials,  and  would  aid  in  preventing 
some  future  Jackson  or  Lincoln  from  throwing  the 
official  machinery  of  government  out  of  gear.  This  is 
well,  for  restraint,  in  public  as  well  as  in  private  life, 
is  the  safety-valve  of  the  body-politic. 

The  minority,  as  before  said,  were  certainly  right 
about  the  necessity  of  a  check  to  prevent  the  Presi- 
dent from  abusing  the  power  of  removal.  But  the 
senatorial  check  they  proposed,  however  practical  it 
may  have  been  then,  is  certainly  not  practical  now, 
for,  on  account  of  the  great  increase  of  business,  the 
Senate  has  hardly  time  now  to  look  after  confirmations, 
much  less  removals.  Further,  the  exact  check  they 
proposed  was  incorporated  in  the  Tenure  of  Office  Act 
of  1860-67,*  and  was  found  in  practice  to  be  unsatis- 
factory. One  example  of  its  inefficacy  will  suffice.  J. 
D.  Cox,  in  an  article  in  the  North  Americati  llevlew 
for  January,  1871  (p.  87),  in  speaking  of  the  corrup- 
tion at  Washington  after  the  demoralizing  civil  war, 
and  incidentally  of  the  Tenure  of  Office  Act,  says  that 
"  dishonest  (official)  incumbents  were  plundering  the 
people  under  tlie  shelter  of  a  Tenure  of  Office  Act, 
which  seemed  to  be  skillfully  adapted  to  remove  every 

*  Jiepealed  in  1887, 


116  GREAT   USE   AND  POWER   OP  THE   SENATE. 

trace  of  responsibility  from  botli  the  appointing  and 
confirming  powers.  The  Republicans  in  Congress  were 
complaining  that  the  President  refused  to  remove  men 
who  were  indicted  or  convicted  in  the  courts,  and  the 
friends  of  the  President  retorted  that  the  Senate  refused 
to  consent  to  the  removal  of  others  who  were  proven  to 
be  plunderers  of  the  treasury  on  the  like  evidence."  * 

Again,  the  minority  were  certainly  right  about  it 
being  the  intention  of  the  framers  of  the  Constitution 
that  the  Senate  should  be  a  check  on  the  President, 
and  also  (which  was  admitted  by  the  majority)  that 
its  duties  are  sometimes  executive  and  sometimes  ju- 
dicial, and  that  it  is  to  this  extent  blended  with  both 
the  executive  and  judicial  departments.  The  Senate, 
so  far  as  the  removal  of  an  officer  confirmed  by  it  is 
concerned,  is  at  all  times  a  more  or  less  perfect  check 
on  the  President,  because  he  has  to  depend  on  it  for 
the  confirmation  of  a  successor.  The  Senate,  in  fact,  as 
it  is  almost  self-evident  was  the  intention  of  the  framers 
of  the  Constitution,  exercises  great  power.  It  should 
therefore  be  composed  of  experienced  and  trained  states- 
men only.  No  mere  politician  should  enter  its  cham- 
ber. And  it  would  be  better,  far  better,  that  its  mem- 
bers should  all  be  as  poor  as  Socrates,  than  that  one  of 
them  should  be  chosen  on  account  of  his  wealth,  or  be 
even  charged  with  buying  his  election.  Bad  men  may 
get  into  the  Senate  ;  but  the  people  who,  on  account 
of  this  fact,  howl  for  its  abolition,  would  destroy  the 
equilibrium  of  the  government.  They  might  as  well, 
for  the  same  reason,  ask  for  the  abolition  of  either  the 
House  of  Representatives  or  the  United  States  Supreme 
Court.     The  proper  remedy  is  purification. 

*  See  the  remarkable  prediction  of  Representative  Ames,  page  125. 
Mr.  Madison  (page  117)  also  indulges  in  some  lamentable  forebodings, 
and  under  the  patronage  system  their  realization  is  not  impossible, 


TH^  iJEfiD  AND  tJSE  OF  BKSPONSIBILITY.  lH 


SPEECHES    IN    FAVOR    OF    REMOVAL    BY    THE    PRESIDENT 
ALONE.  * 

James  Madison  of  Virginia  said  (pp.  462,  463,  496, 
498,  581)  :  "  It  is  evidently  the  intention  of  the  Con- 
stitution that  the  first  Magistrate  should  be  responsi- 
ble for  the  executive  department.  So  far  therefore  as 
we  do  not  make  the  officers  who  are  to  aid  him  in 
the  duties  of  that  department  responsible  to  him,  he 
is  not  responsible  to  his  country.  Again,  is  there  no 
danger  that  an  officer,  when  he  is  appointed  by  the 
concurrence  of  the  Senate,  and  has  friends  in  that  body, 
may  choose  rather  to  risk  his  establishment  on  the  favor 
of  that  branch  than  rest  it  upon  the  discharge  of  his 
duties  to  the  satisfaction  of  the  executive  branch,  which 
is  constitutionally  authorized  to  inspect  and  control  his 
conduct?  And  if  it  should  liappen  that  the  officers 
connect  themselves  with  the  Senate,  they  may  mutu- 
ally support  each  other,  and  for  want  of  efficacy  re- 
duce the  power  of  the  President  to  a  mere  vapor  ;  in 
which  case  his  responsibility  would  be  annihilated,  and 
the  expectation  of  it  unjust.  The  high  executive  of- 
ficers, joined  in  cabal  with  the  Stjnate,  would  lay  the 
foundation  of  discord,  and  end  in  an  assumption  of  the 
executive  power,  only  to  be  removed  by  a  revolution  in 
the  government.  I  believe  no  principle  is  more  clearly 
laid  down  in  the  Constitution  than  that  of  responsi- 
bility.    *     *     * 

*  The  salient  points  only  of  this  debate  are  given.  They  are  taken 
from  vol.  i  of  *'  The  Debates  and  Proceedings  in  the  Congress  of  the 
United  States,  compiled  from  authentic  materials,  by  Joseph  Gales,  Sr." 
The  speeches,  divided  pro  and  con,  are  given  in  the  order  of  their  de- 
livery ;  but  those  who  spoke  twice  or  three  times,  have  their  remarks 
combined  in  one  speech.  Repetitions  of  arguments,  either  by  the  same 
or  different  speakers,  have,  as  far  as  practicable,  been  omitted. 


lis  BEMOVAL   AN  EXECUTIVE  POWElt. 

"Is  the  power  of  displacing  an  executive  power?  I 
conceive  that  if  any  power  whatsoever  is  in  its  nature 
executive,  it  is  the  power  of  appointing,  overseeing,  and 
controlling  those  who  execute  the  laws.  If  the  Con- 
stitution had  not  qualified  the  power  of  the  President 
in  appointing  to  office,  by  associating  the  Senate  with 
him  in  that  business,  would  it  not  be  clear  that  he  would 
have  the  right,  by  virtue  of  his  executive  power,  to 
make  such  appointment?  Should  we  be  authorized,  in 
defiance  of  that  clause  in  the  Constitution,  *  The  exec- 
utive power  shall  be  vested  in  a  President,'  to  unite 
the  Senate  with  the  President  in  the  appointment  to 
office?  *  *  *  If  it  is  admitted  that  we  should  not, 
I  think  it  may  be  disputed  whether  we  have  a  right 
to  associate  them  in  removing  persons  from  office,  the 
one  power  being  as  much  of  an  executive  nature  as 
the  other  ;  and  the  first  only  is  authorized  by  being 
excepted  out  of  the  general  rule  established  by  the 
Constitution,  in  these  words  :  *  The  executive  power 
shall  be  vested  in  a  President.'     *     *     * 

"  The  doctrine,  however,  which  seems  to  stand  most 
in  opposition  to  the  principles  I  contend  for  is  that  the 
power  to  annul  an  appointment  is,  in  the  nature  of 
things,  incidental  to  the  power  which  makes  the  ap- 
pointment. I  agree  that  if  nothing  more  was  said  in 
the  Constitution  than  that  the  President,  by  and  with 
the  advice  and  consent  of  the  Senate,  should  appoint 
to  office,  there  would  be  great  force  in  saying  that  the 
power  of  removal  resulted,  by  a  natural  implication, 
from  the  power  of  appointing.  But  there  is  another 
part  of  the  Constitution  no  less  explicit  than  the  one 
on  which  the  gentleman's  doctrine  is  founded.  It  is 
that  part  which  declares  that  the  executive  power  shall 
be  vested  in  a  President  of  the  United  States.  The 
association  of  the  Senate  with  the  President  in  exer- 


GOOD  OFFiCERS  SHOULD  l^OT  BE  EEMoVED.  119 

cising  that  particular  function  is  an  exception  to  this 
general  rule ;  and  exceptions  to  general  rules,  I  con- 
ceive, are  ever  to  be  taken  strictly.*  But  there  is  an- 
other part  of  the  Constitution  which  inclines,  in  my 
judgment,  to  favor  the  construction  I  put  upon  it  — 
the  President  is  required  to  see  that  the  laws  be  faith- 
fully executed.  If  the  duty  to  see  the  laws  faithfully 
executed  be  required  at  the  hands  of  the  Executive 
Magistrate,  it  would  seem  that  it  was  generally  in- 
tended he  should  have  that  species  of  power  which  is 
necessary  to  accomplish  that  end.  *  *  *  Now  if  the 
officer,  when  once  appointed,  is  not  to  depend  upon 
the  President  for  his  official  existence,  but  upon  a  dis- 
tinct body  (for  where  there  are  two  negatives  required, 
either  can  prevent  the  removal),  I  confess  I  do  not  see 
how  the  President  can  take  care  that  the  laws  be  faith- 
fully executed.     *     *     * 

"  The  danger  then  consists  merely  in  this  :  the  Presi- 
dent can  displace  from  office  a  man  whose  merits  re- 
quire that  he  should  be  continued  in  it.  What  will 
*     *     *     operate  to  prevent  it  (this  abuse  of  power)  ? 

*  Daniel  Webster  says  (iv,  193):  "  The  error  of  this  argument  lies  in 
this.  It  supposes  the  power  of  removal  to  be  held  by  the  Tresident 
under  the  general  grant  of  executive  power.  Now  it  is  certain  that  the 
power  of  appointment  is  not  held  under  that  general  grant,  because  it 
is  particularly  provided  for,  and  is  conferred,  in  express  terms,  on  the 
President  and  Senate,  If  therefore  the  power  of  removal  be  a  natural 
appendage  to  the  power  of  appointment,  then  it  is  not  conferred  by  the 
GENERAL  WORDS  granting  executive  power  to  the  President,  but  is  con- 
ferred by  the  special  clause  which  gives  the  appointing  power  to  the 
President  and  Senate.  *  *  *  if  exceptions  to  a  general  rule  are  to 
be  taken  strictly,  when  expressed,  it  is  still  more  clear,  when  they  are 
not  expressed  at  all,  that  they  are  not  to  be  implied  except  on  evident 
and  clear  grounds ;  and  as  ihe  general  power  of  appointment  is  confess- 
edly given  to  the  President  and  Senate,  no  exception  is  to  be  implied  in 
favor  of  one  part  of  that  general  power,  namely,  the  removing  part,  un- 
less for  some  obvious  and  irresistible  reason." 


126  WhM  IMPEACttMEN*  19  SC5^mA.hLt, 

In  the  first  place,  lie  will  be  impeachable  by  this  House, 
before  the  Senate,  for  such  an  act  of  maladministration, 
for  I  contend  that  the  wanton  removal  of  meritorious 
officers  would  subject  him  to  impeachment  and  removal 
from  his  own  high  trust.  *  *  *  q^^  jjg  accomplish 
this  end?  No.  He  can  place  no  man  in  the  vacancy 
whom  the  Senate  shall  not  approve. 

"  If  there  is  any  point  in  which  the  separation  of 
the  legislative  and  executive  powers  ought  to  be  main- 
tained with  greater  caution,  it  is  that  which  relates  to 
officers  and  offices.  The  powers  relative  to  offices  are 
partly  legislative  and  partly  executive.  The  Legisla- 
ture creates  the  office,  defines  the  powers,  limits  its 
duration,  and  annexes  a  compensation.  This  done,  the 
legislative  power  ceases.  They  ought  to  have  nothing 
to  do  with  designating  the  man  to  fill  the  office.  That 
I  conceive  to  be  of  an  executive  nature." 

John  Vining  of  Delaware  said  (pp.  465,  511):  "If 
this  power  is  not  in  the  President,  it  is  not  vested  in 
any  body  whatever.  It  cannot  be  within  the  legisla- 
tive power  of  the  Senate,  because  it  is  of  an  adverse 
nature.  It  cannot  be  within  the  executive  power  of 
the  Senate,  because  they  possess  none  but  what  is  ex- 
pressly granted  by  the  Constitution,     *     *     * 

"  I  take  it  that  the  best  principle  is  that  he  who  is 
responsible  for  the  conduct  of  the  officer,  ought  to  have 
the  power  of  removing  him.  *  *  *  Perhaps  it  might 
be  equally  right  that  the  responsible  person  should  have 
the  appointment  of  those  who  are  to  aid  him.  But 
this  case  is  qualified  by  an  express  stipulation  in  the 
Constitution,  and  therefore  must  be  submitted  to. 

"  The  argument  of  convenience  is  strong  in  favor 
of  the  President,  for  this  man  (Secretary  F.  A.)  is  an 
arm  or  an  eye  to  him.  He  sees  and  writes  his  secret  dis- 
patches.    He  is  an  instrument  over  which  the  President 


ought  to  have  a  complete  command.  *  *  *  If  the  Pres- 
ident removes  a  vahiable  officer,  which  seems  to  be  the 
great  danger  the  gentleman  from  South  Carolina  (Mr. 
Smith)  apprehends,  it  would  be  an  act  of  tyranny  which 
the  good  sense  of  the  nation  would  never  forget.  But 
if  the  Senate  turns  out  a  good  man,  they  might  be  re- 
elected by  the  Legislatures.  The  Senate  may  remove 
a  good  officer  without  feeling  any  injury.  They  are 
not  feelingly  sensible  of  the  advantages  arising  from 
his  labors,  because  they  do  not  act  in  concert  with  him  ; 
while  the  President,  by  such  a  removal,  deprives  him- 
self of  a  valuable  and  necessary  aid.  When  a  good 
officer  is  obtained,  the  President  has  every  motive  of 
justice,  self-interest,  and  public  good  to  retain  him  in 
his  situation.  None  of  these  motives  operate,  or  but 
faintly  operate,  upon  the  Senate." 

On  page  570  Mr.  Vining,  in  reply  to  Mr.  Jackson, 
speaks  of  the  danger  "  of  denying  the  Executive  a  due 
proportion  of  power."  This,  he  said,  was  the  case  in 
both  Sweden  and  Poland.  "  In  Sweden,"  he  said,  "  the 
limited  power  of  the  King  was  nearly  annihilated  by 
an  aristocracy."  The  King,  "  for  the  security  of  his 
nation,"  and  with  the  assent  of  the  nation,  had  been 
compelled  "  to  assume  all  the  powers  of  despotism." 
Of  Poland  he  said  :  "  The  object  of  the  Poles  has  been 
to  guard  against  what  was  called  the  encroachments 
of  the  throne.  '  It  is  not,'  said  they  but  a  century  ago, 
*  a  master  that  we  want,  it  is  only  a  chief.'  Some  went 
further,  and  asserted  that  a  free  people  w^anted  no  chief 
at  all."  Of  our  own  government  he  said  :  "  If  by  legis- 
lative encroachment  we  weaken  the  executive  arm,  we 
render  it  incapable  of  performing  the  functions  assigned 
it  by  the  Constitution,  and  subject  it  to  become  an  easy 
prey  to  the  other  branches  of  the  government." 

Elias  Boudinot  of  New  Jersey  said  (pp.  468,  409;  521  ^ 


12?,        1?HE  SEKAfE  MAY  THWaR*  TflE  MESifcENf. 

528)  :  "  Let  us  examine  whether  it  (the  power  of  re- 
moval) belongs  to  the  Senate  and  President.  Certain- 
ly, sir,  there  is  nothing  that  gives  the  Senate  this  right 
in  express  terms.  But  they  are  authorized,  in  express 
words,  to  be  concerned  in  the  appointment.  And  does 
this  necessarily  include  the  power  of  removal  ?  If  the 
President  complains  to  the  Senate  of  the  misconduct  of 
an  officer,  and  desires  their  advice  and  consent  to  the 
removal,  what  are  the  Senate  to  do?  Most  certainly 
they  will  inquire  if  the  complaint  is  well  founded.  To 
do  this  they  must  call  the  officer  before  them  to  answer. 
Who  then  are  the  parties  ?  The  supreme  executive  of- 
ficer against  his  assistant ;  and  the  Senate  are  to  sit  as 
judges,  to  determine  whether  sufficient  cause  of  removal 
exists.  Does  not  this  set  the  Senate  over  the  head  of 
the  President  ?  But  suppose  they  shall  decide  in  favor 
of  the  officer.  What  a  situation  is  the  President  then 
in,  surrounded  by  officers  with  whom,  by  his  situation, 
he  is  compelled  to  act,  but  in  whom  he  can  have  no 
confidence  ;  reversing  the  privilege  given  him  by  the 
Constitution,  to  prevent  his  having  officers  imposed 
upon  him  who  do  not  meet  his  approbation  ! 

"  But  I  have  another  more  solid  objection,  which 
places  the  question  in  a  more  important  point  of  view. 
The  Constitution  has  placed  the  Senate  as  the  only 
security  and  barrier  between  the  House  of  Representa- 
tives and  the  President.  Suppose  the  President  has 
desired  the  Senate  to  concur  in  removing  an  officer, 
and  they  have  declined.  Or  suppose  the  House  has 
applied  to  the  President  and  Senate  to  remove  an  of- 
ficer obnoxious  to  them,  and  they  determine  against  the 
measure.  The  House  can  have  recourse  to  nothing  but 
an  impeachment,  if  they  suppose  the  criminality  of  the 
officer  will  warrant  such  procedure.  Will  the  Senate 
then  be  that  upright  cpurt  which  they  ought  to  ap- 


Why  the  senate  suoULb  be  unprejudiced.     12^ 

peal  to  on  Ibis  occasion,  when  they  have  prejudged  your 
cause?  I  conceive  the  Senate  will  be  too  much  under 
the  control  of  their  former  decision  to  be  a  proper  body 
for  this  House  to  apply  to  for  impartial  justice.  As 
the  Senate  are  the  dernier  resort,  and  the  only  court 
of  judicature  which  can  determine  on  cases  of  impeach- 
ment, I  am  for  preserving  them  free  and  independent, 
both  on  account  of  the  officer  and  this  House.  I  there- 
fore conceive  that  it  was  never  the  intention  of  the 
Constitution  to  vest  the  power  of  removal  in  the  Presi- 
dent and  Senate  ;  but  as  it  must  exist  somewhere,  it 
rests  on  the  President  alone.     *     *     * 

*'  The  President  nominates  and  appoints.  He  is  f  ur- 
tlier  expressly  authorized  to  commission  all  officers. 
Now  does  it  appear  from  this  distribution  of  power  that 
the  Senate  appoints?  Does  an  officer  exercise  powers 
by  authority  of  the  Senate  ?  No.  I  believe  the  Presi- 
dent is  the  person  from  whom  he  derives  his  authority. 
He  appoints,  but  under  a  check.  It  is  necessary  to 
obtain  the  consent  of  the  Senate.  But  after  that  is 
obtained,  I  ask  who  appoints?  Who  vests  the  officer 
with  authority  ?  Who  commissions  him  ?  The  Presi- 
dent does  these  acts  by  his  sole  power,  but  they  are  ex- 
ercised in  consequence  of  the  advice  of  another  branch 
of  the  government.  If  therefore  the  officer  receives  his 
authority  and  commission  from  the  President,  surely 
the  removal  follows  as  coincident.  *  *  *  The  Con- 
stitution vested*  all  executive  power  in  the  President. 
The  power  of  designating  and  appointing  officers  to 
execute  the  laws  was  in  its  nature  executive.  Conse- 
quently the  President  would  appoint  ex  officio^  if  he 
bad  not  been  limited  by  the  express  words  of  the  Con- 
stitution. Hence  he  (Mr.  Boudinot)  inferred,  ex  officio^ 
he  would  remove  without  limitation. 

*  The  four  closing  sentences  are  reported  iu  the  second  person, 


l24  SXTSPENSIOIT  A  NUGATORY   rOVT^lL. 

"  Gentlemen  say  they  have  a  sufficient  remedy  for 
every  evil  likely  to  result  from  connecting  the  Senate 
with  the  President.  This  they  propose  to  do  by  allow- 
ing the  power  of  suspension.  This  does  not  answer 
the  end,  because  there  is  a  possibility  that  the  officer 
may  not  be  displaced  after  a  hearing  before  the  Sen- 
ate. *  *  *  Y^Q  }iad  better  at  once  give  a  power 
that  would  answer  two  valuable  purposes,  than  one  alto- 
gether nugatory.  In  the  first  place,  it  (removal)  would 
entirely  separate  the  legislative  and  executive  depart- 
ments, conformably  to  the  great  principles  of  the  Con- 
stitution ;  and,  in  the  second  place,  it  would  answer  the 
end  of  government  better,  and  secure  real  benefits  to 
the  Union." 

Fisher  Ames  of  Massachusetts  said  (pp.  474,  475,  476, 
477,  540)  :  "  The  executive  powers  are  delegated  to  the 
President  with  a  view  to  have  a  responsible  officer  to 
superintend,  control,  inspect,  and  check  the  officers  nec- 
essarily employed  in  administering  the  laws.  The  only 
bond  between  him  and  those  he  employs  is  the  confi- 
dence he  has  in  their  integrity  and  talents.  When  that 
confidence  ceases,  the  principal  ought  to  have  power  to 
remove  those  whom  he  can  no  longer  trust  with  sefety. 
*  *  *  The  powers  of  the  President  are  defined  in  the 
Constitution.  But  it  is  said  that  he  is  not  expressly 
authorized  to  remove  from  office.  If  the  Constitution 
is  silent  also  with  respect  to  the  Senate,  the  argument 
may  be  retorted.  If  this  silence  proves  that  the  power 
cannot  be  exercised  by  the  President,  it  certainly  proves 
that  it  cannot  be  exercised  by  the  President  by  and 
with  the  advice  and  consent  of  the  Senate.  The  power 
of  removal  is  incident  to  government.  But  not  being 
distributed  by  the  Constitution,  it  will  come  before  the 
Legislature,  and,  like  every  other  omitted  case,  must  be 
supplied  by  law. 


HOW   SENATE   MAY   CAUSE   SERIOUS   TBOUBLE.        125 

"  The  attempt  to  blend  the  executive  and  legislative 
departments  in  exercising  the  power  of  removal  is  such 
a  mixing  as  ought  not  to  be  carried  into  practice  on 
arguments  grounded  on  implication.  And  the  gentle- 
man from  Virginia  (Mr.  White's)  reasoning  is  wholly- 
drawn  from  implication.  He  supposes,  as  the  Consti- 
tution qualifies  tlie  President's  power  of  appointing  to 
office  by  subjecting  his  nominations  to  the  concurrence 
of  the  Senate,  that  the  qualification  follows  of  course 
in  the  removal. 

"  Another  reason  occurs  to  me  against  blending  these 
powers.  An  officer  who  superintends  the  public  reve- 
nue will  naturally  acquire  a  great  influence.  If  he  ob- 
tains support  in  the  Senate,  upon  an  attempt  of  the 
President  to  remove  him,  it  will  be  out  of  the  power 
of  the  House,  when  applied  to  by  the  first  Magistrate, 
to  impeach  him  with  success,  for  the  very  means  of 
proving  charges  of  malconduct  against  him  will  be 
under  the  power  of  the  officer.  All  the  papers  neces- 
sary to  convict  him  may  be  withheld  while  the  person 
continues  in  liis  office.  Protection  may  be  rendered 
for  protection  ;  and  as  this  officer  has  such  exten- 
sive influence,  it  may  be  exerted  to  procure  the  re- 
election of  his  friends.  These  circumstances,  in  addi- 
tion to  those  stated  by  the  gentleman  from  New  Jersey 
(Mr.  Boudinot),  must  clearly  evince  to  every  gentleman 
tlie  impropriety  of  connecting  the  Senate  with  the  Pres- 
ident in  removing  from  office.  * 

*  On  page  542  Mr.  Ames  says :  "If  the  Senate  are  to  possess  the 
power  of  removal,  they  will  be  enabled  to  hold  the  person  in  office,  let 
the  circumstances  be  what  they  may  that  point  out  the  necessity  or  pro- 
priety of  his  removal.  It  creates  a  permanent  connection.  It  will 
nurse  faction.  It  will  promote  intrigue  to  obtain  protectors  and  to 
shelter  tools.  Sir,  it  is  infusing  poison  into  the  Constitution.  *  *  * 
There  is  rujn  in  it.     It  is  tempting  the  Senate  with  forbidden  fruit," 


126        PRESIDENT'S  EXECUTIVE  POWER  ILLUSTRATED. 

"  But  why  should  we  connect  the  Senate  in  the  re- 
moval ?  Their  attention  is  taken  up  with  other  impor- 
tant business,  and  they  have  no  constitutional  authority 
to  watch  the  conduct  of  the  executive  officers,  and  there- 
fore cannot  use  such  authority  with  advantage.  If  the 
President  is  inclined  to  shelter  himself  behind  the  Sen- 
ate with  respect  to  having  continued  an  improper  per- 
son in  office,  we  lose  the  responsibility,  which  is  our 
greatest  security.  The  blame  among  so  many  will  be 
lost.     *     *     * 

"  It  must  be  admitted  that  the  Constitution  is  not 
explicit  on  the  point  in  contest.  Yet  the  Constitution 
strongly  infers  that  the  power  is  in  the  President  alone. 
It  is  declared  that  the  executive  power  shall  be  vested 
in  the  President.  Under  these  terms  all  the  powers 
properly  belonging  to  the  executive  department  of  the 
government  are  given,  and  such  only  taken  away  as  are 
expressly  excepted.  If  the  Constitution  had  stopped 
here,  and  the  duties  had  not  been  defined,  either  the 
President  had  had  no  powers  at  all,  or  he  would  acquire 
from  that  general  expression  all  the  powers  properly 
belonging  to  the  executive  department.     *     *     * 

"The  President  *  *  *  jg  ^]jg  agent.  The  Senate 
may  prevent  his  acting,  but  cannot  act  themselves.  It 
may  be  difficult  to  illustrate  this  point  by  examples 
which  will  exactly  correspond.  But  suppose  the  case 
of  an  executor,  to  whom  is  devised  land,  to  be  sold 
with  the  advice  of  a  certain  person,  on  certain  condi- 
tions. The  executor  sells,  with  the  consent  ^nd  on  the 
conditions  required  in  tlie  will.  The  conditions  are 
broken.  May  the  executor  re  enter  for  the  breach  of 
them  ?  Or  has  the  person  with  whom  he  was  obliged 
to  consult  in  the  sale  any  power  to  restrain  him  ?  The 
executor  may  remove  the  wrongful  possessor  from  the 
land^  though  perhaps  by  the  will  he  may  hold  it  in  trust 


SENATE   NOT  INSPECTORS   OF   OFFICERS.  127 

for  another  person's  benefit.  In  this  manner  the  Presi- 
dent may  remove  from  office  ;  though,  when  vacant,  he 
cannot  fill  it  without  the  advice  of  the  Senate." 

Thomas  Hartley  of  Pennsylvania  said  (pp.  479,  480, 
481):  "This  is  an  office  of  considerable  importance. 
*  *  *  In  all  commercial  countries  it  will  require  men 
of  high  talents  to  fill  such  an  office,  and  great  respon- 
sibility. It  is  necessary  to  connect  the  business  in  such 
a  manner  as  to  give  the  President  a  complete  command 
over  it ;  so  in  whatever  hands  it  is  placed,  or  however 
modulated,  it  must  be  subjected  to  his  inspection  and 
control.     *     *     * 

"  Another  reason  why  the  power  of  removal  should 
be  lodged  with  the  President  rather  than  the  Senate 
arises  from  their  connection  with  the  people.  The  Pres- 
ident is  the  representative  of  the  people  in  a  near  and 
equal  manner.  He  is  the  guardian  of  his  country.  The 
Senate  are  the  representatives  of  the  State  Legislatures  ; 
but  they  are  very  unequal  in  that  representation.  Each 
State  gends  two  members  to  that  House,  although  their 
proportions  are  as  ten  to  one.  Hence  arises  a  degree 
of  insecurity  to  an  impartial  administration.  But  if 
they  possessed  every  advantage  of  equality,  they  can- 
not be  the  proper  body  to  inspect  into  the  proper  be- 
havior of  officers,  because  they  have  no  constitutional 
powers  for  this  purpose." 

John  Lawrence  of  New  York  said  (pp.  483,  484)  : 
"  It  has  been  stated  as  an  objection  that  we  should 
extend  the  powers  of  the  President,  if  we  give  him 
the  power  of  removal ;  and  we  are  not  to  construe  the 
Constitution  in  such  way  as  to  enlarge  the  executive 
power  to  the  injury  of  any  other  ;  that  as  he  is  limited 
in  the  power  of  appointment  by  the  control  of  the  Sen- 
ate, he  ought  to  be  equally  limited  in  the  removal.  If 
there  be  any  weight  in*  this  argument,  it  applies,  as  f orci- 


128        CONSISTENCY  AND  PRESIDENTIAL  KEMOVALS. 

bly  against  vesting  the  power  conjointly  in  the  President 
and  Senate  ;  because  if  we  are  not  to  extend  the  powers 
of  the  Executive  beyond  the  express  detail  of  duties 
found  in  the  Constitution,  neither  are  we  at  liberty  to 
extend  the  duties  of  the  Senate  beyond  those  precise 
points  fixed  in  the  same  instrument.  Of  course  if  we 
cannot  say  the  President  alone  shall  remove,  we  cannot 
say  the  President  and  Senate  may  exercise  such  power. 

"  It  is  admitted  that  the  Constitution  is  silent  on  this 
subject.  But  it  is  also  silent  with  respect  to  the  ap- 
pointments it  has  vested  in  the  Legislature.  The  Con- 
stitution declares  that  Congress  may  by  law  vest  the  ap- 
pointment of  such  inferior  officers  as  they  think  proper 
in  the  President  alone,  in  the  courts  of  law,  or  heads 
of  departments,  yet  says  nothing  with  respect  to  the 
removal.  *  *  *  In  those  cases  in  which  the  Consti- 
tution has  given  the  appointment  to  the  President,  he 
must  have  the  power  of  removal  for  the  sake  of  con- 
sistency ;  for  no  person  will  say  that  if  the  President 
should  appoint  an  inferior  officer,  he  should  not  have 
the  power  to  remove  him  when  he  thought  proper,  if 
no  particular  limitation  was  determined  by  the  law." 

Representative  George  Clymer  of  Pennsylvania  said 
(pp.  489,  490)  :  "  I  am  clear  that  the  Executive  has 
the  power  of  removal  as  incident  to  his  department ; 
and  if  the  Constitution  had  been  silent  with  respect 
to  the  appointment,  he  would  have  had  that  power 
also.  The  reason  perhaps  why  it  was  mentioned  in 
the  Constitution  was  to  give  some  further  security 
against  the  introduction  of  improper  men  into  office. 
But  in  cases  of  removal  there  is  not  such  necessity  for 
this  check.  What  great  danger  would  arise  from  the 
removal  of  a  worthy  man,  when  the  Senate  must  be 
consulted  in  the  appointment  of  his  successor?  Is  it 
likely  they  will  consent  to  advance  an  improper  char- 


MB.    BENSON'S    ADMIRABLE    ILLUSTBATION.  129 

acter?  The  presumption  therefore  is  that  he  would 
not  abuse  this  power  ;  or,  if  he  did,  only  one  good 
man  would  be  changed  for  another.  If  the  President 
is  divested  of  this  power,  his  responsibility  is  destroyed. 
You  prevent  his  efficiency,  and  disable  him  from  af- 
fording that  security  to  the  people  which  the  Consti- 
tution contemplates.  *  *  *  Xhe  Executive  must 
act  by  others.  But  you  reduce  him  to  a  mere  shadow 
when  you  control  both  the  power  of  appointment  and 
removal.  If  you  take  away  the  latter  power,  he  ought 
to  resign  the  power  of  superintending  and  directing 
the  executive  parts  of  government  into  the  hands  of 
the  Senate  at  once,  and  then  we  become  a  dangerous 
aristocracy,  or  shall  be  more  destitute  of  energy  than 
any  government  on  earth." 

Egbert  Benson  of  New  York  said  (pp.  505,  506,  507) : 
"  I  will  not  repeat  what  has  been  said  to  prove  that 
the  true  constrution  is  that  the  President  alone  has  the 
power  of  removal,  but  will  state  a  case  to  show  the 
embarrassment  which  must  arise  by  a  combination  of 
the  senatorial  and  legislative  authority  in  this  particu- 
lar. I  will  instance  the  officer  to  which  the  bill  re- 
lates. To  him  will  necessarily  be  committed  negotia- 
tions with  the  ministers  of  foreign  courts.  This  is  a 
very  delicate  trust.  The  supreme  executive  officer,  in 
superintending  this  department,  may  be  entangled  with 
suspicions  of  a  very  delicate  nature  relative  to  the  trans- 
actions of  the  officer,  and  such  as  from  circumstances 
would  be  injurious  to  name.  Indeed  he  may  be  so 
situated  that  he  will  not,  cannot,  give  the  evidence  of 
his  suspicion.  Now,  thus  circumstanced,  suppose  he 
should  propose  to  the  Senate  to  remove  the  Secretary 
of  Foreign  Affairs.  Are  we  to  expect  the  Senate 
will,  without  any  reason  being  assigned,  implicitly 
submit  to  his  proposition?    They  will  not.     Suppose 


130  SENlTE    ONLY   A   dONSTlTtTTlOl^^AL   CHfiaS. 

he  should  say  he  suspected  the  man's  fidelity.  They 
would  say  we  must  proceed  further,  and  know  the  rea- 
son for  this  suspicion.  They  would  insist  on  a  full 
communication.  Is  it  to  be  supposed  that  this  man 
will  not  have  a  single  friend  in  the  Senate  who  will 
contend  for  a  fair  trial  and  a  full  hearing  ?  The  Presi- 
dent then  becomes  the  plaintiff  and  the  Secretary  the 
defendant.  The  Senate  are  sitting  in  judgment  be- 
tween the  Chief  Magistrate  of  the  United  States  and 
a  subordinate  officer.  Now  I  submit  to  the  candor  of 
the  gentlemen  whether  this  looks  like  good  government. 
Yet  in  every  instance  when  the  President  thinks  proper 
to  have  an  officer  removed,  this  absurd  scene  must  be 
displayed.  How  much  better,  even  on  principles  of 
expediency,  will  it  be  that  the  President  alone  have  the 
power  of  removal. 

"  It  has  been  warmly  contended  that  the  power  of 
removal  is  incidental  to  the  power  of  appointment.  It 
may  be  true  in  general,  but  upon  examination  we  shall 
find  there  is  a  distinction  in  this  case  from  what  the 
general  principle  supposes.  If  the  President  and  Senate 
are  to  be  considered  as  one  body,  deliberating  together 
on  the  business  of  appointments,  every  individual  of 
which  participates  equal  powers,  the  reasoning  that  has 
been  urged  will  hold  good.  But  I  take  it  for  granted 
that  they  are  two  distinct  bodies,  and  can  only  give  a 
simple  affirmative  or  negative.  No  member  of  the  Sen- 
ate has  power  to  offer  an  original  proposition.  In  short, 
the  moment  we  depart  from  this  simple  idea  that  the 
provision  in  the  Constitution  is  intended  for  any  other 
purpose  but  to  prevent  the  President  from  introducing 
improper  persons  into  office,  we  shall  find  it  difficult  to 
form  any  certain  principle  upon  which  they  ought  to 
act,  and  our  opinions  and  deliberations  will  be  discord- 
ant and  distracted." 


MR.    SEDGWICK'S   fERTINEJfT  iNQttlElES.  131 

Mr.  Benson  further  said  that  "if  we  declare  in  the 
bill  that  the  officer  shall  be  removable  by  the  President, 
it  has  the  appearance  of  conferring  the  power  upon 
him."  Therefore,  in  order  to  avoid  even  an  apparent 
conference  of  power,  and  to  do  nothing  more  than  de- 
clare the  House's  "  sentiments  upon  the  meaning  of 
a  constitutional  grant  of  power  to  the  President,"  he 
moved  as  a  substitute  for  the  words  "  to  be  removable 
by  the  President,"  the  following  :  "  whenever  the  said 
officer  shall  be  removed  by  the  President."  Mr.  Madi- 
son, who  appreciated  Mr.  Benson's  delicate  legislative 
distinction,  seconded  the  latter's  motion.  The  amend- 
ment was  adopted  by  a  vote  of  30  to  18. 

Theodore  Sedgwick  of  Massachusetts  said  (pp.  522, 
523)  :  "  What  is  to  be  the  consequence  if  the  Senate 
are  to  be  applied  to  (for  permission  to  remove  an  of- 
ficer) ?  If  they  are  to  do  anything  in  this  business,  I 
presume  they  are  to  deliberate,  because  they  are  to  ad- 
vise and  consent.  If  they  are  to  deliberate,  you  put 
them  between  the  officer  and  the  President.  They  are 
then  to  inquire  into  the  causes  of  removal.  The  Presi- 
dent must  produce  his  testimony.  How  is  the  question 
to  be  investigated  ?  Because,  I  presume,  there  must  be 
some  rational  rule  for  conducting  this  business.  Is  the 
President  to  be  sworn  to  declare  the  whole  truth,  and 
to  bring  forward  facts  ?  Or  are  they  to  admit  suspi- 
cion as  testimony  ?  Or  is  the  word  of  the  President  to 
be  taken  at  all  events  ?  If  so,  this  check  is  not  of  the 
least  efficacy  in  nature.  But  if  proof  be  necessary, 
what  is  then  the  consequence  ?  Why,  in  nine  cases  out 
of  ten,  where  the  case  is  very  clear  to  the  President 
that  the  man  ought  to  be  removed,  the  effect  cannot 
be  produced,  because  .it  is  absolutely  impossible  to  pro- 
duce the  necessary  evidence.  Are  the  Senate  to  pro- 
ceed without  evidence  ?     Some  gentlemen  contend  not. 


132  SEPAllATE    POWERS    THE    ONLY    SAFETY. 

Then  the  object  will  be  lost.  Shall  a  man,  under  these 
circumstances,  be  saddled  upon  the  President  who  has 
been  appointed  for  no  other  purpose  but  to  aid  the 
President  in  performing  certain  duties?  *  *  *  if 
he  js,  where  is  the  responsibility  ?  *  *  *  Without 
you  make  him  responsible,  you  weaken  and  destroy  the 
strength  and  beauty  of  your  system.  What  is  to  be 
done  in  cases  which  can  only  be  known  from  a  long 
acquaintance  with  the  conduct  of  an  officer?" 

On  page  582  Mr.  Sedgwick  says  there  are  a  thousand 
circumstances,  exclusive  of  impeachments,  which  may 
demand  removal  from  office,  of  which  the  President 
alone  is  the  proper  judge. 

Richard  Bland  Lee  of  Virginia  said  (pp.  525,  526)  : 
"It  is  laid  down  as  a  maxim  in  government  by  all 
judicious  writers  that  the  legislative,  executive,  and 
judicial  powers  should  be  kept  as  separate  and  distinct 
as  possible,  in  order  to  secure  the  liberties  of  the  people. 
And  this  maxim  is  founded  on  the  experience  of  ages  ; 
for  we  find  that  however  governments  have  been  estab- 
lished, however  modified  in  their  names  or  forms,  if 
these  powers  are  blended  in  or  exercised  by  one  body, 
the  effects  are  ever  the  same — the  public  liberty  is  de- 
stroyed. *  *  *  'pjje  fi-amers  of  the  Constitution 
*  *  *  divided  our  government  into  three  principal 
branches,  with  express  declarations  that  all  legislative 
power  shall  vest  in  one,  all  executive  in  another,  and 
the  whole  judicial  in  a  third.     *     *     * 

"  It  is  our  duty  to  vest  all  executive  power  belonging 
to  the  government  where  the  Convention  intended  it 
should  be  placed.  It  adds  to  the  responsibility  of  the 
most  responsible  branch  of  the  government ;  and  with- 
out responsibility  we  should  have  little  security  against 
the  depredations  and  gigantic  strides  of  arbitrary  power. 
It  is  necessary  to  hold  up  a  single  and  specific  object  to 


THE  PUBLIC  MUST  HAVE  SOMEBODY  TO  WATCH.       133 

the  public  jealousy  to  watch.  Therefore  it  is  necessary 
to  connect  the  power  of  removal  with  the  President. 
The  Executive  is  the  source  of  all  appointments.  Is  his 
responsibility  complete  unless  he  has  the  power  of  re- 
moval ?  *  *  *  If  the  power  of  removal  is  vested 
in  the  Senate,  it  is  evident,  at  a  single  view,  that  the 
responsibility  is  dissipated,  because  the  fault  cannot  be 
fixed  on  any  individual.  Besides  the  Senate  are  not 
accountable  to  the  people.  *  *  *  But  even  if  they 
were,  they  have  no  powers  to  enable  them  to  decide 
with  propriety  in  the  case  of  removals,  and  therefore 
are  improper  persons  to  exercise  such  authority." 

Benjamin  Goodhue  of  Massachusetts  said  (pp.  533, 
534)  :  "  It  has  long  been  an  opinion  entertained  of  the 
people  of  America  that  they  would  not  trust  the  gov- 
ernment with  the  power  of  doing  good  lest  it  should 
be  abused.  *  *  *  The  question  on  the  present 
occasion  seems  to  stand  on  nearly  the  same  ground  — 
whether  we  shall  trust  the  power  of  doing  good  to  the 
Executive  Magistrate,  or  deprive  him  of  it  for  fear  lie 
may  abuse  it.  *  *  *  The  only  security  wliich  the 
Constitution  means  to  give  us  is  to  call  the  officers  of 
government  to  account  if  they  abuse  their  powers,  and 
not  to  cramp  their  exercise  so  as  to  make  them  inef- 
ficient.    *     *     * 

"  It  has  been  said  that  the  power  would  be  more  safe 
in  the  hands  of  tlie  Senate  than  m  that  of  the  President. 
But  I  do  not  view  it  in  that  light.  *  *  *  j^^  would 
be  a  very  inconvenient  and  useless  power  for  them  to 
be  possessed  of.  It  is  in  nothing  similar  to  the  power 
they  have  in  appointments.  There  they  are  really  use- 
ful by  their  advice,  because  it  is  more  probable  that 
the  Senate  may  be  better  acquainted  with  the  charac- 
ters of  the  officers  that  are  nominated  than  the  Presi- 
dent himself.     But  after  their  appointments  such  knowl- 


134        KEMOVlN(i  SOMfi'fiMfi^  A  giiPAtiAl-fi  POWKIJ. 

edge  is  little  required.  The  officer  is  placed  under  the 
control  of  the  President,  and  it  is  only  through  him  that 
the  improper  conduct  of  a  person  in  a  subordinate  situ- 
ation can  be  known." 

Thomas  Scott  of  Pennsylvania  indulged  in  a  semi- 
facetious  speech,  but  he  made  one  good  point  when  he 
said  (p.  533)  :  "  Is  anything  more  plain  than  that  the 
President,  above  all  the  officers  of  government,  both 
from  the  manner  of  his  appointment  and  the  nature  of 
his  duties,  is  truly  and  justly  denominated  the' man  of 
the  people  ?  Is  there  any  other  person  who  represents 
so  many  of  them  as  the  President  ?  He  is  elected  by 
the  voice  of  the  people  of  the  whole  Union.  The  Sen- 
ate are  the  representatives  of  the  State  sovereignties. 
*  *  *  Yet  this  body  is  held  up  as  more  nearly 
related  to  the  people  than  the  President  himself." 

Abraham  Baldwin  of  Georgia  said  (pp.  557,  558, 
559)  :  "Gentlemen  who  undertake  to  construe,  say  they 
see  clearly  that  the  power  which  appoints  must  also 
remove.  Now  I  have  reviewed  this  subject  with  all 
the  application  and  discernment  my  mind  is  capable  of, 
and  have  not  been  able  to  see  any  such  thing.  There 
is  an  agency  given  to  the  President  in  making  appoint- 
ments, to  which  the  Senate  are  connected.  But  how  it 
follows  that  the  connection  extends  to  the  removal, 
positively  I  cannot  see.  They  say  that  it  follows  as 
a  natural,  inseparable  consequence.  This  sounds  like 
logic.  But  if  we  consult  the  premises,  perhaps  the 
conclusion  may  not  follow.  The  Constitution  opposes 
this  maxim  more  than  it  supports  it.  The  President 
is  appointed  by  electors  chosen  by  the  people  them- 
selves, or  by  the  State  Legislatures.  Can  the  State 
Legislatures,  either  combined  or  separate,  effect  his  re- 
moval ?  No.  But  the  Senate  may,  on  impeachment 
by  this  House.     The  judges  are  appointed  by  the  Presi- 


^HE  KEsTEAINING  t»OWEE  OF  iMPEACfiMENT.       l35 

dent,  by  and  with  the  advice  and  consent  of  the  Senate. 
But  they  are  only  removable  by  impeachment.  The 
President  has  no  agency  in  the  removal.  Hence,  I 
say,  it  is  not  a  natural  consequence  that  the  power 
which  appoints  should  have  the  power  of  removal  also. 
We  may  find  it  necessary  that  subordinate  officers 
should  be  appointed  in  the  first  instance  by  the  Presi- 
dent and  Senate.  I  hope  it  will  not  be  contended  that 
the  President  and  Senate  shall  be  applied  to  in  all  cases 
when  their  removal  may  be  necessary.  *  *  *  I  dis- 
pute  the  maxim  altogether  ;  for  though  it  is  sometimes 
true,  it  is  often  fallacious.  But  by  no  means  is  it  that 
kind  of  conclusive  argument  which  they  contend  for. 

"  But  what  is  the  evil  of  the  President  being  at  lib- 
erty to  exercise  this  power  of  removal?  Why  we 
fear  that  he  will  displace  not  one  good  officer  only,  but, 
in  a  fit  of  passion,  all  the  good  officers  of  the  govern- 
ment ;  by  which,  to  be  sure,  the  public  would  suffer. 
*  *  *  I  believe  he  could  not  turn  out  so  many  but 
that  the  Senate  would  still  have  some  choice  out  of 
which  to  supply  a  good  one.  But  even  if  he  was  to 
do  this,  what  would  be  the  consequence?  He  would 
be  obliged  to  do  the  duties  himself,  or,  if  he  did  not, 
we  would  impeach  him  and  turn  him  out  of  office  as  he 
had  done  others.  I  must  admit  though  that  there  is  a 
possibility  of  such  an  evil  ;  but  it  is  a  remote  possibility 
indeed.  *  *  *  Checked  and  surrounded  as  his  powers 
are,  I  see  little  cause  for  apprehension." 

Peter  Sylvester  of  New  York  said  (p.  561)  :  "I  lay 
it  down  as  a  positive  case  that  the  President  is  invested 
with  all  executive  power  necessary  to  carry  the  Consti- 
tution and  the  laws  passed  in  pursuance  thereof  into 
full  effect,  so  far  as  these  powers  are  unchecked  and 
uncontrolled  by  express  stipulations  in  the  Constitution. 
If  the  exceptions  with  respect  to  appointments  had  not 


136  THE    ADVOCATES    OF   SUSPENSION. 

been  made,  the  President  would  have  had  that  power 
as  well  as  the  power  of  removal.  In  the  first  his  power 
is  eclipsed  by  the  interference  of  the  Senate,  but  in  the 
last  the  manifestation  is  clear.  Both  these  powers  be- 
ing inherent  in  the  executive  branch  of  the  government, 
must  remain  there." 

SPEECHES     IN    FAVOR     OF     REMOVAL    BY    THE    PRESIDENT 
AND     SENATE. 

Alexander  White  of  Virginia,  who  made  the  motion 
to  strike  out  the  words  "  to  be  removable  by  the  Presi- 
dent," said  (pp.  467,  517)  :  "It  was  objected  that  the 
President  could  not  remove  an  officer  unless  the  Senate 
was  in  session,  but  yet  the  emergency  of  the  case  might 
demand  an  instant  dismission.  I  should  imagine  that 
no  inconvenience  would  result  on  this  account,  because, 
on  my  principle,  the  same  power  which  can  make  a 
temporary  appointment  can  make  an  equal  suspension.* 
The  powers  are  apposite  to  each  other. 

"  The  gentleman  (Mr.  Madison)  says  we  ought  not 
to  blend  the  executive  and  legislative  powers  further 
than  they  are  blended  in  the  Constitution.  I  contend 
we  do  not.  There  is  no  expression  in  the  Constitution 
which  says  that  the  President  shall  have  the  power  of 
removal  from  office.  But  the  contrary  is  strongly  im- 
plied, for  it  is  said  that  Congress  may  establish  offices 
by  law,  and  vest  the  appointment,  and  consequently  the 
removal,  in  the  President  alone,  in  the  courts  of  law, 
or  heads  of  departments.  Now  this  shows  that  Con- 
gress are  not  at  liberty  to  make  any  alteration  by  law 
in  the  mode  of  appointing  superior  officers,  and  conse- 

*  The  practicability  of  suspension  in  lieu  of  removal  was  also  advoca- 
ted by  Messrs.  Jackson,  Sherman,  Page,  Stone,  and  Tucker.  Mr.  Bou- 
diuot,  as  has  already  been  shown,  thought  it  would  be  too  indecisive. 


THE  DANGER   IN   AN    AMBITIOUS   PEESIDENT.         137 

quently  that  they  are  not  at  liberty  to  alter  the  manner 
of  removal. 

"  It  has  been  said  if  the  concurrence  of  the  Senate 
be  necessary,  they  may  refuse  to  concur  when  a  removal 
ia  proper.  *  *  *  ^y^  j^i-g  ^q  presume  the  Senate 
will  do  their  duty.  *  *  *  But  shall  we,  because 
the  Senate  may  do  wrong,  give  the  President  the  power 
to  act  without  them  ?  Is  it  contended  that  the  Presi- 
dent has  any  superior  agency  in  this  business  because 
he  nominates  ?  We  may  as  well  contend,  on  the  same 
principle,  that  because  this  House  has  the  exclusive 
power  of  originating  money  bills,  we  may  repeal  a  law 
of  that  nature  without  the  consent  of  the  Senate." 

William  Smith  of  South  Carolina  said  (pp.  457,  458, 
608)  :  "  I  imagine,  sir,  we  are  declaring  a  power  in 
the  President  which  may  hereafter  be  greatly  abused. 
*  *  *  We  ought  to  *  *  *  contemplate  this  power 
in  the  hands  of  an  ambitious  man,  who  might  apply 
it  to  dangerous  purposes.  If  we  give  this  power  to 
the  President,  he  may,  from  caprice,  remove  the  most 
worthy  men  from  office.     *     *     * 

^*  Another  danger  may  result.  If  you  desire  an  of- 
ficer to  be  a  man  of  capacity  and  integrity,  you  may 
be  disappointed.  A  gentleman  possessed  of  these  qual- 
ities, knowing  he  may  be  removed  at  the  pleasure  of 
the  President,  will  be  loath  to  risk  his  reputation  on 
such  insecure  ground.  As  the  matter  stands  in  the 
Constitution,  he  knows  if  he  is  suspected  of  doing  any- 
thing wrong  he  shall  have  a  fair  trial,  and  the  whole  of 
his  transactions  be  developed  by  an  impartial  tribunal. 
He  will  have  confidence  in  himself  when  he  knows  he 
can  only  be  removed  for  improper  behavior.  But  if  he 
is  subjected  to  the  whim  of  any  man,  it  may  deter  him 
from  entering  into  the  service  of  his  country  ;  because, 
if  he  is  not  subservient  to  that  person's  pleasure,  he 


138  ALEXANDER   HAMILTON   ON   REMOVALS. 

may  be  turned  out,  and  the  public  may  be  led  to  sup- 
pose for  improper  behavior.  This  impression  cannot  be 
removed,  as  a  public  inquiry  cannot  be  obtained.  Be- 
sides this,  it  ought  to  be  considered  that  the  person  who 
is  appointed  will  probably  quit  some  other  office  or 
business  in  which  he  is  occupied.  Ought  he,  after  mak- 
ing this  sacrifice  in  order  to  serve  the  public,  to  be 
turned  out  of  place  without  even  a  reason  being  as- 
signed for  such  behavior  ?  Perhaps  the  President  does 
not  do  this  with  an  ill  intention.  He  may  have  been 
misinformed  ;  for  it  is  presumable  that  a  President  may 
have  around  him  men  envious  of  the  honors  and  emol- 
uments of  persons  in  office,  who  will  insinuate  suspi- 
cions into  his  honest  breast  that  may  produce  a  re- 
moval. Be  this  as  it  may,  the  event  is  still  the  same 
to  the  removed  officer.  The  public  suppose  him  guilty 
of  malpractices.  Hence  his  reputation  is  blasted,  his 
property  sacrificed.  I  say  his  property  is  sacrificed, 
because  I  consider  his  office  as  his  property.  He  is 
stripped  of  this  and  left  exposed  to  the  malevolence  of 
the  world,  contrary  to  the  principles  of  the  Constitution, 
and  contrary  to  the  principles  of  all  free  governments, 
which  are  that  no  man  shall  be  despoiled  of  his  prop- 
erty but  by  a  fair  and  impartial  trial. 

"  Gentlemen  say  we  ought  not  to  suppose  such  an 
abuse  of  power  in  the  President.  But  the  Constitution 
wisely  guards  against  his  caprice  in  the  appointment, 
and  why  should  we  abate  the  security  in  cases  of  re- 
moval?"* 

*  Representiitivc  Smith  made  the  following  quotation  from  General 
Alexander  Hamilton  ("  The  Federalist,"  Ilallowell  Ed.,  p.  358):  "  It  has 
been  mentioned  as  one  of  the  advantages  to  be  expected  from  the  co- 
operation of  the  Senate  in  the  business  of  appointments,  that  it  would 
contribute  to  the  stability  of  the  administration.  The  consent  of  that 
^ody  ^ould  be  necessary  to  displace  as  well  as  to  appoint,    A  change 


TENUBE  DURING  GOOD  BEHAVIOE.        130 

On  page  471  Mr.  Smith  says  :  "  It  will  not  be  con- 
tended that  the  State  governments  did  not  furnish  the 
late  Convention  with  the  skeleton  of  thijs  Constitution. 
I  have  turned  over  the  Constitutions  of  most  of  the 
States.  In  some  instances  I  find  the  Executive  Magis- 
trate suspends,  but  none  of  them  have  the  right  to  re- 
move officers."  On  page  459  he  says  that  in  order  to 
test  and  decide  the  constitutionality  of  the  question  of 
removal,  a  removed  officer  could  apply  to  a  court  of 
justice  for  a  mandamus  to  be  restored  to  his  office,  and 
that  the  court  would  settle  it.  As  to  the  tenure  of  sub- 
ordinate officers,  he  said  they  could  "  be  regulated  by 
law."  But  as  to  the  removal  of  chief  officials,  he  said 
that  inasmuch  as  the  Constitution  prescribed  impeach- 
ment only,  it  "  contemplated  only  this  mode."  Messrs. 
Page  and  Huntington  also  believed  in  removal  by  im- 
peachment. Impeachment  for  removal,  except  where 
required  by  the  Constitution,  is  of  course  impracticable 
nowadays,  even  for  the  Secretary  of  State,  which  cor- 
responds to  the  then  (1781))  proposed  Secretary  of  For- 
eign Affairs.  Messrs.  Smith,  Page,  and  Stone  favored 
the  holding  of  offices  during  good  behavior.  Other 
Representatives  were  opposed  to  this  principle,  and  yet 

of  the  Chief  Magistrate  therefore  woulii  not  occasion  so  violent  or  so 
general  a  revolution  in  the  officers  of  the  government  as  might  be 
expected  if  he  were  the  sole  disposer  of  offices.  Where  a  man  in  any 
station  has  given  satisfactory  evidence  of  his  fitness  for  it,  a  new  Presi- 
dent would  be  restrained  from  attempting  a  change  in  favor  of  a  person 
more  agreeable  to  him  by  the  apprehension  that  a  discountenance  of 
the  Senate  might  frustrate  the  attempt,  and  bring  some  degree  of  dis- 
credit upon  himself.  Those  who  can  best  estimate  the  value  of  a  steady 
administration,  will  be  most  disposed  to  prize  a  provision  which  con- 
nects the  official  existence  of  public  men  with  the  approbation  or  disap- 
probation of  that  body,  which,  from  the  greater  permanency  of  its  own 
composition,  will  in  all  probability  be  loss  subject  to  inconstancy  than 
any  other  member  of  the  government." 


140      REMOVAL  A  QUESTION  OF  CONSTITUTIONALITY. 

they  feared  that  worthy  men  would  be  removed  from 
office.  In  this  resj)ect  their  arguments  were  both  in- 
consistent and  contradictory. 

Benjamin  Huntington  of  Connecticut  said  (p.  459)  : 
"  I  think  the  clause  ought  not  tg  stand.  It  was  well 
observed  that  the  Constitution  was  silent  respecting  the 
removal  otherwise  than  by  impeachment.  I  would  like- 
wise add  that  it  mentions  no  other  cause  of  removal 
than  treason,  bribery,  or  other  high  crimes  and  misde- 
meanors. It  does  not,  I  apprehend,  extend  to  cases  of 
infirmity  or  incapacity.  Indeed  it  appears  hard  to  me 
that  after  an  officer  has  become  old  in  an  honorable  ser- 
vice, he  should  be  impeached  for  this  infirmity.  *  *  * 
It  was  said  if  the  President  had  this  authority,  it  would 
make  him  more  responsible  for  the  conduct  of  the  of- 
ficer. But  if  we  have  a  vicious  President,  who  inclines 
to  abuse  this  power,  which  God  forbid,  his  responsi- 
bility will  stand  us  in  little  stead.  Therefore  that  idea 
does  not  satisfy  me  that  it  is  proper  the  President 
should  have  this  power." 

Elbridge  Gerry  of  Massachusetts  said  (pp.  472,  473, 
502,  574)  :  "  Some  gentlemen  consider  this  as  a  ques- 
tion of  policy.  But  to  me  it  appears  a  question  of 
constitutionality,  and  I  presume  it  will  be  determined 
on  that  point  alone. 

"  The  best  arguments  I  have  heard  urged  on  this 
occasion  came  from  the  honorable  gentleman  from  Vir- 
ginia (Mr.  Madison).  He  says  the  Constitution  has 
vested  the  executive  power  in  the  President,  and  that 
he  has  a  right  to  exercise  it  under  the  qualifications 
therein  made.  He  lays  it  down  as  a  maxim  that  the 
Constitution  vesting  in  the  President  the  executive 
power,  naturally  vests  him  with  the  power  of  appoint- 
ment and  removal.  Now  I  would  be  glad  to  know  from 
that  gentleman  by  what  means  we  ar?  to  decide  this 


I'llE   SENATJl'S    salutary   StABlLIl'Y.  141 

question.  Is  his  maxim  supported  by  precedent  drawn 
from  the  practice  of  the  individual  States?  The  direct 
contrary  is  established.  In  many  cases  the  Executives 
are  not  in  particular  vested  with  the  power  of  appoint- 
ment. And  do  they  exercise  that  power  by  virtue  of 
their  office  ?  It  will  be  found  that  other  branches  of 
the  government  make  appointments.  How  then  can 
gentlemen  assert  that  the  powers  of  appointment  and 
removal  are  incident  to  the  executive  department  of 
government?  To  me  it  appears  at  best  but  problem- 
atical. Neither  is  it  clear  to  me  that  the  power  that 
appoints  naturally  possesses  the  power  of  removal. 

*'  It  has  been  argued  that  if  the  power  of  removal 
vests  in  the  President  alone,  it  annuls  or  renders  nuga- 
tory the  clause  in  the  Constitution  which  directs  the 
concurrence  of  the  Senate  in  the  case  of  appointments. 
It  behooves  us  not  to  adopt  principles  subversive  of 
those  established  by  the  Constitution. 

"  It  has  been  frequently  asserted,  on  former  occa- 
sions, that  the  Senate  is  a  permanent  body,  and  was 
so  constructed  in  order  to  give  durability  to  public  mea- 
sures. If  they  are  not  absolutely  permanent,  they  are 
formed  on  a  renovating  principle,  which  gives  them  a 
salutary  stability.  This  is  not  the  case  either  with  the 
President  or  House  of  Representatives.  *  *  *  j^ 
appears  to  me  that  a  permanency  was  expected  in  the 
magistracy,*  and  therefore  the  Senate  were  combined 
in  the  appointment  to  office.  But  if  the  President  alone 
has  the  power  of  removal,  it  is  in  his  power  at  any 
time  to  destroy  all  that  has  been  done.  It  appears  to 
me  that  such  a  principle  would  be  destructive  of  the 
intention  of  the  Constitution,  expressed  by  giving  the 
power  of  appointment  to  the  Senate.  It  also  subverts 
the  clause  which  gives  the  Senate  the  sole  power  of 

*  This  could  not  be  unless  a  President  were  elected  term  after  term. 


14^  iiit.    GERUY   FEARS   THE   PItiJStf)fiNf. 

trying  impeachments,  because  the  President  may  re- 
move the  officer  in  order  to  screen  him  from  the  effects 
of  their  judgment  on  an  impeachment.  Why  should 
we  construe  any  part  of  the  Constitution  in  such  a 
manner  as  to  destroy  its  essential  principles,  when  a 
more  consonant  construction  can  be  obtained  ?    *    *    * 

"  It  has  been  said  by  my  colleague  that  these  officers 
are  the  creatures  of  the  law.  But  it  seems  as  if  we 
were  not  content  with  that.  We  are  making  them  the 
mere  creatures  of  the  President.  They  dare  not  exer- 
cise the  privilege  of  their  creation,  if  the  President 
shall  order  them  to  forbear,  because  he  holds  their 
thread  of  life.  Plis  power  will  be  sovereign  over  them, 
and  will  soon  swallow  up  the  small  security  we  have 
in  the  Senate's  concurrence  to  the  appointment ;  and 
we  shall  shortly  need  no  other  than  the  authority  of 
the  supreme  executive  officer  to  nominate,  appoint,  con- 
tinue, or  remove.     *     *     * 

"  It  is  said  that  the  President  will  be  subject  to  im- 
peachment for  dismissing  a  good  man.  This  in  my 
mind  involves  an  absurdity.  How  can  the  House  im- 
peach the  President  for  doing  an  act  which  the  Leg- 
islature has  submitted  to  his  discretion? 

"  The  Senate  and  this  House  may  think  it  necessary 
to  inquire  why  a  good  officer  is  dismissed.  The  Presi- 
dent will  say  :  *  It  is  my  pleasure.  I  am  authorized  by 
law  to  exercise  this  prerogative.  I  have  my  reasons 
for  it,  but  you  have  no  right  to  inquire  them  of  me.' 
This  language  may  be  proper  in  a  monarchy  ;  but  in 
a  republic  every  action  ought  to  be  accounted  for." 

Samuel  Livermore  of  New  Hampshire  said  (pp.  478, 
479)  :  "  Surely  a  law  passed  by  the  whole  Legislature 
cannot  be  repealed  by  one  branch  of  it.  So  I  conceive 
in  the  case  of  appointments  it  requires  the  same  force 
to  supersede  an  officer  as  to  put  him  in  office.     I  ac- 


143          :£iECtJTlVE   POWER  NOT  ALL  PRESlDl^J^T'S. 

knowledge  that  the  clause  relative  to  impeachment  is 
for  the  benefit  of  the  people.  It  is  intended  to  enable 
their  representatives  to  bring  a  bad  officer  to  justice 
who  is  screened  by  the  President.  But  I  do  not  con- 
ceive, with  the  honorable  gentleman  from  South  Caro- 
lina (Mr.  Smith),  that  it  by  any  means  excludes  the 
usual  ways  of  superseding  officers. 

"  When  an  important  and.  confidential  trust  is  placed 
in  a  man,  it  is  worse  than  death  to  him  to  be  displaced 
without  cause.  His  reputation  depends  on  the  single 
will  of  the  President,  who  may  ruin  him  on  bare  sus- 
picion. Nay,  a  new  President  may  turn  him  out  on 
mere  caprice,  or  in  order  to  make  room  for  a  favorite. 
This  contradicts  all  my  notions  of  propriety.  Every- 
thing of  this  sort  should  be  done  with  due  deliberation. 
Every  person  ought  to  have  a  hearing  before  he  is  pun- 
ished." 

James  Jackson  of  Georgia  said  (pp.  487,  488,  489, 
530,  531,  555)  :  "If  this  power  is  incident  to  the  ex- 
ecutive branch  of  government,  it  does  not  follow  that 
it  vests  in  the  President  alone,  because  he  alone  does 
not  possess  all  executive  powers.  The  Constitution  has 
lodged  the  power  of  forming  treaties,  and  all  executive 
business,  I  presume,  connected  therewith,  in  the  Presi- 
dent ;  but  it  is  qualified  by  and  with  the  advice  and 
consent  of  the  Senate,  provided  two-thirds  of  the  Sen- 
ate agree  therein.  The  same  has  taken  place  with  re- 
spect to  appointing  officers.  *  *  *  It  may  be  wrong 
that  the  great  powers  of  government  should  be  blended 
in  this  manner.  But  we  cannot  separate  them.  The 
error  is  adopted  in  tlie  Constitution.     *     *     * 

"  Behold  the  baleful  influence  of  the  royal  preroga- 
tive when  officers  hold  their  commissions  during  the 
pleasure  of  the  Crown  !  At  this  moment,  see  the  King 
of  Sweden  aiming  at  arbitrary  power,  shutting  up  the 


144     Mesidext  and  senate  chec^  each  ofriES. 

doors  of  his  Senate,  and  compelling,  by  force  of  arras, 
his  shuddering  councilors  to  acquiesce  in  his  despotic 
mandates.*  I  agree  that  this  is  the  hour  in  which  we 
ought  to  establish  our  government.  But  it  is  an  hour 
in  which  we  should  be  wary  and  cautious,  especially 
in  what  respects  the  Executive  Magistrate.  With  the 
present,  I  grant,  every  power  may  be  safely  lodged. 

*  *  *  May  not  a  man  with  a  Pandora's  box  in  his 
breast  come  into  power  and  give  us  sensible  cause  to 
lament  our  present  confidence  and  want  of  foresight? 

*  *  *  I  think  this  power  too  great  to  be  safely 
trusted  in  the  hands  of  a  single  man,  especially  in  the 
hands  of  a  man  who  has  so  much  constitutional  power. 

*  *  *  I  cannot  agree  to  extend  this  power,  because 
I  conceive  it  may  at  some  future  period  be  exercised 
in  such  a  way  as  to  subvert  the  liberties  of  my  country. 

*  *  *  If  the  President  has  the  power  of  removing 
all  officers  who  may  be  virtuous  enough  to  oppose  his 
base  measures,  what  would  become  of  the  liberties  of 
our  fellow-citizens?     *     *     * 

"I  differ  with  gentlemen  who  say  that  the  Senate 
have  no  part  of  the  executive  power,  or  that  the  Presi- 
dent has  no  part  of  the  legislative  authority.  I  con- 
sider them  as  checks  upon  each  other,  to  prevent  the 
abuse  of  either.  And  it  is  in  this  way  the  liberties  of 
the  people  are  secured.  I  appeal  for  the  truth  of  this 
sentiment  to  the  writings  of  Puhlius.  f 

"  I  call  upon  gentlemen  once  more  to  *  *  *  prove 
to  me  that  it  was  not  the  intention  of  this  Constitu- 
tion to  blend  the  executive  and  legislative  powers.  If 
these  are  the  principles  of  the  Constitution,  why  will 

*  Compare  with  Mr.  Vining's  remarks,  page  121,  Also  see  the  ad- 
mirable Swedish  civil  service  regulations  of  the  present  day,  page  186, 
The  contrast  between  Sweden  in  1789  and  1888  is  remarkable. 

I  Alexander  Hamilton, 


gentlenleli  contend  for  the  independency  of  each  bf^ttch 
of  the  government?" 

John  Page  of  Virginia  said  (pp.  490-1,  519-20,  561, 
552)  :  "  I  venture  to  assert  that  this  clause  of  the  bill 
contains  in  it  the  seeds  of  royal  prerogative.  If  gen- 
tlemen lay  such  stress  on  the  energy  of  the  government, 
I  beg  them  to  consider  how  far  this  doctrine  may  go. 
Everything  which  has  been  said  in  favor  of  energy  in 
the  Executive,  may  go  to  the  destruction  of  freedom, 
and  establish  despotism.  This  very  energy,  so  much 
talked  of,  has  led  many  patriots  to  the  Bastile,  to  the 
block,  and  to  the  halter.  If  the  Chief  Magistrate  can 
take  a  man  away  from  the  head  of  a  department  with- 
out assigning  any  reason,  he  may  as  well  be  invested 
with  power,  on  certain  occasions,  to  take  away  his  ex- 
istence. But  will  you  contend  that  this  idea  is  con- 
sonant with  the  principles  of  a  free  government,  where 
no  man  ought  to  be  condemned  unheard,  nor  till  after 
a  solemn  conviction  of  guilt,  on  a  fair  and  impartial 
trial  ?  *  *  *  If  gentlemen  had  been  content  to  say 
that  the  President  might  suspend,  I  should  second  the 
motion,  and  afterward  the  officer  might  be  removed  by 
and  with  the  advice  and  consent  of  the  Senate. 

"  The  framers  of  the  government  had  confidence  in 
the  Senate,  or  they  would  not  have  combined  them 
with  the  Executive  in  the  performance  of  his  duties. 
*  *  *  Some  ixentlemen  contend  that  the  Senate  are 
a  dangerous  and  aristocratic  body.  But  I  contend  that 
they  are  a  safe  and  salutary  branch  of  the  government, 
representing  the  republican  Legislatures  of  the  individ- 
ual States,  and  intended  to  preserve  the  sovereignty  and 
independence  of  the  State  governments,  which  they  are 
more  likely  to  do  than  the  President,  who  is  elected  by 
the  people  at  large.  A  popular  President,  influenced 
bjr  the  sentiments  of  his  electors,  may  be  induced  tp 
9 


146         fotfRJ'otri  CHECKS  on  *he  ^REgit>iii^:^. 

believe  that  it  would  be  best  for  the  general  interest 
that  those  governments  were  destroyed.  But  as  long 
as  we  have  that  body  independent  of  him,  and  secured 
in  their  aulhority,  we  may  defy  such  impotent  attempts. 
They  wiH  watch  his  conduct  and  prevent  the  exercise 
ol  despotic  power.  But  if  they  are  weakened  and  strip- 
ped of  their  essential  authority,  they  will  become  weak 
barriers  against  the  strides  of  an  uncontrolled  power. 
If  you  take  from  them  their  right  to  check  the  Presi- 
dent in  the  removal  of  officers,  they  cannot  prevent  the 
dismission  of  a  faithful  servant  who  has  opposed  the 
arbitrary  mandates  of  an  ambitious  President.  The 
principles  laid  down  in  the  Constitution  clearly  evince 
that  the  Senate  ought  not  only  to  have  a  voice  in  the 
framing  of  laws,  but  ought  also  to  see  to  their  execu- 
tion. *  *  *  I  myself  shall  never  be  satisfied  unless 
I  see  fourfold  checks  upon  the  President.  It  (the  clause 
in  the  bill)  will  inevitably  lead  to  the  establishment  of 
those  odious  prerogatives  which  we,  by  an  arduous  con- 
flict, have  been  endeavoring  to  get  rid  of. 

"  Indecision,  delay,  blunders — nay,  villainous  actions 
iti  the  administration  of  government — are  trifles  com- 
pared to  legalizing  the  full  exertion  of  a  tyrannical 
despotism.  Good  God  I  What !  authorize  in  a  free 
republic,  by  law  too,  by  your  first  act,  the  exertion 
of  a  dangerous  royal  prerogative  in  your  Chief  Magis- 
trate I  What !  where  honor  and  virtue  ought  to  be 
the  support  of  your  government,  will  you  infuse  and 
clierish  meanness  and  servility  in  your  citizens,  and  in- 
solence and  arbitrary  power  in  your  Chief  Magistrate, 
when  you  know  that  thousands  of  virtuous  citizens  are 
dissatisfied  with  your  government  because  they  think 
they  see  the  seeds  of  monarchy  in  it  ?  And  two  whole 
States  have  refused  to  unite  with  you  because  they 
tbink  your  government  dangerous  to  their  liberties  J 


'»  A   MONSTROUS   DOCTRINE.  ''  14*7 

Will  you  openly,  before  their  faces,  in  a  solemn  act  of 
Congress,  insert  words  which  fully  justify  their  opin- 
ions and  fears  ?     *     *     * 

"  It  is  said  the  officers  ought  to  he  commissioned 
durante  bene  placito^  et  ne  dure  se  bene  gesserint*  a 
monstrous  doctrine.  As  to  inferior  officers,  who,  w^e 
are  told,  must  also  be  impeached,  Congress  have  a  con- 
stitutional right  to  empower  the  President  to  appoint, 
and,  I  suppose,  to  remove  also  ;  not  that  the  power  nec- 
essarily follows  appointments." 

Roger  Sherman  of  Connecticut  said  (pp.  491,  492, 
638,  576)  :  "It  is  a  general  principle  in  law  as  well  as 
reason  that  there  shall  be  the  same  authority  to  remove 
as  to  establish  *  *  *  unless  there  are  express  ex- 
ceptions made.  *  *  *  It  is  so  in  legislation,  where 
the  several  branches  whose  concurrence  is  necessary  to 
pass  a  law,  must  concur  in  repealing  it.  Just  so  I  take 
it  to  be  in  cases  of  appointment  ;  and  the  President  alone 
may  remove  when  he  alone  appoints,  as  in  the  case  of 
inferior  officers  to  be  established  by  law.  *  *  *  I 
have  not  heard  any  gentleman  2)roduce  an  authority 
from  law  or  history  which  proves  that  where  two 
branches  are  interested  in  the  appointment,  one  of  them 
has  the  power  of  removal.  I  remember  that  the  gen- 
tleman from  Massachusetts  (Mr.  Sedgwick)  told  us  that 
the  two  Houses,  notwithstanding  the  partial  negative 
of  the  President,  possessed  the  whole  legislative  powei". 
But  will  the  gentleman  infer  from  that  that  because 
the  concurrence  of  both  branches  is  necessary  to  pass 
a  law,  a  less  authority  can  repeal  it?  This  is  all  we 
contend  for. 

"If  gentlemen  would  consent  to  make  a  general  law 
declaring  the  proper  mode  of  removal,  I  think  we  should 
acquire  a  greater  degree  of  unanimity,  whi(;h.  on  this 
*  During  good  pleasure,  and  not  during  good  behavior. 


iU        »« A  JIjrDaMfiNT  ON  THE  MBSITS  Ol'  MEN.  ^< 

occasion,  must  be  bettel*  than  cafryin^  the  question 
against  a  large  minority." 

Michael  Jenifer  Stone  of  Maryland  said  (pp.  493, 
495,  564,  566,  567,  568,  669)  :  "  If  the  Constitution  had 
given  no  rule  by  which  officers  were  to  be  appointed, 
I  should  search  for  one  in  my  own  mind.  But  as  the 
Constitution  has  laid  down  the  rule,  I  consider  the  mode 
of  removal  as  clearly  defined  as  by  implication  it  can 
be.  It  ought  to  be  the  same  as  that  of  the  appointment. 
What  quality  of  the  human  mind  is  necessary  for  the 
one  that  is  not  necessary  for  the  other  ?  Information, 
impartiality,  and  judgment  in  the  business  to  be  con- 
ducted are  necessary  to  make  a  good  appointment.  Are 
not  the  same  properties  necessary  for  a  dismission  ? 

"  I  cannot  subscribe  to  the  opinion  that  the  executive, 
in  its  nature,  implies  the  power  to  appoint  the  officers 
of  government.  Why  does  it  imply  it  ?  The  appoint- 
ment of  officers  depends  upon  the  qualities  that  are  nec- 
essary for  forming  a  judgment  on  the  merits  of  men  ;* 
and  the  displacing  of  them,  instead  of  including  the 
idea  of  what  is  necessary  for  an  executive  officer,  in- 
cludes the  idea  necessary  for  a  judicial  one.  Therefore 
it  cannot  exist,  in  the  nature  of  things,  that  an  execu- 
tive power  is  either  to  appoint  or  displace  the  officers 
of  government.  Is  it  a  political  dogma  ?  Is  it  founded 
in  experience  ?  If  it  is,  I  confess  it  has  been  very  long 
wrapped  up  in  mysterious  darkness.  *  *  *  It  is 
very  forcible  to  my  mind  that  the  Constitution  has  con- 
fined his  (the  President's)  sole  appointment  to  the  case 
of  inferior  officers.     *     *     * 

"Now  I  would  ask,  in  all  cases  where  the  integrity 

*  Mr.  Stone  cut  very  close  to  the  civil  service  law,  for  the  examiners, 
by  the  aid  of  competitive  examinations,  form  "  a  judgment  on  the  merits 
of  men."  The  law  is  the  fulfillment  of  his  prophecy,  namely,  "  I  believe 
the  people  can  apply  a  remedy,"  &c.  (p.  149). 


BALANCE  BETWEEN  PRESIDENT  AND   SENATE.        149 

and  confidence  is  the  same,  whether  it  is  more  likely 
that  one  man  should  do  right  and  exercise  his  power 
with  propriety  than  a  number  of  men  with  the  aid  of 
each  other's  deliberations?  Is  it  more  likely  that  a 
number  of  men  should  do  wrong  than  one  man  ?  *  *  * 
It  would  be  more  difficult  for  a  majority  to  be  obtained 
in  a  body  composed  of  members  of  thirteen  independ- 
ent States  in  favor  of  despotic  measures  than  might 
justly  be  expected  from  the  caprice  or  want  of  judg- 
ment in  a  single  individual.  Is  it  likely  the  danger 
would  be  so  great?     I  apprehend  it  is  not.    *    *    * 

"  If  the  evils  we  apprehend  should  absolutely  arise 
from  our  determination,  I  do  not  conceive,  with  some 
other  gentlemen,  that  we  are  inevitably  ruined.  I  be- 
lieve the  people  can  apply  a  remedy  ;  and  I  have  no 
doubt  but  they  have  sense  and  resolution  enough  for 
th.it  purpose.     *     *     * 

"  I  suppose  it  is  necessary  to  keep  up  the  balance  be- 
tween the  Executive  Magistrate  and  the  Senate.  What 
is  this  balance?  It  is  laid  down  in  the  Constitution 
that  the  President  shall  nominate  and  the  Senate  ap- 
prove. We  are  bound  then  to  carry  this  balance 
throughout  all  the  subjects  to  which  it  relates.  If  the 
President  has  the  solo  power  of  removal,  you  destroy 
the  power  of  the  Senate.  And  though  you  do  not  ex- 
pressly put  tiie  power  of  appointment  in  the  President 
alone,  yet  you  put  it  there  effectively,  because  he  may 
defeat,  by  removal,  the  joint  appointment.  Will  this 
be  giving  the  proper  balance  which  the  Constitution 
directs?     No.     It  will  be  directly  the  reverse. 

"  If  all  executive  power  is  vested  in  the  President, 
what  right  has  this  House  to  prescribe  him  rules  to  in- 
terfere in  forming  executive  officers  ?  The  Executive 
can  better  form  them  for  itself.     *     *     * 

"  If  I  look  to  the  constitution  or  nature  of  things,  I 


150  AN   APPOINTMENT   AN   IMPLIED   CONTRACT. 

should  be  led  to  conclude  tbat  the  body  choosing  agi-nts 
has  the  power  of  dismissing  them,  because  the  power 
naturally  lodges  in  those  who  have  the  interest  and 
management  of  the  concern.  The  executive  business 
of  this  officer  is  under  the  superintendence  and  man- 
agement of  the  Senate  as  well  as  the  President.  Trea- 
ties with  foreign  nations  must  be  conducted  by  the 
advice  of  the  Senate,  and  concluded  with  their  consent. 
Hence  results  a  necessity  in  that  body  having  a  concern 
in  the  choice  and  dismissal  of  the  Secretary  of  Foreign. 
Affairs.  I  do  not  see  any  other  sure  or  safe  bottom 
on  which  the  question  can  be  determined. 

"  In  the  nature  of  things,  in  all  appointments,  there 
is  an  implied  contract ;  on  the  part  of  the  officer  that 
he  will  perform  the  service,  and  on  the  part  of  those 
who  appoint  him  that  he  shall  have  an  adequate  re- 
ward. In  the  engagement  of  the  officer,  qualities  com- 
mensurate with  the  duties  are  required.  In  the  reward, 
the  dignity  of  the  station  and  the  qualities  of  the  of- 
ficer ought  to  be  estimated.  And  although  in  this  en- 
gagement an  officer  may  dispense  of  certain  forms  of 
trial,  yet  he  can  never  surrender  a  natural  right — he 
cannot  engage  to  be  punished  without  being  guilty,  or 
dismissed  without  being  useless.  It  has  been  well  ob- 
served that  the  appointment  ought  to  cease  when  the 
causes  of  it  no  longer  exist.  But  it  is  equally  clear 
that  it  ought  to  continue  as  long  as  the  reasons  re- 
main. And  although  in  public  and  private  life  it  may 
be  proper  to  discharge  an  agent  without  divulging  the 
reason,  yet  clearly  a  good  reason  ought  to  precede  the 
dismission,  because  otherwise  you  do  an  act  of  injus- 
tice by  a  breach  of  contract.     *     *     * 

"It  has  been  judged  by  some  gentlemen  a  dreadful 
affair  that  the  President  should  become  a  party  before, 
the  Senate.     It  would  degrade  his  dignity.     It  was  said 


LIBEETY   EXALTS   THE   HUMAN   SPECIES.  151 

the  judiciary  would  be  pleased  if  this  weighty  question 
could  be  taken  off  their  hands.  To  what  a  hight  do 
gentlemen  exalt  that  character  in  their  own  minds ! 
How  far  above  the  level  of  the  people,  when  they  con- 
sider  it  derogatory  to  his  dignity  to  institute  an  exam- 
ination into  the  conduct  of  an  officer  next  to  himself  in 
rank !  when  they  consider  it  almost  above  human  na- 
ture to  determine  a  question  of  right  between  the  Presi- 
dent and  a  great  officer  of  the  United  States.  If  gen- 
tlemen have  an  idea  that  this  character  is  to  have  such 
a  degree  of  elevation  above  the  community,  it  is  time 
to  tbink  of  restraining  bis  power.*  On  what  does  power 
depend  ?  Not  on  the  strength  of  arm,  but  opinion.  If 
gentlemen  will  exalt  a  character  above  themselves,  call 
him  what  you  will,  he  will  be  possessed  of  monarchy.  j{ 

"  We  have  expended  our  treasure,  our  blood,  and  our 
time  to  very  little  purpose  if  we  do  not  think  that  lib- 
erty and  safety  exalt  the  human  species.  From  the 
meanest  to  the  highest  rank  in  life,  the  propriety  of 
conduct  arises  from  the  security  and  independence  of 
situation.     *     *     * 

"  If  a  man  is  a  candidate  for  an  office  held  by  the 
tenure  of  will  and  pleasure,  he  must  examine  his  soul 
and  see  if  there  are  qualities  in  him  to  enable  him  to 
cringe  and  submit  to  the  arbitrary  mandate  of  the  Pres- 
ident. If  he  finds  these  qualities  in  his  disposition,  he 
is  suited  for  the  business.  But  if  the  Constitution  is 
to  be  justly  administered,  and  he  finds  himself  disposed 


*  Mr.  Stone,  so  far  as  I  know,  is  the  first  American  to  make  this  sug- 
gestion. It  is  fitting  that  the  author  of  such  a  clear,  profound,  and  pro- 
phetic argument  should  have  this  honor.  A  worthy  President  is  entitled 
to  the  support,  good-will,  and  even  love  of  the  people,  but  he  is  no  better 
as  a  man  than  any  other  worthy  citizen.  Further,  respectful  criticism 
of  the  President's  official  acts  is  always  in  order,  even  by  officeholders, 
Intelligent  criticism  is  often  useful. 


152  PROPOSED   CONSTITUTIONAL   AMENDMENTS. 

to  sacrifice  to  the  pleasure  of  the  Chief  Magistrate, 
although  he  possesses  qualities  which  suited  him  for 
his  employment,  yet  he  is  unfit  for  the  ofiice." 

Thomas  Tudor  Tucker  of  South  Carolina  said  (pp. 
584,  585)  :  "  I  am  embarrassed  on  this  question,  as  the 
yeas  and  nays  are  called,  because  the  vote  is  taken  in 
such  a  manner  as  not  to  express  the  principles  upon 
which  I  vote.  In  the  Committee  of  the  Whole  I  voted 
for  striking  out  the  words  that  are  now  proposed  to 
be  struck  out,  and  my  reason  was  I  was  doubtful 
whether  it  was  proper  to  vest,  on  this  occasion,  the 
power  in  the  President  alone.  It  appears  to  me  that 
the  power  is  not  necessarily  vested  in  the  President  by 
the  Constitution  ;  neither  in  the  President  and  Senate. 
I  find  no  words  that  fix  this  power  precisely  in  any 
branch  of  the  government.  It  must,  however,  by  im- 
plication be  in  the  Legislature,  or  it  is  nowhere  until 
the  Constitution  is  amended.  *  *  *  I  apprehend  a 
law  is  necessary  in  every  instance  to  determine  the  ex- 
ercise of  the  power.  In  some  cases  it  may  be  proper 
that  the  President  alone  should  have  it.  I  am  not  clear 
in  my  own  mind  what  general  rule,  if  any,  can  be 
established  on  this  subject.  Perhaps  in  other  cases  it 
may  be  lodged  with  the  President  and  Senate  ;  or  it 
may  be  given  to  the  heads  of  departments.  But  who- 
soever is  invested  with  it,  it  must  be  in  consequence 
of  a  lav/  ;  and  the  Legislature  have  a  right  to  vest  it 
where  they  please." 

Mr.  Tucker  closed  his  speech  by  saying,  among  other 
things,  that  perhaps  it  would  be  out  of  order  to  change 
the  word  remove  to  suspend.  * 

*  Mr.  Tucker,  some  weeks  after  the  close  of  the  debate,  moved  the 
consideration  of  numerous  amendments  to  the  Constitution,  among  them 
the  following  (p.  702):  '*  Art.  ii,  Sec.  4,  clause  3.  At  the  end  add  these 
words:  He  shall  also  have  power  to  suspend  from  his  office,  for  a  time 


JOHN   ADAMS'S  MISTA]£E  (NOTE).  153 

Thomas  Sumter  of  South  Carolina  said  (p.  591)  : 
"  This  bill  appears  to  my  mind  so  subversive  of  the 
Constitution,  and  in  its  consequences  so  destructive  to 
the  liberties  of  the  people,  that  I  cannot  consent  to  let  it 
pass  without  expressing  my  detestation  of  the  principle 
it  contains.  I  do  it  in  this  public  manner  in  order  to 
fulfill  what  I  think  to  be  my  duty  to  my  country,  and 
to  discharge  myself  of  any  concern  in  a  matter  that  I 
do  not  approve." 

The  bill  passed  the  House  by  a  vote  of  29  to  22,  and 
went  to  the  Senate  on  the  14th  of  July.  As  before 
said,  the  words  "  to  be  removable  by  the  President," 
had  been  amended  to  read  :  "  whenever  the  said  prin- 
cipal officer  shall  be  removed  from  office  hy  the  Presi- 
dent of  the  United  States,  the  chief  clerk  shall,  during 
the  vacancy,  have  charge  and  custody,"  &c.  It  was 
moved  to  strike  out  the  italicized  words.  The  debate 
lasted  nearly  four  days,  only  one  day  less  than  that  in 
the  House.  The  vote  was  a  tie  (9  to  9),  but  as  Vice- 
President  Adams  f  voted  in  the  negative,  the  words 
stood.      The    Senate's    action    vas  disinterested  if  not 

not  exceeding  twelve  months,  any  officer  whom  he  shall  have  reason  to 
think  unfit  to  be  intrusted  with  the  duties  thereof;  and  Congress  may 
by  law  provide  for  the  absolute  removal  of  officers  found  to  be  unfit  for 
the  trust  reposed  in  them." 

Also  the  following  :  *'  Art,  i,  Sec.  6,  clause  2.  Amend  to  read  thus  : 
No  person  having  been  elected,  and  having  taken  his  seat  as  a  Senator 
or  Representative,  shall,  during  the  time  for  which  he  was  elected,  be 
appointed  to  any  civil  office  under  the  authority  of  the  United  States." 

*  The  world  owes  Mr.  Sumter  more  than  is  apparent  in  the  above 
remarks.  Twice  during  the  five  days'  debate  he  appealed  to  the  House 
to  postpone  calling  the  yeas  and  nays  in  order  to  give  the  subject  a 
full  and  free  discussion. 

f  Senator  George  F,  Edmunds  says  (Supplement  to  Congressional 
Globe,  1868,  p.  425):  "Mr,  Adams  *  *  *  was  strongly  opposed 
to  the  provision  of  the  Constitution  requiring  the  Senate  to  confirm  any 
appointment." 


154  SIMPtE  AKD  COMPOUND  POWEESj 

patriotic,  for  it  delegated  a  power  to  the  President 
which  by  implication  at  least  belonged  to  itself  and 
the  President.  The  Senate  sat  with  closed  doors  from 
1789  till  1795,  "with  a  single  exception,  through  all  leg- 
islative as  well  as  executive  transactions."  But  Vice- 
President  Adams  kept  notes  for  at  least  one  day  (July 
15),  and  it  is  to  him  that  the  world  is  indebted  for  the 
following  glimpse  of  what  must  have  been  a  very  in- 
structive debate  ("  Works  of  John  Adams,"  vol.  iii, 
pp.  408  to  412). 

NOTES    OF    ONE    DAY'S    DEBATE    IN    THE    SENATE. 

Charles  Carroll  of  Maryland  :  "  The  executive  power 
is  commensurate  with  the  legislative  and  judicial  pow- 
ers. 

*'  The  rule  of  construction  of  treaties,  statutes,  and 
deeds. 

"  The  same  power  which  creates  must  annihilate. 
This  is  true  where  the  power  is  simple,  but  when  com- 
pound, not. 

"If  a  Minister  is  suspected  to  betray  secrets  to  an 
enemy,  the  Senate  not  sitting,  cannot  the  President  dis- 
place nor  suspend  ? 

"  The  States  General  of  France  demanded  that  offices 
should  be  during  good  behavior. 

"It  is  improbable  that  a  bad  President  should  be 
chosen  ;   but  may  not  bad  Senators  be  chosen  ? 

"  Is  there  a  due  balance  of  power  between  the  exec- 
utive and  legislative,  either  in  the  general  government 
or  State  governments? 

'^  3fontesquieu.  English  liberty  will  be  lost  when  the 
legislative  shall  be  more  corrupt  than  the  executive. 
Have  we  not  been  witnesses  of  corrupt  acts  of  Legis- 
latures, making  depredations?     Rhode  Island  yet  per- 


EQUILIBRIUM  OF  CONSTITUTIONAL  POWER.  155 

Oliver  Ellsworth  of  Connecticut :  "  We  are  sworn  to 
support  the  Constitution. 

"  There  is  an  explicit  grant  of  power  to  the  President 
which  contains  the  power  of  removal.  The  executive 
power  is  granted  ;  not  the  executive  powers  hereinafter 
enumerated  and  explained. 

"  The  President,  not  the  Senate,  appoints  ;  they  only- 
consent  and  advise. 

"  The  Senate  is  not  an  executive  council ;  has  no 
executive  power. 

"The  grant  to  the  President  express,  not  by  impli- 
cation." 

Pierce  Butler  of  South  Carolina  :  "  This  power  of  re- 
moval would  be  unhinging  the  equilibrium  of  power  in 
the  Constitution. 

"  The  Stadiholder  withheld  the  fleet  from  going  out, 
to  the  annoyance  of  the  enemies  of  the  nation. 

"  In  treaties,  all  powers  not  expressly  given,  are  re- 
served. Treaties  to  be  gone  over,  clause  by  clause,  by 
the  President  and  Senate  together,  and  modeled. 

"  The  other  branches  are  imbecile  ;  disgust  and 
alarm  ;  the  President  not  sovereign  ;  the  United  States 
sovereign,  o/  people  or  Congress  sovereign. 

"  The  House  of  Representatives  would  not  be  in- 
duced to  depart,  so  well  satisfied  of  the  grounds." 

Senator  Ellsworth  again  :  "  The  powers  of  this  Con- 
stitution are  all  vested  ;  parted  from  the  people,  from 
the  States,  and  vested,  not  in  Congress,  but  in  the 
President. 

"  The  word  sovereignty  is  introduced  without  deter- 
minate ideas.  Power  in  the  last  resort.  In  this  sense 
the  sovereign  executive  is  in  the  President. 

"  The  United  States  will  be  parties  to  a  thousand 
suits.  Shall  process  issue  in  their  name  versus  or  for 
themselves? 


l56  I^UE  MfiSiDENi?  iJOf  ABOVE  *flE  LAW. 

"  The  President,  it  is  said,  may  be  put  to  jail  for 
debt." 

Richard  Henry  Lee  of  Virginia :  "  United  States 
merely  figurative,  meaning  the  people." 

William  Grayson  of  Virginia :  "  The  President  is 
not  above  the  law  ;  an  absurdity  to  admit  this  idea 
into  our  government.  Not  improbable  that  the  Presi- 
dent may  be  sued.  Christina  II  of  Sweden  committed 
murder.  France  excused  her.  The  jurors  of  our  lord, 
the  President,  present  that  the  President  committed 
murder.  A  monarchy  by  a  side  wind.  You  make  him 
vindex  injuriarum.^  The  people  will  not  like  *  the  ju- 
rors of  our  lord,  the  President,'  nor  *  the  peace  of  our 
lord,  the  President,'  nor  his  dignity  ;  his  crown  will 
be  left  out.  Do  not  wish  to  make  the  Constitution  a 
more  unnatural,  monstrous  production  than  it  is.  The 
British  Court  is  a  three-legged  stool ;  if  one  leg  is 
longer  than  another,  the  stool  will  not  stand. 

"  Unpalatable  ;  the  removal  of  officers  not  palatable. 
We  should  not  risk  anything  for  nothing.  Come  for- 
ward like  men,  and  reason  openly,  and  the  people  will 
bear  more  quietly  than  if  you  attempt  side  winds. 
This  measure  will  do  no  good,  and  will  disgust." 

Senator  R.  H.  Lee  again  :  "  The  danger  to  liberty 
greater  from  the  disunited  opinions  and  jarring  plans 
of  many  than  from  the  energetic  operations  of  one. 
Marius,  Sylja,  Caesar,  Cromwell  trampled  on  liberty 
with  armies. 

"  The  power  of  pardon  ;  of  adjourning  the  Legisla- 
ture. 

"  Power  of  revision  sufficient  to  defend  himself.  He 
would  be  supported  by  the  people. 

"  Patronage  gives  great  influence.  The  interference 
more  nominal  than  real. 

*  All  avenger  of  injury. 


li^GLlSfl  LififitiTY  OWING  TO  JURIES.  157 

"  The  greater  part  of  power  of  making  treaties  in  the 
President. 

"  The  greatest  power  is  in  the  President ;  the  less 
in  the  Senate. 

"  Cannot  see  responsibility  in  the  President  or  the 
great  oflScers  of  state. 

"  A  masked  battery  of  constructive  powers  would 
complete  the  destruction  of  liberty. 

"  Can  the  Executive  lay  embargoes,  establish  fairs 
(sic),  tolls,  &c. 

"  The  Federal  government  is  limited  ;  the  legislative 
power  of  it  is  limited  ;  and  therefore  the  executive  and 
judicial  must  be  limited. 

"  The  Executive  not  punishable  but  by  universal  con- 
vulsion, as  Charles  I. 

**The  legislative  in  England  not  so  corrupt  as  the 
executive. 

"  There  is  no  responsibility  in  the  President  or  min- 
istry. 

^^  Blackstone.  The  liberties  of  England  owing  to 
juries.  The  greatness  of  England  owing  to  the  genius 
of  that  people. 

"  The  Crown  of  England  can  do  what  it  pleases, 
nearly. 

"  There  is  no  balance  in  America  to  such  an  Exec- 
utive as  that  in  England. 

*'  Does  the  executive  arm  mean  a  standing  array  ? 

"Willing  to  make  a  law  that  the  President,  if  he 
sees  gross  misconduct,  may  suspend  pro  tempore.^"* 

William  Paterson  of  New  Jersey  :  "  Laments  that 
we  are  obliged  to  discuss  this  question  ;  of  great  im- 
portance and  much  difficulty. 

"  The  executive  coextensive  with  the  legislative.  Had 
the  clause  stood  alone,  would  not  there  have  been  a  dev- 
olution of  all  executive  power  ? 

I* 


1^8  No   t»OWERS   WltSOtJT  PEOPEB  SAtANCE^. 

"  Exceptions  are  to  be  construed  strictly.  This  is  an 
invariable  rule." 

Senator  Grayson  again  :  "  The  President  has  not  a 
continental  interest,  but  is  a  citizen  of  a  particular  State. 
A  K.  of  E.  otherwise  ;  K.  of  E.  counteracted  by  a  large, 
powerful,  rich,  and  hereditary  aristocracy.  Hyperion 
to  a  satyr. 

"  Where  there  are  not  intermediate  powers,  an  alter- 
ation of  the  government  must  be  to  despotism. 

*'  Powers  ought  not  to  be  inconsiderately  given  to 
the  Executive  without  proper  balances. 

"Triennial  and  septennial  Parliaments  made  by  cor- 
ruption of  the  Executive. 

"  Bowstring.  *  General  Lally.  f  Brutus's  power  to 
put  his  sons  to  death. 

"  The  power  creating  shall  have  that  of  uncreating. 
The  Minister  is  to  hold  at  pleasure  of  the  appointer. 

"  If  it  is  in  the  Constitution,  why  insert  it  in  the 
law  ?     Brought  in  by  a  side  wind,  inferentially. 

"  There  will  be  every  endeavor  to  increase  the  consol- 
idatory  powers  ;  to  weaken  the  Senate  and  strengthen 
the  President. 

"  No  evil  in  the  Senate  participating  with  the  Presi- 
dent in  removal." 

George  Read  of  Delaware  :  "  The  President  is  to 
take  care  that  the  laws  be  faithfully  executed.  He  is 
responsible.  How  can  he  do  his  duty  or  be  responsible, 
if  he  cannot  remove  his  instruments  ? 

"  It  is  not  an  equal  sharing  of  the  power  of  appoint- 

*  A  Turkish  instrument  of  death. 

f  Thomas  A.  Lally,  a  French  soldier,  who  distinguished  himself  in 
1757-58  by  making  a  plucky  but  unsuccessful  expedition  against  Eng- 
land's East  Indian  possessions,  was  born  in  Romans,  Dauphiny,  in  1702 
and  beheaded  in  Paiis  in  1766.  Through  the  efforts  of  his  son,  the 
trial  was  revised  and  the  sentence  finally  reversed  in  1 778. 


A   QUESTION   OP  EXPEDIenCT.  159 

Inent  between  the  President  and  Senate.  The  Senate 
are  only  a  check  to  prevent  impositions  on  the  Presi- 
dent. 

"  The  Minister  an  agent,  a  deputy  to  the  great  Ex- 
ecutive. 

"  Difficult  to  bring  great  characters  to  punishment 
or  trial. 

"  Power  of  suspension." 

William  S.  Johnson  of  Connecticut ;  "  Gentlemen 
convince  themselves  that  it  is  best  the  President  should 
have  the  power,  and  then  study  for  arguments. 

"  Exceptions.  Not  a  grant.  Vested  in  the  Presi- 
dent would  be  void  for  uncertainty.  Executive  power 
is  uncertain.  Powers  are  moral,  mechanical,  material. 
Which  of  these  powers  ?  What  executive  power  ?  The 
land  ;  the  money  ;  conveys  nothing.  What  land  ?  what 
money  ? 

"  Unumquodque  dissolvitur  eodem  modo  quo  ligatur.* 

"  Meddles  not  with  the  question  of  expediency. 

"  The  executive  wants  power  by  its  duration  and  its 
want  of  a  negative,  and  power  to  balance.     Federalist 

Senator  Ellsworth  asked  :  "  What  is  the  difference 
between  a  grant  and  a  partition?" 

Ralph  Izard  of  South  Carolina  :  "  Cujus  est  insti- 
tuere,  ejus  est  abrogare."t 


Senator  Thomas  H.  Benton  of  Missouri,  in  the  report 
of  the  Select  Committee  on  amending  the  Constitution 
of  the  United  States,  made  on  March  1,  1826,  in  speak- 
ing of  the  construction  put  upon  the  Constitution  by 
the  first  Congress,  says  it  yielded  to  the  President  "  the 
kingly   prerogative  of  dismissing  officers  without   the 

*  A  thing  is  loosed  by  the  same  means  by  which  it  is  bound. 

\  He  who  has  the  power  to  institute,  has  also  the  power  to  abrogate. 


ieO       THfi  J'OCTE-lf Ears'   TENtSE   OF   OFFICE   LaW. 

formality  of  a  trial."     (Appendix  to  Gales  &  Seaton^a 
"Debates,"  1826,  vol.  ii,  pt.  ii,  p.  132.) 

Daniel  Webster,  in  a  speech  in  the  Senate,  in  1835, 
on  "The  Appointing  and  Removing  Power,"  said  (Ev- 
erett's Webster,  iv,  184,  185,  196):  "I  do  not  mean 
to  deny,  and  the  bill  does  not  deny,  that  the  President 
may  remove  officers  at  will,  because  the  early  decision 
adopted  that  construction,  and  the  laws  have  since  uni- 
formly sanctioned  it.     The  law  of  1820,*  intended  to 

*  The  four-years'  tenure  of  office  law,  the  first  section  of  which  (prac- 
tically the  whole  law)  is  as  follows : 

"  That  from  and  after  the  passage  of  this  act  all  district  attorneys, 
collectors  of  customs,  naval  officers,  and  surveyors  of  the  customs,  navy 
agents,  receivers  of  public  moneys  for  lands,  registers  of  the  land  offices, 
paymasters  in  the  army,  the  apothecary  general,  the  assistant  apotheca- 
ries general,  and  the  commissary  general  of  purchases,  to  be  appointed 
under  the  laws  of  the  United  States,  shall  be  appointed  for  the  term  of 
four  years ;  but  shall  be  removable  from  office  at  pleasure." 

In  1836  all  postmasters  drawing  an  annual  salary  of  $1,000  or  more 
were  also  included  in  the  provisions  of  the  four-years'  law. 

Thomas  Jefferson,  writing  to  James  Madison  on  November  29,  1820, 
says  of  this  law  (vii,  190):  "It  saps  the  constitutional  and  salutary 
functions  of  the  President,  and  introduces  a  principle  of  intrigue  and 
corruption  which  will  soon  leaven  the  mass,  not  only  of  Senators, 
but  of  citizens.  It  will  keep  in  constant  excitement  all  the  hungry  cor- 
morants for  office ;  render  them,  as  well  as  those  in  place,  sycophants 
to  their  Senators ;  engage  these  in  eternal  intrigue  to  turn  out  one  and 
put  in  another,  in  cabals  to  swap  work,  and  make  of  them,  what  all  ex- 
ecutive directories  become,  mere  sinks  of  corruption  and  faction." 

In  reply  Mr.  Madison  says :  "  The  law  terminating  appointments  at 
periods  of  four  years  is  pregnant  with  mischiefs.  *  *  *  If  the  error 
be  not  soon  corrected,  the  task  will  be  very  difficult,  for  it  is  of  a  nature 
to  take  a  deep  root." 

John  Quincy  Adams,  who  was  till  about  1805  an  independent  Feder- 
alist, and  afterward  an  independent  Republican,  says  (Morse's  Adams, 
p.  179):  "Efforts  had  been  made  by  some  of  the  Senators  to  obtain 
different  nominations,  and  to  introduce  a  principle  of  change  or  rotation 
in  office  at  the  expiration  of  these  commissions,  which  would  make  the 


ORIGINATED   FOE   CAMPAIGN   PUEPOSES.  161 

be  repealed  by  this  bill,  expressly  affirms  the  power. 
*    *    *    At  the  same  time,  after  considering  the  ques- 

government  a  perpetual  and  unintermitting  scramble  for  office.  A  more 
pernicious  expedient  could  scarcely  have  been  devised  *  *  *  I  de- 
termined to  renominate  every  person  against  whom  there  was  no  com- 
plaint which  would  have  warranted  his  removal." 

Senator  Samuel  L.  Southard  of  Xew  Jersey,  who,  like  Webster  and 
others,  advocated  the  repeal  of  the  law,  says  (G.  &  S.'s  Debates,  1835, 
vol.  xi,  pt.  i,  pp.  421,  422):  "  The  law,  as  it  stood,  placed  every  man 
who  was  not  above  being  bribed  by  office,  in  the  market,  feeling  and 
acting  on  the  principle  that  he  was  to  support  the  man  who  would  keep 
him  in  office.  Pass  the  bill  before  the  Senate  and  the  result  will  be 
far  different.  Each  officeholder  would  be  independent,  and  would  look 
solely  to  a  faithful  discharge  of  his  duty  for  his  continuance  in  office. 
As  the  law  now  stood  *  *  *  each  one  not  inflaenced  by  pure  mo- 
tives, would  say  to  the  Executive :  '  Will  you  retain  me  in  office  if  I 
support  you  ? '  " 

Mr.  George  William  Curtis  says  (Senate  Report  No.  576,  for  1882,  p. 
154):  "  The  law  of  1820  *  *  *  was  introduced  in  the  Senate  by  a 
friend  of  William  H.  Crawford  of  Georgia  [Mahlon  Dickerson],  who  was 
a  presidential  candidate,  and  it  was  introduced,  as  John  Quincy  Adams, 
who  was  then  in  Washington  and  in  the  Cabinet,  specifically  states,  for 
the  purpose  of  helping  Mr.  Crawford  in  his  campaign." 

Mr.  Curtis  further  says,  in  one  of  his  annual  civil  service  addresses  at 
Newport,  R.  I.,  that  the  bill  was  drawn  by  Mr.  Crawford  himself. 

Mr.  Dorman  B.  Eaton  says  ("  The  Term  and  Tenure  of  Office,"  pp. 
24,  28):  "In  that  year  (1820)  William  H.  Crawford,  Secretary  of  the 
Treasury,  was  a  presidential  candidate,  and  Van  Buren,  who  was  to 
come  into  the  Senate  in  1821  (even  then  an  aspirant  for  the  presidency), 
was  Crawford's  supporter.  They  were  unsurpassed  for  their  skillful  use 
of  patronage.  Both  were  able  to  see  that  if  the  terms  of  the  inferior 
officers  were  reduced  to  four  years,  there  would  be  more  patronage  to 
dispose  of.  *  *  *  The  four-years'  law,  for  which  the  only  apology 
was  the  pretended  need  of  bringing  inferior  officers  to  a  more  frequent 
and  strict  account  before  the  people,  was  followed  by  297  defaulting 
collectors,  receivers,  &c,,  reported  by  the  Secretary  of  the  Treasury  to 
the  House  on  March  30,  1838." 

But  while  Mr.  Crawford  was  probably  the  power  behind  the  throne, 
and  while  the  law  may  have  been  intended  by  him  and  a  few  others  for 
campaign  purposes  only,  there  were  probably  but  few  statesmen  of  that 


162  UNSUSPECTING   STATESMEN   ENTRAPPED. 

tion  again  and  again  within  the  last  six  years,  I  am  very- 
willing  to  say  that,  in  my  deliberate  judgment,  the. 
original  decision  was  wrong.  I  cannot  but  think  that 
those  who  denied  the  power  in  1789  had  the  best  of 
the  argument.  *  *  *  I  believe  it  to  be  within  the  just 
power  of  Congress  to  reverse  the  decision  of  1789."  * 

day  who  were  aware  of  the  fact.  A  few  defalcations  set  the  sensitive, 
statesmen  of  1820  to  thinking  about  a  remedy,  and  it  may  be  that 
they  were  all  caught  in  Mr.  Crawford's  four-yeai's'  law  trap.  However 
this  may  be,  the  defalcations  spoken  of  by  Mr.  Eaton  show  that  the  too 
sensitive  statesmen  of  1820  made  a  mistake;  in  fact,  that  they  got  out 
of  the  frying-pan  into  the  fire. 

Daniel  Webster,  in  the  course  of  his  powerful  speech  on  the  appoint- 
ing and  removing  power,  testifies  to  the  conscientiousness  of  some  of 
the  statesmen  of  1820.  He  desired  to  repeal  the  four-years'  law,  but 
he  says :  *'  I  agree  that  it  has  in  some  instances  secured  promptitude, 
diligence,  and  a  sense  of  responsibility.  These  were  the  benefits  which 
those  who  passed  the  law  expected  from  it,  and  these  benefits  have  in 
some  measure  been  realized." 

Senator  David  Barton  of  Missouri  says  (G.  &  S.'s  Debates,  1830,  vol. 
vi,  pt.  i,  pp.  464,  465) :  "  The  legislator  of  1820  naturally  asked  himself 
what  term  and  tenure  of  office  would  attain  the  desired  public  security. 

*  *  *  The  evil  of  the  old  law  was  that,  while  the  government  was 
plodding  through  some  tedious  process  of  law,  *  *  *  the  defaulter 
could  embezzle  our  funds  *  *  *  and  escape  to  Texas,  &c.,  before 
the  process  had  ascertained  whether  there  was  lawful  cause  for  removal 
or  not." 

Representative  Ames,  speaking  in  the  first  Congress  of  the  slow  pro- 
cess of  removal  by  impeachment,  predicted  this  precise  result.  He 
said:  "  While  we  are  preparing  the  process,  the  mischief  will  be  perpe- 
trated, and  the  offender  will  escape." 

*  In  a  speech  at  Worcester,  Mass.,  in  1832,  Mr.  Webster  thus  criti- 
cised President  Jackson's  official  nominations  and  the  patronage  system 
(i,  262) ;  "  Within  the  last  three  years  more  nominations  have  been 
rejected  on  the  ground  of  '  unfitness '  than  in  all  the  preceding  forty 
years  of  the  government.  And  these  nominations,  you  know,  sir,  could 
not  have  been  rejected  but  by  votes  of  the  President's  own  friends. 

*  *  *  In  some  not  a  third  of  the  Senate,  in  others  not  ten  votes,  and 
in  others  not  a  single  vote  could  be  oljtained,     *    *     *    ^H  this,  sir, 


MR.    WEBSTER'S   STATESMAN-LIKE   WORDS.  163 

Henry  Clay  says  (Colton's  "  Speeches  of  H.  Clay," 
ii,  20)  :  "  No  one  can  carefully  examine  the  debate  in 
the  House  of  Representatives  in  1789  without  being 
struck  with  the  superiority  of  the  argument  on  the 
side  of  the  minority,  and  the  unsatisfactory  nature  of 
that  of  the  majority.  How  various  are  the  sources 
whence  the  power  is  derived  !  Scarcely  any  two  of 
the  majority  agree  in  their  deduction  of  it." 

John  C.  Calhoun  says  (ii,  430) :  *'  I  was  struck,  on 
reading  the  debate,  with  the  force  of  the  arguments 
of  those  who  contended  that  the  power  (of  removal) 
was  not  vested  by  the  Constitution  in  the  Executive. 

is  perfectly  natural  and  consistent.  The  same  party  selfishness  which 
drives  good  men  out  of  office  will  push  bad  men  in.  Political  proscrip- 
tion leads  necessarily  to  the  filling  of  offices  with  incompetent  persons, 
and  to  a  consequent  mal-execution  of  official  duties.  And  in  my  opin- 
ion, sir,  this  principle,  *  *  »  unless  the  public  shall  effectually 
rebuke  and  restrain  it,  will  entirely  change  the  character  of  our  govern- 
ment." 

Again,  in  his  speech  on  the  appointing  and  removing  power,  Mr.  Web- 
ster thus  philosophizes  concerning  the  evils  of  patronage  (iv,  180,  183): 
"  The  unlimited  power  to  grant  office  and  to  take  it  away  gives  a  com- 
mand over  the  hopes  and  fears  of  a  vast  multitude  of  men.  It  is  gener- 
ally true  that  he  who  controls  another  man's  means  of  living  controls 
his  will.  Where  there  are  favors  to  be  granted  there  are  usually  enough 
to  solicit  for  them ;  and  when  favors  once  granted  may  be  withdrawn  at 
pleasure,  there  is  ordinarily  little  security  for  personal  independence  of 
character.  The  power  of  giving  office  thus  affects  the  fears  of  all  who 
are  in  and  the  hopes  of  all  who  are  out.  Those  who  are  '  out '  endeavor 
to  distinguish  themselves  by  active  political  friendship,  by  warm  per- 
sonal devotion,  by  clamorous  support  of  men  in  whose  hands  is  the 
power  of  reward;  while  those  who  are  'in'  ordinarily  take  care  that 
others  shall  not  surpass  them  in  such  qualities  or  such  conduct  as  are 
most  likely  to  secure  favor.  They  resolve  not  to  be  outdone  in  any  of 
the  works  of  partisanship.     The  consequence  of  all  this  is  obvious. 

"  Men  in  office  have  begun  to  think  themselves  mere  agents  and  ser- 
vants of  the  appointing  power,  and  not  agents  of  the  government  or  thQ 
pountry." 


164  OPINIONS    OF   CALHOUN   AND   KENT. 

To  me  they  appeared  to  be  far  more  statesman-like 
than  the  opposite  arguments,  and  to  partake  much 
more  of  the  spirit  of  the  Constitution." 

Again,  in  speaking  of  the  powers  of  the  President, 
Mr.  Calhoun  says  (i,  219,  220):  "I  do  not  add  the 
power  of  removing  officers,  the  tenure  of  whose  office 
is  not  fixed  by  the  Constitution,  which  has  grown  into 
practice  ;  because  it  is  not  a  power  vested  in  the  Presi- 
dent by  the  Constitution,  but  belongs  to  the  class  of 
implied  powers,  and,  as  such,  can  only  be  rightfully 
exercised  and  carried  into  effect  by  the  authority  of 
Congress." 

Chancellor  James  Kent,  speaking  of  the  decision  of 
the  Congress  of  1789,  says  ("Commentaries,"  i,  344)  : 
"  This  question  has  never  been  made  the  subject  of 
judicial  discussion  ;  and  the  construction  given  to  the 
Constitution  in  1789  has  continued  to  rest  on  this  loose, 
incidental,  declaratory  opinion  of  Congress,  and  the 
sense  and  practice  of  government  since  that  time.  It 
may  now  be  considered  as  firmly  and  definitively  set- 
tled, and  there  is  good  sense  and  practical  utility  in 
the  construction.  It  is,  however,  a  striking  fact  in  the 
constitutional  history  of  our  government  that  a  power 
so  transcendent  as  that  is,  which  places  at  the  disposal 
of  the  President  alone  the  tenure  of  every  executive 
officer  appointed  by  the  President  and  Senate,  should 
depend  upon  inference  merely,  and  should  have  been 
gratuitously  declared  by  the  first  Congress  in  opposition 
to  that  high  authority  of  the  Federalist,*  and  should 
have  been  supported  or  acquiesced  in  by  some  of  those 
distinguished  men  who  questioned  or  denied  the  power 
of  Congress  even  to  incorporate  a  national  bank." 

Joseph  Story,  LL.D.,  says  ("Exposition  of  the  Con- 
stitution," N.  Y.  Ed.,  1881,  p.   175)  :   "If  we  connect 
*  Alexaniier  Hamilton. 


this  power  of  I'emoVal  *  *  *  With  aiiothef  power, 
which  is  given  in  the  succeeding  clause,  to  fill  up  va- 
cancies in  the  recess  of  the  Senate,  the  chief  guards 
intended  by  the  Constitution  over  the  power  of  appoint- 
ment may  become  utterly  nugatory.  A  President  of 
high  ambition  and  feeble  principles  may  remove  all 
officers,  and  make  new  appointments  in  the  recess  of 
the  Senate  ;  and  if  his  choice  should  not  be  confirmed 
by  the  Senate,  he  may  reappoint  the  same  persons  in 
the  recess,  and  thus  set  at  defiance  the  salutary  check 
of  the  Senate  in  all  such  cases." 

Senator  George  H.  Williams  of  Oregon  says  (Sup- 
plement to  Cong.  Globe,  1868,  p.  458)  :  "  Concerning 
the  decision  of  1789,     *     *     *     j^^  jjj^y  i^q  gj^j^  ^\^r^^  j^ 

was  brought  about  by  the  arguments  of  James  Madison 
in  the  House  and  the  casting  vote  of  Vice-President 
Adams  in  the  Senate,  both  of  whom  at  the  time  ex- 
pected to  fill  the  executive  office,  and  both  of  whom, 
it  has  been  said,  looked  upon  a  contrary  decision  as 
expressing  a  want  of  confidence  in  the  then  adminis- 
tration of  Washington.*  Experience  has  demonstrated 
its  mischievous  and  corrupting  tendencies  and  effects." 

*  The  same  reasons  may  liave  influenced  Thomas  Jefferson  also.  At 
the  request  of  President  Washington  he  wrote  an  "  opinion  whether  the 
Senate  has  a  right  to  negative  the  *  grade '  he  (the  President)  may  think 
it  expedient  to  use  in  a  foreign  mission  as  well  as  the  '  person '  to  be 
appointed,"  in  the  course  of  which  he  said  ("  Works  of  John  Adams," 
iii,  576) :  *'  The  Senate  is  not  supposed  by  the  Constitution  to  be  ac- 
quainted with  the  concerns  of  the  executive  department.  It  was  not 
intended  that  these  should  be  communicated  to  them ;  nor  can  they 
therefore  be  qualified  to  judge  of  the  necessity  which  calls  for  a  mission 
to  any  particular  place,  or  of  the  particular  grade,  more  or  less  marked, 
which  special  and  secret  circumstances  may  call  for.  All  this  is  left  to 
the  President.     They  are  only  to  see  that  no  unfit  person  is  employed." 

The  original  manuscript  of  this  Opinion  was  found  among  President 
Adams's  papers.  As  he  was  Washington's  successor  in  office,  the  latter 
probabl)'  gave  it  to  him  for  reference.    It  is  not  in  Jefferson's  own  works. 


166  fSE   CBITICS   SOMEWHAT   PREJUDICED. 

'Representative  Chilton  Allan  of  Kentucky  says  (G. 
&  S.'s  Debates,  1833-34,  vol.  x,  pt.  iii,  pp.  3354-56): 
"The  first  fatal  error  that  crept  into  our  system  of 
government  was  the  power  conferred  in  1789  upon  the 
President  to  remove  public  officers — a  power  given  to 
the  popularity  of  President  Washington,  and  which  he 
never  abused — a  power  that  remained  harmless  in  the 
statute  book  for  forty  years.  This  power  has  been 
called  up  from  its  long  slumber.  It  has  displayed  its 
character.  *  *  *  The  power  of  removal  for  opinion's 
sake  at  once  saps  the  foundation  of  republican  govern- 
ment and  introduces  the  spirit  of  monarchy.  *  *  * 
This  power  of  removal,  in  its  origin,  was  not  intended 
to  go  further  than  to  the  removal  of  officers  for  whose 
conduct  the  President  is  immediately  responsible.  But 
of  late  the  broad  ground  is  taken  that  he  can  command 
and  remove  those  for  whose  conduct  he  is  not  respon- 
sible." 


The  foregoing  criticisms  of  the  decision  of  the  first 
Congress  express  the  prejudice  rather  than  the  deliber- 
ate judgment  of  the  critics.  President  Jackson's  whole- 
sale removals  created  such  a  profound  impression  on 
the  statesmen  of  his  day,  that  even  Mr.  Webster  ad- 
mitted that  they  may  have  biased  his  judgment.  This 
must  have  been  true,  for  otherwise  how  could  such  a 
statesman  fail  to  commend  the  profound  arguments  of 
the  majority  in  the  great  debate,  some  of  which  experi- 
ence has  proved  to  be  true? 

The  American  people  are  possessed  of  an  inherent  fear 
of  monarchical  power.  But  they  came  by  it  honestly, 
for  it  is  hereditary,  having  been  transmitted  down  from 
the  forefathers.  In  further  proof  of  this  fact,  let  the 
following  extracts  from  the  speeches  and  writings  of 
President   Jackson's    contemporaries   speak  for  them- 


Tflfi   PRESIDENT   TOO   BUSY   FOB  MISCHJEF.  l6^ 

selves.  They  do  not  all  refer  directly  to  the  power  of 
removal,  but,  like  the  preceding  criticisms,  they  show 
the  same  fear  and  dislike  of  monarchical  power  and  the 
same  prejudice  caused  by  President  Jackson's  removals. 
The  speakers  all  feared  and  some  predicted  direful 
future  results.  They  were  greatly  alarmed  at  the  pros- 
pect of  a  corrupt  President.  A  corrupt  President  would 
be  a  calamity.  But  the  President  is  so  beset  as  it  were 
by  constitutional  checks,  the  most  potent  perhaps  being 
the  power  of  impeachment,  that  no  permanent  injury 
need  be  feared  unless  the  people  as  well  as  the  Presi- 
dent become  corrupt.  Besides  the  constitutional  checks, 
the  President  nowadays  is  so  engaged  in  the  transaction 
of  legitimate  business  that  he  has  but  little  time  to  con- 
coct conspiracies.  Further,  political  conspiracies,  com- 
paratively speaking,  are  rare  in  this  country.  They 
are  in  fact  opposed  to  the  genius  of  American  institu- 
tions. But  in  spite  of  all  this,  the  wise  words  of  the 
far-seeing  statesmen  of  1789  and  1829  cannot  be  too 
carefully  weighed  or  too  much  heeded 

Senator  David  Barton  of  Missouri  says  (G.  &  S.'s 
Debates,  1829-30,  vol.  vi,  pt.  i,  pp.  368,  462)  :  "  He 
denied  that  in  any  cases,  except  the  Cabinet  officers, 
the  Federal  officers  were  ever  intended  to  be  rendered 
the  servile  creatures  of  the  Executive,  *  *  *  ^^q^ 
were  intended  to  be  freemen,  looking  to  the  faithful 
performance  of  their  duties  and  to  the  protection  of 
the  Senate  and  the  laws  for  their  offices.  It  was  fit 
that  the  officers  of  a  despot  should  live  or  die  by  the 
breath  of  their  master.  That  suited  such  form  of  gov- 
ernment. Not  so  in  a  republic — a  government  of  law. 
*  *  *  If  this  abuse  of  the  offices  be  tolerated,  his- 
tory will  tell  posterity  that  a  combination  of  aspirants 
destroyed  the  constitutional  liberties  of  the  United 
States  by  the  usual  gradations  of  tyranny  and  bribery, 


as  was  feared  and  deprecated  by  the  Father  of  his 
Country  I " 

Senator  George  M.  Bibb  of  Kentucky,  speaking  of 
President  Jackson's  "  Protest,"  *  and  of  the  power  of 
removal,  says  (''  Debates,"  1833-34,  vol.  x,  pt.  ii,  pp. 
1499,  1513):  "The  power  of  removal  of  officers,  al- 
though not  expressly  limited  by  the  Constitution  to 
any  particular  specified  causes,  is  yet  qualified  and  reg- 
ulated by  the  public  uses  and  benefits  for  which  it  was 
conferred,  and  is  abused  and  perverted  when  exercised 
tQ  *  *  *  subserve  selfish  ambition.  *  *  *  Hq 
(the  President)  makes  and  unmakes  at  his  pleasure. 
*This  is  my  will,  and  that  is  your  duty.  I  take  the 
responsibility.  Obey  me,  or  1  dismiss  you,  and  supply 
your  place  by  one  whose  opinions  are  well  known  to 
me.'  Can  it  be  true  ?  Does  any  free  man  believe  that 
all  officers,  subject  to  removal,  are  also  subject  to  the 
order  and  direction  of  the  President  in  the  exercise  of 
the  duties  and  trusts  which  their  offices  impose,  and 
which  they  are  bound  by  oath  to  execute  faithfully  ? 
Is  the  President  the  sole  interpreter  of  the  Constitution 
and  laws  for  them  ?  *  *  *  This  prerogative  power 
far  exceeds  any  possessed  by  the  King  of  England,  for 
there  it  is  an  established  maxim  that  '  no  man  shall 
dare  assist  the  Crown  in  contradiction  to  the  laws  of 

*  President  Jackson's  '*  Protest,"  which  was  really  an  argument  in 
defense  of  his  course  in  removing  the  deposits  in  the  United  States 
Bank,  was  brought  out  by  the  following  resolution,  which  was  intro- 
duced by  Senator  Clay : 

Resolved,  That  the  President,  in  the  late  executive  proceedings  in 
relation  to  the  public  revenue,  has  assumed  upon  himself  authority  and 
power  not  conferred  by  the  Constitution  and  laws,  but  in  derogation  of 
both. 

This  resolution  was  expunged  from  the  journal  January  16,  1837,  by 
ft  vote  of  24  to  19* 


THE  LAWS  ABOVE  THE  COMifA:S^DS  OF  UE^.         169 

the  land.'  *  *  *  They  (the  writers  of  the  Protest) 
might  have  learned  from  the  speeches  and  writings  of 
the  wise  and  virtuous  of  ancient  and  modern  times  that 
no  government  is  well  constituted  *  unless  the  laws  pre- 
vail above  the  commands  of  men.'"* 

Representative  George  McDuffie  of  South  Carolina 
says  (Debates,  vol.  x,  pt.  iii,  pp.  3454,  3455)  :  "I  have 
deemed  it  important  to  speak  thus  distinctly  on  the  dis- 
missing power,  because  I  have  a  deep  and  solemn  con- 
viction that  if  Congress  does  not  interpose,  speedily  and 
effectually  interpose  on  this  subject,  the  day  is  not  dis- 
tant when  this  government  will  sink  into  deep  corrup- 
tion and  absolute  monarchy.  *  *  *  j£  y^^^  bring  all 
the  offices  of  this  government  into  the  political  market 
as  the  legitimate  *  spoils  of  victory;'  if  every  aspirant 
to  the  presidential  office  inscribes  on  his  banner  this 
celebrated  motto  to  animate  his  partisans,  is  not  the 
whole  mass  of  the  offices  and  patronage  of  your  gov- 
ernment converted  into  a  mighty  fund  of  corruption, 
sufficient  to  purchase  an  imperial  crown,  and  which 
no  human  contrivance  can  permanently  resist?  Mr. 
Speaker,  the  immense  patronage  of  this  government, 
under  this  new  doctrine  of  the  absolute  right  of  every 
new  President  to  discharge  all  the  incumbents  from 
office  at  his  mere  will  and  pleasure,  to  make  way  for 
his  partisans,  is  a  power  I  would  not  trust  in  the  hands 
of  an  angel,  if  there  were  an  angel  in  human  form." 

*  Senator  Bibb  further  says  :  "  One  of  the  great  securities  for  liberty 
consists  in  the  division  of  the  powers  of  government.  Thus  safety  in 
legishition  is  consulted  by  having  many  Senators  and  many  Representa- 
tives. Safety  in  the  judicial  department  is  consulted  by  having  a  plu- 
rality of  judges.  So  the  safety  in  the  executive  department  consists  in 
distributing  the  powers  into  numerous  compartments,  subjecting  each 
officer  to  a  personal  responsibility,  and  to  the  law;  whereby  a  govern- 
ment of  laws  is  created,  and  not  a  government  at  the  will  of  one  man/' 

(p.  mi.) 

9 


ITO        Removal  o:c*  ttiitoLUTioi^Aiit  soldIees. 

Senator  Jolin  Tyler  of  Virginia  says  (Debates,  vol.  x, 
pt.  i,  pp.  672,  673):  "Is  the  presidential  power  only 
to  be  considered  dangerous  when  he  (the  President)  is 
at  the  head  of  an  army  ?  Patronage  is  the  sword  and 
the  cannon  by  which  war  may  be  made  on  the  liberty 
of  the  human  race.  *  *  *  If  the  offices  of  the  gov- 
ernment shall  be  considered  but  as  'spoils,'  to  be  dis- 
tributed among  a  victorious  party,  then  indeed,  sir,  the 
consequences  are  most  fatal.  All  stability  in  govern- 
ment must  be  at  an  end.  Novices  are  introduced  in 
the  place  of  long-tried,  experienced,  and  faithful  public 
agents,  and  the  public  interests  necessarily  suffer,  and 
suffer  severely." 

Senator  Peleg  Sprague  of  Maine  says  (p.  388)  :  "Since 
the  political  victory  of  1828,  the  vultures  have  been 
screaming  over  the  battle-field,  and  *even  the  cries  of 
the  widows  and  the  orphan '  could  not  scare  them  from 
their  prey.  A  spirit  of  proscription  for  opinion's  sake, 
scarcely  paralleled  in  the  annals  of  free  governments, 
has  swept  in  terror  over  the  land,  prostrating  the  purest 
and  the  best,  breaking  down  the  independent,  bending 
the  feeble,  and  leaving  the  timid,  like  trembling  slaves, 
to  eat  their  bread  in  fear.  Veteran  soldiers  of  the 
Revolution  have  been  sacrificed  for  daring  to  exercise 
the  freedom  for  which  they  fought !  Officers  of  the 
late  war.  Republicans  of  '98,  patriots  at  all  times,  have 
been  punished  for  daring,  in  a  republican  country,  to 
breathe  the  language  of  freemen  ! " 

Senator  Samuel  L.  Southard  of  New  Jersey  says  (pp. 
161,  162)  :  "I  do  not  mean  at  this  time  to  discuss  the 
existence  of  the  power  of  dismission,  or  to  question  its 
constitutionality.  *  *  *  The  spoils  of  party  *  *  * 
are  the  triumphs  of  corruption  over  virtue  and  the  Con- 
stitution. The  power  of  dismission,  if  to  be  exercised 
^t  all,  should  be  exercised  for  competent  cause  \  mi 


t^ATElOK   iiiJNliY   t'BA^g   l^OWEU   AND   KINGS.         1*71 

that  competent  cause  must  exist  in  the  law,  and  by 
the  commands  of  the  law  ;  must  be  connected  with  tlio 
actual  discharge  of  the  duties  required  by  law  ;  to  pre- 
vent the  performance  of  acts  expressly  forbidden  by 
law  ;  to  secure  the  performance  of  acts  expressly  com- 
manded by  law  ;  to  relieve  from  fraud  and  mental  in- 
capacity to  discharge  the  duties  arising  under  circum- 
stances which  could  not  otherwise  be  controlled.  *  *  * 
There  is  not  a  man  on  earth  to  whom  I  would  confide 
it  in  the  extent  now  claimed  by  the  advocates  of  the 
Executive." 

Representative  William  F.  Gordon  of  Virginia  says 
(Debates,  vol.  xi,  pt.  ii,  pp.  1282,  1285,  1286)  :  "  I  verily 
believe  *  *  *  the  wise  and  patriotic  framers  of  our 
Constitution  have  unintentionally  given  to  the  execu- 
tive power  a  fearful  and  dangerous  ascendency,  which 
makes  it  an  overbalance  to  all  the  other  departments  of 
government.  *  *  *  Patrick  Henry*  uttered  this 
sententious  maxim  of  political  wisdom  :  *  When  you 
give  power,  you  know  not  what  you  give.'  *  *  * 
We  may  all  very  plainly  see  that  the  contest  for  the 
executive  office  is  the  rock  on  which  the  permanency 
of  this  republic  is  likely  to  be  wrecked  ;  and  the  vehe- 
mence of  this  contest  will  ever  be  in  proportion  to  the 
executive  patronage.  *  *  *  I  desire  to  limit  and 
restrain  the  executive  patronage." 

*  Mr.  Henry's  words  were  spoken  in  the  Virginia  Convention  of  lYSS, 
the  Convention  that  adopted  the  national  Constitution,  Speaking  of 
the  Constitution,  Mr.  Henry  said  (Wirt's  "  Life  of  Patrick  Henry,"  p. 
296):  "This  Constitution  is  said  to  have  beautiful  features.  When  I 
come  to  examine  these  features,  sir,  they  appear  to  me  horribly  fright- 
ful !  Among  other  deformities,  it  has  an  awful  squinting.  It  squints 
toward  monarchy »    *    »    *    Your  President  may  easily  become  Kinc." 

Mr.  Henry  opposed  the  adoption  of  the  Constitution  with  more  elo- 
quence than  reason.  But  despite  his  and  other  men's  eloquence  it  was 
adopted  by  a  vote  of  89  to  79, 


172  STATEMENT   OF   REASONS   FOR   REMOYAL. 

Albert  Gallatin,  one  of  the  founders  of  the  govern- 
ment, and  for  fourteen  years  Secretary  of  the  Treasury 
under  Jefferson  and  Madison,  in  a  letter  to  his  wife, 
dated  Washington,  May  2,  1829,  says  (Adams's  Galla- 
tin, p.  633)  :  "  On  every  occasion  I  have  freely  expressed 
my  entire  disapprobation  of  the  system  of  removal  for 
political  opinions." 

Senator  Samuel  Smith  of  Maryland  says  (Debates, 
1831-32,  vol.  viii,  pt.  i,  p.  1363):  "I  am  opposed  to 
removals  from  office  for  opinions  declared.  But,  sir,  I 
l70uld  remove  any  officer  who  made  use  of  his  office  to 
force  inferiors  to  act  contrary  to  their  wishes.  I  would 
remove  every  postmaster  who  had  been  known  to  frank 
the  *  coffin  handbills,'  or  any  other  abusive  papers  of 
either  of  the  candidates." 

Senator  Thomas  Ewing  of  Ohio  says  (Debates,  vol. 
X,  pt.  ii,  p.  1416)  :  *' I  will  advise  and  consent  to  the 
appointment  of  no  man,  to  any  office,  who  has  earned 
that  appointment  in  the  arena  as  a  political  gladiator. 
And  I  will  advise  and  consent  to  the  reappointment  of 
no  man  to  any  responsible  office  who,  while  he  held  that 
office,  abused  it  to  the  mere  purposes  of  party,  instead 
of  using  it  for  the  benefit  of  his  country.  *  *  *  At 
the  same  time  I  would  inquire  into  no  man's  political 
opinions  or  personal  preferences.  It  is  a  gross  abuse 
that  such  inquiries  have  ever  been  made  in  appointments 
to  office." 

Senator  Hugh  L.  White  of  Tennessee  says  (Debates, 
vol.  xi,  pt.  1,  pp.  488-9)  :  "  It  is  asked  by  the  opponents 
of  this  bill  what  benefit  its  friends  expect  from  a  state- 
ment of  the  reasons  of  the  removal  when  the  nomination 
of  a  successor  is  presented  to  the  Senate.  I  answer  for 
myself,  I  wish  to  cut  up  by  the  roots  the  demoralizing 
tendencies  of  office-hunting.  *  *  *  Under  the  pres- 
ent state  of  things    *    *    *    office-hunting  will  become 


HOW   OFFICE-HUNTEES  DECEIVE   PEESIDENT.         173 

a  science.  Men  will  be  selected  and  furnished  with 
funds  to  defray  the  expense  of  coming  to  Washington 
for  the  purpose  of  having  one  set  turned  out  and  an- 
other set  put  in,  by  means  of  artful  tales,  secretly  got- 
ten up  and  reduced  to  writing,  which  it  is  supposed 
will  never  see  the  light.  This  officer  and  representative 
of  office  hunters  will  come  on  with  one  pocket  full  of 
bad  characters,  with  which  to  turn  out  incumbents,  and 
tlie  other  filled  with  good  characters,  with  which  to 
provide  for  his  constituents.  *  *  *  Require  the 
reasons  for  removal  to  be  stated,  and  no  man  will  dare 
to  make  a  statement  which  he  does  not  believe  to  be 
true,  because  exposure  and  disgrace  will  certainly  be 
the  consequence.  You  will  take  out  of  the  hand  of  the 
cowardly  assassin  the  poisoned  dagger  heretofore  used 
in  the  dark.  You  will  shield  the  Executive  against 
mistakes  founded  on  false  representations." 

Senator  Benton,  chairman  of  a  Committee  on  Exec- 
utive Patronage,  in  a  report  made  on  May  4,  1826,  says 
(Appendix  to  G.  &  S.'s  Debates,  vol.  ii,  pt.  ii,  p.  133)  : 
"  In  coming  to  the  conclusion  tliat  executive  patronage 
ouglit  to  be  diminished  and  regulated  on  the  plan  pro- 
posed, the  Committee*  rest  their  opinion  on  the  ground 
that  the  exercise  of  great  patronage  in  the  hands  of 
one  man  has  a  tendency  to  sully  the  purity  of  our  in- 
stitutions and  to  endanger  the  lil)ertie8  of  the  country. 
Tliis  doctrine  is  not  new.  A  jealousy  of  power,  f  and 
of  the  influence  of  patronage,  which  must  always  ac- 
company its   exercise,   has   ever  been   a   distinguished 

*  The  Committee  consisted  of  Senators  T.  PI  Benton  of  Missouri, 
Nathaniel  Macon  of  North  Carolina,  Martin  Van  Buren  of  New  York, 
Hugh  L.  White  of  Tennessee,  William  Findlay  of  Pennsylvania,  Mahlon 
Dickerson  of  New  Jersey,  John  Holmes  of  Maine,  Robert  Y.  Uayne  of 
South  Carolina,  and  Richard  M.  Johnson  of  Kentucky. 

j-  Compare  with  page  166. 


174        PEESIDENT  J.    Q.   ADAMS  CREATES  A  ELURRY. 

feature  in  the  American  character.  It  displayed  itself 
strongly  at  the  period  of  the  formation  and  of  the 
adoption  of  the  Federal  Constitution.  *  *  *  Noth- 
ing could  reconcile  the  great  men  of  that  day  to  a  Con- 
stitution of  so  much  power  but  the  guards  which  were 
put  upon  it  against  the  abuse  of  power.  Dread  and 
jealousy  of  this  abuse  displayed  itself  throughout  the 
instrument.  To  this  spirit  we  are  indebted  for  the  free- 
dom of  the  press,  trial  by  jury,  liberty  of  conscience, 
freedom  of  debate,  responsibility  to  constituents,  power 
of  impeachment,  the  control  of  the  Senate  over  appoint- 
ments to  office." 

The  American  jealousy  of  power  is  still  further  illus- 
trated by  the  following  extracts  from  speeches  in  the 
United  States  Senate  in  1826.* 

Senator  John  Branch  of  North  Carolina  says  (De- 
bates, vol.  ii,  pt.  i,  pp.  386,  387)  :  "It  is  time  to  re- 
enact  Magna  Charta.  It  is  time  to  reassert  the  prin- 
ciples of  the  Declaration  of  Independence.  *  *  * 
Are  we  dependent  on  the  whim,  or  caprice,  or  courtesy 
of  the  President  for  power?  *  *  *  The  Senate  was 
wisely  designed  to  act  as  a  check  on  the  appointing 
power.  *  *  *  It  is  intended,  I  trust,  to  be  perpetual. 
It  was  so  designed.  But  I  have  the  most  awful  fore- 
bodings that  it  will  not  be.  *  *  *  It  (the  Con- 
stitution) may  not  prove  an  adequate  protection  again^ 
the  insidious  encroachments  of  ambitious  leaders." 

Senator  John  Randolph  of  Virginia  says  (p.  392)  : 
"Since  the  revolution  of  1801,  the  practice  has  been 
settled   that   the  Secretary  of  State  shall  succeed  the 

*  These  speeches  were  the  result  of  a  special  message  from  President 
John  Q.  Adams,  wherein  he  claimed  the  independent  right  to  appoint 
a  representative  to  a  "  Congress  of  American  Nations,  to  be  assembled 
at  Panama."  But  out  of  courtesy  to  the  Senate,  he  did  not  exercise  t\]Q 
^leged  right. 


PATROKAGE  LIKE  AECHIMEDES'S   LEVEE  175 

President.  Hence  it  is  that  the  Secretaryship  of  State 
has  been  the  apple  of  discord  under  all  administrations 
succeeding  that  of  Mr.  Jefferson.  It  was  the  bone  of 
contention  between  Mr.  Gallatin  and  Mr.  Robert  Smith. 
There  are  more  here  besides  myself  (looking  at  Mr. 
Macon)  that  know  it.  It  has  been  the  apple  of  discord, 
ay,  and  of  concord  too,  sir,  since.  It  has  been  the 
favorite  post  and  position  of  every  bad,  ambitious  man, 
whether  apostate  Federalist  or  apostate  Republican,  who 
wishes  to  get  into  the  presidency,  *  *  *  *  honestly 
if  they  may,  corruptly  if  they  must.'  It  has  been  that 
which  Archimedes  wanted  to  move  the  world,  *  *  * 
*a  place  to  stand  upon,'  ay,  and  to  live  upon  too,  sir, 
and,  with  the  lever  of  patronage,  to  move  our  little 
world." 

Senator  Littleton  W.  Tazewell  of  Virginia  says  (p. 
602)  :  "  I  utterly  deny  the  correctness  of  this  doctrine, 
which  seeks  to  create  a  new,  substantive,  and  fruitful 
source  of  power,  in  existing  or  future  Presidents,  from 
the  past  practices  of  their  predecessors.  And  I  deny 
more  strongly,  if  I  may  do  so,  the  authority  to  enlarge 
the  volume  of  power  issuing  from  this  newly  discovered 
fountain  by  the  process  of  induction  and  reasoning  by 
analogy.  Let  it  be  once  granted  that  the  practice  of  one 
President  gives  a  legitimate  authority  to  his  successor, 
and  that  this  authority  may  be  enlarged  by  analogies, 
and  it  must  be  obvious  to  all  that  the  power  granted 
by  the  people  to  the  Executive,  although  made  by  the 
Constitution  but  a  school-boy's  snow-ball,  in.  a  few  turns 
would  become  a  monstrous  avalanche,  that  must  one 
day  crush  themselves." 

Senator  John  Chandler  of  Maine  says  (pp.  633,  634, 
635)  :  "  Hardly  a  session  of  Congress  passed  but  what 
some  power,  some  patronage  was  gained  by  the  Execu- 
tive.     *     *     *     ju  tijig  government  the  departments 


176        POWERS  SHOULD  BALANCE  LIKE  A  SEE-SAW. 

were  to  balance  each  other.  How  was  this  balance  to 
be  kept  up?  Not  by  constantly  increasing  the  power 
of  one  department  of  the  government ;  but  the  House 
of  Representatives  should  take  care  of  the  portion  com- 
mitted to  them,  the  Senate  theirs,  and  the  President  his. 
*  *  *  Balance  anything.  Get  a  rail  and  play  at  see- 
saw. Give  one  a  little  more  than  the  other,  and  away 
he  would  go.  So  it  was  with  these  powers.  Give  one 
of  them  only  a  hair's  breadth  more  than  it  ought  to 
have,  and  the  balance  would  be  destroyed.  *  *  * 
Governments  were  made  on  the  suspicion  that  all  those 
who  had  power  would  go  wrong." 


CHAPTER    IX. 

COMPARATIVE    POLITICAL    ECONOMY. 

Its  Utility. — The  Civil  Service  Systems  of  England,  Canada,  British 
India,  Germany,  France,  Sweden,  Norway,  and  China. 

A  SHORT  account  of  the  civil  service  laws  and  cus- 
toms of  a  few  representative  nations  is  a  fitting  con- 
clusion to  this  book.  Comparative  political  economy, 
past  as  well  as  present,  is  a  useful  and  instructive  study. 
It  ought  to  be  made  a  distinct  branch  of  study  in  all 
governments,  for  it  is  full  of  information  and  promise. 
Like  comparative  anatomy  (and  pathology  also,  for  na- 
tions suffer  with  diseases  as  it  were),  it  reveals  new 
sources  of  light.  It  is  as  broad  as  the  earth  itself,  and 
as  various  as  the  divisions  and  subdivisions  of  men. 
If  the  combined  wisdom  of  the  world  does  not  at  least 
approximate  perfection,  what  will?*  The  bigot  and 
the  narrow-minded  man  only  will  reject  useful  laws  or 
regulations  because  they  were  originated  in  England, 
France,  China,  or  India.  The  time  may  come  when  it 
will  be  said  of  the  United  States  of  1888,  "They  had 
only  the  fragment  of  a  government,  for  they  either  re- 
jected or  were  ignorant  of  the  wisdom  of  other  nations." 
What  would  be  thought  of  a  nation  that  rejected  the 
telegraph  because  it  had  its  origin  in  another  nation? 
Washington's  recommendation,  which  was  approved  by 
Jefferson,  of  the  establishment  of  a  National   Univer- 

*  Let  us  avail  ourselves  of  the  wisdom  and  experience  of  former 
ages.     Let  us  aggregate  the  knowledge  of  every  nation. — John  Vinino. 


1V8  aiSTORY   OP   ENGLISH   EXAMINATIONS. 

sity  for  "  the  education  of  our  youth  in  the  science  of 
government"  was  certainly  a  wise  one. 

The  English  civil  service  law  is  much  like  our  own  ; 
but  it  contains  provisions  that  ours  does  not,  namely. 
Preliminary  examinations  are  held  for  the  purpose  of 
weeding  out  those  who  are  "  too  stupid  or  ignorant  t  :> 
have  a  chance  on  a  competitive  trial."  Pensions  aro 
granted,  provided  the  official  has  served  ten  years — 
one  sixtieth  of  the  original  salary  being  allowed  for 
ten  years  of  service,  and  an  additional  sixtieth  for  each 
succeeding  year  till  the  fortieth,  when  the  increase  stops. 
Pecuniary  embarrassment,  caused  by  an  officeholder's 
imprudence,  forfeits  "that  honorable  position  in  the 
service  which  is  necessary  to  give  him  a  claim  to  pro- 
motion or  increase  of  salary  from  length  of  service." 
There  is  a  "  movable  clerical  force  of  all  work,"  that 
goes  "  from  department  to  department,  as  convenience 
may  require."  These  salutary  regulations  are  worthy 
of  imitation. 

Mr.  Dorman  B.  Eaton  says  that  promotion  examina- 
tions for  the  customs  service  were  begun  in  England 
by  Lord  Liverpool  in  1820  ;  that  non  competitive  ex- 
aminations were  begun  by  Lord  Melbourne  between 
1834  and  1841,  but  that  "  the  decisive  part  of  the  con- 
test between  patronage  and  open  competition  was  be- 
tween 1845  and  1855,  though  the  victors  did  not  take 
possession  of  the  whole  field  until  1870."  Lord  Mel- 
bourne favored  competitive  examinations,  but  they  were 
thought  to  be  "  too  great  an  innovation  to  begin  at 
once."  The  order  for  the  competitive  system  of  exam- 
ination was  issued  on  May  21,  1855. 

In  Canada  an  act  of  Parliament  was  passed  in  1882 
providing  for  non-competitive  civil  service  examinations. 
It  was  amended  in  1883,  1884,  and  1885.  The  exam- 
inations are  (1)  preliminary^  for  lower  grade  offices ; 


THE  PRACTICAL  EEQIJIREMEN^TS   llST   CAKAbA.         l79 

(2)  qualifying^  for  clerkships  and  higher  grade  offices  ; 

(3)  promotion^  for  those  ah-eady  in  the  service.  The 
preliminary  and  qualifying  examinations  are  held  twice 
a  year  ;  the  promotion  but  once.  But  when  the  exi- 
gencies of  the  service  require  it,  provision  is  made  for 
special  examinations.  The  examinations  are  held  simul- 
taneously throughout  the  Dominion,  and  are  conducted 
by  subexaminers.  The  written  papers  are  transmitted 
to  the  Board  of  Examiners  at  Ottawa,  where  they  are 
examined  and  valued.  The  successful  candidates  in 
the  preliminary  and  qualifying  examinations  receive 
certificates  and  have  their  names  printed  in  the  Offi- 
cial Gazette.  Candidates  who  pass  the  preliminary 
examination,  have  the  option  of  taking  the  qualifying 
one  also.  The  examinations  embrace  the  elementary 
branches  of  education,  but  candidates  are  permitted  to 
take  certain  prescribed  optional  subjects.  These  are 
translating  English  into  French  and  French  into  Eng- 
lish, book-kcei)ing,  short-hand,  telegraphy,  type- writing, 
and  *2)rejis'  writing.  The  last  consists  in  condensing 
the  salient  points  of  reports,  &c.,  into  about  a  fourth 
of  the  printed  matter.  For  the  inside  service^  that 
is,  for  those  employed  in  the  different  departments  at 
Ottawa  (the  capital),  there  is  an  additional  allowance 
of  $50  per  annum  for  every  additional  optional  subject, 
not  exceeding  four,  in  which  a  candidate  may  pass.  In 
most  cases  an  annual  increase  of  salary  is  allowed,  but 
it  cannot  exceed  the  prescribed  limit  of  the  respective 
classes.  When  a  vacancy  occurs  in  a  class  next  above 
the  one  in  which  an  employe  is  serving,  he  may,  on 
passing  the  promotion  examination,  be  promoted  to  it. 
lie  thus  reaps  the  advantage  of  a  double  increase  of 
salary — (1)  by  promotion  ;  (2)  by  annual  increase.  Ex- 
aminations are  held  in  either  the  English  or  French  lan- 
guage, at  the  option  of  the  candidate.     Thirty  per  cent. 


180        ME.  THOEBUEJ?^  I'AVORS  CoMi^ETlTlVE  TESTS. 

of  the  marks  allowed  for  each  branch  of  study  and 
fifty  per  cent,  of  the  aggregate  number  of  marks  given 
to  all  the  subjects  must  be  attained.  That  is,  if  there 
are  eight  subjects  taken,  there  must  be  400  marks  made. 
There  is  a  probationary  period  of  six  months,  both  for 
original  and  promotion  appointments.  The  respective 
ages  at  and  between  which  all  ordinary  appointments 
to  the  inside  service  are  made  are  15,  18,  and  35  years — 
15  for  places  below  that  of  a  third-class  clerk  ;  in  other 
cases  18.  Deputy  Pleads  of  Departments,  officers,  and 
employes,  whose  appointments  are  of  a  permanent  char- 
acter, can  only  be  removed  from  office  by  authority  of 
the  Governor  in  Council.  Employes  guilty  of  miscon- 
duct or  neglect  of  duty  are  suspended  without  pay  till 
such  time  as  the  suspension  is  removed.  There  is  an 
attendance  hook  in  which  all  employes,  under  Deputy 
Heads,  are  required  to  record  their  names  every  morn- 
ing, or  at  such  other  times  as  may  be  required  by  the 
Governor  in  Council. 

In  a  letter  dated  Ottawa,  Canada,  September  9,  1887, 
J.  Thorburn,  LL.D.,  Chairman  of  the  Board  of  Exam- 
iners, to  whom  I  am  indebted  for  the  foregoing  facts 
in  regard  to  the  Canadian  civil  service  system,  says  : 

Dear  Sir:  The  civil  service  examinations  in  Canada 
differ  in  some  important  respects  from  those  in  Great 
Britain  and  in  the  United  States.  With  us  they  are 
only  qualifying,  not  necessarily,  when  passed,  leading 
to  appointments  ;  whereas  with  you  and  in  England, 
with  a  few  specified  exceptions,  they  are  competitive. 
In  this  respect,  I  am  satisfied,  you  have  the  advantage 
of  us,  for,  as  is  now  generally  admitted,  the  more  fully 
the  political  element  is  eliminated  from  them,  the  better 
it  is  for  the  public  service. 

Our  government  has   not   hitherto   seen  its  way  to 


EABlflKG  THEIR  PROMOTION.  18l 

adopt  a  competitive  system.  It  retains  the  power  of 
selecting  any  candidate  who  has  passed  the  examina- 
tion test,  irrespective  of  his  standing  as  compared  with 
that  of  others,  and  the  result  therefore  naturally  follows 
that  as  soon  as  an  applicant  for  office  finds  that  he  has 
"  passed  the  Rubicon,"  he  sets  to  work  at  once  to  bnng 
all  the  pressure,  political,  social,  or  religious,  that  he 
can  obtain  to  bear  upon  the  different  ministers  of  the 
Crown,  and  it  will  generally  be  found  that  the  weakest 
and  least  deserving  of  the  candidates,  conscious  of  their 
deficiencies,  are  those  that  make  the  most  strenuous  and 
persistent  efforts  to  secure  political  backing. 

Another  serious  drawback  to  our  qualifying  system 
of  examination  is  to  be  found  in  the  fact  that  out  of 
the  large  number  of  candidates  who  every  year  reach 
the  standard  required  by  the  examiners,  probably  not 
more  than  one  in  twenty  has  the  least  prospect  of  ap- 
pointment. In  course  of  time,  therefore  we  shall  have  a 
large  army  of  disappointed  aspirants,  each  one  of  whom 
thinks  he  has  some  special  claim  upon  the  government, 
waiting  for  something  to  turn  up,  instead  of  betaking 
themselves  to  other  avocations  of  life. 

You  will  see  from  the  copy  of  the  rules  and  regula- 
tions sent  to  you  that  we  have  a  promotion  examination 
for  those  already  in  the  service.  This  has  given  rise 
to  considerable  opposition,  especially  on  the  part  of 
those  who  have  been  a  long  time  in  the  service.  The 
experience,  however,  of  the  Deputy  Heads  has  been 
largely  in  its  favor.  It  exercises  a  wholesome  and 
steadying  influence  on  the  younger  members  of  the  ser- 
vice when  they  know  that  they  have  to  earn  their  pro- 
motion, instead  of  relying  for  it  upon  the  interest  and 
solicitations  of  influential  friends.  I  find  that  in  Eng- 
land they  have  a  modified  form  of  promotion  examina- 
tions.    These  are  held  at  the  request  of  the  heads  of 


i82  C0M1>ET1TIYE  TESTS  IN  BBITlSti  INDIA. 

the  several  departments  for  the  purpose  of  selecting 
those  who  are  fittest  for  promotion  or  reward,  but  they 
are  not  necessarily  required  by  law. 

In  reply  to  your  question  as  to  the  extent  of  the 
reform  in  Her  Majesty's  dominions,  I  answer  that  the 
system  of  examination  for  public  ofiices  is  in  operation 
in  India,  New  South  Wales,  Victoria,  South  Australia, 
New  Zealand,  and  Jamaica,  and  so  far  as  I  have  been 
able  to  learn,  it  is  found  to  work  satisfactorily. 
Respectfully  yours, 

J.  THORBURN. 

In  another  letter  (April  11,  1888)  Mr.  Thorburn  says  : 
"  The  government  has  decided  to  have  only  one  prelim- 
inary and  qualifying  examination  instead  of  two  a  year. 
The  Secretary  of  State  has  given  notice  of  his  intention 
to  make  certain  slight  emendations  in  the  civil  service 
act.  When  there  are  80  or  100  candidates  at  an  ex- 
amination, it  is  difficult  to  keep  them  from  copying 
from  each  other  ;  and  in  some  cases  we  have  had  can- 
didates personating  others.  To  deal  with  such  cases 
the  Chairman  will  be  authorized  to  examine  witnesses 
under  oath,  and  have  the  delinquents  punished.  I  am 
not  without  hope  that  we  shall  yet  have  competitive 
examinations  in  Canada." 

The  British  India  civil  service  law,  which  requires 
strict  competitive  examinations,  was  passed  in  1853, 
two  years  before  the  passage  of  the  English  act.  In 
fact,  England  wished  to  try  an  experiment,  and  began 
it  in  India.  The  plan  for  the  enforcement  of  the  law 
was  drawn  by  Lord  Macaulay,  Lord  Ashburton,  Doctor 
Melvill,  Doctor  Jowett,  and  Sir  John  S.  Lefevre. 

"India,"  says  Mr.  E.  F.  Waters,  "has  a  special  ad- 
ministration, differing  from  all  the  other  dependencies 
of  the  Crown.     Her  Governor  has  larger  powers,  and 


THE   VARIETY   OP   LANGITAGE   IN   INDIA.  183 

all  appointments  in  the  civil,  medical,  engineering,  and 
artillery  services  of  that  immense  and  densely  popula- 
ted country  (150,000,000  people)  are  based  upon  com- 
petitive examination.  *  *  *  Different  candidates 
are  examined  (according  to  the  different  Provinces  of 
India,  or  the  different  departments  they  may  wish  to 
enter),  in  addition  to  ordinary  studies,  in  jurisprudence, 
law  of  evidence,  law  of  India,  political  economy,  his- 
tory and  geography  of  India,  Arabic,  Bengali,  Hindi, 
Hindustani,  Malayalum,  Marathi,  Persian,  Sanskrit, 
Tamil,  and  Telugu." 

Mr.  D.  B.  Eaton  says  that  natives  of  France,  Canada, 
Brazil,  and  the  United  States  have  won  appointments 
in  the  Indian  service. 

Non-competitive  examinations  were  held  in  British 
India  long  before  1853,  but  they  were  not  very  success- 
ful, notwithstanding  the  applicants  were  required  to 
attend  Haileybury  College  for  two  years.  For  exam- 
ple, Mr.  Eaton  says  that  in  the  years  1851  to  1854,  both 
inclusive,  437  applicants  were  examined  for  commissions 
in  the  Indian  army.  Nearly  a  third  failed  in  English 
and  a  still  greater  number  in  arithmetic.  This  college, 
which  was  conducted  on  the  patronage  system  plan, 
was  abolished  in  1854. 

In  Prussia  (Germany)  the  civil  service  has  been  gov- 
erned since  her  humiliation  in  1806  by  the  first  Napo- 
leon as  scientifically  perhaps  as  has  her  military  ser- 
vice, which,  in  turn,  in  1870-71,  humiliated  the  third 
Napoleon,  and  one  has  improved  and  strengthened  the 
government  about  as  much  perhaps  as  the  other.*  The 
following  speaks  for  itself  (Cyclopedia  of  Political  Sci- 

*  Prussia  owes  it  very  much  to  the  high  order  of  efficiency  which  has 
been  introduced  into  her  civil  service  that  she  has  risen  to  be  one  of 
the  first  powers  in  the  world.  Improvements  in  administration  have 
hardly  been  less  in  France  and  Great  Britain. — C.  C.  Andrews, 


184  EXAMINAllOlf   AND   REEXAMINATION. 

ence,  iii,  445)  :  "  Various  services  are  directly  subor- 
dinate to  the  Ministry  of  State  (council  of  ministers), 
such  as  the  official  journal,  the  archives,  printing,  and 
various  others,  notably  the  Commission  of  Examination 
for  future  functionaries.  To  be  a  functionary  it  is  nec- 
essary to  have  studied  three  years  at  the  University, 
to  have  passed  a  period  of  instruction  and  preparation 
for  the  public  service,  and  to  undergo  a  new  examina- 
tion, called  the  state  examinatio7i,  before  the  Commis- 
sion. The  candidate  then  obtains  the  title  of  Assessor, 
which  confers  the  right  of  being  employed  and  compen- 
sated, but  some  time  elapses  before  a  place  with  the 
title  of  Councilor  can  be  had.  The  functionaries  of 
lower  grade  and  simple  employes,  are  likewise  obliged 
to  pass  an  examination,  but  the  requirements  are  not 
so  great. 

"  As  to  the  internal  organization  of  the  public  ser- 
vices, some  are  organized  into  bureaus  ;  that  is,  they 
have  a  chief,  a  sole  functionary,  and  employes.  But 
most  of  these  services  have  Councils  or  Committees,  in 
which  the  President  often  has  a  great  preponderance, 
but  in  which  each  Councilor  has  his  powers  (decernat) 
clearly  defined." 

In  France  the  civil  service  is  free  of  politics  and  piib- 
lic  offices  are  held  during  good  behavior.  Mr.  E.  F. 
Waters,  who  has  traveled  in  France  and  other  parts  of 
Europe,  and  who  was  for  twenty  years  an  editor  of 
the  Bost07i  Daily  Advertiser,  in  a  pamphlet  (issued  in 
1881)  entitled  "The  Great  Struggle  in  England  for 
Honest  Government,"  says  (p.  28)  :  "  It  is  not  con- 
tended that  the  English  service  is  the  best  attainable. 
The  French  system  is  in  some  respects  better.  *  It  is 
the  result  of  nearly  a  hundred  years  of  experience. 
Every  officer  in  it  below  Minister  of  Finance,  com- 
menced bis  service  in  a  clerkship,  or  some  more  subor- 


GEEAT  STABILITY  OF  SERVICE  IN  PEANCE.  185 

dinate  position,  and  the  advancement  which  his  fidelity 
and  ability  secured  has  never  been  hindered  by  polit- 
ical frowns,  or  even  by  political  revolutions.  His  ap- 
pointment was  without  partiality,  and  public  examina- 
tions have  awarded  him  his  promotions.*  For  more 
than  fifty  years  a  record  has  been  kept  of  every  man's 
ofiicial  conduct,  as  reported  by  different  superior  of- 
ficers. *  *  *  Under  such  a  system,  it  becomes 
almost  impossible  for  an  unworthy  man  to  work  his 
way  to  a  position  where  his  incompetency  or  corruption 
can  largely  prejudice  the  reputation  of  the  service,  or 
materially  affect  the  revenue  of  the  empire.'  " 

In  a  letter  dated  October  10,  1887,  Mr.  Waters  fur- 
ther says  of  the  French  civil  service  :  "  It  is  bureau- 
cratic, but  intelligent,  honest,  and  faithful.  Their  en- 
tire idea  is  to  do  their  duty,  and  nothing  else,  and  they 
take  an  extreme  pride  in  their  position.  A  common 
track-guard  on  a  State  railway  is  as  proud  as  a  King 
of  his  position,  and  although  courteous,  is  unrelenting 
in  carrying  out  instructions.  Nothing  can  exceed  the 
courtesy  of  the  higher  trained  ofticials."f 

Concerning  the  French  diplomatic  and  consular  ser- 
vices Mr.  Abram  S.  Hewitt  says  (Cong.  Record,  1878, 
p.  1652)  :  "A  most  elaborate  scheme  of  examination  is 
laid  down  for  admission  to  the  permanent  consular  and 
diplomatic  services.  The  examinations  embrace  interna- 
tional law,  diplomatic  history,  statistics,  political  ec<m- 
omy,  geography,  and  the  languages — two  modern  lan- 
guages besides  their  own.  *  *  *  Promotion  is  made 
from  the  lower  grades  of  the  entire  foreign  service." 

*  Compare  with  page  56,  "  with  or  without  the  President,"  &c. 

f  The  prodigious  eagerness  for  office  in  France  is  due,  in  a  very  large 
degree,  to  the  fact  that  government  offices  are  permanent,  a  quahty 
which  more  than  makes  up  for  the  extreme  smalhiess  of  the  salaries, — 

E.  L.  GODKIN, 


186  AN   INGEXIOUS   SWINDLE   CHECKED. 

These  eminently  practical  examinations  have  been  in 
force  for  about  sixty-five  years. 

In  Sweden  subordinate  public  officials  and  employes 
are  appointed  without  regard  to  politics  and  serve  dur- 
ing good  behavior.  This  has  been  the  rule  since  1809, 
the  date  of  the  adoption  of  the  present  Constitution. 
Subordinate  officials  can  only  be  removed  after  trial, 
but  are  suspended  immediately  on  complaint.  Experi- 
ence has  shown  that  any  tendency  this  rule  may  have 
to  cause  disrespect  or  disobedience  is  overbalanced  by 
the  hope  of  promotion  and  better  pay,  which  can  only 
be  attained  by  faithful  service.  Some  of  the  higher 
officials,  however,  can  be  removed  by  the  King  without 
trial.  Again,  notwithstanding  strict  non  competitive 
examinations  for  all  officials  are  required,  the  King,  in 
cases  of  emergency,  can  dispense  with  them.  All  ap- 
pointments are  made  by  the  King  and  his  Ministers. 

It  is  noteworthy  that  there  are  three  entirely  different 
sets  of  distillery  inspectors — the  witness^  the  controller^ 
and  the  ox^er controller.  One  watches  the  other.  All 
are  required  to  see  that  no  distillery  manufactures  more 
than  the  annual  prescribed  quantity  of  liquors.  This 
latter  provision,  in  case  the  liquor  tax  is  raised,  prevents 
an  ingenious  swindle.  In  the  United  States,  for  exam- 
ple, when  there  is  talk  of  increasing  the  liquor  tax,  dis- 
tilleries usually  double  their  manufacture.  When  the 
tax  is  actually  raised,  little  or  no  liquor  is  manufac- 
tured for  about  a  year.  The  government  thus  loses 
heavily  the  first  year  after  the  increase. 

There  are  two  distinct  grades  of  education  for  public 
offices  in  Sweden.*     For  subordinate  offices,  such  as  the 

*  III  Sweden  "  education  is  not  free  except  for  the  poor;  but  it  is  ob- 
ligatory in  this  sense,  that  children  cannot  be  admitted  to  their  first 
communion  until  they  are  able  to  read  and  write."  ("Cyclopedia  of 
Political  Science,"  iii,  838.) 


TUE    EDUCATION   REQUIEED   IN   SWEDEN.  18? 

post  and  customs  departments,  it  is  only  required  that 
a  person  shall  have  graduated  at  a  high  school ;  but 
for  those  who  wish  to  enter  any  of  the  higher  branches 
of  the  service,  it  is  necessary  to  pass  at  least  one  of  two 
examinations  at  the  University.  There  are  two  high 
school  courses — the  practical  and  the  classical.  The 
practical  course  consists  of  geography,  history,  arithme- 
tic, algebra,  trigonometry,  chemistry,  mineralogy,  bot- 
any, drawing,  and  the  French,  English,  and  German 
languages.  The  classical  course  embraces  the  Latin, 
Greek,  and  Hebrew  languages  instead'  of  the  English 
and  German.  It  is  necessary  to  pass  an  examination 
in  one  of  these  courses  in  order  to  enter  the  University. 
The  University  course  consists  of  political  economy, 
judicial  encyclopedia,  the  law  of  nations,  Swedish  con- 
stitutional law,  administrative  law,  the  law  of  private 
rights,  and  legal  process.  There  are  three  University 
examinations,  the  preliminary,  requiring  about  a  year's 
study,  and  the  written  and  oral,  requiring  from  two 
to  two  and  a  half  years  of  additional  study.  Each  an- 
swer in  the  written  examination  must  be  wholly  im- 
promptu, and  must  be  made  in  about  eight  hours. 
Only  those  who  pass  the  written  examination  can  enter 
the  oral,  which  is  public,  and  which  also  occupies  about 
eight  hours.  There  are  two  other  University  courses 
and  kinds  of  examination,  both  in  law,  either  of  which 
qualify  a  person  for  admission  to  the  civil  service, 
though  they  are  intended  more  especially  as  tests  for 
admission  to  the  judicial  service. 

The  respectability  of  the  service  is  probably  the  main 
reason  why  students  devote  so  much  time  to  study  in 
order  to  enter  it.  Further,  in  some  cases  the  pay  is 
good,  and  only  about  six  or  eight  hours'  work  a  day 
is  required.  Owing  to  the  long  course  of  study,  office- 
holders are  usually  2-4  vears  olcj  on  entering  the  service. 


188  THE   FIRST  EIGHT  YEARS   OF  SERVICE. 

An  applicant,  who  must  furnish  certificates  from  two 
reputable  persons  as  to  his  character,  practical  ability, 
&c.,  is  almost  invariably  appointed  first  as  a  *  super- 
numerary,' at  an  annual  salary  of  1,000  crowns  (about 
$270).*  After  serving  for  about  eight  years,  on  proba- 
tion as  it  were,  he  is  promoted  to  a  regular  or  *  fixed ' 
position,  and  his  salary  is  increased.  After  this,  pro- 
motions to  fill  vacancies  in  all  ordinary  ofiices  usuall}'- 
go  to  the  person  who  has  served  longest  in  the  next 
lower  grade.  But  this  is  not  the  case  in  important 
ofiices.     In  these"  the  only  question  is  as  to  ability. 

There  is,  in  some  cases,  after  five  and  ten  years  of 
service,  an  annual  increase  of  pay  of  from  about  $125 
to  $150  respectively.  There  is  a  practice,  peculiar  to 
the  Dapartment  of  Foreign  Affairs,  of  granting  *  expect- 
ance' pay  (about  $1,000  a  year)  to  persons  temporarily 
out  of  diplomatic  employment.  Pensions  are  paid  to 
persons  of  10  years  of  age,  provided  they  have  served 
30  years  ;  and  also  to  persons  of  65  years  of  age,  pro- 
vided they  are  disabled  and  have  served  about  40  years. 
The  annual  sum  paid  is  from  about  $800  to  $2,000. 
There  is  also  a  "separate  pension  establishment  for 
widows  and  children  of  persons  in  the  service,"  the 
funds  for  which  are  raised  by  assessing  the  public  of- 
ficers, in  addition  to  which  the  government  annually  ap- 
propriates about  $24,000.  f 

In  Norway  the  civil  service  rules  are  practically  the 
same  as  in  Sweden.     "  Norway  is  united  with  Sweden 

*  A  Swedish  crowu  (kroner,  formerly  called  riksdaler)  is  equivalent 
to  $0.26.8. 

f  The  facts  concerning  the  civil  service  of  Sweden  are  based  on  a 
report  of  Minister  C.  C.  Andrews,  and  were  furnished  to  him,  in  Swed- 
ish, by  M.  Von  Steyern,  the  Dispatching  Secretary  and  Secretary-in-Chief 
of  the  Ecclesiastical  Department.  (See  "  Foreign  RelatioHS  of  the  Uni- 
ted States,"  1876,  pp.  553  to  564.) 


fcOSimtlTlVB  EXAMINAtiOltS  I'OR  4,000  TEAES.       ISd 

under  one  sovereign,  but  according  to  the  terms  of  its 
Constitution  (adopted  November  4,  1814,  and  revised 
in  1869),  is  *  f ree,  independent,  indivisible,  and  inalien- 
able.' The  King  exercises  the  executive  power  through 
a  Council  of  State,  consisting  of  two  Ministers  of  State 
and  seven  Councilors.  Two  of  the  Councilors  and  one 
Minister  reside  near  the  King  at  Stockholm,  and  the 
remainder  are  at  Christiania."  In  Sweden  the  govern- 
ment consists  of  the  King  and  "  a  Council  of  State, 
composed  of  ten  members,  two  of  whom,  called  Min- 
isters of  State,  hold  the  portfolios  of  Justice  and  For- 
eign Affairs,  and  eight  of  whom  are  called  Councilors 
of  State."  In  Norway  it  is  noteworthy  that  "  the  rail- 
ways and  telegraphs  are  the  property  of  the  govern- 
ment." I  am  informed  by  the  Swedish-Norwegian  Con- 
sul in  New  York  that  this  is  partly  the  case  in  Sweden 
also.  * 

Ixj^hioa  competitive  examinations  have  been  in  use 
about  4,000  years.  Mr.  William  A.  P.  Martin  says  the 
system  is  "the  most  admirable  institution  of  the  Chinese 
empire."  He  furtlier  says  (North  American  Review, 
July,  1870,  pp.  65,  66,  68,  72,  75,  76)  :  **  The  germ  from 
which  it  (the  competitive  system)  sprung  was  a  maxim 
of  the  ancient  sages,  expressed  in  four  syllables,  Kil 
hieii  Jin  neng  —  *  employ  the  able  and  promote  the 
worthy,'  and  examinations  were  resorted  to  as  affording 
the  best  test  of  ability  and  worth.  Of  Yushun,  that 
model  Emperor  of  remote  antiquity,  who  lived  about 
2,200  B.  C,  it  is  recorded  that  he  examined  his  officers 
every  third  year,  and  after  three  examinations  either 
gave  them  promotion  or  dismissed  them  from  the  service. 

"  Every  third  year  the  government  holds  a  great  ex- 
amination for  the  trial  of  candidates,  and  every  fifth 

*  The  words  quoted  in  the  above  paragraph  are  from  the  American 
Cyclopedia, 


loo        THE    COMPETITIVE   SYSTEM   A   SAFETY^ VAtV^. 

year  makes  a  formal  inquisition  into  the  record  of  its 
civil  functionaries.  *  *  *  The  candidates  for  office, 
those  who  are  acknowledged  as  such  in  consequence 
of  sustaining  the  'initial  trial,'  are  divided  into  three 
grades,  *  *  *  <  budding  geniuses,'  *  promoted  schol- 
ars/ and  those  who  are  *  ready  for  office.' 

"  We  have  met  an  old  Mandarin,  who  related  with 
evident  pride  how,  on  gaining  the  second  degree,  he 
had  removed  with  his  whole  family  to  Peking,  from  the 
distant  province  of  Yunnan,  to  compete  for  the  third  ; 
and  how  at  each  triennial  contest  he  had  failed,  until, 
after  more  than  twenty  years  of  patient  waiting,  at  the 
seventh  trial,  and  at  the  mature  age  of  three-score 
years,  he  bore  oif  the  coveted  prize.  He  had  worn  his 
honors  for  seven  years,  and  was  then  Mayor  of  the 
city  of  Tientsin.  In  a  list  now  on  our  table  of  99  suc- 
cessful competitors  for  the  second  degree,  16  are  over 
40  years  of  age,  1  62,  and  1  83.  The  average  age  of 
the  whole  number  is  above  30  ;  and  for  the  third  degree 
the  average  is  of  course  proportionally  higher. 

"  The  political  bearings  of  this  competitive  system 
are  too  important  to  be  passed  over,  and  yet  too  nu- 
merous to  be  treated  in  detail.  *  *  *  j^  ggj-ves  the 
state  as  a  safety-valve,  providing  a  career  for  those  am- 
bitious spirits  which  might  otherwise  foment  disturb- 
ances or  excite  revolutions.  Whilst  in  democratic  coun- 
tries the  ambitious  flatter  the  people,  and  in  monarchies 
fawn  on  the  great,  in  China,  instead  of  resorting  to 
dishonorable  acts  or  to  political  agitation,  they  betake 
themselves  to  quiet  study.  They  know  that  their  men- 
tal caliber  will  be  fairly  gauged,  and  that  if  they  are 
born  to  rule,  the  competitive  examinations  will  open  to 
them  a  career.  The  competitive  system  has  not  indeed 
proved  sufficient  to  employ  all  the  forces  that  tend  to 
produce  intestine  commotion  ;  but  it  is  easy  to  perceive 


i^H^    SYSTElM    A   KIND    OF    CONSTITtTIOI^^.  l9i 

that  without  it  the  shocks  must  have  been  more  fre- 
quent and  serious. 

"It  operates  as  a.  countei'poise  to  the  power  of  an 
absolute  monarch.  Without  it  the  great  offices  would 
be  filled  by  hereditary  nobles,  and  the  minor  offices  be 
farmed  out  by  thousands  to  imperial  favorites.  AVith 
it  a  man  of  talents  may  raise  himself  from  the  hum- 
blest ranks  to  the  dignity  of  viceroy  or  premier.  Tsi- 
ang  siang  pun  wu  chung,  *  the  General  and  the  Prime 
Minister  are  not  born  in  office,'  is  a  line  that  every 
school  boy  is  taught  to  repeat.  Rising  from  the  peo- 
ple, the  Mandarins  understand  the  feelings  and  wants 
of  the  people,  though  it  must  be  confessed  that  they 
are  usually  avaricious  and  oppressive  in  proportion  to 
the  length  of  time  it  has  taken  them  to  reach  their  ele- 
vation. Siill  they  have  the  support  and  sympathy  of 
the  people  to  a  greater  extent  than  they  could  have  if 
they  were  the  creatures  of  arbitrary  power.  The  system 
therefore  introduces  a  popular  element  into  the  govern- 
ment— a  check  on  the  prerogative  of  the  Emperor  as  to 
the  appointment  of  officers,  and  serves  as  a  kind  of 
Constitution  to  his  subjects,  prescribing  the  conditions 
on  which  they  shall  obtain  a  share  in  the  administration 
of  the  government.  *  *  *  It  is  the  Chinaman's 
ballot-box,  his  grand  charter  of  rights.  Even  the  Em- 
peror cannot  tamper  with  it  without  peril.  Though 
the  Emperor  may  lower  its  demands,  in  accordance 
with  the  wishes  of  a  majority,  he  could  not  set  it  aside 
without  producing  a  revolution. 

"  In  districts  where  the  people  have  distinguished 
themselves  by  zeal  in  the  imperial  cause,  the  only 
recompense  they  crave  is  a  slight  addition  to  the  num- 
bers on  the  competitive  prize  list.  Such  additions  the 
government  has  made  very  frequently  of  late  years,  in 
consideration  of  money  supplies.     It  has  also,  to  relieve 


102  EXlMUCER  fElCHlxa  I^UT  To  DliA^TH. 

its  exhausted  exchequer,  put  up  for  sale  the  decorations 
of  the  literary  orders,  and  issued  patents  admitting  con- 
tributors to  the  higher  examinations  without  passing 
through  the  lower  grades.  But  though  the  government 
thus  debases  the  coin,  it  guards  itself  jealously  against 
the  issue  of  a  spurious  currency.  Seven  years  ago 
Peiching,  First  President  of  the  Examining  Board  at 
Peking,  was  put  to  death  for  having  fraudulently  con- 
ferred two  or  three  degrees.  The  fraud  was  limited  in 
extent,  but  the  damage  it  threatened  was  incalculable. 
It  tended  to  shake  the  confidence  of  the  people  in  the 
administration  of  that  branch  of  the  government  w^hich 
constituted  their  only  avenue  to  honors  and  office."* 

*  Mr.  Martin,  in  order  to  show  how  strictly  the  examinations  are  con- 
ducted, says :  "  The  government  examinations  of  China  admit  about 
2,000,000  candidates  every  year,  and  pass  only  I  per  cent."  He  saya 
that  about  2,000  competitors  enter  the  lists  for  the  degree  of  Budding 
Geniuses,  and  that  of  this  number  about  20  are  successful.  But  they 
win  honors  only  ;  further  competition  is  necessary  to  attain  office.  The 
successful  student  "  is  the  best  of  a  hundred  scholars,  exempted  from 
liability  to  corporal  punishment,  and  raised  above  the  vulgar  herd.  The 
social  consideration  to  which  he  is  now  entitled  makes  it  a  grand  day 
for  him  and  his  family."  Of  the  "  model  scholar  of  the  empire,"  or 
"  scholar  laureate,"  who  is  chosen  every  three  years  by  the  Emperor* 
Mr.  Martin  says :  *'  Provinces  contend  for  the  shining  prize,  and  the 
town  that  gives  the  victor  birth  becomes  noted  forever.  Swift  heralds 
bear  the  tidings  of  his  triumph,  and  the  hearts  of  the  people  leap  at 
their  approach.  We  have  seen  them  enter  a  humble  cottage,  and  amid 
the  flaunting  of  banners  and  the  blare  of  trumpets,  announce  to  its 
startled  inmates  that  one  of  their  relations  had  been  crowned  by  the 
Emperor  as  the  laureate  of  the  year.  And  so  high  was  the  estimation 
in  which  the  people  held  the  success  of  their  fellow-townsman,  that  his 
wife  was  requested  to  visit  the  six  gates  of  the  city,  and  to  scatter  be- 
fore each  a  handful  of  rice,  that  the  whole  population  might  share  in 
the  good  fortune  of  her  household." 

Mr.  Martin  may  well  ask  what  could  be  more  democratic  than  choos- 
ing one  of  the  chief  officers  of  a  nation  of  about  450,000,000  people 
^rom  "  a  humble  cottage,"  or  words  to  that  effect. 


CONFUCIUS'S  WISDOM   AND   STATESMANSHIP.  193 

"  One  great  defect,"  says  the  Encyclopedia  Britan- 
nica  (v,  669),  "in  the  competitive  system  in  China  is 
that  there  is  no  limit  to  the  number  of  candidates,  nor 
to  the  age  when  they  may  go  up  for  examination,  and 
the  result  is  that,  what  with  the  surplus  victors  and 
the  unsuccessful  aspirants,*  who  go  on  trying  year  after 
year  until  they  have  become  gray-haired  old  men,  there 
exists  a  large  non-producing  class  in  the  community 
which  acts  as  a  dead  weight  on  the  national  prosperity." 

Confucius  (551  B.C.),  the  philosopher  and  statesman, 
whose  wise  words  are  an  important  supplement  to  the 
foregoing  extracts,  speaking  of  officeseekers  and  office- 
holders, says  ("Chinese  Classics,"  i,  189)  :  "While  they 
have  not  got  their  aims,  their  anxiety  is  how  to  get 
them.  When  they  have  got  them,  their  anxiety  is  lest 
they  should  lose  them.  When  they  are  anxious  lest 
such  things  should  be  lost,  there  is  nothing  to  which 
they  will  not  proceed." 

Confucius's  estimate  of  the  value  of  education  as  a 
qualification  for  officeholding  may  be  inferred  from  the 
following  (p.  208)  :  "  The  student,  having  completed 
his  learning,  should  apply  himself  to  be  an  officer.  The 
officer,  having  discharged  all  his  duties^  should  devote 
his  leisure  to  learning." 

A  government  founded  on  these  principles  is  sure  to 
stand.  It  is  like  a  house  built  on  a  rock.  When  it 
perishes,  if  a  government  founded  on  imperishable  prin- 
ciples can  perish,  it  will  be  from  natural  causes.  But 
alas  for  the  Chinese,  the  same  wall  that  for  so  many 
centuries  inclosed  their  learning  and  wisdom,  also  ex- 
cluded the  learning  and  wisdom  of  other  nations  ! 

John  W.  Draper  says  ("  Intellectual  Development  of 
Europe,"  ii,  397,  398)  :   "  A  trustworthy  account  of  the 

*  Compare  with  Mr.  Thorburn's  remarks  on  page  181. 
9 


l94  (^EllAT  tJNlTY   OE'  TliE   CtilNEsfi. 

present  condition  of  China  would  be  a  valuable  gift  to 
philosophy,  and  also  to  statesmanship.  On  a  former 
page  I  have  remarked  that  it  demands  the  highest  pol- 
icy to  govern  populations  living  in  great  differences  of 
latitude.  Yet  China  has  not  only  controlled  her  cli- 
matic strands  of  people — she  has  even  made  them,  if 
not  homogeneous,  yet  so  fitted  to  each  other  that  they 
all  think  and  labor  alike.  Europe  is  inevitably  hasten- 
ing to  become  what  China  is.  In  her  we  may  see  what 
we  shall  be  like  when  we  are  old." 

Note. — William  Alexander  Parsons  Martin,  D.D.,  LL.D.,  quoted  in 
this  chapter,  was  born  in  Livonia,  Indiana,  April  10,  1827;  went  to 
Ning-po,  China,  in  1850,  where  he  was  engaged  for  ten  years  in  mis- 
sionary labor.  From  1863  till  1868  he  was  a  missionary  at  Peking,  and 
in  1869  became  President  of  the  Tong  Weng  College  in  that  city  and 
Professor  of  international  law.  He  acted  as  an  adviser  of  Chinese  offi- 
cials on  questions  of  international  law  when  disputes  have  arisen  with 
European  powers,  notably  during  the  conflict  with  France  in  1884-85, 
In  1885  he  was  made  a  Mandarin  of  the  third  class.  (Appleton's  Cyc. 
of  Am.  Biography,  iv,  234.) 


INDEX 


Adams  J.  on  removals,  91 ;  notes, 

163,  165;  notes  of  debate  in  Sen- 

ate  on  power  removal,  154-169. 
Adams  John  Quincy,  on  removals, 

92;  notes,  160,  174. 
Allan  Chilton,  power  removal,  166. 
Ames  F.  power  removal,   1 24-27 ; 

predictions  of,  126-26,  162. 
Andrews  C.  C.  notes,  183,  188. 
Appeals,  a  proposed  board  of,  114. 
Application    papers,    how    marked 

(note)  26. 
Applicants  furnish  three  certificates 

as  to  character  (note)  27. 
Aristocracies,  cause  of  and  remedy 

for,  63-66. 
Aristocracy,  danger  of  officeholders', 

61-70;  the  Roman  and  English, 

63,  64  ;  views  of  latter,  in  1856, 

of  English  civil  service  law,  69. 
Aristocrats,  we   must   discriminate 

between  real  and  apparent,  62. 
Arthur   Chester  A.   preaches    and 

practices  fitness  for  and  stability 

in  office,  37,  96. 

Baldwin  Abraham,  power  removal, 
134-35. 

Bancroft  George,  note,  24. 

Barton  David,  on  purity  and  free- 
dom of  elections,  42 ;  his  excuse 
for  the  4-years'  law  (note)  162; 
tenure  during  good  behavior,  167. 

Bayard  James  A.  why  he  changed 
his  vote  from  Burr  to  Jefferson 
in  1801,  civil  service  views  of, 
vindication  of,  &c.  97-100. 


Bayard  T.  F.  obligation  to,  98 ;  de- 
nounces so-called  '  practical  poli- 
ticians'  and  spoils  system,  107. 

Bell  J.  on  freedom  of  elections  and 
patronage  evils,  42 ;  quotes  Eng- 
lish history  and  a  celebrated  res- 
olution of  Parliament  (note)  43. 

Benson  E.  power  removal,  129-31. 

Benton  T.  II.  note,  19  ;  on  patronage 
and  the  freedom  of  elections,  41 ; 
on  decision  first  Congress  as  to 
power  of  removal,  169 ;  report 
on  executive  patronage,  173. 

Bibb  George  M.  on  power  of  remo- 
val, 168;  on  the  division  of  the 
powers  of  government  (note)  169. 

Board  of  Appeals,  a  proposed,  114. 

Boudinot  E.  note,  113;  power  re- 
moval, 121-24. 

Branch  J.  on  Senate's  functions  and 
danger  ambitious  leaders,  1 74. 

Brenton  Samuel,  resolution  of,  9. 

Bribery  at  elections,  the  danger  of, 
Buchanan,  Harrison,  Benton,  Jef- 
ferson, and  Bell  on,  39-43. 

British  India,  civil  service  of,  182. 

Brooks  E.  competitive  tests,  &c.  65. 

Buchanan  James,  on  danger  of  bri- 
bery at  elections,  40 ;  would  not 
inquire  as  to  the  political  opinions 
of  subordinate  officers,  93. 

Burr  Aaron,  the  founder  perhaps  of 
the  '  machine '  in  American  poli- 
tics (note)  71. 

Burt  Silas  W.  difference  between 
conduct  of  public  and  private  bu- 
siness (note)  19 ;  on  competitive 


idd 


INDEX. 


examinations,  35  ;  one  of  the  first 
to  hold  examinations,  Si. 
Butler  P.  power  removal,  155. 

Calhoun  John  C.  denounces  spoils 
system,  criticises  debate  in  first 
Congress  on  removal,  and  gives 
his  own  opinion,  106,  163-64. 

Canada,  civil  service  of,  178-82. 

Carroll  C.  power  removal,  154. 

Caucus  system,  the  (note)  105. 

Chamber  Commerce,  New  York,  fa- 
vors examinations  for  custom 
house  officials,  35,  36. 

Chandler  J.  departmental  balances, 
175-76. 

China,  civil  service  of,  189-92. 

Civil  service  bills,  various,  7,  8. 

Civil  service  law,  the,  summary  of 
provisions  of,  9-12  ;  why  its  scope 
should  be  increased,  12, 13 ;  fruits 
and  features  of,  17-21 ;  its  chief 
object,  19;  its  constitutionality, 
20-24 ;  only  an  elaboration  and 
improvement  of  two  other  laws — 
§g  164  and  1753  of  U.  S.  Revised 
Statutes,  23 ;  causes  a  radical 
change,  24 ;  will  increase  effi- 
ficiency,  elevate  politics,  aid  in 
purifying  elections,  &c.  38-40 ; 
will  promote  self-respect,  hon- 
esty, impartiality,  &c.  53-56  ;  has 
caused  a  welcome  and  salutary 
change  and  promises  a  complete 
reform  of  the  civil  service,  89,  90. 

Civil  service  laws,  two  other,  23. 

Clay  H.  denounces  Jackson's  pre- 
scriptive policy,  relates  an  inci- 
dent of  a  democratic  convention, 
tells  Senator  Marcy  that  Gov.  Met- 
calfe practiced  the  merit  system, 
criticises  decision  of  first  Con- 
gress on  power  of  removal,  76, 
81,  163;  resolution  of,  168. 

Cleveland  Grover,  on  corruption  at 
Castle  Garden,  56,  57  ;  notes,  89, 
90 ;  defends  the  civil  service  law 
system,  96,  97. 

Clinton  D,  W.  on  patronage,  73. 

Clymer  G.  power  removal,  128. 

Commission,  the  civil  service,  no 
more  right  to  depart  from  the  law 


and  evidence  than  a  judge  or  jury 
(note)  26,  27. 

Commission,  the  New  York  State 
civil  service,  on  results  realized 
and  competitive  examinations,  1 8, 
33 ;  also  competitive  examina- 
tions in  Ireland,  34  ;  favors  read- 
justment of  salaries,  66. 

Committee  of  Parliament  on  pro- 
motion examinations  (note)  28 ; 
why  they  should  be  carefully  con- 
ducted, 28. 

Comparative  political  economy,  177. 

Competitive  examinations,  26-37 ; 
their  impartiality  and  utility,  26- 
28 ;  use  of  trial  by  probation, 
27 ;  appointees  independent  of 
politicians,  28 ;  have  same  effect 
as  West  Point  examinations,  28  ; 
a  check  on  politically  ambitious 
chief    officials,    29 ;    relieve    the  ' 

President  and  others  of  burdens 
of  which  even  Washington  com- 
plained, 29 ;  sometimes  the  means 
of  securing  private  employment, 
30 ;  superior  to  non-competitive 
examinations,  30 ;  not  a  guaran- 
tee of  good  character,  but  miy 
expose  bad  character,  30,  31 ;  ed- 
ucation required,  31 ;  high  char- 
acter of  the  individuals  examined 
(note)  31 ;  in  Ireland,  34. 

Confucius,  maxims  of,  193, 

Constitution,  the  American,  W.  E. 
Gladstone's  opinion  of  (note)  21. 

Cox  J.  D.  exposes  corruption  at 
Washington,  30,  58,  87 ;  Tenure 
of  Office  act,  inefficacy  of,  1 1 5. 

Crosby  H.  on  politicians  (note)  54. 

Crockett  D.  testifies  to  Gen.  Jack- 
son's susceptibility  to  flattery,  77. 

Curtis  George  William,  obligation 
to,  4  ;  what  officeholders  should 
and  should  not  do,  45  ;  civil  ser- 
vice law  not  un-American,  67-69 ; 
peroration  to  his  1885  Newport 
address  (note)  68  ;  spoils  system 
in  vogue  in  New  York  in  1801 
and  amusing  incident  connected 
therewith  (note)  71  ;  the  reasons 
for  and  authorship  of  the  four- 
years'  law,  161. 


INDEX. 


19T 


Draper's  (John  W.)  warning  of  a 
false  standard  of  social  distinc- 
tion and  description  of  the  de- 
pravity of  the  Roman  aristocracy 
that  resulted  therefrom  (note)  63 ; 
on  Chinese  government,  193. 

Eaton  Dorman  B,  author  of  civil 
service  law  bill,  7 ;  examinations 
sometimes  expose  bad  character, 
31;  "vicious,  extraneous  influ- 
ence," 57 ;  on  Aaron  Burr  and 
Martin  Van  Buren,  71  ;  on  Eng- 
lish civil  service  history,  178  ;  on 
civil  service  of  British  India,  183. 

Edmunds  George  F.  introduces  a 
civil  service  bill,  8 ;  says  Presi- 
dent John  Adams  was  opposed  to 
the  confirmation  of  appointments 
by  the  Senate  (note)  1 53. 

Edward  I,  election  law  of,  46. 

Elections,  interference  with,  see 
"  Bribery  at  Elections." 

Elections,  David  Barton  on  purity 
and  freedom  of,  42  ;  W.  J.  Graves 
on  same  and  Jackson's  removals, 
44. 

Ellsworth  Oliver,  power  removal, 
155-56,  159. 

English  civil  service  law,  good  effect 
of,  50  ;  some  of  its  features,  178. 

English  election  laws,  chief,  from 
1275  till  1883,  46-52. 

Everett  Edward,  favors  educational 
qualifications  for  office,  32,  33. 

Ewing  T.  against  confirming  'polit- 
ical gladiators'  by  Senate,  172. 

Examinations  by  the  Postmaster- 
General  and  Secretary  of  Navy 
(note)  29. 

Examinations,  competitive,  see  com- 
petitive examinations. 

Examiners,  why  government  officials 
are  chosen  to  act  as  such  (note)  9. 

Fisher  S.  S.  holds  first  competitive 

examinations,  36,  37. 
Foot  Samuel  A.  attributes  proscrip- 

tive  policy  to  Van  Burcn,  76. 
Forsyth  John,  'boomerang'  speech 

of,  73. 
France,  civil  service  of,  184-85, 


Franklin  Benjamin,  deprecates  high 
salaries,  64  ;  warns  the  consiiiu- 
tional  convention  against  ambi- 
tious and  avaricious  men,  88. 

Fruits  and  facts,  17-25. 

Gallatin  A.  on  the  qualifications  of 
subordinate  officers,  32 ;  opposes 
removal  for  opinion's  sake,  172. 

Garfield  James  A.  clear  and  plain 
words  of,  95. 

George  II,  election  laws  of,  49. 

George  III,  election  law  of,  disfran- 
chising 40,000  voters,  49. 

George  IV,  election  law  of,  50. 

Gerry  E.  power  removal,  140-42. 

Godkin  Edwin  L.  maxim  of,  office- 
holders' aristocracy,  insults  by 
and  cause  of  aristocracies,  inso- 
lence of  office,  eagerness  for  office 
in  France,  36,  61,  62,  65,  70,  185. 

Goodhue  B  power  removal,  133. 

Gordon  William  F.  fears  executive 
patronage  and  power,  171. 

Government  Departments,  the,  con- 
ducted as  schools,  would  produce 
diplomatists,  financiers,  soldiers, 
&c.  (note)  28. 

Gladstone  William  E.  on  American 
Constitution  (note)  21. 

Grant  Ulysses  S.  on  patronage  .sys- 
tem, 30  ;  recommendations  of,  94. 

Graves  E.  0.  testimony  of  (note)  58. 

Graves  Wm,  J.  on  freedom  of  elec- 
tions and  Jackson's  removals,  44. 

Grayson  William,  power  removal, 
156,  158. 

IIager  Albert  D.  letter  of  (note)  83. 

Hamilton  Alexander,  principles  and 
proposed  plan  of,  21,  22;  Senate 
should  participate  in  removals  as 
well  as  a))pointments,  138. 

Harrison  William  IT.  on  removal 
and  the  freedom  of  elections,  41. 

Hartley  T.  power  removal,  127. 

Ilawley  Senator,  report  of,  59. 

Hawthorne  Julian,  report  of,  64. 

Hayes  President,  views  of,  94. 

Hayne  Senator,  on  Van  Buren,  78. 

Henry  P.  eloquent  but  mistaken  op- 
position of  to  Constitution,  171. 


198 


INDEX. 


Henry  VI,  election  laws  of,  46,  4Y. 

Hewitt  Abram  S.  on  French  diplo- 
matic and  consular  services,  185. 

Hill  David  B.  on  competitive  exam- 
inations, 34. 

Holmes  Senator,  maxim  of,  107. 

Huntington  B.  power  removal,  140, 

Huske  General,  on  English  officials 
in  American  colonies,  16. 

Insolence  of  Office,  remedy  for, 

70. 
Ireland,  competitive  examinations 

in,  34. 
Ivins  William  M.  modus  operandi 

of  present  English   election  law 

explained  by,  60-52. 
Izard  R.  power  removal,  159. 

Jackson  Andrew,  first  to  practice 
patronage  system  nationally,  71 ; 
letters  of,  73  ;  probable  causes 
of  his  radical  change,  74-79. 

Jackson  J.  power  removal,  143-45. 

Jackson  Mrs.  abuse  and  death  of,  74. 

James  Sir  H.  election  law  of,  52. 

James  T.  L.  postoffice  rules  of,  37. 

Jay  Chief  Justice  John,  civil  service 
principles  and  practices  of,  22. 

Jay  John,  report  of  and  note  on,  57. 

Jefferson  Thomas,  on  duration  of 
constitutions  and  laws;  opposed 
to  monopolies  (note)  21 ;  talent 
and  woi  th  for  office,  32 ;  on  re- 
movals, 91  ;  mistakeof  (note)  98; 
on  4-years'  law  (note)  160 ;  writes 
opinion  for  Washington  on  Sen- 
ate's  confirmatory  powers  (note) 
165. 

Jenckes  Thomas  Allen,  bill  of,  8  ;  a 
touch  of  humor,  62. 

Johnson  Andrew,  his  comparatively 
conservative  course,  87 ;  power 
removal  liable  to  abuse,  93. 

Johnson  W.  S.  power  removal,  159. 

Jones  P.  H.  competitive  tests,  37. 

Kent  James,  power  removal,  164. 
Kinney  William,  alleged  remark  of 

and  note  on,  83. 
Kleiner  J.  J.  declines  renomination 

on  account  of  officeseekers,  60. 


Lally  Thomas  A.  note  on,  158. 

Law,  the  civil  service,  see  civil  ser- 
vice law. 

Lawrence  John,  probably  antedated 
Burr  in  advocating  patronage  sys- 
tem, 72  ;  power  removal,  127. 

Leading  statesmen's  principles,  91- 
112. 

Lee  K.  B.  power  removal,  132. 

Lee  R,  H.  power  removal,  156-57. 

Lewis  Sir  G.  C.  on  adapting  laws  to 
the  people  (note)  24. 

Lewis  William  B.  letter  to  Jackson 
on  danger  patronage  system,  75. 

Life  tenures,  no  danger  in  if  based 
on  merit,  66  ;  will  be  rare,  66. 

Lincoln  A.  preaches  one  thing  and 
practices  another,  83  ;  letter  of, 
83  ;  remarks  of  to  Lamon,  Sum- 
ner, and  Schurz,  84 ;  Lamon's 
dark  picture  of  (note)  84. 

Livermore  S.  power  removal,  142. 

Low  Seth,  on  competitive  examina- 
tions, 34. 

Lowell  James  Russell,  on  Prince  of 
Wales's  celebrated  speeches,  64. 

Macaulay  Thomas  Babington,  on 
corrupt  English  elections,  47. 

Macon  Nathaniel,  resolution  of  and 
note  on,  100. 

Madison  President,  on  appointing 
and  removing  powers,  21 ;  mis- 
take of,  81 ;  on  spoils  of  victory, 
92;  power  removal,  117-20;  on 
4-years'  law  (note)  160. 

Marcy  William  L.  speech  of,  proba- 
ble cause  of  his  using  the  word 
'  spoils,'  and  humoraus  letter  of, 
81,  82  ;  letter  from  James  Parton 
about,  82. 

Martin  William  A.  P.  on  Chinese 
civil  service,  189-92;  note,  194. 

Massachusetts,  report  of  civil  ser- 
vice commission  of,  13. 

May  T.  E.  colonial  officeholders,  16. 

McDuffie  G.  power  removal,  169. 

McKee  Samuel,  resolution  of,  66. 

Metcalfe  Thomas,  non  partisan  ap- 
pointments of  (note)  81. 

Mill  J.  S.  on  competitive  tests,  30. 

Miller  Senator,  on  Van  Buren,  78, 


INDEX. 


1§0 


Monarchical  power,  inherent  fear  of 

Americana  in,  166. 
Monroe  James,  views  of,  92. 
Mundella  Mr.  note,  64. 
Murtha  W.  H.  good  example  of,  56. 

Napoleon  I,  official  rules  and  anec- 
dote of  (note)  1 14. 

Norway,  civil  service  and  govern- 
ment of,  188-89. 

O'Brien  H.  on  laborers  (note)  13. 

Office,  insolence  of,  remedy  for,  70. 

Officeholders'  aristocracy,  danger  of, 
61-70;  the  Roman  and  English, 
63,  64 ;  views  of  latter,  in  1855, 
of  English  civil  service  law,  69. 

Officeholders'  salaries,  too  much  dif- 
ference in,  64-66 ;  readjustment 
of,  66. 

Officeholders,  should  be  protected 
from  mistakes,  dislikes,  fits  of 
passion,  &c.  114. 

Officeholding,  ordinary,  something 
better  than,  90. 

Officeseeking,  Senator  Hawley's  pic- 
ture of,  60. 

Page  J.  power  removal,  145-47. 

Paley  W.  disquisition  of  on  patron- 
age, 108-9 ;  favors  woman  suf- 
frage (note)  109. 

Parton  James,  on  Van  Buren's  tact 
and  secrecy,  79 ;  letters  from,  80, 
82 ;  exposes  patronage  system,  80. 

Paterson  VV.  power  removal,  157. 

Patronage  and  merit  systems  com- 
pared, 53-58. 

Patronage  evils  insidious,  89. 

Patronage  pandemonium,  the,  86-8. 

Patronage  system,  the,  71-90;  its 
fairness  only  apparent,  72,  73. 

Pearson  H.  G.  on  competitive  exam- 
inations, 35. 

Peiching  (president  Chinese  examin- 
ing board)  put  to  death  for  fraud, 
192. 

Pendleton  George  H.  introduces  civil 
service  law  bill,  7. 

Poindexter  G.  on  Van  Buren,  77. 

potts  William,  obligation  to  and  re- 
port of,  14-6, 


Power  of  removal,  the,  113-76. 

Principle,  voting  for  a  man  of  is 
voting  for,  39. 

Probation,  trial  by,  27,  28. 

Promotion  examinations,  compulso- 
ry, 11;  why  they  should  be  care- 
fully conducted,  28 ;  committee 
of  Parliament  on,  28. 

Prussia,  civil  service  of,  183. 

Public  business,  why  its  fundamen- 
tal rules  are  same  as  private,  19. 

QuiNCY  JosiAH,  characteristic  prop- 
osition and  speech  of,  101-6 ;  rule 
of  law  laid  down  by  (note)  106. 

Quincy  Josiah  jr.  maxim  of,  106. 

Randolph  John,  the  presidency  and 
the  lever  of  patronage,  1 74. 

Read  G.  power  removal,  168. 

Reform,  civil  service,  "  surest  guar- 
antee of  the  safety  and  success  of 
American  institutions,"  97. 

Removals,  number  of  by  seven  first 
Presidents  (note)  93. 

Republic,  a,  cannot  stand  multiform 
and  long-continued  corruption,  40. 

Resolution,  civil  service,  of  national 
democratic  convention  of  1876 
(note)  94. 

Reynolds  Governor,  views  of,  83. 

Robertson  Wm.  H.  on  competitive 
examinations,  35. 

Roman  aristocracy,  depravity  of,  63  ; 
anecdote  of  Julius  Caesar,  64. 

Salaries,  officeholders',  too  much 
difference  in,  64-66 ;  readjust- 
ment of,  66. 

Schurz  Carl,  bill  of,  8  ;  letter  from 
about  Lincoln,  84. 

Scott  Thomas,  power  removal,  134. 

Sedgwick  T.  power  removil,  131. 

Senate,  great  power  and  use  of,  1 16  ; 
sat  with  closed  doors  from  1 789 
till  1795,  154  ;  Vice-President  J. 
Adams  keeps  notes  of  one  day's 
debate  of,  154. 

Sherman  R,  power  removal,  147. 

Sherwin  Henry,  on  the  relation  of 
competitive  examinations  to  edu- 
cation (note)  18, 


200 


INDiJX. 


Smith  S.  deposition  of  (note)  and 
on  removal  for  opinion's  sake, 
100-72. 

Smith  W.  on  power  removal,  im- 
peachment, &o.  137-39. 

Some  of  the  law's  promises,  38-52. 

Southard  Samuel  L.  when  removal 
is  justifiable,  170;  on  repeal  4- 
years'  law  161. 

Sprague  P.  describes  effects  of  Jack- 
son's proscriptive  policy,  170. 

Stone  M.  J.  power  removal,  148-52 ; 
prophecy  of  (note)  148 ;  a  cring- 
ing disposition  requisite  for  an 
office  held  at  will  and  pleasure, 
151. 

Story  Joseph,  power  removal,  164. 

Sumner  Charles,  author  first  com- 
petitive civil  service  bill,  7. 

Sumter  Thomas,  on  power  removal 
and  note  on,  153. 

Sweden,  civil  service  of,  186-88. 

Sylvester  P.  power  removal,  135. 

Tazewell  Littleton  W.  on  execu- 
tive power,  175. 

Tenure  of  office  law,  failure  of,  115. 

Tenures,  life,  no  evil  in  if  based  on 
merit  and  why  they  will  be  rare, 
66,  67  ;  used  by  demagogues  as  a 
scare-crow,  67. 

Thomas  J,  L.  examinations  held  by, 
37. 

Thorburn  J.  obligation  to  and  let- 
ters from,  180-82. 

Tilden  S.  J.  gift  of,  33  ;  civil  service 
views  of  (note)  94. 

Tree  of  Liberty,  what  will  kill  it,  41. 

Trevelyan  Sir  C.  (note)  18. 

Trumbull  Lyman,  author  Sec.  1753 
U.  S.  Rev.  Stat.  7 ;  bill  of,  58. 

Tucker  Thomas  Tudor,  on  power  of 
removal,  152;  proposed  constitu- 
tional amendments  (note)  152. 

Tyler  John,  favors  regulating  and 
restraining  power  removal,  93 ; 
danger  of  patronage,  170. 

Van  Buren  Martin,  on  the  draw- 
backs of  patronage,  79;  debate 


on  confirmation  of,  76-9  •,  a  good 
word  from  J  as.  Parton  about,  80. 

Veteran  soldiers,  Massachusetts,  tri- 
umph of  (note)  47. 

Veteran  soldiers  and  sailors  (and, 
under  new  rules,  their  widows 
and  orphans)  preference  for,  11, 
47. 

Vining  J.  on  power  removal,  Swe- 
den and  Poland,  and  comparative 
political  economy,  120-21,  177. 

Washington  George,  on  burdens  of 
officeseeking,  29;  maxim  of,  32; 
on  establishment  of  a  national 
university,  32 ;  lays  foundation 
for  the  civil  service  law,  91. 

Waters  E.  F.  note,  16  ;  on  civil  ser- 
vices of  British  India  and  France, 
and  letter  from,  182-84-85. 

Webster  D.  on  legislative  powers 
(note)  20  ;  maxim  of,  36  ;  public 
virtue  the  principle  of  republican 
governments  (note)  40  ;  depreca- 
ted high  salaries  (note)  64 ;  pre- 
diction of  (note)  79 ;  criticises 
Madison  (note)  119;  criticises  de- 
cision first  Congress  on  removal, 
160;  on  4-years'  law,  Jackson's 
nominations,  and  the  evils  of  pat- 
ronage (notes)  162-63. 

Wheeler  E.  P.  civil  service  law  in- 
spired by  the  genius  of  American 
institutions,  18. 

White  A.  power  removal,  136. 

White  Hugh  L.  on  evils  of  office- 
hunting,  172. 

William  III,  election  laws  of,  47. 

William  and  Marv,  election  law  of, 
47. 

Williams  G.  H.  on  decision  of  first 
Congress  on  removal,  165. 

Wilson  Justice,  on  evils  of  patron- 
age and  rules  for  appointments, 
110;  Washington's  opinion  of 
and  maxim  of  (notes)  110-14. 

Wise  Henry  A.  on  Van  Buren,  79. 

Women  in  national  and  Massachu- 
setts services,  13,  25  ;  suffrage  of, 
(note)  109. 


APPENDIX 


INFORMATION  FOR  APPLICANTS  FOR  OFFICE. 

All  applications  for  regular  competitive  examination  for 
admission  to  the  classified  civil  service  must  be  made  on  blank 
forms  to  be  prescribed  by  the  commission. 

Requests  for  blank  forms  of  application  for  competitive  exam- 
ination for  admission  to  the  classified  civil  service,  and  all  regular 
applications  for  such  examination,  shall  be  made — 

1.  If  for  the  classified  departmental  service,  or  railway  mail 
service,  to  the  United  States  Civil  Service  Commission,  at  Wash- 
ington, D.  C. 

2.  If  for  the  classified  customs  service,  to  the  civil  service 
board  of  examiners  for  the  customs  district  in  which  the  person 
desiring  to  be  examined  wishes  to  enter  the  customs  service. 

3.  If  for  the  classified  postal  service,  to  the  civil  service  board 
of  examiners  for  the  postofiice  at  which  the  person  desiring  to 
be  examined  wishes  to  enter  the  postal  service. 

Note. — The  application  blanks  for  the  Railway  Mail  Service 
differ  from  those  for  the  departmental  service,  and  applicants 
should  be  certain  that  they  obtain  the  proper  blanks  for  the 
service  for  which  they  wish  to  apply. 

Requests  for  blank  forms  of  application  to  customs  and  postal 
boards  of  examiners  must  be  made  in  writing  by  the  persons 
desiring  examination,  and  such  blank  forms  shall  not  be  fur- 
nished to  any  other  persons. 

Note, — The  foregoing  refers  to  the  National  civil  service. 
For  the  New  York  State  civil  service,  applicants  should  address 
their  conjmunications  as  follows:  "State  Civil  Service  Com- 
mission, Albany,  N.  Y."    For  Now  York  city,  Brooklyn,  Buffalo, 


202  APPENDIX. 

&c. :  "  Secretary  Municipal  Civil  Service,"  giving  the  name  of 
the  city.  For  the  Massachusetts  State  Civil  Service  and  also 
for  the  city  of  Boston  :  "  State  Civil  Service  Commission, 
5  Pemberton  Sq. ,  Boston,  Mass."  For  Massachusetts  cities  other 
than  Boston,  to  the  respective  Secretaries  of  tiie  Boards  of 
Examiners  of  such  cities. 


WHAT  AN   APPLICANT   MUST    STATE   UNDER   OATH. 

His  full  name.  That  he  is  a  citizen  of  the  United  States. 
Year  and  place  of  his  birth.  The  state,  territor}^  or  district  of 
which  he  is  a  bona  fide  resident,  and  the  length  of  time  he  has 
been  a  resident  thereof.  His  post  office  address.  His  business 
or  employment  during  the  three  years  immediately  preceding 
the  date  of  his  application,  and  where  he  has  resided  each  of 
those  years.  Condition  of  his  health,  and  his  physical  capacity 
for  the  public  service.  His  previous  employment  in  the  public 
service.  Any  right  of  preference  in  civil  appointments  he  may 
claim  under  section  1754  of  the  Revised  Statutes.  The  kind  of 
school  in  which  he  received  his  education.  That  he  does  not 
habitually  use  intoxicating  beverages  to  excess.  That  he  has 
not,  within  the  year  next  preceding  the  date  of  his  application, 
been  dismissed  from  the  public  service  for  delinquency  or 
misconduct.     Such  other  facts  as  the  commission  may  require. 

Every  applicant  for  examination  for  the  classified  depart- 
mental service  must  support  the  statements  of  his  application 
paper  by  certificates  of  persons  acquainted  with  him,  residents 
of  the  state,  territory,  or  district  in  which  he  claims  bona  fide 
residence  ;  and  the  commission  shall  prescribe  the  form  and 
number  of  such  certificates. 

A  false  statement  made  by  an  applicant,  or  connivance  by  him 
with  any  person  to  make  on  his  behalf  a  false  statement  in  any 
certificate  required  by  the  commission,  and  deception  or  fraud 
practiced  by  an  applicant,  or  by  any  person  on  his  behalf  with  his 
consent,  to  influence  an  examination,  shall  be  good  cause  for 
refusal  to  examine  such  applicant,  or  for  refusing  to  mark  bis 
papers  after  examination. 

The  oath  to  an  application  must  be  taken  before  an  officer 
having  an  official  seal  ;  if  taken  before  a  justice  of  the  peace  he 
must  furnish  a  certificate  of  the  court  that  he  is  authorized  to 
administer  the  oath. 


APPENDIX.  203 


SUBJECTS   OF   EXAMINATION. — CUSTOMS   SERVICE. 

Clerk  and  Storekeeper  Examination. — Orthography.  Copying. 
Penmanship.  Arithmetic  :  fundamental  rules,  fractions,  per- 
centage, interest,  and  discount.  Elements  of  book-keeping 
and  of  accounts.  Elements  of  the  English  language.  Letter- 
writing.  Elements  of  the  geography,  history  and  government 
of  the  United  States.     Time  of  examination,  7  hours. 

Law  Clerk  Examination. ^-Orthography.  Copying.  Penman- 
ship. Arithmetic  :  fundamental  rules,  fractions,  percentage 
interest,  and  discount.  Elements  of  the  English  language. 
Letter-writing.     Law  questions.     Time,  7  hours. 

Day  Inspector  Examination. — Orthography.  Copying.  Pen- 
manship. Arithmetic  :  fundamental  rules,  fractions  and  per- 
centage. Elements  of  the  English  language.  Geography  of 
America  and  Europe.     Time,  6  hours. 

Inspectress  Examination. — Orthography.  Copying.  Penman- 
ship. Arithmetic  :  fundamental  rules.  Geography  of  America 
and  Europe.     Time,  6  hours. 

Night  Inspector,  Messenger,  Assistant  Weigher,  and  Opener-and- 
Packer  Examination. — Orthography.  Copying.  Penmanship. 
Arithmetic  :  fundamental  rules.     Time,  from  4  to  5  hours, 

Oauger  Examination. — Orthography.  Copying.  Penmanship. 
Arithmetic  :  practical  questions.  Theoretical  questions.  Prac- 
tical tests.     Time,  8  hours. 

Examiner  Examination. — Orthography.  Copying.  Penmanship. 
Arithmetic  :  fundamental  rules,  fractions,  percentage  and  dis- 
count. Elements  of  the  English  language.  Practical  questions. 
Practical  tests.     Time,  8  hours. 

Sampler  Examination. — Orthography.  Copying.  Penmanship. 
Arithmetic  :  fundamental  rules.  Practical  questions.  Practical 
tests.     Time,  6  hours. 

POSTAL   SERVICE. 

Clerk  Examination. — Orthography.  Copying.  Penmanship. 
Arithmetic :  fundamental  rules,  fractions  and  percentage. 
Elements  of  the  English  language.  Letter-writing.  Elements 
of  the  geography,  history  and  government  of  the  United  States. 
Time,  6  hours. 

Carrier  Examination.— Orthography.  Copying.  Penmanship. 
Arithmetic  :  fundamental  rules.     Elements  of  the  geography  of 


204  APPENDIX. 

the  United  States.     Knowledge  of  the  locality  of  the  postoffice 
delivery.     Physical  tests.     Time,  5  hours. 

Messenger  Examination. — Orthography,  Copying.  Penman- 
ship. Arithmetic :  fundamental  rules.  Physical  tests.  "  This 
examination  shall  also  be  used  to  test  fitness  for  the  position  of 
piler,  stamper,  junior  clerk,  or  other  place,  the  duties  of  which 
are  chiefly  manual.     Time,  5  hours. 

RAILWAY  MAIL   SERVICE. 

There  is  but  one  grade  of  examination,  all  appointments  being 
made  to  class  one,  which  includes  all  places  of  $800  or  less  per 
annum.  Places  above  $800  are  filled  by  promotion  or  transfer. 
The  examination  will  not  include  more  than  the  following 
subjects :  Orthography.  Penmanship.  Copying  Arithmetic  : 
fundamental  rules,  fractions  and  percentage.  Letter-writing. 
The  geography  of  the  United  States,  and  especially  of  the  State 
or  railway  mail  division  im  which  the  applicant  resides.  The 
railway  systems  of  the  State  or  railway  mail  division  in  which 
the  applicant  resides.     Reading  addresses. 

The  Classified  Railway  Mail  Service  embraces  all  Superintend- 
ents, Assistant  Superintendents,  Chief  Clerks,  Railway  Postal 
Clerks,  Route  Agents,  Local  Agents,  Mail  Route  Messengers, 
and  other  employes  of  the  Railway  Mail  Service,  One  General 
Superintendent  and  one  Assistant  General  Superintendent  are 
alone  exempted  from  examination.  All  other  places  can  be  filled 
only  by  promotion,  transfer  or  examination.  Superintendents 
of  Mails  at  classified  Post  offices  will  be  selected  from  among  the 
employes  of  the  Railway  Mail  Service,  Applicants  must  not  be 
under  18  or  over  35  years  of  age,  except  that  any  person  honor- 
ably discharged  from  the  military  or  naval  service  of  the  United 
States  by  reason  of  disability  resulting  from  wounds  or 
sickness  incurred  in  the  line  of  duty,  may  be  examined  without 
regard  to  his  age.     No  females  are  appointed, 

A  schedule  of  the  times  and  places  of  examinations  is  given  to 
each  applicant  together  with  a  form  of  application  paper  and 
three  forms  of  statements  concerning  applicant.  From  the 
schedule  he  may  select  the  time  and  place  t)f  examination  most 
convenient  for  him,  nnd  on  receiving  the  application  and  state- 
ments properly  filled  out  with  indication  of  the  time  and  place  of 
examination  selected,  the  Commission  will  furnish  a  card  of 
admission  to  the  examination. 


APPENDIX.  205 

Each  applicant  who  passes  the  examination  at  the  required 
grade  will  be  entered  upon  the  register  of  eligibles  of  the  State 
in  which  he  resides  for  certification  for  appointment  from  that 
State  in  the  order  of  grade.  An  eligible  of  the  District  of 
Columbia  will  be  entered,  according  to  his  election,  on  the  regis- 
ter of  the  State  of  Maryland  or  on  that  of  the  State  of  Virginia, 
No  prediction  will  be  made  of  the  time  or  probability  of  an 
appointment.  Each  applicant  by  his  examination  decides  his  own 
grade  and  hence  his  own  chances.  No  applicant  will  be  informed 
of  his  relative  standing  on  any  register  of  those  eligible  for 
appointment. 

There  is  no  use  of  seeking  the  aid  of  any  prominent  or  pre- 
sumably influential  person  to  secure  an  application  paper  or  an 
examination.  No  recommendation  or  certificate,  besides  those 
provided  for  in  the  official  blanks,  will  be  received  or  can  be  of 
any  use  in  securing  an  examination  or  a  certification  for  appoint- 
ment. Neither  the  Commission  nor  any  Examiner  can  help  any 
one  to  get  an  appointment,  and  they  have  nothing  to  do  with  the 
choice  by  the  appointing  officer  from  those  certified. 

The  Railway  Mad  Service  is  governed  by  the  same  general 
rules  as  other  departments. 

DEPARTMENTAL    SERVICE. 

Copyist  Examination.— ¥  or  places  of  $000  per  annum  and 
under.  Orthography.  Copying.  Penmanship.  Arithmetic : 
fundamental  rules,  fractions  and  percentage.     Time,  5  hours. 

Clerk  Examination.— ¥ov  places  of  $1,000  per  annum  and 
upward.  Orthography.  Copying.  Penmanship.  Arithmetic  : 
fundamental  rules,  fractions,  percentage,  interest  and  discount. 
Elements  of  book-keeping  and  of  accounts.  Elements  of  the 
English  language.  Letter-writing.  Elements  of  the  geography, 
history  and  government  of  the  United  States.     Time,  7  hours. 

Supplementary  Examinations. — For  places  which,  in  the  opinion 
of  the  commission,  require,  in  addition  to  the  knowledge  required 
to  pass  the  copyist  or  the  clerk  examination,  certain  technical, 
professional,  or  scientific  knowledge,  or  knowledge  of  a  language 
other  than  the  English  language,  or  peculiar  or  special  skill. 
The  principal  supplementary  examinations  are  :  Type-writing, 
stenography,  law,  medical  science,  modern  languages  (French, 
German,  Italian,  Spanish  and  Swedish),  proof-reading  and 
telegraphy. 


20G  APPENDIX. 

8j)ecial  Examinatiom. — For  places  which,  in  the  opinion  of  the 
commission,  require  certain  technical,  professional  or  scientific 
knowledge  or  skill.  Each  special  examination  shall  embrace,  in 
addition  to  the  special  subject  upon  which  the  applicant  is  to  be 
tested,  as  many  of  the  subjects  of  the  clerk  examination  as  the 
commission  may  decide  to  be  necessary  to  test  fitness  for  the 
place  to  be  filled.  Any  person  twenty  years  of  age  or  over  may 
take  one  or  more  "special"  examinations,  but  a  separate  appli- 
cation (with  separate  certificates  of  vouchers)  must  be  filed  for 
each.  The  most  common  "  specials  "are  :  Bookkeeper  ;  "  prin- 
cipal," "  special,"  or  "medical"  examiner  of  the  Bureau  of 
Pensions  ;  assistant  examiner  of  the  Patent  Office  ;  inspector  in 
the  Post  Office  Department  ;  draughting  (mechanical,  architect- 
ural or  topographical);  State  Department  ;  copying  of  drawings. 
Persons  desiring  to  take  "special  "  examinations  are  not  required 
to  take  any  other  examination  as  a  basis,  each  "special"  being 
complete  in  itself. 

The  names  of  all  competitors  who  have  passed  a  supple- 
mentary or  a  special  examination  shall  be  entered,  without  regard 
to  State  residence,  upon  the  register  of  persons  eligible  to  the 
class  or  place  to  test  fitness  for  which  such  supplementary  or 
special  examination  was  held. 

The  grade  of  each  competitor  shall  be  expressed  by  the  whole 
number  nearest  the  general  average  attained  by  him,  and  the 
griide  of  each  eligible  shall  be  noted  upon  the  register  of  eligibles 
in  connection  with  his  name.  When  two  or  more  eligibles  are 
of  the  same  grade,  preference  in  certification  shall  be  determined 
by  the  order  in  which  their  application  papers  were  filed. 

Immediately  after  the  general  averages  in  an  examination  shall 
have  been  ascertained,  each  competitor  shall  be  notified  that  he 
has  passed  or  has  failed  to  pass 

If  a  competitor  fails  to  pass,  he  may,  with  the  consent  of  the 
commission,  be  allowed  re-examination  at  any  time  within  six 
months  from  the  date  of  failure  without  filing  a  new  application  ; 
otherwise  he  must  make  a  new  application. 

No  person  who  has  passed  an  examination  shall,  while  eligible 
on  the  register  supplied  by  such  examination,  be  re-examined, 
unless  he  shall  furnish  evidence  satisfactory  to  the  commission 
that  at  the  time  of  his  examination  he  was,  because  of  illness  or 
other  good  cause  incapable  of  doing  himself  justice. 

The  term  of  eligibility  to  appointment  under  the  copyist  and 


APPENDIX.  207 

the  clerk  examinations  shall  be  one  3'ear  from  the  day  on  which 
the  name  of  the  eligible  is  entered  on  the  register.  The  term  of 
eligibility  under  a  supplementary  or  a  special  examination  shall 
be  determined  by  the  commission,  but  shall  not  be  less  than  one 
year. 

An  applicant  for  a  customs  or  a  postal  examination  cannot  be 
examin;  d  at  any  other  custom-house  or  postoflBce  than  the  one 
in  which  he  is  seeking  to  enter  the  classified  service. 

If  an  applicant  fails  to  receive  due  notice  of  an  examination, 
or  if  he  shall  give  a  reason  satisfactory  to  the  commission  or  the 
board  of  examiners  for  failure  to  attend  an  examination  of  which 
he  may  have  received  due  notice,  he  slialL  be  notified  to  attend 
the  next  examination  for  the  same  class  or  place. 

At  the  beginning  of  an  examination  each  competitor  must  fill 
the  blanks  in  the  "  declaration  sheet."  He  must  also  write  his 
examination  number,  and  nothing  else,  on  an  envelope,  inclose 
the  declaration  sheet,  and  seal  the  envelope.  The  envelope  must 
be  delivered  to  one  of  the  examiners,  and  it  must  not  be  opened 
until  after  the  competitor's  papers  shall  have  been  marked  and 
his  general  average  ascertained. 

As  soon  as  the  envelopes  containing  the  declaration  sheets  shall 
have  been  delivered,  examination  sheet  1  shall  be  given  to  the 
competitors,  and  as  soon  as  it  shall  have  been  completed  sheet  2  ; 
and  so  on,  no  competitor  being  allowed  to  liave  more  than  one 
sheet  at  the  same  time.  If,  through  no  fault  of  the  competitor, 
a  sheet  is  spoiled,  the  examiners  may  issue  another  sheet  of  the 
same  number.  The  time  when  a  competitor  receives  a  sheet, 
and  the  time  when  he  finishes  it,  must  be  stated  at  the  top  of  the 
sheet. 

The  examiners  shall  require  every  competitor  on  completion  of 
each  sheet,  to  surrender  the  sheet  itself  and  also  all  scrap  or 
otiier  paper  on  which  he  may  have  done  preliminary  work. 

The  answers  on  examination  papers  must  be  written  with  ink  ; 
but  preliminary  work  may  be  done  with  pencil. 

In  the  dictation  exercise  the  passage  to  be  dictated  shall  first 
be  read  aloud  for  information,  and  then  be  dictated  in  groups  of 
words,  at  the  rate  of  not  less  than  fifteen  nor  more  than  twenty- 
five  words  per  minute.  The  examiner  who  reads  the  dictation 
must  not  repeat  any  group  of  words,  or  any  word,  dictated  by 
him  ;  but  he  must  be  careful  in  giving  the  dictation  to  pronounce 
each  word  distinctly. 


208  APPENDIX. 

After  an  examination  sliall  have  been  begun,  no  conversation 
or  communication  shall  be  permitted  between  competitors. 

No  examination  shall  begin  earlier  than  9  a.  m.  or  continue 
later  than  6  p.  m. 

Every  examination  must  be  held  in  the  presence  of  more  than 
one  examiner.     No  secret  examination  must  be  permitted. 

Each  examination,  except  the  examination  in  book-keeping,  or 
others  especiall}'-  excepted  from  this  regulation  by  the  commission, 
must  be  completed  on  the  day  on  which  it  is  begun. 

The  examination  in  book-keeping  shall  be  held  on  two  suc- 
cessive days,  seven  hours  being  allowed  on  the  first  day  and  five 
on  the  second.  The  first  day  shall  be  devoted  to  technical 
book  keeping,  the  second  to  collateral  subjects. 

Twenty  minutes  shall  be  allowed  at  the  beginning  of  each 
examination  for  the  work  of  filling  the  blanks  of  the  declaration 
sheet,  and  ten  minutes  for  explanations  and  instructions  by  Ihe 
examiner  in  charge,  which  time  will  not  be  included  in  the  time 
allowed  to  the  examination.  Explanations  must  be  made  to  the 
class  as  a  whole,  not  to  individual  competitors. 

No  allowance  will  be  made  for  time  spent  out  of  the  examina- 
tion room  for  lunch  or  other  purposes,  and  none  for  time  lost  in 
the  examination  room.  The  examiner  in  charge  must,  however, 
be  careful  not  to  permit  delay  in  the  issuing  of  question  sheets. 

No  competitor  shall  leave  the  room  during  an  examination 
without  first  giving  notice  of  his  desire  to  do  so.  If  a  competitor 
leaves  the  room  before  he  has  finished  the  sheet  on  which  he  is 
engaged  he  will  not  be  permitted  to  finish  it  on  his  return.  It 
will  be  taken  up,  and  the  next  sheet  will  be  given  to  him. 

Should  the  examiner  in  charge  have  reason  to  suspect  that 
competitors  have  copied  from  each  other,  or  that  they  have 
improperly  obtained  information  relating  to  the  subject  of  the 
examination,  the  commission  shall  be  informed  thereof,  and 
the  examination  papers  of  such  competitors  shall  not  be  marked 
until  the  circumstances  leading  to  tlie  suspicion  shall  have  been 
investigated  ;  and  if  it  be  ascertained  that  the  competitors  have 
been  guilty  of  the  offense  charged,  their  papers  shall  be  canceled. 

Applicants  must  supply  themselves  with  tablets,  pen,  ink, 
lead  pencils,  and  erasers,  and  in  technical  examinations  (such  as 
draughting  and  type- writing)  with  the  necessary  instruments. 

No  books,  notes,  maps  or  diagrams  shall  be  permitted  in  the 
examination  room  for  the  use  or  information  of  the  competitors. 


APPENDIX.  209 

An  applicant  who  has  for  any  reason  been  denied  examination 
in  liis  order,  may  appeal  to  the  commission. 

No  person  can  be  examined  for  or  be  eligible  to  more  than  one 
branch  of  the  service  at  the  same  time. 

Applicants  are  cautioned  not  to  defer  the  filing  of  their  appli- 
cation papers,  as  unavoidable  delays  often  occur,  and  persons  are 
prevented  thereby  from  taking  their  examination  at  the  time  and 
place  most  convenient  for  them. 

As  soon  as  practicable  after  an  examination  the  papers  of  the 
competitors  shall  be  marked  and  the  general  average  of  each 
ascertained. 

A  competitor,  after  receiving  notice  that  he  has  passed  or  has 
failed  to  pass,  may,  in  person  or  by  duly  authorized  agent, 
inspect,  in  the  presence  of  an  examiner,  his  examination  papers, 
and  if  in  his  opinion  injustice  has  in  any  way  been  done  him,  he 
may,  within  thirty  days  after  the  receipt  of  notice,  appeal  to  the 
commission,  specifying  particularly  and  in  detail  the  cause  of 
the  complaint.  The  commission  shall  promptly  decide  all  such 
appeals,  and  may,  in  the  investigation  thereof,  direct  the  re- 
marking of  appellant's  papers  and  change  his  general  average. 
But  no  communication  from  a  competitor,  explanatory  of  errors 
presumed  to  have  been  made  by  him  in  an  examination,  shall 
receive  attention. 

There  shall  be  given  to  every  subject  in  an  examination  a 
relative  weiglit  according  to  its  importance  therein,  and  the 
general  average  of  each  competitor  shall  be  ascertained  as 
follows  :  Multiply  the  average  of  the  marks  on  each  subject  by 
the  number  indicating  the  relative  weight  of  the  subject,  and 
divide  the  sum  of  the  products  by  the  sum  of  the  relative 
weights.     The  quotient  will  be  the  general  average. 

No  person  having  custody  of  or  access  to  a  register  of  eligibles 
shall  disclose  the  grade  of  any  eligible  whose  name  is  thereon 
without  consent  of  the  eligible  concerned  ;  and  no  person  shall, 
without  consent  of  the  commission,  disclose  the  relative  grades 
of  eligibles  whose  names  appear  thereon. 

An  eligible  who,  for  any  reason,  has  been  refused  certification 
when  his  name  was  in  order  therefor,  may  appeal  to  the  com- 
mission, and  such  appeal  shall  be  decided  without  delay. 

No  request  for  the  examination  of  an  applicant  for  the 
customs  or  postal  service  out  of  his  order,  as  determined  by  the 
number  of  his  application  paper,  shall  be  granted. 


210  APPENDIX. 

No  request  to  have  the  papers  of  a  competitor  marked  out  of 
their  order  shall  be  granted. 

No  request  to  have  the  name  of  an  eligible  certified  out  of  its 
order  on  the  register  of  eligibles  shall  be  granted. 

Note. — For  further  special  information  concerning  the  civil 
service  law  and  its  rules  and  regulations,  the  reader  is  referred 
to  pages  9,  10,  11,  12,  26,  27,  28,  31,  45  and  53  of  this  work. 

NEW    YORK    CITY. 

The  following  questions  are  taken  from  the  "  Second  Annual 
Report  of  the  Supervisory  Board  of  Commissioners  of  the  New 
York  Municipal  Civil  Service."  They  show  the  practical  char- 
acter of  the  questions  asked  in  civil  service  examinations. 
Besides  the  three  specimens,  equally  practical  questions  are 
asked  of  law  clerks,  firemen,  pilots,  physicians,  apothecaries,  civil, 
topographical,  sanitary  and  other  engineers,  sanitary  and  numer- 
ous other  inspectors,  transitmen,  chainmen,  rodmen,  levelers, 
watchmen,  doormen,  guards,  bridge  and  other  keepers,  foremen, 
assistant-foremen,  various  examiners,  veterinary  surgeons,  veter- 
inary inspectors,  stenographers,  messengers,  &c.,  &c. 

Book-keeping. — What  is  book  keeping  ?  Explain  the  principles 
of  double  entry.  What  are  resources  ?  What  are  liabilities  ? 
Give  examples  of  each.  When  does  a  draft  become  bills  receiv- 
able ?  When  does  a  draft  become  bills  payable  ?  Open,  con- 
duct and  close  cash  account.  Draw  a  promissory  note  for  |!560  at 
sixty  days.  What  does  the  certification  of  a  check  mean  ?  What 
books  are  generally  used  in  book-keeping  by  double  entry  ? 
Describe  them.  What  is  a  trial  balance  ?  What  is  a  draft  ? 
What  is  an  acceptance  ?  What  is  understood  by  posting,  and 
from  what  and  to  what  books  are  items  posted  ? 

Mechanical  Engineer. — State  how  you  would  get  the  water  into 
a  vSteam  boiler  before  getting  up  steam,  and  how  you  would  keep 
the  required  quantity  of  water  in  it  when  steam  is  up  and  the 
boiler  in  use.  How  would  you  empty  a  boiler  of  water  witli 
steam  up,  and  how  without  steam  ?  If  there  are  more  ways  than 
one  of  getting  water  into  a  boiler,  state  them.  How  many  gauges, 
gauge-cocks  and  valves  are  there  connected  with  a  boiler  ? 
Describe  them  and  their  uses.  How  high  should  water  be 
carried  in  a  boiler,  and  how  can  you  find  out  how  much  water 
there  is  in  it  ?     If  the  water  sliould  get  low  in  the  boiler,  what 


APPENDIX.  211 

course  would  you  pursue  and  what  precautions  would  you  take 
in  putting  water  in  it  ?  What  are  the  causes  of  boiler  explosions, 
and  what  measures  would  you  take  to  guard  against  them  ? 
How  many  methods  are  there  of  testing  steam  boilers  ?  Describe 
a  governor,  and  state  its  uses.  Which  parts  of  a  steam  engine 
require  particular  attention  ?  Can  the  motion  of  an  engine  be 
reversed  ?  If  so,  how  ?  If  your  engine  should  stop  on  the 
center,  how  would  you  start  it  ? 

Superintending  Gardener. — Describe  in  detail  the  methods 
which  should  be  used  in  transplanting  a  tree,  including  the  pre- 
vious preparation  of  the  soil.  When  should  magnolias  be  trans- 
planted ?  How  can  the  varieties  of  deciduous  and  evergreen 
trees  be  propagated  ?  v  Describe  the  methods  which  must  be 
adopted  in  order  to  secure  their  successful  propagation.  Describe 
the  difference  between  a  root,  a  bulb  and  a  tuber.  What  is  a 
perennial  plant  ?  What  is  the  difference  between  individual 
beauty,  landscape  beauty,  and  decorative  beaut}^  in  trees  and 
shrubs  ?  What  is  the  meaning  of  incongruity  of  character  in 
scenery,  and  how  do  incongruities  of  character  affect  the  value 
of  the  garden  works  ?  What  do  the  terms  intricacy,  obscurity 
and  mystery  mean  when  used  with  reference  to  landscape  ;  and 
on  what  do  such  qualities  depend  ?  Decorative  fruit.  Name 
ten  trees  and  shrubs  desirable  for  the  showy  character  of  their 
fruit.  Autumn  foliage.  Name  ten  trees  and  shrubs,  the  leaves 
of  which  assume  bright  colors  in  autumn. 

For  offices  that  require  general  information  concerning  New 
York  City  and  its  government,  the  following  or  equally  practical 
questions  are  asked  : 

How  many  wards  are  there  in  this  city  ?  What  is  the  length 
of  the  City  of  New  York  ?  State  which  of  the  following  officers 
are  elected  and  which  are  appointed  :  Police  Court  Judges, 
Comptroller,  City  Chamberlain.  Justices  of  the  Civil  Courts, 
Coroners,  President  Board  of  Aldermen.  Commissioner  of  Public 
Works,  County  Clerk,  Police  Commissioners,  Register.  What 
is  the  official  title  of  the  chief  prosecuting  officer  of  the  county  ? 
If  a  barrel  of  ashes  were  left  standing  too  long  in  front  of  your 
door,  what  city  department  would  you  notify  ?  What  city 
department  has  charge  of  paupers,  vagrants  and  convicts?  When 
the  lower  part  of  a  telegraph  pole  is  painted  red,  what  does  it 
indicate  ?  In  the  temporary  absence  of  the  Mayor,  who  acts  in 
his  stead  ?    Name  five  principal  buildings  owned  by  the  city, 


212  APPENDIX. 

and  give  their  location.  What  is  the  oflScial  title  of  the  chief 
executive  officer  of  the  city  ?  If  your  neighbor  kept  a  disorderly 
hou<=e,  to  what  city  department  should  you  make  complaint  ? 
What  official,  if  any,  has  custody  of  the  seal  of  the  city  ?  What 
city  department  has  charge  of  the  j^ublic  baths  ?  What  city 
department,  if  any,  keeps  the  recoid  of  births,  deaths  and  mar- 
riages occurring  in  the  city,  and  where  is  its  office  ?  Name  three 
islands  in  the  East  river  belonging  to  the  city.  What  is  the  title 
of  the  legislative  department  of  the  city  ?  If  you  were  alarmed 
by  a  case  of  small-pox  in  your  neighbor's  house,  to  what  city 
department  would  you  complain  ?  Wiiat  city  department  has 
charge  of  maintaining  the  Twenty-third  and  Twenty -fourth 
Wards,  and  where  is  its  office  ?  What  city  departments  have  a 
single  head  ?  What  official  has  charge  of  granting  the  privilege 
to  place  stands  and  showcases  on  the  sidewalks,  and  signs  and 
awnings  over  the  sidewalks  ?  Name  the  three  most  important 
Uuiled  States  Government  buildings  in  the  city,  and  give  their 
location.  Name  five  of  the  departments  of  the  city  government. 
If  you  want  permission  to  carry  a  pistol,  to  whom  do  you  apply? 
Name  three  classes  of  business  that  pay  license  fees  to  the  city 
What  is  the  official  title  of  the  treasurer  of  the  City  of  New 
York  ? 

MASSACHUSETTS   SERVICE. 

Office  of  Civil  Sera^ice  Commission,  ^ 
5  Pemberton  Sq.,  Boston,  June  26,  1889.  f 
Sir: — In  a  general  way  the  civil  service  law  rules  of  Massa- 
chusetts cover  clerks,  copyists,  book-keepers,  stenographers, 
type-writers,  agents  or  any  persons,  under  whatever  designation, 
rendering  similar  service  ;  persons  rendering  a  limited  amount 
of  clerical  service  who  are  employed  in  positions  which  require 
special  knowledge  of  duties  not  clerical  and  of  which  such 
special  knowledge  constitutes  the  chief  qualification  ;  turnkeys, 
watchmen,  gatemen  and  guards  in  the  public  institutions  ; 
members  of  the  fire  force  of  Boston  ;  the  district  police  and  all 
persons  doing  police  duty,  either  permanently  or  temporarily, 
in  and  for  and  paid  by  any  city  of  the  Commonwealth  ;  draw- 
tenders  and  assistant  draw-tenders,  foremen  and  sub-foremen, 
inspectors  and  all  persons,  under  whatever  designation,  doing 
similar  service. 


APPENDIX.  213 

The  first  step  for  a  person  seeking  appointment  is  to  file  an 
application.  This  commission  has  issued  two  blanks  for  that 
purpose  ;  one  for  veterans  of  the  war  of  the  rebellion  who 
desire  to  apply  for  appointment  without  examination,  under 
chapter  437  of  the  Acts  of  1887  ;  tlie  other  for  all  applicants, 
veterans  and  civilians,  who  desire  appointment  through  exam- 
ination. Where  the  standing  of  a  veteran  and  a  civilian  is 
equal,  the  former  has  the  preference.  ■ 

There  are  no  stated  times  for  holding  examinations,  but  appli- 
cations are  received  at  any  time,  and,  when  an  examination  is 
to  be  held,  applicants  are  notified  to  appear.  The  qualifying 
test  is  65  per  cent.  The  three  highest  on  the  list  are  certified  for 
appointment.  Those  on  the  bottom  of  the  list  stand  little  chance 
of  appointment. 

Applicants  can  always  obtain  blanks  and  copies  of  the  last 
report  of  the  Commission  by  applying  to  this  office  or  to  the 
board  of  civil  service  examiners  of  a  city.  It  is  intended  that 
the  report  and  the  appendix  shall  give  to  all  persons  interested  a 
full  and  complete  statement  of  what  is  required  of  applicants 
and  appointing  officers. 

Very  truly  yours, 

WARREN  P.  DUDLEY,  Secretary. 

In  the  clerical  service  of  Massachusetts  there  is  no  limit  as  to 
age.  In  the  prison  service  applicants  must  not  be  less  than  22 
nor  over  40  years  of  age ;  in  the  police  service  of  cities  other 
than  Boston,  the  same  ;  in  the  detective  or  inspection  service  of 
the  district  police,  not  less  than  22  nor  over  55,  except  watchmen 
in  public  buildmgs  and  veteran  soldiers  and  sailors  ;  in  the  fire 
and  police  services  of  Boston,  not  less  than  22  nor  over  30, 
Boston  firemen  must  be  5  feet  4  inches  in  hight  (bare  feet)  and 
weigh  120  pounds  nude  ;  policemen.  5  feet  8  inches  in  hight  and 
weigh  140  pounds,  same  conditions. 


214  APFENDIX. 


NEW   YORK    STATE    SERVICE. 

The  regulations  governin;;  applications  for  office  in  the  State 
civil  service  of  New  York  are  similar  to  those  of  tlie  National 
service,  but  in  some  respects  they  differ,  namely:  The  stationery 
used  during  examinations  is  furnished  by  the  State.  The  pro- 
bationary term  is  three  months.  To  be  eligible  to  appointment, 
competitors  must  answer  70  per  cent,  of  all  obligatory  subjects, 
and  50  per  cent,  of  any  one  subject.  Many  non-competitive 
examinations  are  held.  No  applicant  is  admitted  to  the  exami- 
nation room  after  10  A.  M.  An  examination  lasts  seven  hours 
or  less.  Examinations  in  optional  subjects  are  held  either  in  the 
evening  of  the  day  of  examination  or  the  next  day.  Competitors 
arc  recommended  to  bring  their  luncheons  with  them  and  to  eat 
them  in  the  examination  room.  In  writing  from  dictation  or 
copying  from  manuscript  the  use  of  stylographic  pens  is  for- 
bidden. The  Commissioners  truly  say  (Sixth  Rept.,  1889,  p. 
478) :  "  The  ordeal  of  these  examinations,  except  in  their  neces- 
sary confinement,  is  not  exacting  or  in  any  way  difficult  to  those 
wlio  have  availed  themselves  of  the  free  education  the  State 
offers  to  all." 

The  positions  in  the  various  State  institutions  coming  within 
the  scope  of  the  law  are  numerous,  including  even  cooks, 
chambermaids  and  people  of  general  work.  Applicants  who 
wish  can  get  "  a  scheme  of  examination,"  by  writing  to  the 
Secretary  of  the  Commission  at  Albany.  Teachers  in  reforma- 
tories and  asylums  should  also  write  to  him  for  special  instruc- 
tions as  to  their  examinations. 

SUBJECTS   OF   EXAMINATION. 

For  clerks,  employes  whose  functions  are  purely  clerical, 
interpreters,  copyists,  book-keepers,  stenographers,  typewriters, 
&c.,  with  salaries  under  $1,300,  the  obligatory  subjects  are  : 
Writing  from  dictation,  about  a  page  of  foolscap  (3).*  Hand- 
writing (4).  Spelling  (2).  Copying  from  manuscript,  about  a 
page  (2).  Arithmetic  :  numeration,  addition,  fractions  and 
reduction  of  weights  and  measures  (3).    Geography  :  New  York 


*The  figures  in  i)arenthe8e8  indicate  the  relative  weight  of  the  subjects. 


APPENDIX.  215 

State  and  the  United  States  (1).  In  addition  there  may  be  an 
oral  examination  and  specific  questions  to  test  fitness  for  certain 
positions.  The  optional  subjects  are  :  Expert  penmanship,  ele- 
ments of  book-keeping,  foreign  languages  and  special  qualifica- 
tions for  positions  specified  by  the  applicant.  The  age  limits, 
except  for  veteran  soldiers  and  sailors,  are  21  and  50  years. 

For  the  same  oflSces  and  also  the  same  conditions  and  optional 
subjects,  but  with  salaries  from  $1,200  to  $1,500,  the  obligatory 
subjects  are  :  Writing  from  dictation  (3).  Handwriting  (3). 
Spelling  (3).  Copying  from  manuscript  (3).  Arithmetic  :  1  exa'm- 
plc  in  addition,  3  in  fractions,  2  in  reduction,  3  in  proportion,  4 
in  interest  and  discount  (4).  Geography  :  4  questions  as  to  New 
York  and  2  as  to  the  United  States  (1).  History  :  the  same.  Con- 
stitution: 3  questions  as  to  New  York  and  2  as  to  the  United 
States  (1).     Condensing  documents,  not  exceeding  6  folios  (2). 

The  interpreters,  in  addition  to  one  of  the  foregoing  examin- 
ations ( which  depending  on  the  salary  paid ),  are  required  to 
translate,  both  orally  and  in  writing,  two  foreign  languages,  and 
are  also  questioned  in  the  elementary  history  and  geography  of 
the  countries  such  languages  represent.  The  optional  subject  is 
any  additional  foreign  language. 

Stenographers  are  also  examined  in  their  specialty.  They 
must  write  at  least  150  words  per  minute.  If  they  wish,  they 
may  be  examined  in  typewriting  and  foreign  languages.  Age 
limits,  18  and  50  years. 

For  court  janitors  and  attendants,  office  messengers,  and 
orderlies  in  offices  and  public  buildings,  the  obligatory  subjects 
are  :  Writing  from  dictation  (2).  Handwriting  (3).  Spelling  (1). 
Writing  the  substance  of  a  verbal  order  from  memory  (4). 
Arithmetic:  numeration,  addition,  subtraction,  multiplication 
and  division  (2).  An  exercise  in  observation  (3).  Those  who 
desire  to  be  examined  in  a  foreign  language  must  so  state  in 
their  application.  Janitors  are  also  examined  as  to  their  specific 
duties.  Messengers  must  be  physically  sound,  with  age  limits 
of  18  and  50. 

For  guards  at  the  Elmira  Reformatory  the  examination  is  the 
same  as  the  last  preceding,  with  this  addition.  "An  oral  exam- 
ination, from  which  will  be  marked  experience,  discretion, 
habits  and  bearing  (5)."  The  guards  need  not  be  citizens  of  the 
State,  but  they  must  be  physically  sound,  not  less  than  5  feet  9 
inches  iii  hight  (hare  feet),  and  of  a  humane  disposition.     Age 


216  APPENDIX, 

limits,  21  and  50.  Salary  $30  a  month.  Guards  at  Sing  Sing, 
Auburn  and  Clinton  prisons,  who  must  be  citizens  of  the  State, 
receive  $780  a  year. 

For  court  officers  and  clerks,  whose  functions  are  more  or  less 
judicial  or  discretionary,  the  obligatory  subjects  are  •  The  prac- 
tice of  the  law  relative  to  the  particular  duties  which  they  may 
be  required  to  perform  (5).  Questions  relating  to  the  jurisdiction 
of  the  court  for  a  position  in  which  they  apply  (3).  VTriting 
from  dictation  (2).  Copying  from  manuscript  (2).  Handwriting 
(3).'  Spelling  (3)  Arithmetic  :  fundamental  rules,  fractions, 
reduction,  discount,  interest  and  proportion  (3).  Geography  and 
history  :  Kew  York  State  and  United  States  (1).  Constitution 
(1).  Condensing  documents  (2).  Optional  subjects  :  Expert 
penmanship,  English  composition  or  letter-writing,  book-keeping, 
short-hand  writing,  typewriting,  foreign  languages,  or  special 
qualifications  for  a  department  specified  by  the  applicant. 

For  assistant  engineers  :  Arithmetic,  geometr}-,  applied  or 
practical  geometry,  plane  trigonometry,  mensuration,  use  of 
instruments,  mechanics,  practical  construction. 

For  levelers  :  Arithmetic,  plane  trigonometr}'',  mensuration, 
use  and  adjustment  of  instruments,  tabulation  of  field-notes, 
making  profile  draughts,  practical  construction. 

For  rodmcn  :  Arithmetic,  plane  trigonometry,  mensuration, 
use  of  leveling  rod. 

Applicants  for  positions  which  require  professional,  technical, 
or  expert  training,  are  required  to  show  what  special  education 
they  have  received  before  being  admitted  to  examination. 


The  United  States  Civil  Service  Commissioners  say  (5th  Rept., 
1889,  p.  2S)  that  '*  While  the  education  of  the  schools  is  neces- 
sary as  a  preparation  for  the  public  service,  it  docs  not  in  itself 
necessarily  or  generally  constitute  a  complete  preparation  for 
that  service  ;"  that  much  depends  on  the  common-sense  of  the 
applicant  and  his  personal  qualities  and  habits,  mental,  moral 
and  physical.  In  other  words,  public  business  requires  the  same 
sterling  qualifications  that  private  business  does. 


•thivebsitt] 


14  DAY  USE 

RETURN  TO  DESK  FROM  WHICH  BORROWED 

LOAN  DEPT. 

This  book  is  due  on  the  last  date  stamped  below,  or 

on  the  date  to  which  renewed. 

Renewed  books  are  subject  to  immediate  recall. 


REC'D  LD 


DEC  28  1962 


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